Description

Objectives

Fiscal and socio-economic objectives are to reduce military spending, free up resources for productive use, and provide long-term, productive employment for ex-combatants.

Demobilization’s primary political objectives are to set the stage for reconciliation by encouraging former rivals to transfer their opposition to the political arena instead of resorting to armed force, to reduce one or both former armies’ involvement and influence in politics, to strengthen civilian control over the armed forces, or to provide rival parties with experience in the negotiation process as part of substituting peaceful solutions for violent conflict.

Expected outcome or impact

Relationship to conflict prevention and mitigation

Demobilization and reintegration represent one step in military downsizing. Additional personnel reduction sometimes requires that the national miliary be integrated or restructured to adjust the balance of representation of diverse ethnic, regional or political groups as further discussed in another tool profile in this section. Reduction in military expenditures is another aspect of military downsizing.

Implementation

Organizers

Participants

Activities

NegotiationNegotiation is both the first phase of demobilization and a process which continues throughout the demobilization and reintegration period. Negotiations between government and military leadership must still be conducted even when demobilization occurs in the absence of a conflict. For demobilization in a conflict context, negotiations must produce agreement on security arrangements for the post-conflict period. This includes the number of combatants from each side to be demobilized and the structure of the new army. Agreements must specify how combatants will be disarmed and assembled, how cantonment will be organized and managed, and goals of reintegration. Negotiations keep the parties to the conflict and the international community engaged and focused on keeping the peace process on track.

Defining who has combatant status, identifying combatants, determining eligibility for demobilization and reintegration benefits, and deciding which forces will be included in the process are critical and potentially controversial steps. Transparent and consistent eligibility requirements will help minimize the perception that any group is being favored or victimized. Reduction in force should be voluntary, whenever possible, and require positive inducements to ease the transition to civilian life.

Reliable estimates of combatant numbers are vital to planning and funding and should be broken down by "casual" versus "hard-core" or professionals and conscripts, with ranks and troop locations. This information is sensitive to both sides for security and political reasons. Factions may inflate actual numbers of combatants for security or negotiation leverage, understate combatant numbers while hiding troops "in the bush," or direct their most infirm, aged or youthful members to occupy quartering areas while withholding their fittest, most competent forces.

Organization, Planning and Coordination

An institutional structure must be created to plan and implement demobilization and reintegration programs, generally over a one-to-three year period. After that time, any continuing reintegration tasks likely could be taken over by normal government structures. In some cases, the government alone creates a special government or parastatal organization for this and seeks international support, as occurred in Uganda, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. In other cases, especially in post-conflict demobilizations, a special institutional entity is created and managed by one or more international and regional organizations, such as UN agencies, donors, and NGOs, in coordination with both the government and the non-government party to the conflict, as in Mozambique, El Salvador, Haiti and Angola. A single, coordinated program that follows a coherent strategy is more effective than various agencies and donors operating their own, piece-meal demobilization-related projects. An agreed agency to coordinate among donors is important since donors are likely to provide a large portion of DRP funding.

The entity charged with conflict-related demobilization must be recognized by all parties to the conflict and be neutral. Regional and district offices are ideal for outreach into outlying areas. Ideally, the peace agreement establishes the institutional framework, tasked with policy-making, coordinating, approving strategies, programs, projects and funding, and monitoring progress and results. UN peace missions often assume responsibility for demobilization when they oversee compliance with peace accords.

All major parties to the conflict should participate in planning the DRP. In particular, including combatants from the outset contributes to their confidence in the demobilization process, without which they are likely to engage in mutinies, desertion, roadblocks, or other acts of non-compliance with the accord to delay the demobilization calendar.

It may be difficult to find agencies to work with combatants prior to demobilization, even to provide food and other relief because law or policy bar many international organizations and NGOs from assisting armed military groups. These restrictions vary as will each organization’s definition of when an individual ceases to be a combatant.

