Conference Summary
Stabilization and Reconstruction: Closing the Civilian-Military Gap

Panel II: Post-Conflict Policy: How to Enable More Effective Responses

The first panel member saw the goal in simple terms: “What are we trying to accomplish? We want to engage local people, build local institutions, grow the economy, especially small businesses and put government systems in place. Get young men up early in the morning, and work them hard all day, so they are too tired to fight. Pay them enough to feed their families, but little enough that they will need to come back the next day. Get them engaged in building their country.”

Of course, there is nothing simple here.  To be effective, progress must be community- driven, and that doesn’t happen overnight. We need to manage expectations in DC and make clear that it will be a long haul. New technological developments in communications like satellite phones and emails may have actually hampered real progress because home offices can more easily direct efforts. Another panel member characterized that problem as “giving headquarters a 6000-mile screwdriver so that they can fix problems.”  Clearly, authority should go with responsibility.

This panel member emphasized that effective S/R can only be carried out by and through a professionalized, adequately resourced cadre of dedicated—and fully available—people.  He mentioned:

• For effective staffing, relationships must be in place beforehand: they cannot be created ad hoc. Make sure mechanisms for staffing are available. Do not rely upon a pool of well intentioned but untested individuals. Getting a core group of trained and experienced people with proven track records and who are willing to work in the worst conditions will cost money.
• Appropriate authority and resources must be present. War situations are very fluid, and we must recognize that there will be successes and failures. We need authority plus responsibility plus resources. Individuals make co-ordination work.
• It is unrealistic to think that any one organization will have all the right people at any one time. So, secure and retain talent. Keep key people for their skills; invest in their future through mentoring, internships, continuing education, and joint training.
• Have contract mechanisms that are quickly implemented and flexible.
• Capture successes and replicate on broader institutional scale.

Another member of this panel emphasized the need for planning and analysis before undertaking S/R operations.  He noted such vital questions as: Who will accept the post-conflict situation? Who are the spoilers? Whose interests are not satisfied by the post-conflict peace? Have we identified a process through which we can come to a peace agreement? How do we create the administration that will consolidate peace?

He also agreed that interagency planning is crucial and adequate resources need to be positioned to carry out the plans.

The final member of this panel emphasized the need to formalize the relationship between the military and USAID to achieve effective responses. USAID recognized that it needed an office to achieve these goals--the office of military affairs at USAID. USAID’s private sector partners (contractors) implement policy and USAID cannot succeed without implementing partner support.

This participant noted the need to change the idea that the military must play the lead role in the post-conflict effort. Rather, the military should provide security for the development programs that lead to stability. The panelist pointed out that DOD Directive 3000.05 says that the military will take the lead in S/R only if other organizations cannot. But the military prefers not to have to take the lead.

 

 

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