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ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

BANGLADESH, ZIMBABWE, AND COLOMBIA



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ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENTS

BANGLADESH, ZIMBABWE, AND COLOMBIA

A Framework for Electoral Security Assessments

March 23, 2010

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under funding from the Elections and Political Process Indefinite Quantity Contract (EPP IQC), Creative Associates International, Inc. (Creative) conducted electoral security assessments in Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and Colombia. The objective of these electoral security assessments was to identify and profile potential electoral conflict and violence, propose program strategies and activities to prevent, manage or mediate this conflict, and establish a framework by which the results of this programming can be evaluated.

Each country's electoral security assessment is presented as a standalone report. The three assessments are followed by a section providing comparative insights on the three cases. Each assessment is organized in the following fashion: The assessments begin with a discussion of Conditions, that is, the context and circumstances surrounding the next election cycle. The section on Conditions is followed by a discussion of the History of Electoral Violence in each country. With these points as background, the Assessment Framework unfolds in four steps:

- Step 1 – Electoral Security Assessment Framework
- Step 2 – Electoral Security Planning
- Step 3 – Electoral Security Programming
- Step 4 – Monitoring and Evaluation

BANGLADESH

Background – Conditions and History

Officially, the 2008 parliamentary election was the ninth since the founding of Bangladesh in 1971. However, most sources consider just three parliamentary elections as meeting international standards. Those elections, in 1996, 2001 and 2008, were not under the undue influence of the military and resulted in transfers of power between the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL). However, even though there was general approval of the conduct of these three elections, each one was afflicted with some form of violence.

Various factors undergird violence in Bangladesh's elections. First, the political culture and First-Past-The-Post "winner take all" electoral system are high stakes and confrontational in nature. Second, the political party system is personalistic and hierarchical. Third, regulatory and judicial institutions are described as weak or politicized. Illicit funding or "black money" plays a role in the violence through the relationship of "muscle and money" employed to intimidate voters.

While these warning signs should be noted, there have also been mitigating factors introduced to prevent, manage or mediate potential electoral violence. Electoral reforms have included the professionalization of the Bangladesh Elections Commission (BEC) Secretariat, removing it from the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's office and placing the appointment authority for Returning Officers and Presiding Officers under the jurisdiction of the BEC. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to enhance the integrity of the voter registry has also de-conflicted that issue.

There were three sets of elections held in the 2008-2009 cycle: 1) municipal; 2) parliamentary; and 3) upazila. The municipal elections were held in August and reported to be largely without conflictive incidents, as were the Upazila elections, held just after the New Year in January 2009. However, such was not the case for the December 28 parliamentary elections. The Care-Taker Government (CTG) imposed a State of Emergency (SoE) on November 3 in anticipation of electoral violence. The SoE was relaxed on December 12 and lifted on December 17. Following the lifting of the SoE, the military deployed 50,000 troops from December 20 to January 3 to secure the run-up to voting, Election Day, and the immediate aftermath of the balloting.

Step 2 – Electoral Security Planning

The performance and integrity of the BEC in the 2008 elections de-conflicted public perceptions about ruling party impartiality. Despite the abusive tactics used by security forces in 1996 and, to a lesser extent, in 2001, in 2008 the Bangladesh police and military played a positive role in election security. Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms remained slow and ineffective.

Based upon the history of electoral violence, the targets of conflict are political party activists, supporters of the three principal political parties, minorities such as Hindus or minorities in the Rajshahi and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), and property such as political party offices and party leaders' residences. The perpetrators of electoral violence have the same profiles as targets, that is, activists and supporters of the principal political parties. The underlying motives to using violence appear to be economic in nature. The shifts in party governance caused by elections open up economic opportunities for the new party in power. This enhancement of the electoral stakes is a tangible motive behind the violence.

In 2008, the tactics included murders, personal injuries, kidnapping and youth exploitation, particularly to university groups associated with political parties. Intimidation and vote buying were also reported. In the pre-election phase, the violence was principally among and between political party activists and supporters. Election Day was largely peaceful; however, post-election violence occurred as inter-party and intra-party conflict. Forty Districts were monitored and in only nine of them (22 percent) were there no incidents of violence reported.

During the period monitored (December 14 – 28), there were 336 people injured in electoral violence. No deaths were reported in the pre-election period or on Election Day. In the post-election phase, there were seven deaths and 265 injuries were reported. On a violence intensity scale of 0 – 3 with 3 being the most violent, the intensity can be rated at between 1 and 2.

Step 2 – Electoral Security Planning

Based upon the electoral threat profile, two new primary program objectives have been identified for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to consider:

- Objective #1: Improved capacity of formal and informal institutions to effectively resolve electoral disputes; and
- Objective #2: Increase planning and coordination among electoral and security actors to better anticipate violence in order to prevent or manage it.

The planning scenario assumes that the contest for political power will remain divisive between the AL and BNP moving toward parliamentary elections in 2013. The scenario assumes that the military will continue to play a role as the protector of democracy and will not intervene in governance.

The relevant program areas identified by USAID/Bangladesh's DG portfolio are quoted below:

- Build an active constituency for strong elected local government;
- Accountability and transparency in the public sector by enhancing civil society and organization participation;
- Increase political parties' responsiveness to citizen's input; and
- Provide training to leaders of influence to promote tolerance, diversity, social harmony and practices of good governance and modern development.

Step 3 – Electoral Security Programming

This step provides program concepts that can be considered by the donor community and activities that can be specifically supported by USAID.

Institution	Activity Summary
Official Enforcement Institutions	
Bangladesh Elections Commission	Develop procedural improvements on the allocation of polling stations, the use of tendered ballots and queue controls to de-conflict these issues; Build capacity to enforce political finance, codes of conduct and political party oversight regulations; and Establish an electoral security taskforce with other relevant stakeholders for communication and coordination.
Parliamentary Drafting Committee	Draft legislation to improve electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.
Police and Other Security Forces	Establish a Joint Elections Operation Center; Expand deployment to include more political event and facilities; Increase the number of female officers at polling stations; and Receive training to enhanced electoral conflict prevention and mediation skills.

Social Enforcement Institutions	
Political Parties	Continue third party mediation initiative; Provide fellowships to university students for learning about electoral dispute resolution and post-election expectation and behaviors
Civil Society Organizations	Continue domestic monitoring but include a consistent incident reporting procedure for all groups; Train domestic monitors on the method of a Parallel Vote Tabulation; and Conduct grassroots peace education campaigns.
Traditional Leaders	Encourage messages of peace and mediation efforts from traditional leaders

The following new program activities can be considered within the manageable interests of USAID.

Objective #1:

- Strengthen BEC capacity to draft legislative changes facilitating improved formal electoral dispute resolution mechanisms;
- Build BEC capacity to improve regulation, adjudication and resolution of pre-election disputes;
- Offer electoral dispute resolution fellowships to students in third countries to demonstrate alternatives to violence;
- Identify neutral CSOs (no party affiliation) and provide training in conflict mediation and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and
- Provide training to traditional and religious leaders in conflict mediation and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

Objective #2:

- Provide technical assistance and training to BEC in electoral security administration.; and
- Depending on specific needs, further assistance to security forces; i.e. JEOC design, training of JEOC trainers to prepare participating organizations and development of policies and procedures.

Based on availability of resources, additional activities to support existing Mission electoral security programs may include:

- Working with NDI to incorporate messages of non-violence into political party training/ mediation; and
- Working with EWG to train election monitors on a consistent approach to electoral incident reporting that can be used by the JEOC as well as in the PVT.

Step 4 – Monitoring and Evaluation

Although actual programs are highly speculative at this time, the following illustrative indicators may be considered.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of formal and informal institutions to effectively resolve electoral disputes.

Indicator Type	Indicator Description
Standard Indicators	Number of groups trained in conflict mediation/resolution skills with USG assistance (CSOs and traditional leaders).
	Number of election officials trained with USG assistance.
	Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Number of legislative changes facilitating improved formal electoral dispute resolution.
	Number of days from filing of complaints to resolution in formal system.
	Level of voter confidence in formal electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.
	Level of voter confidence in informal electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.
	Number of complaints resolved using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

Objective #2: Increase planning and coordination among electoral and security actors to better anticipate violence in order to prevent or manage it.

Indicator Type	Indicator Description
Standard Indicators	Number of election and security officials trained with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Degree to which the BEC is an effective partner in electoral security administration.
	Nature of complaints from significant political parties about election-related security arrangements.
	Increased capacity by BEC and security forces to prevent violent incidents from occurring.
	Increased capacity by BEC and security forces to monitor the incident patterns and migration.

ZIMBABWE

Background – Conditions and History

As one source described it, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) was born of violence, grew in violence and governs through violence. It was established in 1963 through a violent split with the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), although ZAPU later merged with ZANU PF in 1987. Although ZANU PF's violent tactics began as an insurgency against colonists, the current machinery of violence involves

both state and non-state institutions including the military, intelligence agencies, police, youth militias, so-called war veterans and ZANU PF activists. The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has no such integrated security/political party apparatus. It emerged as the opposition party from civil society and labor unions. Although MDC leaders and supporters are most often the targets of electoral violence, the MDC has not adopted violent retaliatory tactics and has taken the "hits" without escalating the conflict.

There are three extra-ordinary factors contributing to volatility in the current political environment. First, in the aftermath of the 2008 violence, a Global Peace Agreement (GPA) was negotiated under the auspices of the South African presidency. The GPA essentially ended the violence and established a government of inclusion, with Robert Mugabe remaining as president and Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. A Constitutional Reform Process (CRP) was also established, to encourage public input in its content. However, reports are that ZANU PF has mobilized youth militia to intimidate and influence public opinion about the content of the constitution. And, the sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom, United States and European Union have become politicized between the ZANU PF and MDC. As a result, current threats, the political environment since 2008 and a history of electoral violence create conditions of continued conflict for the constitutional referendum and general elections.

In 2008, the election sequencing was "harmonized" as local, parliamentary and presidential first round elections were held on the same day. The pre-election period and Election Day were relatively peaceful. However, when ZANU PF's did not receive the votes it expected in the first round, they violently retaliated against MDC supporters. The violence against MDC activists and supporters was reported to be directed and resourced by the state security structures and executed by the youth militia and war veterans. There were over 2,000 violations documented by domestic groups. The tactics included murders, beatings, arrests, confiscations of personal property and livestock, and arson of homes and businesses.

Step 1 – Electoral Security Assessment Framework

The Zimbabwe Elections Commission was established by the Constitution of Zimbabwe and mandated to "prepare for, conduct and supervise all elections and referenda" replacing the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). To many observers, ZEC members were politically subservient to the ZANU PF and were operationally inept to conduct the election. Either through partisanship or ineptitude, opposition parties claimed that the voter registry included "ghost voters," and that there were discrepancies in the count. As a result, the announcement of the presidential first round results was delayed by over one month and the ZEC failed to sufficiently license CSOs to conduct voter education campaign.

State and non-state security actors fused with ZANU PF activists are the overwhelming perpetrators of electoral violence. The state structures include the military, police, intelligence, judiciary and penal institutions. These institutions effectively provide ZANU PF with a military wing to participate in and resource the political and non-state perpetrators.

Electoral violence in Zimbabwe appears centrally directed and resourced. The motives in the pre-election phase are to intimidate voters to support ZANU PF candidates or abstain from voting. While largely peaceful on Election Day, the harassment of

international observers, intimidation of poll workers and arrest of polling agents is a diversion from electoral fraud likely taking place. In the post-election phase, the violence is directed at regions where ZANU PF lost or should have won by a larger margin. The perpetrators employ a full palette of tactics in electoral violence. These tactics can start with simple intimidation and escalate into threats to food security, arrests of opposition leaders, and false perpetrator charges against victims of violence.

The judicial system failed the 2008 election on at least two major accounts. First, it failed to force the ZEC to release the first round election results according to statutory deadlines. This inaction enabled a period of instability to emerge in which widespread violence against MDC supporters occurred. And, the second failure is the judicial system's inability to bring any of the real perpetrators of the post-election violence to justice. The absence of prosecution, penalty or victim compensation offers no judicial disincentive to commit electoral violence. The traditional targets of electoral violence are opposition supporters and others regarded as potentially threatening to the regime's continued hegemony. These include MCD-T and MDC-M activists, that is, their leadership, political party agents and voters.

Zimbabwe Civic Action Support Group reports that there were 2,007 cases of electoral violence and 161 murders documented during the 2008 election cycle. Based on a population of 11 to 12 million persons, approximately 880,000 to 996,000 people, or roughly eight percent of the population, were driven from their homes since 2000, primarily by political and human rights violations. The level of violence intensified in 2008 compared with 2000, 2002 or 2005. The conflict intensity is coded as 3.