The Assembly Phase

During assembly or cantonment, armed combatants go to designated locations until they are demobilized or sent elsewhere for induction and training in the new army. Combatants from rival armies or factions should be assembled at different locations. Quartering areas may be established for non-government armies, and government soldiers may be required to report to bases. Irregular forces based across borders may need to be repatriated, either prior to or following their demobilization. Children, female combatants, the aged, and disabled may be demobilized without participating in assembly, or be taken to special transit areas before release. Transportation should be provided to assembly areas.

Assembly areas require security and physical amenities including food and potable water, living quarters, sanitation, and health care for combatants and often their families. Conditions must be adequate to reduce volatility without camps becoming permanent settlements.

Demobilization activities during assembly often include disarmament, collection and registration of weapons; registration and documentation (issue of photo identification cards, filling out questionnaires, creating a database of combatant records); debriefing, reorientation, and counseling.

Identification cards are critical for monitoring the distribution of demobilization benefits. Identification cards issued to each side should have an identical format which does not disclose of which army the ex-combatant was a member. Disarmament must also be closely monitored, knowing that the forces to be demobilized may try to turn in their oldest, least serviceable weapons, caching their most effective weapons prior to entering assembly points.

Information on combatants’ and family members’ needs, aspirations and capabilities should be gathered through surveys, interviews, and questionnaires. Combatants can be assisted during assembly to fill out questionnaires as an eligibility requirement for benefits. Preliminary data to inform future DRP programming can be gathered on gender, skills, educational level, disabilities, occupation preferences, family ties, and anticipated settlement areas. Combatants should receive thorough physical exams to verify any physical or emotional disabilities and develop treatment and therapy plans. When combatants first enter assembly points, however, it is rarely possible to obtain comprehensive information on beneficiaries’ needs and opportunities or to provide accurate counselling because reintegration programs are often not yet formulated or funded and many combatants’ ideas will evolve during this period based on information they receive while cantoned and the time they will have had to think about their futures.

Recreational, education, training, job counseling and psycho-social counseling activities can be conducted during cantonment. A pre-discharge orientation and information and referral program can prepare and direct combatants for the upcoming transition to civilian life, increase their confidence in the demobilization process, and encourage more realistic expectations. Demobilization planners must be aware that war victors may try to use the cantonment period as an opportunity for political re-education.

Another, less elaborate, cheaper and more rapidly implemented option to quartering is to have combatants report to transit centers to be registered and disarmed. This approach has obvious fiscal, logistical, and possibly immediate political advantages but is probably only appropriate for certain situations.

Determining the appropriate length of time for assembly involves trade-offs: shorter cantonment means lower costs, reduced likelihood of violent flare-ups in the assembly areas, political expediency when ex-combatants move quickly towards normalcy and productivity and reduced risk of quartering areas becoming settlements populated by demobilized fighters. At the same time, cantonment represents a critical opportunity to prepare ex-combatants for the transition to civilian life; this preparation can contribute to long-term peace and stability when this preparation includes an in-depth orientation with education on human rights, civic responsibility, democratic governance, and available education, training and employment programs. Communities must also be prepared for the arrival of ex-combatants, and time is needed to plan, fund and establish reintegration programs. In some cases, where there is a good deal of animosity by community members toward former combatants (e.g., in Liberia, Uganda), community sensitization programs may be necessary.

Organizers should plan to demobilize rival armies at comparable rates, respecting agreed timetables insofar as possible. A phased or graduated demobilization may be advisable if the political situation warrants, providing organizers with the opportunity to improve implementation and adjust benefits over time.

Transition or Reinsertion Phase

Transition refers to the period after departure from the assembly area, transit center, or base during which ex-combatants become at least marginally self-sufficient. "Ex-combatants must be involved in constructive activity during this phase so they truly reintegrate, detach themselves from their potentially disruptive combat units, and see their future in the society under reconstruction." During transition, targeted programs can help sustain ex-combatants and assist with reintegration. Ex-combatants in transition are likely to require assistance with physical security, food, water, housing, agricultural materials, construction materials, sanitation and health. In past demobilization programs, this phase has commonly received the least attention in evaluating the best assistance mechanisms. Transition benefits should be consistent with reintegration goals and programs.