Step 2 – Electoral Security Planning

Based upon the electoral threat profiling, there are two new primary program objectives for USAID to consider:

- Objective #1: Improved professionalism and transparency of the ZEC to administer and oversee elections; and
- Objective #2: Reduced incentives to engage in violence in pilot communities.

The planning scenario assumes that the government of inclusion will hold together through the CRP and referendum although the relationship between the parties will remain conflictive. Within the partnership, the ZANU PF will remain dominant especially with respect to the state and non-state security institutions.

This programming supports three of the six principal areas of DG focus for the USAID Mission: 1) enhancing civil society; 2) supporting democratic parties; and 3) promoting free and fair elections.

Step 3 – Electoral Security Programming

Below are program concepts that the donor community can consider and activities that USAID can support.

Institution	Activity Summary
Official Enforcement Institutions	
Zimbabwe Elections Commission	Provide technical assistance in improving the voter registry and ballot tabulation procedures; and Develop an electoral security plan so that security planning is not left to state structures alone
Joint Operations Command	Organize regular dialogue between general from countries that are members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Zimbabwean counterparts.
Transitional Justice Mechanisms	Training election monitors in a consistent method of electoral incident reporting if transitional justice is called for after the next election cycle.
Social Enforcement Institutions	
Political Parties	Provide training to political parties on governance and the responsibilities of ruling parties.
Civil Society Organizations	Provide conventional election observation as well as incident reporting; Continue local peacebuilding and reconciliation programs; Encourage advocacy for enfranchisement of the diaspora; Provide skill training and employment opportunities for youth; Facilitate the establishment of a veterans advocacy organization; and Provide humanitarian services for those displaced, injured, tortured or having suffered other losses as a result of the violence.
Traditional Leaders	Engage traditional leaders in local peacebuilding and reconciliation projects.

The following program activities can be considered within the manageable interests of USAID.

Objective #1: Improved professionalism and transparency of the ZEC to administer and oversee elections.

- Assist ZEC to improve the voter registry;
- Strengthen ZEC capacity to accredit domestic and international observers;
- Support ZEC ability to establish and implement ballot tabulation procedures; and
- Assist ZEC with addressing electoral security issues, beginning with mapping out potential areas of violence.

Objective #2: Reduced incentives to engage in violence in pilot communities.

- Capitalize on existing community-level peace building networks to scale up local-level programming and bring together security forces and community members, including traditional leaders, to address electoral dispute resolution;
- Support for the ZESN, a collection of organizations training and fielding domestic election observers;

- Support existing initiatives to develop a veterans association able to provide social and economic benefits to war veterans, as well as to advocate on their behalf;
- Provide conflict resolution training to teachers who serve at polling stations; and
- Identify linkages with other USAID programs that present economic and political opportunities for youth and war veterans.

Step 4 – Monitoring and Evaluation

Although actual programs are highly speculative at this time, the following illustrative indicators may be considered.

Objective #1: Improved professionalism and transparency of the ZEC to administer and oversee elections.

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of election officials trained with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance.
	Level of voter confidence in ZEC.
	Number of ZEC coordinated civilian-military electoral security activities.
	Percentage of errors in voter registry.
	Percentage of eligible voters registered to vote.
	Number of international monitors accredited by ZEC according to international standards.
	Number of domestic monitors accredited by ZEC according to international standards.

Objective #2: Reduced incentives to engage in violence in pilot communities.

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of conflict mediation/resolution skills with USG assistance.
	Number of groups trained in inclusive consensus building techniques with USG assistance.
	Number of domestic election observers trained with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Percentage of community electoral dispute resolution activities including community youth.
	Percentage of community electoral dispute resolution activities led by youth in pilot communities.
	Percentage of community electoral dispute activities led by war veterans in pilot communities.
	Level of services provided by veterans association to war veterans.
	Number of veterans receiving services from veterans association.

COLOMBIA

Background – Conditions and History

Violence has been a feature on the Colombia political landscape since 1899 when the War of 1000 Days was fought between the Conservative and Liberal Parties until 1902. Conflict re-emerged between the two political parties in 1945, triggering another period of strife call *La Violencia*. This conflict was eventually resolved through the formation of a ruling coalition by the two powers called Frente Nacional, which governed from 1958 to 1974. However, during the 1960s, leftist guerilla groups such as the FARC and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) emerged to challenge the political status quo. It was a period that also saw the resurgence of the Communist Party.

Up to 2006, voting was suppressed in FARC areas. The FARC fought, as one source described it, “to end the state, not take it over.” In part, as a response to the leftist guerrillas’ tactics of territorial capture and suppression, the 1990s saw the emergence of the so-called paramilitaries, ostensibly engaged by powerful interests in commerce or patronage to counter the guerrilla threats and retain property. In paramilitary areas voter turnout was encouraged, particularly for paramilitary-backed candidates.

The presence of illegal armed groups is a major security condition. Many sources indicate that there remains widespread support for the Democratic Security initiative, Uribe’s security framework, because of perceived military gains made against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the de-mobilization of the paramilitaries. However, while these military gains are real, the FARC is said to be regrouping in border zones with Venezuela and Ecuador and have created a new front in the department of Guaviare. In addition, the justice system has exposed 86 politicians linked to the paramilitaries through bribes and pay-offs in an investigation termed the “para-politics scandal.”

Step 1 – Electoral Security Assessment Framework

The CNE is the national body responsible for policy and supervision of national and sub-national elections. It partners with other agencies, such as the Civil Registry, to operationally conduct elections. Electoral administration is generally regarded as meeting international standards. However, the CNE lacks the capacity to enforce political finance regulation, leaving open the opportunities for “black money” in political campaigns.

Plan Democratia, the security plan for the election, engages the government, police, army, navy and air force. The core committee concerned with electoral security logistics involves the Ministry Of Defense, Ministry Of Interior, High Military Command, and National Registrar directing as many as 150,000 security forces protecting 77,000 voting locations.

The lack of capacity and conviction has created an institutional weakness in the prosecution of electoral crimes. There are two bodies mandated to adjudicate electoral crimes and disputes: 1) the Prosecutor General (crimes); and 2) the CNE (electoral disputes). But, neither agency has the training and capacity to conduct adequate

investigations, prepare cases, resolve crimes and disputes and assign penalties or compensation.

The targets of electoral violence can be classified into two major categories: 1) communities; and 2) individuals. This distinction is important because program strategies to counter community threats will vary from those of individual protection. In this context, the term “communities” refers to groups of individuals brought together geographically as well as by ethnicity, gender, age or political association. In this sense, IDPs, rural populations, women, youth and indigenous peoples can be considered targets or communities at risk for electoral violence. Individuals can also be the targets of violence. These individuals can further be classified on two levels: 1) public; and 2) private. Public targets are incumbent elected officials particularly mayors, departmental governors and those on municipal councils. Candidates for these offices can be considered a public individual targets as well. Private individual targets include business people, by-standers or competing perpetrators.

Spoilers that perpetrate electoral violence can be classified into three major groupings: 1) guerillas; 2) paramilitaries; and 3) *bacrim* (bandits and criminals). In some cases, members of the Colombian military have been cited as perpetrators of violence, but this involvement is episodic compared with the other three types. The FARC and ELN have suffered military and political set-backs and are changing tactics because of a loss of grassroots support. Guerillas are now reportedly traveling in small groups, dressed as civilians using small arms and explosives, unlike their history of military-style uniforms and demeanors. The guerillas can be expected to interfere with the election where they have some control or presence.

The term “paramilitary” has changed meaning since the demobilization campaign of 2006. Before demobilization, paramilitaries were organized in a military style with hierarchy, weapons and operations reflecting these characteristics. However, under the current scenario, *Systema de Alertas Tempranas* (SAT) has identified 22 new groups organized along five major structures in the regions where the demobilization of paramilitaries occurred. While still possessing military weapons and training, the new groups appear to be less disciplined than the former ranks and their involvement and tactics in the 2011 municipal elections remain to be seen.

The *bacrim* will remain engaged in electoral violence and pay-offs as long as there is demand for their criminal enterprise and they require acquiescence from public officials to sustain it.

While these commons threads can be identified, each group is motivated by particular objectives. For guerillas, their efforts are designed to strike against the state; whereas paramilitaries have employed violence to influence votes and get their candidates elected.

Guerrillas are beginning to return to public life after redefining their strategies to regain grassroots support. FARC continues to recruit among youth and indigenous communities. Paramilitaries are more complicated because there is a military and economic dimension. Paramilitaries want control of capital where guerillas want drug money to buy guns; they are not interested in the accumulation of capital. The *bacrim* and mafia families form relationships with elected officials and voters and obtain their loyalty. These relationships can be successful because of the fragility of political parties.

By one report, FARC carried out 1,429 attacks in the first ten months of 2009, a 30 percent increase over the same period in 2008. The violence has triggered the displacement of three to four million in a population of 43.6 million, or up to nine percent of the population. The intensity coding for Colombia is a 3.

Step 2 – Electoral Security Planning

Based upon the electoral threat profiling, two new primary program objectives have been identified for USAID to consider:

- Objective #1: Improved capacity of the CNE to provide electoral integrity and security; and
- Objective #2: Increased civil society capacity to support credible local elections.

The planning scenario assumes that the FARC and *bacrim* will continue their tactics in the 2011 municipal elections. While that is assumed, this scenario also includes the continuation of a robust security response to the more militaristic of the illegal armed groups, that is, the guerillas and some of the paramilitaries. Given their apparent success on the national level, the “old” paramilitaries can be expected to reach for influence in the municipal elections and vulnerable municipalities can be identified as potential hot spots.

This programming supports USAID’s overarching goal to achieve a “sustainable reduction in the production of illicit drugs and the promotion of peace in Colombia.” It also supports one of USAID’s Strategic Objectives, that is, “Enhanced Democratic Governance.” Within Enhanced Democratic Governance, this programming supports the further areas of interest identified by USAID:

- Judicial reform implemented and access to justice broadened;
- Human rights protected;
- Improved transparency and efficiency in the use of public resources; and
- Conflict mitigated

Step 3 – Electoral Security Programming

This step provides program concepts that can be considered by the donor community and activities that can be specifically supported by USAID.

Institution	Activity Summary
Official Enforcement Institutions	
Consejo Nacional Electoral	Build capacity to conduct enforce political finance regulations and investigate “black money” complaints; Improve procedures to secure the vote for communities at risk; and Provide further assistance to the National Commission for the Coordination and Monitoring of Electoral Process.
Police and Other Security Forces	Establishing Recommended Voter Routes in guerrilla strongholds
SAT	Internationalize outreach program to illustrate the transnational character of the conflict.
Prosecutor General	Build capacity to investigate and prosecute electoral crimes
Social Enforcement Institutions	
Political Parties	Continue assistance for compliance with political finance reprinting requirements; and Examine reforms to reduce the fragmentation of the political party system
Civil Society Organizations	Provide conventional election monitoring; Monitor local governance financial transactions; Monitor the links between money and violence; Conduct civic education in areas “cleared” of guerrillas and paramilitaries; and Protection clusters for victims of the violence
Traditional Leaders	Strengthening SAT communications with traditional leaders

The following new program activities can be considered within USAID’s manageable interests.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of the CNE to provide electoral integrity and security.

- Assist the CNE and Congress to draft legislation that will address political finance reform;
- Once the legislation is passed, support CNE with drafting, implementing, and enforcing supporting regulations;
- Strengthen the capacity of CNE to effectively regulate revenues and expenditures of legitimate financial transactions submitted as part of financial disclosure;
- Improve ability of CNE to investigate financial disclosure reports filed by candidates and political parties for illicit sources of funding;
- Partner with Transparencia to build on their existing work monitoring financial disclosures at the national level to bring attention to the concrete connections between money and acts of violence;
- Support the international outreach of SAT materials to draw international attention to the cross-border aspects of illicit financing and political violence;
- Assist CNE to introduce procedural changes to better protect communities at risk; and

- Provide assistance to the Prosecutor General (electoral crimes) and CNE (electoral disputes) to conduct adequate investigations, prepare cases, resolve crimes and disputes and assign penalties or compensation.

Objective #2: Increased civil society capacity to support credible local elections.

- Partner with organizations such as Congreso Visible to engage civil society in monitoring key local government financial transactions such as departmental contracts, subsidy distribution, hiring and extraction agreements;
- Support civil society efforts to disseminate information concerning key local government financial transactions to citizens; and
- Work with civil society to launch civic education programs focusing on areas that have been cleared of paramilitaries and guerillas.

Step 4 – Monitoring and Evaluation

Although actual programs are highly speculative at this time, the following illustrative indicators may be considered for adaptation.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of the CNE to enhance electoral integrity and security.

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of election officials trained with USG assistance.
	Number of laws or amendments to ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance.
	Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance.
	Number of organizations receiving USG support to promote development of and compliance with political finance regulations and legislation.
Custom Indicators	Degree to which new draft legislation addresses illicit funding in politics.
	Incidents of electoral violence in at risk communities.
	Number of financial disclosure cases prepared by CNE prosecuted by Prosecutor General.
	Level of public awareness of linkages between illicit financing and political violence.

Objective #2: Increased civil society capacity to support credible local elections.

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of people reached by USG assisted voter education.
	Number of CSOs strengthened that promote political participation and voter education.
	Number of organizations receiving USG support to promote development of and compliance with political finance regulations and legislation.
Custom Indicators	Level of public awareness of linkages between illicit financing and political violence.
	Documented incidents of local government financial misconduct identified by CSOs.
	Incidents of local government financial misconduct disseminated to public by CSOs.
	Targeted citizens' abilities to identify and understand basic elements of the electoral system.

Comparative Points of Assessment

While each of these cases is distinctive in terms of targets, spoilers' tactics and intensity, they possess some common features which may be instructive in developing strategic, policies and programs for electoral security in general.

Money and Violence - In each case, connections emerged between violence and illicit sources of political finance. In Bangladesh, the prospects of rents and patronage for the winning party fuel inter-and intra-party violence. In Zimbabwe, public and natural resources are used to finance electoral violence. And in Colombia, illicit funding is used to purchase weapons, buy votes and bribe officials.

Land and Electoral Violence - Each case demonstrated some connection between land issues and electoral violence. In Bangladesh, the post-election economic shifts described above also involve land acquisition pursuits by the winners and land grabs from minorities pressured to sell. In Zimbabwe, there has been a recurring pattern of commercial farm invasions escalating in the pre-election period with farmland appropriated for ZANU PF supporters. And, in Colombia, land is the territorial control sought by guerrillas, paramilitaries and *bacrim*.

Militaries Play an Active Role - In all three cases, the military plays an active role in the electoral process. In Bangladesh, 50,000 troops were deployed around election time and the army played a key logistical role in the conduct of voter registration. The army plays a similar security role in Colombia, with over 100,000 troops and police deployed on Election Day to protect polling station. To the contrary, in Zimbabwe, the military is a key actor in the state security apparatus which provides leadership and funding for electoral violence against MDC supporters and other opponents to the regime.

Election Day is Relatively Peaceful - In each case, most of the electoral violence occurs in the pre-election and post-election periods. Election Day is generally peaceful.

First-Past-the-Post - For each country, the electoral system of the lower chamber is First-Past-the-Post and conducted on a single-mandate district system. The system produces “winner take all” results creating high stakes for each election.

Weak Judiciaries and Culture of Impunity - In each country, the prosecution of suspects and the award of reparations to victims are impeded by weak and politicized judicial institutions resulting in a culture of impunity surrounding electoral violence

Role of Tradition Leaders - In each country, traditional leaders played a role in mediating or enabling electoral violence. In Bangladesh, to engage women in the process, voter education messages were disseminated employing local mosques and mullahs. In Zimbabwe, traditional leaders may serve as the enforcement agents for ZANU PF on the community or tribal level. And in Colombia, may also play a pivotal role in protecting or co-opting their communities by illegal armed groups.

Political Freedom - In none of the cases is the country considered “Free” by the Freedom House rating system. As Freedom House political rights ratings, Bangladesh is Partly Free (3) Zimbabwe is Not Free (6), and Colombia is Partly Free (3).

Conclusions

The intention of this assessment is threefold. First, it is intended to test a methodology to conduct electoral security assessment with the objective of identifying program interventions that can result from the assessment findings. Second, the cases explored in this assessment will be incorporated in the Technical Guidance Handbook on Electoral Security. And third, the assessment is intended to provide the USAID Missions in Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and Colombia and others in the international community with tangible program initiatives to address electoral violence in their host countries.

**Electoral Security Assessments
Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and Colombia
A Framework for Electoral Security Assessments**

I. INTRODUCTION

Under funding from the Elections and Political Process Indefinite Quantity Contract (EPP IQC), Creative Associates International, Inc. (Creative) conducted electoral security assessments in Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and Colombia. The objective of these electoral security assessments is to identify and profile potential electoral conflict and violence, propose program strategies and activities to prevent, manage or mediate this conflict, and establish a framework by which the results of this programming can be evaluated.

Creative was awarded a Task Order from the Democracy and Governance (DG) Office of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) to develop a Technical Guidance Handbook and Assessment Framework on Electoral Security. This Handbook and Assessment Framework is informed by desk research, an Experts Workshop and these field assessments. The electoral security field assessments were conducted from January 20 to February 20, 2010. The case countries were selected through discussions held between the DG Office and mission-based DG Officers.

Each country's electoral security assessment is presented as a standalone report. The three assessments are followed by a section providing comparative insights on the three cases. Annexes with maps, statistics and facsimiles are included. The Sources and Meetings for this assessment are shown in Annex I. A list of acronyms is shown as Annex II

Each assessment is organized in the following fashion. The assessments begin with a discussion of Conditions, that is, the context and circumstances surrounding the next election cycle. This section also identifies early warning signs that may indicate the potential for electoral violence to occur. The section on Conditions is followed by a discussion of the History of Electoral Violence in each country.

With these points as background, the Assessment Framework unfolds in four steps:

Step 1 – Electoral Security Assessment Framework

In this step, profiles of the conflict are defined through seven factors organized in subsections by Official Sector, Social Sector and Electoral Threat Environment. The assessment identifies potential targets, spoilers and their motives. It identifies the tactics that perpetrators employ and the timing and locations on when and where they employ them. Finally, the assessment gauges the intensity of the conflict. The result of this step is the development of electoral threat profiles so that potential programmatic responses can be considered to counter these threats.

Step 2 – Electoral Security Planning

This step puts forward a general planning scenario and set of assumptions underpinning the plan. It discusses the role of the international community as well as that of domestic actors. The planning process examines the interests and constraints of the United

States Government (USG) in pursuing these program activities. The planning step identifies potential change agents to conflict transformation. The result of this step is a planning framework for a USAID program intervention.

Step 3 – Electoral Security Programming

This step describes a set of programming activities for consideration by the international community as well as activities that can be considered by USAID. The program activities are organized by Sector (Official or Social), the enforcement institutions associated with each Sector and a summary of the activities themselves. Official enforcement institutions will be categorized as Regulatory, Security or Judicial in character. Social enforcement institutions are political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), media and traditional leaders with special institutional categories as the circumstances require. The result of this step is an electoral security program composed of a set of activities responsive to the country context and within the parameters of donor constraints.

Step 4 – Monitoring and Evaluation

This step is intended to provide USAID with continuous feedback on the effectiveness of their programming. It includes a summary of the primary program objectives and activities, the establishment of program objectives and benchmarks and sets of illustrative indicators, both standard and custom. The result of this step is a framework USAID can employ to measure program performance.

II. BANGLADESH

BACKGROUND – CONDITIONS AND HISTORY

A. Conditions

Officially, the 2008 parliamentary election was the ninth since the founding of Bangladesh in 1971. However, many sources look to just three parliamentary elections that are generally viewed as meeting international standards, not under the undue influence of the military and resulting in transfers of power between the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and the Awami League (AL) in 1996, 2001 and 2008. The next parliamentary elections are scheduled for 2013. However, even though there was general approval of the conduct of these three elections, each one was afflicted with some form of violence.

Various factors undergird violence in Bangladesh's elections of violence in Bangladesh elections. First, the political culture and First-Past-The-Post electoral system are confrontational in nature with electoral stakes being relatively high, that is, a "winner take all" contest for power. This confrontational dimension extends beyond the electoral outcomes and into economic rents and patronage that the winners obtain through their affiliations with universities, labor unions and other associations. In other words, the outcomes of the election not only represented shifts in party governance, but also major economic realignments in civil society organizations affiliated with the political parties.

Second, the political party system is personalistic and hierarchical in nature. The leaderships of the two major political parties – the AL and the BNP – have personal and political issues with each other which extend back to the War of Independence from Pakistan in 1971. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the father of the current AL leader and current Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, was assassinated in a 1975 military coup d'état when he was President. Hasina was first successful in the 1996 election only to be ousted by her BNP rival, Khaleda Zia in 2001. Zia is the widow of Ziaur Rahman, a general who ruled the country after Mujibur's death and who was subsequently killed by mutinous military officers. Both leaders carry these legacies and personal antagonisms into the political process. Hasina and Zia also share a similar autocratic leadership style with little internal democracy for their political parties. While this polarization is deeply rooted, the AL and BNP do not have substantial ideological differences, save the perception of the AL being more aligned with minorities such as Hindus and tilted toward India in its foreign policy perspectives while the BNP is perceived as more tilted toward Pakistan.

Third, regulatory and judicial institutions are described as weak or politicized. While security institutions have generally played a positive role in recent elections, a history of military rule and coup d'états since 1975 have not permitted democratic institutions to take root and fully develop their mandates in an impartial and professional manner. This institutional fragility allows for illicit funding and violence to combine in a lethal mix. Illicit funding or “black money” plays a role in the violence through the relationship of “muscle and money” employed to intimidate voters.

After the postponement of the 2006 parliamentary elections, a Care Taker Government (CTG) was installed, initially for a period of 90 days. However, the CTG remained in power for two years before the AL parliamentary victory in 2008. Although unelected, the CTG is credited with impartial governance and its appointments to the Bangladesh Elections Commission (BEC) were well regarded and viewed as contributing to the prevention of additional violence associated with electoral mal-administration. However, this governance arrangement was unique to the 2006 to 2008 period and it will not be replicated for the 2013 parliamentary elections.

Some of the early warning signs for future electoral conflict are the following. The terms of the current BEC will expire in 2010. As a result, the AL will be mandated with appointing a new BEC. If their nominees are viewed as AL partisans, then positive perceptions of BEC impartiality and professionalism will be compromised. Partiality or poor performance in election administration can be provocative of electoral violence particularly in the post-election phase when election results are announced.

The personalistic nature and organizational rigidity of political party structures remain in place. This circumstance offers few incentives to reduce confrontational behaviors on the part of the principal political parties' relationships, dialogues and engagements. This issue concerns both inter-party conflict and intra-party candidate vetting. Political aspirants on both sides seek party endorsements for the benefits they provide and have resorted to violence to achieve those objectives. Moreover, the First-Past-The-Post electoral system, a “winner-take-all” culture and the major economic realignments that occur with an electoral victory create a high stakes political environment in Bangladesh. As long as these features of the electoral system remain in place, so will their conflictive impact.

While these warning signs should be noted, there have also been mitigating factors introduced to prevent, manage or mediate potential electoral violence. Electoral reforms have included the professionalization of the BEC Secretariat, removing it from the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister's office and placing the appointment authority for Returning Officers and Presiding Officers under the jurisdiction of the BEC rather than through local government officials. The UNDP project to enhance the integrity of the voter registry has also de-conflicted that issue.

The 39 Bangladeshi political parties are now expected to submit party constitutions, which describe the purpose and objectives of their parties, in order to be accredited to contest. In some cases, such as the Freedom Party and Jamaat-e-Islami, the BEC has either rejected their drafts entirely or requested changes that make their constitutions conform to the secular, national constitution. Parties are also required to follow a Code of Conduct and disclose political finance receipts and expenditures. Further, reforms have been extended to the organizations affiliated with political parties. In order to reduce mistrust among parties, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) has organized continued dialogues so that parties have a neutral forum to meet and discuss their differences.

B. History of Electoral Violence

1. 1996 Parliamentary Elections

In 1995, the AL, convinced of vote-rigging by the BNP, demanded the resignation of Prime Minister Khaleda Zia and requested fresh elections under a neutral CTG. When the government made no concessions, the opposition held a series of protest strikes, leading to widespread violence and human rights abuses. Over a dozen political leaders were killed and hundreds of people were injured in clashes between protesters and the security forces, and in clashes between different political parties. Mid-year elections were called for February 1996, but violence by armed soldiers and rival-political parties continued. According to the UN Human Rights Watch Report that year, an estimated sixteen people were killed and 500 injured in violent incidents over the two weeks leading up to the polls. While the election halted the violence briefly, the government's failure to address or prosecute the perpetrators of violence led to the resurgence (on a smaller scale) of violent demonstrations throughout the summer.