Civilian life makes demands that former soldiers and their families were not accustomed to while in military service. Stability, reconciliation, a psychological boost and often local traditions dictate that ex-combatants should not arrive empty-handed in settlement areas. Ex-combatants require an immediate assistance package and/or cash payments as a safety net upon initial resettlement. Packages may be distributed upon departure from assembly, upon arrival at the destination, or at both points. Package contents should be designed around the ex-combatant’s family, not the individual, and should support the decision to demobilize. Package value should not substantially surpass the average income for the period the package is intended. The incentive package’s various components’ liquidity—their propensity to show up on the market—must also be evaluated, for both positive and negative impact. It is also important in designing benefit packages to keep in mind that other members of receiving communities have suffered from the war, and may resent what they perceive as rewards for inflicting their suffering. Transition assistance packages may include civilian clothing, agriculture starter kits, household items, food, and a card for extended food rations. Package contents may differ for rural and urban settlers, and by geographical region—some practitioners recommend building incentives into the packages to encourage ex-combatants to settle in certain rural areas and avoid further contributing to urban over-crowding, while others advise keeping packages identical for programming ease, to minimize transaction costs, and to avoid controversy. The armies' commanders could be asked to help select package items.

Cash disbursements can provide a safety net for ex-combatants during this transition period. Cash may be disbursed in a lump sum or periodically. Cash allowances may be allotted toward the purchase of clothing, food, medical care, agriculture, household effects and housing construction in lieu of or to supplement in-kind assistance. A larger allowance may also be disbursed to ex-combatants to support investments in education, training, purchase of goods for trade, or capital investments. Cash programs appeal to donors because of simpler logistics and rapid implementation, and some practitioners advise giving ex-combatants the opportunity to make their own decisions. In some cases, however, ex-combatants have quickly misspent cash allowances without contributing to reintegration. A combination of cash and in-kind assistance may be most effective.

Reintegration

Reintegration for ex-combatants means absorption into civilian society, typically measured as productive employment at a socio-economic level approximating that of non-combatant peers. As a recent World Bank study relates, reintegration should encompass former soldiers’ re-entry into civilian political, social and economic life. The wide range of approaches for intervention must be assessed to determine which is appropriate for a given situation. Programming decisions should be based on information on local needs and resources.

Training, counseling, credit, assistance obtaining land access, housing construction, and other services are generally required for successful reintegration. Ex-combatants may receive financial, logistical, and material support for housing construction or repair, including construction materials and instruction in building techniques. They can set up cooperatives, reconstruction societies, veterans’ associations, and other self-help groups. Sustainable initiatives require training, inputs, initial credit and market development, in sectors such as fishery, livestock, agriculture and trade. Training should be relevant to the private sector job market to which the trainee will be returning. Food for work is expensive with no sustainability component. "The militia will laugh at food for work," claimed an agency field official in Somalia. Meeting social and psychological needs is a major challenge in reintegration programming and requires community support and cooperation.

Many demobilized may need assistance beyond the DRP completion date. DRPs ideally are designed so any support can be incorporated into general reconstruction and development efforts.

Sequencing

Demobilization in a conflict context is generally thought of as a formal program which follows national reconciliation and precedes or overlaps with reintegration. However, in the case of militias and/or regionalized irregular armies, demobilization can take place outside of a formal peace agreement through a more informal program offering combatants incentives to self-demobilize as individuals. Programs that emphasize developing alternative livelihoods may serve as sufficient incentives to individual combatants who maintain membership in militias primarily for economic reasons. In this case reintegration would precede demobilization; both can precede and even help lead to national reconciliation. Such a program must take steps to ensure that assistance is not used for combat operations and must ensure valid security alternatives—trusted police, military—to fulfill the disbanding militia’s community security functions.

Cost considerations

Other resource considerations

· A high-level institutional entity to deal exclusively with demobilization and reintegration planning and implementation.

· Development of a general strategy for demobilization and reintegration that outlines programs and coordinates responsibilities and tasks, reducing waste and duplication of time and resources, helping to maintain confidence of the ex-combatants, and increasing cooperation of the groups involved.

· Training for DRP institutional staff.

· Professional accounting and auditing procedures.