2. 2001 Parliamentary Elections

During the 2001 election electoral violence took several forms. Inter-party violence occurred as party rivals clashed with each other at processions and campaign rallies. Knives and machetes were the weapons of choice. Intra-party violence occurred as activists sought to secure their positions within a party, lacking a democratic means to do so. In fact, violence surrounding the nomination process was reported by one Superintendent of Police to be the worst of the campaign period. There were some incidents that could be considered as "terrorist" in nature because targets were not solely identified by the political affiliation but also their group identity. This violence took place in Feni on the Indian border as well as Bhola and Laxmipur. While state violence was reported to have diminished considerably under the CTG, poor training and low pay offered to police led to reports of some voter intimidation by police during the election.

Approximately 150 people (mostly Hindu minorities supporting AL) were reportedly killed. The highest numbers of incidents were reported in Patuakhali and Cox's Bazar, with 20 people killed in those districts alone. (Cox's Bazar was also listed as a high incident location in 2008 election reporting). Violence was also directed against journalists. The Rapid Action Battalion (RAB), a constabulary force, was formed as a result of this violence as a front line reserve force to counter immediate threats.

3. 2008 Parliamentary Elections

There were three sets of elections held in the 2008-2009 cycle: 1) municipal; 2) parliamentary; and 3) upazila. There were 81 million voters on the electoral registry. The municipal elections were held in August and reported to be largely without conflictive incidents, as were the Upazila elections, held just after the New Year in January 2009. However, such was not the case for the December 28 parliamentary elections. The CTG imposed a State of Emergency (SoE) on November 3 in anticipation of electoral violence. The SoE was largely supported by the electorate in rural areas, to thwart the activities of the political party "muscle men." Minority groups in Rajshahi and Chittagong also supported the SoE and the protection that it provided for them. The SoE was relaxed on December 12 and lifted on December 17. Following the lifting of the SoE, the military deployed 50,000 troops from December 20 to January 3 to secure the run-up to voting, Election Day, and the immediate aftermath of the balloting.

There were a reported 110 incidents of pre-election violence injuring 336 people. Most of the incidents took place between December 23 and December 27 with a dramatic drop on December 28, Election Day, as reported by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) Electoral Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) project, in partnership with the domestic non-governmental organization (NGO) Odikhar. The incidents largely involved almost equal complicity between BNP and AL supporters and only three incidents were linked to police. In terms of tactics employed by the perpetrators, physical harm and torture were reported in 49 percent of the cases, property destruction in 29 percent and group clashes in eight percent. Of the cases of physical harm, *lathis*, or wooden batons, were employed in 37 percent of the incidents, fist fights in 22 percent, stones in 19 percent and knives in 7 percent. There were few incidents of explosives or firearms being employed. An insurgent group, Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh threatened electoral violence, but it did not manifest.

By some reports, there were seven people killed and 265 injured in post-election violence, including both incidents of inter-party and intra-party violence. One characteristic of the post-election violence was its widespread occurrence on university campuses among student groups affiliated with the political parties. Rival clashes between the Jatiyotabadi Chattra Dal (BNP) and Islami Chattra Shibir (Jamaat-e-Islami) on the campuses of Dinajpur Hahi Danesh University, Netrokona Government University, Jagannath University, Bangladesh University, Khulna Medical College, Narail Government Victoria College, Feni Government College and Dhaka Polytechnic University.

As the AL was victorious in the parliamentary elections, intra-student group clashes occurred as students affiliated with the AL competed for the rents and patronage associated with incumbent power. These incidents occurred on the campuses of University of Dhaka, Rajshahi University, Shahjalal University, University of Rajshahi,

Jahangir University, and Jogonnath University. One report indicated that in many cases the police did not intervene to stop the violence.

STEP 1 – ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

C. Profile of Electoral Threats

1. Official Sector

a. Regulatory Institutions

The performance and integrity of the BEC in the 2008 elections de-conflicted public perceptions about the partiality of the election authority in favor of the ruling party. Through the assistance of UNDP, the step taken to improve the quality of the voter registry removed a significant point of contention between the parties and the BEC on the registry and its potential to allow voter impersonation and multiple voting to occur.

b. Security Institutions

Despite the experiences in 1996, and, to a lesser extent in 2001, with abusive tactics by security forces, in 2008 the Bangladesh police and military played a positive role in election security. It has been speculated that given the army's experience on United Nations (UN) electoral peacekeeping operations, they have direct electoral security experience to apply in a domestic context. Although Bangladesh functioned under military rule during the 1970's and 1980's, and most recently intervened with the CTG to enforce a State of Emergency (SoE) during the pre-election period, its logistical and security assistance were regarded as positive contributions to the electoral process by all sources interviewed. Around 50,000 police and military were deployed in the immediate pre-election period, Election Day and in the post-election phase. In only six percent of the electoral incidents documented by IFES/Odikhar were security forces identified as the perpetrators of electoral violence.

c. Judicial Institutions

Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms appear slow and ineffective. If electoral disputes are encouraged to be adjudicated as an alternative to a violence, then the formal and informal adjudication mechanisms must be in place or there is little incentive for peaceful settlements. The aggrieved parties may resort to violence to achieve some measure of perceived justice.

2. Social Sector

a. Political Parties

Based upon the history of electoral violence, the targets of conflict are political party activists and supporters of the three principal political parties, minorities such as Hindus or minorities in the Rajshahi and the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), and property such as political party offices and the residence of candidates or party leaders.

The perpetrators of electoral violence have the same profiles as targets, that is, activists and supporters of the principal political parties. The breakdown on perpetrators by

percentage of incidents committed, as reported by IFES/Odikhar, is shown in the table below.

Table 1 - Political Party Perpetrators

Perpetrator	Percentage of Incidents Attributed
Bangladesh National Party	38 percent
Awami League	35 percent
Jamaat-e-Islami	9 percent
Police	4 percent
Military	2 percent
Other	12 percent

Between them, the BNP and AL reportedly perpetrated 73 percent of the total incidents.

The underlying motives to win elections through violence appear to be economic in nature. The shifts in party governance of parliament which have occurred at each election since 1996 open up economic opportunities for the new party in power. This enhancement of the electoral stakes is a tangible motive behind the violence. However, a confrontational political culture must also be considered as a latent motive where, as one source described it, there is a willingness to “shed blood for democracy.”

In 2008, the tactics included murders, personal injuries, kidnapping and youth exploitation, particularly the university groups associated with political parties. Intimidation and vote buying were also reported. Parties reportedly engage “muscle men” to assault and intimidate opponents, and perpetrate vote buying to garner votes, thus combining “money and muscle.” The tactics can be systematic and orchestrated such as political confrontations at campaign events, unpermitted and provocative rallies and impeding traffic. Or, the violence can also be spontaneous and opportunistic in cases of random encounters of political rivals turning violent. “Booth capture,” that is, temporarily taking over polling stations, is the only form of electoral violence reported on Election Day. For the most part, the tactics result in physical harm to an individual around half of the time (49 percent) and to property in 28 percent of the incidents.

b. Civil Society Organizations

International and domestic observation provided a measure of transparency in voting with 132 international observers present in 2008 and the establishment of the Election Working Group (EWG) as an umbrella organization composed of 32 domestic CSOs and fielding 150,000 monitors. The Fair Election Monitoring Alliance alone fielded 70,000 election monitors and was the largest partner in the EWG. FEMA also monitored electoral dispute resolution, media and violations to the Code of Conduct, during the pre-election phase, Election Day and in the post-election phase. Additionally, they reviewed political party reforms, such as party registration and political finance, and facilitated all-party mediation workshops.

c. Traditional Leaders

Mullahs and imams were engaged by UNDP in the voter registration program to put forward appeals for citizens to register. Their role was particularly effective at

encouraging women to participate in the registration and electoral process, thus helping to de-conflict gender and elections issues.

3. Electoral Threat Environment

a. Electoral Cycle

In the pre-election phase, the violence was principally among and between political party activists and supporters. Election Day was largely peaceful; however, post-election violence occurred as inter-party and intra-party conflict. In the 2008 election, the pre-election phase experienced injuries but no deaths; while the post-election phase did experience loss of life and a higher number of injuries reported than in the pre-election phase suggesting a higher intensity to post-election violence.

b. Locations

In advance of the December 28, 2008 elections, IFES/Odihr monitored 40 Districts and in only nine of them (22 percent) were there no incidents of violence reported. Some explanations for the lack of violence include the proactive police presence, security control of mass gatherings and local political leadership speaking out against violence. The table below from IFES/Odihr shows the administrative Divisions and Districts with the highest number of incidents in 2008.

Table 2 - Location of Incidents

Division	Number of Incidents	District	Number of Incidents
Rajshahi	29	Pabna	11
Chittagong	24	Kishorgonj	8
Dhaka	16	Brahminbaria	7
Barisal	16	Barisal	6
Khulna	14	Cox's Bazar	6
Sylhet	12	Moulavibazar	6

Within these Divisions and Districts, the conflict sites are public streets, political party offices and on other private property. One explanation for the high levels of incidents in Rajshahi and Chittagong is the presence of minority groups as potential targets. A map of the 2008 electoral violence is shown as Annex III.

c. Intensity

During the period monitored (December 14 – 28), there were 336 people injured in electoral violence. No deaths were reported in the pre-election period or on Election Day. In the post-election phase, there were seven deaths and 265 injuries were reported. On a violence intensity scale of 0 – 3 with 3 being the most violent (see Annex IV for criteria), the intensity can be rated at between 1 and 2, however, the intensity of violence seemed greater in the post-election period compared with the pre-election phase. Also, if compared with the intensity factor of 3 for 2001, the 2008 elections seemed to be less violent.

d. Implications for Electoral Conflict Dynamics

This electoral threat profiling has identified three potential drivers of future conflict. These drivers include the following:

- Existence of a “winner take all” electoral system associated with significant economic and political gains for the winning party and allied civil society organizations, including student groups;
- Weak or politicized regulatory and judicial systems resulting in a culture of impunity and lack of legitimacy of judicial enforcement; and
- Political parties dominated by personalities rather than professionalism resulting in campaigns based on tactics to lure voters rather than differentiation of parties using issues-based platforms.

STEP 2 – ELECTORAL SECURITY PLANNING

D. Program Objectives, Counterparts and Planning

1. Primary Program Objectives

Based upon the electoral threat profiling, two new primary program objectives have been identified for USAID to consider:

- Objective #1: Improved capacity of formal and informal institutions to effectively resolve electoral disputes; and
- Objective #2: Increase planning and coordination among electoral and security actors to better anticipate violence in order to prevent or manage it.

The development hypothesis/theory of change underlying Objective #1 is that more effective, efficient and transparent dispute resolution mechanisms will decrease motivation for violence by reducing the culture of impunity and providing legitimate channels to address grievances.

The development hypothesis/theory of change underlying Objective #2 is that the effectiveness of security forces to prevent or manage electoral violence is enhanced through improved planning and coordination so that the forces can be strategically deployed to deter violence.

2. Counterparts

The matrix below shows the counterparts and anticipated electoral cycle activity period.

Table 3 - Counterparts

Official Enforcement		
Institutional Type	Counterpart	Electoral Cycle Phase
Regulatory Institutions	Bangladesh Elections Commission	Electoral Cycle
	Parliamentary legal drafting committees	Pre-Election
Security Institutions	Military	Electoral Cycle
	Police	Electoral Cycle
	Constabulary Forces	Electoral Cycle
	Ansars	Electoral Cycle
Judicial Institutions	Bangladesh Elections Commission	Electoral Cycle
	High Court	Post-Election
Social Enforcement		
Political Organizations	Political Parties	Electoral Cycle
Non-Governmental Organizations	Domestic Election Observation Groups	Electoral Cycle
	Domestic Civil Society Organizations	Electoral Cycle
	International NGOs	Electoral Cycle
Traditional Leaders	Community Leaders	Electoral Cycle
	Tribal Chiefs	Electoral Cycle
	Religious Leaders	Electoral Cycle
Inter-Governmental Organizations	International Election Observation Groups	Electoral Cycle

3. Planning

a. Scenario

The planning scenario assumes that the contest for political power will remain divisive between the AL and BNP moving toward parliamentary elections in 2013. The scenario assumes that the military will continue to play a role as the protector of democracy and not intervene in governance.