Set-up time

Timeframe to see results

Conflict context

Stages of conflict

Type of conflict

Causes of conflict

Prerequisites

· Political will and commitment of both sides' military and political leadership to demobilize and maintain any peace agreement.

· Precision and clarity of goals in both the accord and in the demobilization and reintegration strategy from which demobilization and reintegration programs are to be designed.

· Near-total cessation of hostilities through a monitored cease-fire agreement or the outright victory of one of the parties (for a conflict-related demobilization).

· A minimum degree of stability and a clear national authority.

· Appreciable movement toward national reconciliation.

· Legal mechanisms, including transparent and consistent selection criteria to minimize any perception that a group is being favored or victimized.

· A combination of disarmament and credible security guarantees for those who give up their arms. Combatants on the losing side especially need to be reassured they will not be discriminated against or suffer reprisals.

· Incentives for combatants to demobilize.

· Restructuring and reform of the police and national armed forces.

· Connections between the DRP and ongoing or future development efforts.

· International political, financial and security support and commitment.

· Reintegration programs to support long-term pacification and reinsertion into civilian society.

· A skilled mediator active in all phases of the peace process, including demobilization, to assist with negotiations and DRP implementation, serve on monitoring teams and exert pressures and incentives to secure continued compliance with the terms of the agreement.

· Coordination among global, regional, state, and unofficial actors in implementing the peace accord and DRP programs.

Past Practice

Within the Greater Horn

The demobilization program planned to reduce the 90,000 member National Resistance Army (NRA) to 45,000 in three phases between 1992 and 1995. The third phase was postponed to 1996. Over 25 percent of the first 32,000 demobilized left voluntarily; just under a quarter were discharged on medical grounds. After the first two phases of demobilization, the defense budget was reduced from a previous 39.3 percent of recurrent expenditures to 26.1 percent, although defense spending in real terms rose by nearly 12 percent due to wage increases for the remaining soldiers and limited hiring of local defense units (LDUs) in the northern region to contain recurrent insurgency. The ratio of social to defense spending improved from 0.6 to 1.1 from before demobilization (1989-1990) to after the first two phases (1992-1993). Nearly all demobilized Ugandans chose to return to rural areas.

UVAB’s success in implementing the demobilization program is unquestioned. Through donor contributions, UVAB contributed to some reintegration activities for ex-soldiers, including education, vocational training, infrastructure reconstruction, credit and loans. More time and information is needed to assess its performance in reintegration, because the effort is still ongoing. The length of service of many of the soldiers and their lack of skills made adjustment to civilian life extremely difficult.

Ethiopia, 1991-1994. Following the regime’s defeat and overthrow, the entire army of nearly 500,000 was demobilized in June-December 1991, along with 22,200 OLF from mid-1992-1994. The transition government established a National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans for overall program implementation and coordination. The commission set up 7 regional offices and 36 district offices to organize and coordinate field implementation of demobilization and reintegration. District officials were involved in decision-making through local advisory and other committees. An advisory council was formed to assist the demobilization commission and played an important role in seeking coordination and cooperation from other ministries. National and local government agencies and NGOs were brought into the process. The commission prepared an extensive demobilization and reintegration strategy, but most donors were initially reluctant to support their proposal.

Meanwhile, the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) and its Ethiopian counterparts undertook preparations for demobilization, including mobilizing transport and arranging for food rations. Phase I of the program consisted of "repatriation"—release and transportation of ex-soldiers to their place of origin—along with emergency assistance of food and a cash grant for ex-soldiers and their dependents. By late January 1992, most demobilized had been returned to their areas of origin and were receiving monthly food rations, distributed by the government’s relief and rehabilitation commission, working through the demobilization commission’s regional centers. The commission held extensive and widespread discussions with local communities to where the ex-soldiers were returning. The demobilization effort is generally considered to be successful, despite donor difficulties.

Phase II, the reintegration strategy, was accepted by donors in late March 1992. The World Bank’s Emergency Relief and Recovery Program (ERRP) became a major conduit of funds for ex-soldiers, and some bilateral donors set up their own projects in collaboration with the commission or channeled their resources through NGOs. Some NGOs coordinated their reintegration support with the commission’s program, while others followed an individual approach.