Additional planning assumptions include the following:

- In the event that the new BEC appointed by the AL is viewed as partisan, the UNDP program will address issues of BEC independence;
- As part of its capacity building program for the BEC, the UNDP program will address allocation of polling stations, use of tendered ballots and queue control;
- ICITAP will provide training on electoral security to police as an expansion of programming;

- The BEC, High Court, CSOs and traditional leaders are willing, and have the capacity, to work with USAID on improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and transparency of electoral dispute resolution; and
- The BEC has the legitimacy with other government institutions to play the convening role required to effectively serve a coordinator for election security planning.

b. International Community

The UNDP is undertaking a five-year capacity building program for the BEC. International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) has been present in Bangladesh and has provided training to national police on use of force standards. With the US Marshall's Service, it has introduced internal discipline measures for the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) among other training. NDI is working with political parties to organize continuous dialogues, providing a neutral forum for the parties to meet, discuss and resolve differences without resorting to violence. The planning process will require a more extensive inventory of existing international programs and actors.

c. Domestic Actors

In addition to the international community, several local actors have played a role in past elections. The EWG has fielded thousands of domestic monitors. In addition, FEMA, has conducted media monitoring and monitored violations of political party codes of conduct. They have also monitored formal electoral dispute resolution and facilitated workshops for political parties to resolve differences. Democracy Watch has also field electoral monitors in national and sub-national elections. Transparency International Bangladesh monitors political finance issues.

d. US Government Interests and Constraints

The relevant program areas identified USAID/Bangladesh's stated objectives of the DG portfolio are quoted below:

- Build an active constituency for strong elected local government;
- Accountability and transparency in the public sector by enhancing civil society and organization participation;
- Increase political parties' responsiveness to citizen's input; and
- Provide training to leaders of influence to promote tolerance, diversity, social harmony and practices of good governance and modern development.

STEP 3 – ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING

E. Electoral Security System Programming Initiatives

This step provides program concepts that can be considered by the donor community and activities that can be specifically supported by USAID.

1. Official Enforcement Programs

a. Regulatory Institutions

1) BEC

A “crossroads” decision that will be required of the donor community is whether the soon-to-be AL appointed BEC meets sufficient standards of independence, impartiality and professionalism to warrant an electoral assistance package. If so, then the donor community can build upon the technical assistance provided by the UNDP, which was intended to both de-conflict the voter registry as a source of controversy while offering more general assistance to generate legitimacy. The UNDP is undertaking a five-year program of capacity building for the BEC. Specific areas where procedural improvement can have a de-conflictive impact include the allocation of polling stations, the use of tendered ballots and queue controls; each of which can turn into a conflictive issue. Capacity building should include a sub-national component.

There have been recent legislative reforms with electoral security implications including reforms on party constitutions, codes of conduct, and finances, in order to promote public accountability of the parties and enforce higher standards for political ethics. Since the BEC is the primary implementer of these reforms, their capacity at regulation and enforcement can be assessed and strengthened where necessary to assure the effectiveness of these measures in de-conflicting certain political behaviors.

Other development programming pertinent to electoral security administration would be assistance with establishing a BEC-led electoral security taskforce for information sharing and planning; developing a BEC election security plan; and establishing BEC capacity to monitor political party codes of conduct and financial spending. The coordination committee should include the BEC, BEC Secretariat, police, army, and Ansars (local security units). The BEC's Electoral Training Institute can offer courses in conflict resolution for Returning Officers and Presiding Officers so that they are equipped to mediate any conflicts that occur in polling stations.

2) Parliamentary Drafting Committee

Programming can be focused on improving the timeliness, transparency and fairness of electoral dispute resolution. Such programming could concern potential legislative changes creating new mechanisms for dispute resolution as well as assistance programming to the BEC and judiciary in dispute regulation and case load management

b. Security Institutions

1) Police and Other Security Forces

As the tactical counterpart to the BEC's electoral security taskforce, the police and other security agencies can establish a Joint Election Operations Center (JEOC). The JEOC concept has been employed to provide improve field coordination and information about election preparations, monitor security issues and facilitate more effective civil-police-military partnering. The JEOC is also the electoral incident profiling center where reporting of incidents are entered according to the threat profile methodology described above and tracked for patterns and migration. Development assistance can be provided to establish a JEOC in anticipation of the 2013 election.

As police presence has been reported as a deterrent to violence, security forces could consider expanding their protective presence at political rallies, political party offices and the residences of party leaders or candidates. However, if such selective protection is provided, the determination of who is protected and who is not must be public criteria conducted by an impartial authority or committee. Police can also increase the number of female officers at polling centers to be responsive to gender-based conflict issues.

Finally, police and other security forces including Ansars could be provided with electoral security training to enhance their effectiveness at crowd control, de-conflicting disputes and becoming more effective at preventing electoral violence. Such training can be additional components of ICITAPs program that began in 2004 in Bangladesh.

2. Social Enforcement Programs

a. Political Parties

Fostering dialogue among the principal political stakeholders through third parties provides opportunities to quell rumors, correct misinformation or disinformation, mediate disputes and enhance the quality of communication and discourse so that conflict can be averted. NDI has been fostering such dialogue in its political party programming, which should be continued.

In an effort to reduce post-election violence on university campuses related to political party loyalties, electoral fellowships can be awarded to student leaders, providing opportunities for experiential learning about electoral administration, dispute resolution and post-election behaviors and expectations. And, where possible, local political party leaders should be encouraged to support messages of non-violence in the pre-election, Election Day and post-election phases.

b. Civil Society Organizations

Domestic election observation programs can introduce a standardized "conflict monitoring" questionnaire for all domestic election monitoring groups. While the IFES/Odikhar EVER program can continue with its focus on electoral incidents, training other groups to observe the election through a "conflict lens" can expand the amount of data collected. If collected in a uniform fashion employing the EVER methodology, the observations can be combined for a broader and deeper examination of the actual conflict.

In order to provide more transparency and confidence in the ballot tabulation process, domestic observer groups should also be trained in Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT). Just as the integrity of the voter registry was a source of potential conflict in previous elections, concerns are expressed about the integrity of the vote tabulation process and a PVT could be employed as a de-conflictive confidence builder. However, some caution must be observed to assure that the PVT methodology is sound because politically significant disparities between official and PVT totals can be a source of conflict.

Other CSOs can be organized into a grassroots, anti-violence public education campaign. A common theme and media package can be developed and distributed to the campaign participants with messages and events intended to demonstrate broad public support for peaceful elections.

c. Traditional Leaders

Just as UNDP conducted voter registration outreach messages through mosques and with the support of mullahs and imams, the messages of non-violent elections can also be carried with traditional leaders of communities, tribes and religious groups.

3. USAID Program Activities

The following new program activities can be considered by USAID as within its manageable interests.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of formal and informal institutions to effectively resolve electoral disputes.

Primary activities under this objective would focus on the BEC, judiciary and civil society organizations in relation to pre-and post-election dispute resolution. These activities would include the following:

- Strengthen BEC capacity to draft legislative changes facilitating improved formal electoral dispute resolution mechanisms;
- Build BEC capacity to improve regulation, adjudication and resolution of pre-election disputes;
- Offer electoral dispute resolution fellowships to students in third countries to demonstrate alternatives to violence;
- Identify neutral CSOs (no party affiliation) and provide training in conflict mediation and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms; and
- Provide training to traditional and religious leaders in conflict mediation and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

Objective #2: Increase planning and coordination among electoral and security actors to better anticipate violence in order to prevent or manage.

Primary activities under this objective would focus on developing coordination between the BEC and security forces on electoral security planning and implementation. The activities would include:

- Provide technical assistance and training to BEC in electoral security administration.; and
- Depending on specific needs, further assistance to security forces may include JEOC design, training of JEOC trainers to prepare participating organizations and development of policies and procedures.

Based on availability of resources, additional activities that would support existing Mission electoral security programs may include:

- Working with NDI to incorporate messages of non-violence into political party training/mediation; and

Working with EWG to train election monitors on a consistent approach to electoral incident reporting that can be used by the JEOC as well as in the PVT

STEP 4 – MONITORING AND EVALUATION

F. Evaluation Framework for USAID Programs

1. Illustrative Indicators

Although actual programs are highly speculative at this time, the following illustrative indicators may be considered. Note that this set of indicators is not adequate to capture all aspects associated with the program objectives and only serve as examples.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of formal and informal institutions to effectively resolve electoral disputes.

Table 4 - M & E Illustrative Indicators

Indicator Type	Indicator Description
Standard Indicators	Number of groups trained in conflict mediation/resolution skills with USG assistance (CSOs and traditional leaders).
	Number of election officials trained with USG assistance.
	Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Number of legislative changes facilitating improved formal electoral dispute resolution.
	Number of days from filing of complaints to resolution in formal system.
	Level of voter confidence in formal electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.
	Level of voter confidence in informal electoral dispute resolution mechanisms.
	Number of complaints resolved using alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.

Objective #2: Increase planning and coordination among electoral and security actors to better anticipate violence in order to prevent or manage it.

Indicator Type	Indicator Description
Standard Indicators	Number of election and security officials trained with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Degree to which the BEC is an effective partner in electoral security administration.
	Nature of complaints from significant political parties about election-related security arrangements.
	Increased capacity by BEC and security forces to prevent violent incidents from occurring.
	Increased capacity by BEC and security forces to monitor the incident patterns and migration.

G. Conclusion

The current manifestation of electoral violence in Bangladesh has a legacy of less than 15 years. The intensity of the violence is less than other countries in the region including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal and India. While the antagonisms between the AL and BNP are entrenched, a generational approach to political party leadership and officials in governance would seek to retire the grievances of the leadership with the retirement of that leadership. Although the military has participated in coup d'états and political assassinations in the past, the current profile of security forces is generally positive particularly with repose to election security. The government, political parties and civil society appear open to development assistance indicating a level of political will required to make such assistance effective.

III. ZIMBABWE

BACKGROUND – CONDITIONS AND HISTORY

A. Conditions

As one source described it, Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) was born of violence, grew in violence and governs through violence. It was established in 1963 through a violent split with Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), although ZAPU later merged with ZANU PF in 1987.

Although ZANU PF's violent tactics began as an insurgency against colonists, the current machinery of violence involves both state and non-state institutions including the military, intelligence agencies, police, youth militias, so-called war veterans and ZANU PF activists. The state structures are said to be coordinated by the Joint Operation Command (JOC) involving the Chief of the Armed Forces, General of the Air Force, Commissioner of Prisons, Director of the Central Intelligence Office (CIO) and General of the Army. This results in a military inter-penetration within ZANU PF and violence uniting these structures. When political setbacks occur for ZANU PF the machinery of

violence steps in to remedy the situation, as exemplified by the 2008 second round presidential elections. Accordingly, even if the ZANU PF loses the election, the “political party” loss may not result in any transition of the state security structures and core of governance. However, competing factions have emerged within the ZANU PF and the security apparatus which hold the potential for intra-party violence to result.

The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has no such integrated security/political party apparatus. It emerged as the opposition party from civil society and particularly the labor unions. Although MDC leaders and supporters are most often the targets of electoral violence, the MDC has not adopted violent retaliatory tactics and has taken the “hits” without escalating the conflict.

There are three extra-ordinary factors contributing to volatility in the current political environment. First, in the aftermath of the 2008 violence, a Global Peace Agreement (GPA) was negotiated under the auspices of the South African presidency. The GPA essentially ended the violence and established a government of inclusion, with Robert Mugabe remaining as president and Morgan Tsvangirai as Prime Minister. Ministries were divided between the ZANU PF and MDC. Of the security forces, the military is under the jurisdiction of the ZANU PF and the police are under the MDC. However, in practice, the ZANU PF maintains control of both security forces. Although security sector reform is an element of the GPA, reform activities have not yet been initiated. In fact, the GPA has been deadlocked but the MDC is reluctant to pull out because it would result in snap elections. Some interlocutors have questioned whether the GPA is a viable process for political transition in Zimbabwe. Although the GPA produced a government of inclusion involving both the ZANU PF and MDC, it is a forced arrangement with MDC holding less than co-equal governing power. Rather than creating unity, the GPA may be aggravating tensions between the parties during this sensitive period.

Also being undertaken is a Constitutional Reform Process (CRP). The CRP is designed to encourage public input in its content. However, reports are that ZANU PF has mobilized youth militia to intimidate and influence public opinion about the content of the constitution. For example, news reports state that on February 21, 2010, ZANU PF youth attacked an MDC meeting in Epworth, Harare, sending four people to the hospital and leaving 70 more people injured. The CRP will result in a referendum to approve or disapprove its adoption.