The program focused on the entire needs of the ex-soldier and his family, including education, employment, health and housing. A majority chose to return to rural areas to farm. Many were assisted in obtaining land and credit, and some communities provided materials and labor for housing. Many received health support, and some were offered vocational training. Donor aid included seeds, fertilizers, plastic tubing for coffee seedlings, and vehicles for administrative capacity. The German donor, GTZ, supports reintegration activities in Ethiopia through an "open fund" financing mechanism, through which many demobilized were supplied with agricultural inputs, work programs, training and housing projects.

Eritrea, 1993-ongoing. Following their victory and secession from Ethiopia, 26,000 of an estimated 95,000 were demobilized from the army of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), with another 22,000 or more planned for future demobilization. Mitias engaged soldiers in agricultural work, reforestation, and soil conservation, as well as rehabilitating infrastructure. Mitias established offices at the district level to monitor progress of ex-soldiers attempting to reintegrate.

Somaliland. In northern Somalia or Somaliland following the Boraama conference, the Somaliland "government" created the National Demobilization Commission to manage disarmament and demobilization, aided by Zimbabwean consultants provided by UNDP. The veterans’ organization Soyaal also addressed the needs of ex-militia. Heavy weapons were turned in during the first half of 1994, but the resumption of war later in the year derailed the efforts.

Sudan. The Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) submitted proposals to create farm cooperatives. The SPLA already has experience with farming, including forced labor of the surrounding communities, especially in Eastern Equatoria in the early 1990s. The SPLA has a cooperative in Tambura (Western Equatoria) which has been assisted with farming inputs. Soldiers are farming and trading surplus at the CARE bush shop. "Before they were stealing from the agencies," says one observer. "Now they are trading with them." An SPLA leader supports this idea, saying the SPLA "could produce as much as possible." There are huge obstacles in terms of organization, discipline, experience, and cohesion. The majority of SPLA soldiers, especially Dinka and Nuer, come primarily from pastoral backgrounds.

Zimbabwe, 1981-1983. The government established a Demobilization Directorate to plan and organize the program; it was a high-level inter-ministerial body supported by officials drawn from former senior combatants and commanders of the armies involved.

Outside the Greater Horn

Evaluation

Strengths

Even partially successful reintegration of demobilized soldiers reduces the level and costs of unemployment, political instability and crime. DRPs help defuse social tension and assist a vulnerable group in building a new life.

"Orderly demobilization, reinsertion, and reintegration of military personnel are central contributions to the restoration of civil society and the peaceful return to productive civilian life of hitherto destabilizing forces."

Weaknesses

Demobilization and reintegration alone cannot prevent conflict and restore civil society and stability. They must be accompanied by other measures, including political reforms, establishing a functional legal system and independent jury, a professional police force, and implementing economic reforms aimed at promoting growth and expanding employment opportunities, and promoting civil society.

"Reintegration is a long and complex process without a clear conclusion; even comprehensive programs in a favorable macroeconomic environment cannot by themselves ensure that the living standards of ex-combatants will equal those of the poorer segments of the civilian population."

Due to security sensitivities, each side is likely to withhold much of the data required for adequate planning.

Because of costs associated with demobilization and reintegration, peace can be as expensive as war. Integrating the soldiers of other forces into the national army can bloat payrolls.

Reducing the size of the military can create a major unemployment problem, which can lead to further instability and violence. Poor nations emerging from extended periods of conflict are likely to have an inadequate resource base and few opportunities for income generation or employment, inhibiting the reintegration of ex-combatants. Many former combatants have low education and skill levels and are inexperienced with civilian life. The economy likely has a limited capacity to absorb many of the ex-combatants, even if they are provided skills. Education and training provided to them may not be appropriate to the employment opportunities available.Combatants are likely to expect rewards for their participation in the war, especially those on the winning side.

Critics contend that as demobilizing soldiers are only one among many war-affected groups, they should not be treated differently from others after they have been formally demobilized.