The sanctions imposed by the United Kingdom, United States and European Union have become politicized between the ZANU PF and MDC. Comments made by British Foreign Minister David Milliband that the British government would take guidance from the MDC on whether to lift sanctions caused a firestorm of criticism by ZANU PF against the MDC and its purported connection to the former colonial power. And, on February 24, news reports further described a protest by 500 ZANU PF youths bringing business in Harare to a halt for a time. The youth were protesting the EU’s renewal of sanctions on the ZANU PF.

As a result, current threats, the political environment since 2008 and a history of electoral violence create conditions of continued conflict for the constitutional referendum and general elections.

B. History of Electoral Violence

Electoral violence was experienced in the first election in Zimbabwe in 1980 with an assassination attempt on candidate Robert Mugabe. The parliamentary election of 1995 was described as a “non-election” because in 40 percent of the constituencies ZANU PF was the only party contesting. Similarly, in the presidential election of 1996, Robert Mugabe was the only candidate.

1) 2000 Referendum and General Election

Electoral violence as it is currently manifested had its defining moment in the post-election phase of the constitutional referendum of 2000. The government suffered a loss and began its campaign of violence in the run-up to the 2000 parliamentary election. In the pre-election period, opposition voting patterns were identified and a number of white farmers regarded as MDC ringleaders were murdered. Systematic voter intimidation began to intensify in April with security forces and ZANU PF activists targeting opposition supporters. There were myths promulgated as part of the intimidation campaign. For example, voters were told that their mobile telephones could reveal how they voted. Land redistribution became an electoral issue.

2) 2002 General Election

In the 2002 pre-election period, human rights groups reported that more than 30 people were killed in electoral violence, mostly MDC supporters. Amnesty International reported 1,400 detentions, mostly opposition polling agents and monitors, taking the form of arrests in the pre-election period and on Election Day. The Commonwealth observer group blamed the violence on “paramilitary youth groups” associated with the ruling party. The 2002 presidential election was held over two days. The police guarded the ballot boxes overnight and when the boxes were opened at the end of the second day, video-taped evidence revealed many ballots neatly marked and stacked in the boxes, indicating ballot box stuffing had occurred.

3) 2005 General Election

In 2005, the number of constituencies increased from 120 to 210 and around 9,000 polling stations were opened. In 2000, votes were counted at constituency-level counting centers. This procedure was changed to counting at polls which generally provides greater transparency in the count. However, this procedural change also served as a tool for voter intimidation. In each polling station, voters' ballots were grouped, tabulated and reported in alphabetical segments from A – L, M's, and N – Z. In the 2000 elections, if post-election retribution occurred because of the way a constituency voted, then the perpetrators had an unwieldy pool of 45,000 voters to intimidate. However, by knowing the poll outcomes by alphabetical division, the size of the targeted pool shrank to 100 to 200 voters. Thus, the “intimidation pool” is much smaller and controllable.

On Election Day, fraud and malpractice, rather than violence, were in abundance in order to help a ZANU PF victory. Observers cited such deficiencies as the exclusion of international media, discrepancies in vote totals, misuse of food aid for vote buying or intimidation, ghost voters and a partisan ZANU PF electoral commission. In the aftermath

of the election, 700,000 people were displaced through the mass destruction of homes and business in sections of Harare conducted by the government to break-up the urban support base for MDC.

4) 2008 Harmonized Elections

In 2008, the election sequencing was “harmonized” as local, parliamentary and presidential first round elections were held on the same day. The pre-election period and Election Day were relatively peaceful. However, the apparent loss of ZANU PF in the first round in March triggered a fierce retaliation against MDC supporters and in those areas that did not deliver votes as expected for ZANU PF. The violence against MDC activists and supporters was reported to be directed and resourced by the state security structures and executed by the youth militia and war veterans. There were over 2,000 violations documented by domestic groups. The tactics included murders, beatings, arrests, confiscations of personal property and livestock, and arson of homes and businesses.

STEP 1 – ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

C. Profile of Electoral Threats

1. Official Sector

a. Regulatory Institutions

1) Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) and Secretariat

The ZEC was established by the Constitution of Zimbabwe mandated to “prepare for, conduct and supervise all elections and referenda” replacing the Electoral Supervisory Commission (ESC). The ZEC has a parallel body to the ESC in the 2005 elections and assume full responsibility for electoral administration in 2008. To many observers, the ZEC membership was politically subservient to the ZANU PF and it was operationally inept to conduct the election. Either through partisanship or ineptitude, opposition parties claimed that the voter registry was included with “ghost voters,” there were discrepancies in the count, the announcement of the presidential first round results was delayed by over one month and the ZEC failed to sufficiently license CSOs to conduct voter education campaign. The ZEC Secretariat is said to be directed by military staff. While not a direct perpetrator of violence, the ZEC was a kind of parallel enabler employing incompetence and fraud to promote ZANU PF’s political interests.

b. Security Institutions

State and non-state security actors fused with ZANU PF activists are the overwhelming perpetrators of electoral violence. The state structures include the military, police, intelligence, judiciary and penal institutions. These institutions effectively provide ZANU PF with a military wing to participate in and resource the political and non-state perpetrators.

While “war veterans” were at the forefront of violence in the past, increasing numbers of youth militia, especially in rural areas, are recruited to the front line. Through the National Youth Training Program, young men are indoctrinated with ZANU PF ideologies

and deployed to communities. Such tactics are being employed in the CRP where public input is being encouraged to make the new constitution a people's document. However, these youth militia are seeking to shape that public input through intimidation and violence so that the public input reflects the political agenda of ZANU PF.

The police also practice a form of passive perpetration in that they ignore the criminal acts of the actual spoilers.

Further descriptions of spoiler types are provided by the Zimbabwe Civic Action Support Group and show below:

- Youth militia such as the Green Bombers;
- War Veterans;
- ZANU PF supporters;
- Zimbabwe National Army;
- Zimbabwe Republic Police: Uniformed, Plain clothes, and Riot police;
- Criminal Investigation Department; and
- Central Intelligence Organization

Electoral violence in Zimbabwe appears centrally directed and resourced. The motives in the pre-election phase are to intimidate voters to support ZANU PF candidates or abstain from voting. It has been described as “instrumentally rational.” While largely peaceful on Election Day, the harassment of international observers, intimidation of poll workers and arrest of polling agents is a diversion from electoral fraud likely taking place. This is further enabled by uncertain voter registry and a faulty voter identification procedure. In the post-election phase, the violence is directed at regions where ZANU PF lost or should have won by a larger margin. The term “electoral cleansing” is often used to describe the violence.

The perpetrators employ a full palette of tactics in electoral violence. These tactics can start with simple intimidation and escalate into threats to food security, arrests of opposition leaders, and false perpetrator charges against victims of violence. Some arrests result in show trials such as that of Roy Bennett, former Minister of Agriculture, falsely charged with treason. Arrests may also result in abduction, physical assault, rape, torture, murder, or *falanga*, which is a beating of the feet making walking difficult.

In rural areas, personal assets such as livestock are seized, property is confiscated and residences and businesses are burned. One tactic often described is the shaking of a matchbox in an arson victim's face — a quiet but potent threat that their property could be torched again. In some cases, the destruction of residences is done on a community-wide scale to uproot clusters of opposition supporters, making it difficult for the displaced persons to re-register or vote.

c. Judicial Institutions

The judicial institutions with jurisdictions that include elections are the Electoral Court to hear petitions from candidates about electoral grievances; a Nomination Court which sits to certify the nomination of presidential candidates' papers; the High Court; and the Supreme Court in special cases. The judicial system failed the 2008 election on at least two major accounts. First, it failed to force the ZEC to release the first round election results according to statutory deadlines. This inaction enabled a period of instability to emerge in which widespread violence against MDC supporters occurred. And, the second failure is the judicial system's inability to bring any of the real perpetrators of the post-election violence to justice. The absence of prosecution, penalty or victim compensation offers no judicial disincentive to commit electoral violence.

2. Social Sector

a. Political Parties

The traditional targets of electoral violence are opposition supporters and others regarded as potentially threatening to the regime's continued hegemony. These include MCD-T and MDC-M activists, that is, their leadership, political party agents and voters. Violence is inflicted on NGOs and neighborhood communities regarded as non-supporters of the ZANU PF. At polling stations, teachers are the target of violence on Election Day, as ZANU PF supporters seek to intimidate poll workers into disregarding their fraudulent acts.

In a December 2009 public opinion survey by Freedom House, 35 percent of the respondents said that they had personally experienced politically motivated intimidation, threats or harassment. Of that figure, 57 percent of the respondents of the MDC said that had been targets whereas only 25 percent of the respondents claiming ZANU PF affiliation indicated that they had been targets. When asked about the persistence of intimidation in elections, 67 percent of the MDC members said that there will *-always* be fear of intimidation, whereas only 39 percent of ZANU PF members felt so.

b. Civil Society Organizations

There is a network on domestic CSOs that provide electoral monitoring, civic education and local peacebuilding programs. The domestic election observation groups, such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network, fielded 210 Long Term Observers and accredited in total 8,667 of the 11, 080 observed invited to participate. Other CSOs, such as CivNet, Zimbabwe Peace Project, National Association of Victims of Violence and others also conduct peace-building initiatives through village-level reconciliation meetings where victims and perpetrators of electoral violence participate and work out their differences by creating common goals. These and other domestic CSOs have played a positive role in bringing some measure of transparency to the conduct the elections and effectively reconciling parties on the local level. However, in these capacities, the CSOs may find themselves the target of violence if their programs appear to have some linkage to the MDC or Western countries.

c. Media

The non-government print and electronic media have been crippled as sources of electoral news and education by violence and operational capture. In the pre-election period, at least four newspapers were closed, journalists harassed and detained. One journalist was murdered. In the 2008 election, the government employed the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Commission (ZBC) in an aggressive, non-stop campaign of self-promotion. The Media Monitoring Project Zimbabwe surveyed the airwaves in the three weeks prior to the March 29 elections and found 122 stories favorable to ZANU PF and 19 favorable to MDC. This experience demonstrates that the media can be both the target of electoral violence and another enabler of ZANU PF political objectives. The difference between victim and enabler is in the editorial perspective of the organization with those perceived as opposing government interests the potential targets.

d. Traditional Leaders

Traditional leaders have been both targets and enablers of violence. Teachers are frequently employed as poll workers. Their literacy and knowledge of the community combine to make teachers logistical poll worker recruits. However, because education is empowerment, teachers can be perceived as a threat to government interests lest people learn too much about the deficiencies of the regime. As a result, teachers, and female teachers in particular, have been targets of Election Day harassment at polling stations. However, traditional community and tribal leaders have also reportedly served as local ZANU PF enforcers delivering a community of votes to the party.

3. Electoral Threat Environment

1. Electoral Cycle

Electoral violence takes a different form in the pre-election, Election Day and post-election phases. In the pre-election phase, ZANU PF employs bribery and intimidation to persuade or coerce voters. There are reports that youth militias are engaging in such tactics to shape public opinion about the new constitution. Election Day is largely peaceful; however, there were reports of harassment of poll worker teachers and international observers by ZANU PF supporters. In past elections, opposition party agents have been arrested on Election Day. In the post-election phase, the violence becomes retributive, targeting areas where voters have voted against ZANU PF or have not delivered the anticipated margins, as in the cases of Mashonland Central and East.

2. Locations

Electoral violence can be mapped through following the electoral outcomes in areas where MDC won or ZANU PF marginally won. The map on the link below shows incidents and perpetrators by location. It is also shown as Annex V. The pattern shows that in Mashonland Central and East, violent incidents were not necessarily deadly. It can be speculated that this is retribution against ZANU PF supporters who failed to deliver because ZANU PF margins, while still winning, were lower than anticipated. It was punishment but not homicide. However, moving south toward Masvingo where MDC won more votes, the violence intensifies and more murders are reported. <http://www.sokwanele.com/map/electionviolence>

3. Intensity

Zimbabwe Civic Action Support Group reports that there were 2,007 cases of electoral violence and 161 murders documented during the 2008 election cycle. In addition to death and injury, human displacement for electoral purposes must also be considered in measuring the intensity of the violence. Based on a population of 11 to 12 million persons, approximately 880,000 to 996,000 people, or roughly eight percent of the population, were driven from their homes since 2000, primarily by political and human rights violations. The level of violence intensified in 2008 compared with 2000, 2002 or 2005. The conflict intensity is coded as 3.

4. Implications for Electoral Conflict Dynamics

The electoral threat profiling has identified seven potential drivers of future electoral conflict. These include the:

- Established national networks of violence integrate state structures, political party activists (ZANU PF) and non-state actors. These networks are highly involved in governance and have the resources and organizational capacity to conduct campaigns of intimidation. ZANU PF realizes that they are unlikely to win a democratic election and uses terror to maintain power;
- A split has developed within ZANU PF and respective security forces with the potential to lead to intra-party violence among competing factions;
- Zimbabwe has a large youth cohort (median age estimated at about 17.5 years) characterized by high unemployment. ZANU PF has effectively mobilized them into “youth militias” trained in intimidation tactics and deployed to communities, especially in rural areas. Youth militias will continue to have a willing pool of recruits as long as there are no economic alternatives;
- War veterans, also engaged in militias of intimidation, lack social and economic security;
- Zimbabwe is experiencing an ongoing constitutional reform process that will lead to a referendum to approve or disprove adoption. This has the potential to change the power dynamics and is perceived as a threat by ZANU PF;
- The power sharing agreement (GPA) between ZANU PF and MDC is effectively deadlocked. Security sector reform called for under the agreement has not taken place and both police and military remain under control of ZANU PF. As a result, there are no checks on violence perpetrated by security forces; and
- Judicial institutions are highly politicized and closely linked, financially and politically to ZANU PF. This has led to a culture of impunity and lack of credibility in legitimate avenues for redressing grievances.

In addition, the team also identified possible opportunities to mitigate conflict dynamics. Despite its actions, ZANU PF seeks legitimacy and international recognition of Zimbabwe as a sovereign state. This may provide openings for high-level diplomatic

efforts led by SADC and supported by other countries, including the US. SADC has the credibility to play a mediating role with Zimbabwean security and political leaders in advance of the next round of elections. Despite the repressive environment, Zimbabweans have managed to maintain a vibrant civil society able to implement programs at both national and local levels.

STEP 2 – ELECTORAL SECURITY PLANNING

D. Program Objectives, Counterparts and Planning

1. Primary Program Objectives

Based upon the electoral threat profiling, two new primary program objectives for USAID to consider:

- Objective #1: Improved professionalism and transparency of the ZEC to administer and oversee elections; and
- Objective #2: Reduced incentives to engage in violence in pilot communities.

The development hypothesis/theory of change underlying objective #1 is that increasing ZEC administrative and oversight capacity will eventually lead to more credible and legitimate elections, reducing the leverage that violence has over influencing election outcomes.

It is important to recognize that this objective will not immediately lead to decreased violence surrounding elections. Indeed, if not managed carefully with security programming, adequate engagement of the ZANU-PF, and other off-setting activities, measures to strengthen the ZEC could lead to more violence if ZANU-PF perceives a threat of losing power. This objective should be undertaken from the perspective of establishing the foundation of a non-partisan and accountable ZEC that will be poised to operate effectively when conditions permit.

The development hypothesis/theory of change underlying objective #2 is that by providing legitimate economic opportunities and chances for political participation, ZANU PF enforcers will be less likely to engage in violence if there are incentives and rewards for working within legitimate structures.

2. Counterparts

The matrix below shows the counterparts and anticipated electoral cycle activity period.

Table 5 - Counterparts

Institutional Type	Counterpart	Electoral Cycle Phase
Official Enforcement		
Regulatory Institutions	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and Secretariat	Electoral Cycle
Security Institutions	Joint Operation Command	Electoral Cycle
Judicial Institutions	Zimbabwe Electoral Commission	Electoral Cycle
	Transitional Justice Mechanisms	Post-Election
Social Enforcement		
Political Organizations	Political Parties	Electoral Cycle
Non-governmental Organizations	Domestic Election Observation Groups	Electoral Cycle
	Domestic Civil Society Organizations	Electoral Cycle
	International NGOs	Electoral Cycle
Traditional Leaders	Community Leaders	Electoral Cycle
	Tribal Chiefs	Electoral Cycle
	Religious Leaders	Electoral Cycle
Inter-Governmental Organizations	International Election Observation Groups	Electoral Cycle

3. Planning

a. Scenario

The planning scenario assumes that the government of inclusion will hold together through the CRP and referendum although the relationship between the parties will remain conflictive. Within the partnership, the ZANU PF will remain dominant especially with respect to the state and non-state security institutions.

Further critical assumptions include the following:

- The new ZEC chair will be approved and remain acceptable to both ZANU PF and MDC;
- The ZEC will be willing to work with a USG funded assistance partner;
- Civil society organizations will continue to have a degree of operating autonomy in Zimbabwe that allows for implementation of proposed activities without endangering participants or staff; and
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs will invite observers and not interfere with ZEC efforts to accredit international and domestic election monitors.

b. International Community

UN electoral assistance has largely been shut out of Zimbabwe. In the past, SADC has been involved in election security initiatives, including an effort at engaging generals in dialogue to bring visibility to the security sector. There is some hope that they will engage again in future elections in a mediation role and leading regional election observation missions. The European Partnership for Democracy, funded by the EU, is reaching out to voters, including youth, to provide civic education on the constitution. IFES supports voter education through local organizations, and NDI is working remotely in Johannesburg providing training for the MDC and other opposition parties. The planning process will require a more extensive inventory of existing international programs and actors.

c. Domestic Actors

Civil society organizations have played a role in past elections, including the Electoral Support Network which has trained and fielded domestic observers. There are also several ongoing small scale community-based dispute resolutions initiatives involving security forces and community members, including traditional leaders, being conducted by Zimbabwean CSOs. The planning process will require a more extensive inventory of existing domestic actors and activities.

d. US Government Interests and Constraints

Overall, US assistance supports Zimbabwe's transition to a more stable and accountable member of the southern African community, instead of a net negative force affecting the political and economic dynamics in the region. Although there is a broad donor coordination mechanism in Zimbabwe, there is a role for USAID to convene a more focused election donor coordination group. There is also a need for a higher-level diplomatic coordination effort. While the US may play a supporting role, leadership must come from SADC or other regional institutions in order to be effective in dealing with the government of Zimbabwe.

This programming supports three of the six principal areas of DG focus for the Mission: 1) enhancing civil society; 2) supporting democratic parties; and 3) promoting free and fair elections.

e. Change Agents

At this time, programming options are limited, in large part due to unwillingness to work towards legitimate democratic reform on the part of the government. Issues concerning the legal framework are less about the creation or existence of appropriate legislation and more about the absence of enforcement. At this time, there is no opening for programming in this area. Similarly, there is not an opening for police professionalization programming at this time. If this changes, consideration should be given to engaging ICITAP and others. There is not currently political will within ZANU-PF for security sector reform as mandated under the GPA. However, precedent exists for SADC led interventions focused on regular dialogues among generals which may create opportunities for engagement in the future.

However, within the Official Sector, the new ZEC presents an opportunity to advance democratic change in the event that the new Chair is willing to work with USG-funded programs. Within the Social Sector, one opportunity to promote democratic change is working with civil society organizations which have had some measure of success fostering peacebuilding, mostly through small-scale community level projects. They demonstrate willingness to work with the international community and ability to enable local reconciliation.

STEP 3 – ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING

E. Electoral Security System Programming Initiatives

This step provides program concepts that can be considered by the donor community and activities that can be specifically supported by USAID.

1. Official Enforcement Programs

a) Regulatory Institutions

1) Zimbabwe Election Commission (ZEC)

One official enforcement partner with potential for program collaboration is the new ZEC. If confirmed by both the ZANU PF and MDC, Justice Mtambanengwe will be the new chair of the ZEC. To the extent that the new ZEC can influence electoral integrity, that is both fraud and security, most sources indicate that it will be less partisan and more capable than the ZEC that oversaw the 2008 polls. The ZEC will be important for technical assistance and accreditation of domestic and international observers, although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs possesses the authority to invite international observers. Assistance to the ZEC can be focused on improving the voter registry and ballot tabulation procedures.

Specific to electoral violence, the ZEC could develop its own electoral security plan so that all security planning is not left to the security structures alone. Recognizing that the ZEC has no resources to provide electoral security, the plan is an opportunity to map out where potential electoral violence may occur if any steps can be taken to prevent it.

2) Security Institutions

While the security structures are opaque, possess no public accountability, and are the principal perpetrators of violence, it is difficult to de-link electoral security measures from the security sector reform occurring under the GPA. One tactic that can be re-employed is to establish regular dialogue among generals in Zimbabwe and the SADC region. This measure is not un-precedented and was undertaken by SADC to curb the post-election violence in 2008. A statement by the South African generals was reportedly tabled by then President Thabo Mbeki and has never been publically released. However, any engagement with the JOC and subsequent visibility into the state security apparatus potentially reduces their propensity for post-election violence in the event of an opposition win.

While police reform programs would assume the same obstacles as any other security sector reform, this assessment can offer some initial approaches if an opening occurs.

By some estimates, 40 percent of the national police have left their jobs and are being replaced by youth militia members with no training or experience. It was reported that many of those police officers who left are now employed by private security firms in Afghanistan and Iraq. If there is an opening to re-populate the ranks and re-professionalize the police, a reverse recruitment program can be undertaken to invite former police officers back to Zimbabwe to serve again.

3) Judicial Institutions

As noted above, Zimbabwe judicial institutions are repeatedly described as politicized. As a result, some form of transitional justice can be considered if violence in the next round of election meets or exceeds the intensity of post-election violence in 2008. These transitional mechanisms could be *ad hoc* in nature or, citing the Kenyan post-election violence investigation precedent, the International Criminal Court (ICC) could be engaged. Public opinion seems to favor some form of transitional justice. The Freedom House survey indicated that 64 percent of MDC members, 58 percent of members of other parties and 42 percent of ZANU PF members all favored some mechanism to reveal and document the truth about past violence rather than forget the past. However, there are several drawbacks to such engagement. First, it could provoke a backlash. Second, the mechanism is slow and may only target the leadership. And third, bringing the actual enforcers to justice will be more elusive given the lack of independence of the domestic judiciary in compensation or prosecution.

2. Social Enforcement Institutions

a) Political Parties

While the environment is generally non-permissive for political party assistance, some remote development programming can be provided to train MDC leadership on the role of the party in power. Other training can be provided to the MDC and other opposition parties in party organization, campaigning and outreach. Training can also be provided for political party agents to monitor the polls.

b) Civil Society Organizations

The network of domestic election observation groups, as exemplified by the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), provides grassroots programming and should be funded throughout the electoral cycle to provide documentation and validation on incidents and fraud. In fact, domestic monitors could receive training on electoral incident monitoring and reporting so that a consistent methodology is applied in documenting such cases for follow-up, prosecution or compensation. A training of trainers program could be conducted by the Centre for Monitoring Electoral Violence in Sri Lanka.

Various CSOs provide grassroots peace-building initiatives through village-level reconciliation meetings where victims and perpetrators of electoral violence participate and resolve their differences by creating common goals. For example, a divided community may come together on the objective that the roads surrounding their village are poor. Their common community effort becomes fixing the roads. Organizations conducting these and similar workshops and monitoring efforts include the ZESN –healing committees,” Civnet workshops, Zimbabwe Peace Project, NGO Human Rights

Forum, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, National Association of Victims of Violence and National Association of NGOs. Media employed includes radio and community-theater. In the pre-election phase, such programming can be preventative in nature, while employed in the post-election phase to mediate disputes.

Outside of the country, there are CSOs operated by the diaspora, such as the Zimbabwe Diaspora CSO Forum, provide advocacy for Zimbabweans displaced from their home country. The diaspora is located in Botswana, Namibia, Canada, United States, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. Although the Supreme Court ruled that voting outside the country was not constitutional, that issue is under debate and the MDC is introducing legislation for diaspora enfranchisement. Outreach programs can organize the diaspora to advocate for their voting rights and to be positive forces in a political transition. The CRP is a legitimate opening for the diaspora to put forward their case for enfranchisement. The diaspora is identified as an electoral security issue for two reasons. First, diasporas can play a conflictive role in domestic affairs and such programming could serve to prevent the Zimbabwe diaspora into succumbing to that posture. Second, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) has estimated that there are 3 million Zimbabweans in the diaspora. If two-thirds of them are at voting age, then the diaspora represents a vote bank of approximately 2 million persons outside of the direct reach of the machinery of violence. At the March 2008 election, the official voter registry contained 5.9 million in-country voters.