Donors are often reluctant to provide resources to demobilization and reintegration programs until the government—and often the non-government side as well—demonstrates its commitment to the demobilization and peace process. However, governments are unable to plan or launch a program without knowledge of the resources that will be available, and often without technical assistance. Low interest of donors in some countries or donors' lack of confidence in the peace process will affect the levels of funding appropriated, and thus the effectiveness of programs.

Lessons learned

Conflict-related demobilization programs are affected by the way the internal wars concluded, whether through a negotiated peace, and especially whether there is an obvious clear victor. The demobilization process is dependent on the quality, detail, and strength of the political agreement, and on all parties’ commitment to hold to and implement the accord on all sides. Outside governments can try to raise the stakes to actors involved in the process to strengthen the political will necessary to carry out demobilization and reintegration.

In a conflict-related situation, demobilization and reintegration issues should be included in the peace negotiations and in the accord.

Demobilization and reintegration benefits must be designed for the ex-combatants’ family unit, not the individual demobilized, and consider the resettlement. Both the communities and combatants should be consulted during the design process.

Construction of special facilities for demobilizing ex-combatants should be avoided.

A Joint Support Unit created, for example, under the auspices of the UN, could make information available on the demobilization and reintegration process, promote cooperation among the many entities involved, and reduce duplication of effort among the host government, foreign governments, the field offices of UN divisions, regional and local government branches, local donor missions, NGOs, and international agencies.

Insufficient information and other constraints make it reasonable to develop programs step by step with the participation of those concerned; this procedure can build confidence and help utilize the experience of ex-combatants.

Program support must have a termination date, and organizers must make efforts to avoid long-term dependency of demobilized on support.

Large-scale absorption of ex-combatants in public service and parastatals must be avoided.

Advance planning is critical and needs adequate investment.

Demobilization is more likely to succeed if it is voluntary. Regional security arrangements and confidence-building processes help provide the security and stability needed for demobilization.

Combatants cannot be stereotyped as a homogeneous group; they are diverse and include winners and losers, regular soldiers and guerrillas, men and women, officers and rank and file, highly skilled and unskilled, each with distinct needs and potential.

Officers' leadership and organizational experience can be valuable to reconstruction and rehabilitation; however, their skills also can be applied to military or criminal ends. Some analysts favor greater benefits for officers while others insist benefits be equitable to all ranks.

Reintegration programs need forward or backward integration into the formal or non-formal economies. Any training should be relevant to the private sector job market to which the trainee will be returning.

In downsizing the government army, care should be taken to not exacerbate its ethnic imbalance as further discussed in another tool profile in this section.

Initiatives to integrate disabled ex-combatants into normal life have been more effective than large-scale institutional care.

References and resources

Kees Kingma and Vanessa Sayers, Demobilization in the Horn of Africa, Proceedings of the IRG Workshop, 4-7 December 1994, Addis Ababa, BICC.

Ramesh Srivastava, Reintegrating Demobilized Combatants: A Report Exploring Options and Strategies for Training-Related Interventions, Vocational Training Systems Management Branch, International Labour Office, Geneva, 1994.

Donald Rothchild, On Implementing Africa’s Peace Accords: From Defection to Cooperation, Africa Today, 1st and 2nd Quarters, 1995: 8-38.

Refugee Policy Group, Challenges of Demobilization and Reintegration: Background Paper and Conference Summary, United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, New York, June 1994.

Creative Associates International, Inc., Other Country Experiences in Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, Washington, DC, March 1995.

The World Bank, Demobilization and Reintegration of Military Personnel in Africa: The Evidence from Seven Country Case Studies, African Regional Series Discussion Paper No. IDP-130. October 1993.

Nat J. Colletta, Markus Koster, and Ingo Wiederhofer, Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda, World Bank Discussion Paper 331. Washington, DC, 1996..

Nat J. Colletta, Markus Koster, and Ingo Wiederhofer, The Transition from War to Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank, 1996.

Kimberly Mahling Clark, Fostering a Farewell to Arms: Preliminary Lessons Learned in the Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, US Agency for International Development, Center for Development Information and Evaluation, Washington, DC, 1996.