The exploitation of young people in state-sponsored militias can be addressed through youth at risk programming. Violence is key to ZANU PF political behavior and this legacy is being transferred to a new generation. Youth are being indoctrinated and the opportunity for a generational shift will be lost without addressing youth concerns. Such programming provides employment, skills training and other economic and social incentives to de-mobilize violent youth. The long term purpose is to change the political culture of ZANU PF as the current generation of leadership leaves power.

Another constituency that can be targeted to de-conflict the elections is the authentic veterans of the conflict in the 1960s and 1970s, as well as subsequent retirees from the armed forces. While “war veteran” has been a label applied to certain street level perpetrators of violence, sources indicate that there is a valid societal need to develop an association that advocates for and provides social services for these veterans and retirees. By providing financial stability, these groups may be less prone to political and financial manipulation by ZANU PF. At least two efforts have been made to establish veterans’ associations – the Veterans Reserve and the Veterans League of Zimbabwe. If established, the core services provided would include trauma treatment and healing; skills, employment and livelihood training; and a framework for soldier retirement.

While civil society organizations can monitor, advocate and build peace, a comprehensive program package anticipates that violence, injury and deaths are going to occur. Accordingly, the organizations which provide humanitarian services to the victims of electoral violence should be included in programming considerations. Known as “protection clusters,” the organizations include UNICEF, International Committee for the Red Cross and International Organization for Migration (IOM) providing housing and relocation services for the displaced; Legal Services Foundation for *pro bono* case legal representation; and Counseling Services Unit for medical services to victims of torture.

c) Traditional Leaders

Traditional leaders have been coerced and exploited by the ruling party. It is important to maintain the involvement of traditional leaders in the small-scale community peacebuilding projects that are sponsored by Zimbabwean civil society organizations. Traditional leaders appear to have the trust of communities in rural areas compared to urban ones. In a 2009 Afrobarometer survey, 71 percent of respondents indicated that they trusted traditional leaders either “a lot” or “somewhat,” compared with 35 percent of urban respondents. And, 62 percent of rural respondents felt that traditional leaders listened to their views and comments. In addition, conflict management and resolution training for teachers at polling stations could be provided as an extra measure of security in case of localized disruptions.

3. Program Activities

The following new program activities can be considered by USAID as within its manageable interests.

Objective #1: Improved professionalism and transparency of the ZEC to administer and oversee elections.

- Assist ZEC to improve the voter registry;
- Strengthen ZEC capacity to accredit domestic and international observers;
- Support ZEC ability to establish and implement ballot tabulation procedures; and
- Assist ZEC with addressing electoral security issues, beginning with mapping out potential areas of violence.

Objective #2: Reduced incentives to engage in violence in pilot communities.

- Capitalize on existing community-level peace building networks to scale up local-level programming and bring together security forces and community members, including traditional leaders, to address electoral dispute resolution. An important focus of these peace building activities is to ensure representation of youth, war veterans and other marginalized groups to bring them into community decision-making processes. In addition, youth and war veterans will receive training in conducting dispute resolution and as feasible be employed in program scale-up;
- Support for the ZESN, a collection of organizations training and fielding domestic election observers. Working through ZESN, observers will be trained to document and validate incidents of electoral violence. At an individual level, knowing that this information is being collected may deter acts of violence. Information will also be made available to the ZEC to inform their security planning and begin to foster relationships with civil society organizations. At a higher level, in the event that some form of transitional justice is undertaken, or the ICC steps in, the data will serve as evidence. Similar to other activities under this objective, youth and war veterans will be engaged as observers and employed as feasible as the project scales up;

- Support existing initiatives to develop a veterans association able to provide social and economic benefits to war veterans, as well as to advocate on their behalf;
- Provide conflict resolution training to teachers who serve at polling stations;
- Identify linkages with other USAID programs that present economic and political opportunities for youth and war veterans.

STEP 4 – MONITORING AND EVALUATION

F. Evaluation Framework for USAID Programs

1. Illustrative Indicators

Although actual programs are highly speculative at this time, the following illustrative indicators may be considered for adaptation. Note that this set of indicators is not adequate to capture all aspects associated with the program objectives, and only serve as examples.

Objective #1: Improved professionalism and transparency of the ZEC to administer and oversee elections.

Table 6 - M & E Illustrative Indicators

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of election officials trained with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance.
	Level of voter confidence in ZEC.
	Number of ZEC coordinated civilian-military electoral security activities.
	Percentage of errors in voter registry.
	Percentage of eligible voters registered to vote.
	Number of international monitors accredited by ZEC according to international standards.
	Number of domestic monitors accredited by ZEC according to international standards.

Objective #2: Reduced incentives to engage in violence in pilot communities.

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of conflict mediation/resolution skills with USG assistance.
	Number of groups trained in inclusive consensus building techniques with USG assistance.
	Number of domestic election observers trained with USG assistance.
Custom Indicators	Percentage of community electoral dispute resolution activities including community youth.
	Percentage of community electoral dispute resolution activities led by youth in pilot communities.
	Percentage of community electoral dispute activities led by war veterans in pilot communities.
	Level of services provided by veterans association to war veterans.
	Number of veterans receiving services from veterans association.

G. Conclusion

Preventing electoral violence will be a difficult goal to achieve. While the current form of violence has a legacy of only ten years, ZANU PF has consistently employed violence in pursuit of its political goals. Indeed, violence in anticipation of the constitutional referendum has already commenced. State security structures and their political counterparts are entrenched, well organized, and resourced to maintain power and employ violence in the process. The spoilers' use of vote fraud is another demonstration of the link between violence and fraud, and may suggest that ZANU PF appreciates it cannot win an election unless it employs both.

IV. COLOMBIA

BACKGROUND – CONDITIONS AND HISTORY

A. Conditions

Modern political violence in Colombia began with *La Violencia* in the 1940s, a period of violent confrontation between the two main political parties, the Conservative Party (PC) and the Liberal Party (PL). However, this violence was curbed in the 1950s through the formation of an alliance between the two parties – the National Front. However, electoral violence today bears little resemblance to that of *La Violencia* in terms of targets, perpetrators and motives.

This assessment occurred a month before the March 2010 election and while campaigning was underway for the presidential election in May. The March election included senators, representatives, Andean Parliament, public consultation on Caribbean region status and presidential primaries for the PC and the Green Party.

The presence of illegal armed groups is a major security condition. Many sources indicate that there remains widespread support for the Democratic Security initiative, Uribe's security framework, because of perceived military gains made against the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) and the de-mobilization of the paramilitaries. However, while these military gains are real, the FARC is said to be regrouping in border zones with Venezuela and Ecuador and have created a new front in the department of Guaviare. In addition, the justice system has exposed 86 politicians who linked to the paramilitaries through bribes and pay-offs in an investigation termed the "para-politics scandal." However, the resilience of the paramilitaries was evident in the March 14 congressional election. Some political analysts say that nearly one third of the newly elected lawmakers, many of them political novices, have questionable ties to paramilitary groups. This number is roughly equal to the number of members named in the original para-politics scandal. Under the party title of the Party of National Integration (PIN), eight new senators out of 102 were elected with reputed paramilitary connections.

B. History of Electoral Violence

The Mission de Observation Electoral (MOE) posits two kinds of risks or threats to electoral integrity. One kind of risk is termed "passive" in nature. These passive risks concern voting anomalies, that is, atypical voting such as unusually high turnout, no blank or null votes, or big majorities for one candidate. The second risk factor is violence, that is, attacks on candidates, displacement, kidnapping, sabotage of electoral facilities or materials and voter intimidation. MOE also examines risks in terms of political power, that is, to which interests is a candidate loyal – coffee, oil, drugs, or paramilitaries to name a few.

Violence has been a feature on the Colombia political landscape since 1899 when the War of 1000 Days was fought between the Conservative and Liberal Parties until 1902. Conflict re-emerged between the two political parties in 1945 triggering another period of strife called *La Violencia*. This conflict was eventually resolved through the formation of a ruling coalition by the two powers called Frente Nacional governing from 1958 to 1974. However, during the 1960s, leftist guerilla groups such as the FARC and Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) emerged to challenge the political status quo. It was a period that also saw the resurgence of the Communist Party. Up to 2006, voting was suppressed in FARC areas. The FARC fought, as one source described it, "to end the state and not take it over." And, in part, as a response to the leftist guerrillas' tactics of territorial capture and suppression, the 1990s saw the emergence of the so-called paramilitaries, ostensibly engaged by powerful interests in commerce or patronage to counter the guerrilla threats and retain property. In paramilitary areas voter turnout was encouraged, particularly for paramilitary-backed candidates

Violent incidents afflicted the voting which took place on March 14, 2010. One major incident occurred during the time while the assessment was being conducted in Colombia. In addition to the congressional elections, the department of Guaviare was holding a special election for governor. This election was to replace former governor Oscar de Jesus Lopez Cadavid who was arrested in 2007 for his alleged links with paramilitaries. On February 14, Jose Perez Restrepo, a candidate for governor, was ambushed and kidnapped by FARC guerillas but subsequently rescued by police and army. Although Restrepo sustained gunshot wounds to his neck and leg, he continued with his campaign.

Despite the persistent threat of electoral violence, there are some migrating factors that should be considered. First, the FARC has been pushed out of the central part of the country toward the Northeast and Southwest with Venezuela and Ecuador, respectively. In the Central-West region, previous elections experienced threats to community leaders, displacement, assassinations and group proxy voting. Entire villages were emptied to prevent voting from taken place. These extreme tactics have not been seen in more recent elections. And some paramilitary violence has transformed into the pursuit of political power, albeit sometime by illicit means. There is reported to be a reduction in overall electoral violence since the 2002 election.

STEP 1 – ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

C. Profile of Electoral Threats

1. Official Sector

Regulatory

Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

The CNE is the national body responsible for policy and supervision of national and sub-national elections. It partners with other agencies, such as the Civil Registry, to operationally conduct elections. Electoral administration is generally regarded as meeting international standards. However, the CNE lacks the capacity to enforce political finance regulation leaving open the opportunities for “black money” in political campaigns.

Security

Plan Democratia is the security plan for the election engaging the government, police, army, navy and air force. The core committee concerned with electoral security logistics involves the Ministry Of Defense, Ministry Of Interior, High Military Command, and National Registrar directing as many as 150,000 security forces protecting 77,000 voting locations.

Judicial

There is an institutional weakness in prosecuting electoral crimes reflecting a lack of capacity investigation and conviction. There are two bodies mandated to adjudicate electoral crimes and disputes: 1) the Prosecutor General (crimes); and 2) the CNE (electoral disputes). But, neither agency has the training and capacity to conduct adequate investigations, prepare cases, resolve crimes and disputes and assign penalties or compensation

2. Social Sector

a. Political Parties

While political parties have not been the targets or perpetrators of electoral violence in recent years, one exceptional case to note is the violent targeting of an entire political party. In the early 1980s, following a series of peace talks between the Colombian government, FARC and various communist factions, the government agreed to support a unified political party for the marginalized groups. Named the Unión Patriótica (UP), the party was an opportunity for FARC members to peacefully participate in local and national governance.

While the Colombia government pledged support and protection to the new party, its members were quickly targeted by violence and threats. Eye-witness accounts recorded in the 2003 documentary film “El Baile Rojo” (the Red Dance) describe large-scale, methodic assassinations of party members and leaders by the Colombian army and paramilitary. From 1986 through 1994, provincial and national UP party leaders (elected or campaigning) were regularly attacked or killed. Death threats to and disappearance of party members and their families was widespread. Most party members not targeted by the “UP genocide” sought political asylum in countries such as Ecuador, Canada, Spain or Sweden.

b. Communities and Individuals at Risk

The targets of electoral violence can be classified into two major categories: 1) communities; and 2) individuals. This distinction is important because program strategies to counter community threats will vary from those of individual protection. In this context, the term “communities” refers to groups of individuals brought together geographically as well as by ethnicity, gender, age or political association. In this sense, IDPs, rural populations, women, youth and indigenous peoples can be considered targets or communities at risk for electoral violence. Residents of poorer neighborhoods in major cities are growing as targets of electoral violence as well.

Individuals can also be the targets of violence. These individuals can further be classified on two levels: 1) public; and 2) private. Public targets are incumbent elected officials particularly mayors, departmental governors and those on municipal councils. Candidates for these offices can also be considered a public individual targets as well. Private individual targets include business people, by-standers or competing perpetrators.

c. Spoilers

Spoilers that perpetrate electoral violence can be classified into three major groupings: 1) guerillas; 2) paramilitaries; and 3) *bacrim* (bandits and criminals). In some cases, members of the Colombia military have been cited as perpetrators of violence, but this involvement is episodic compared with the other three types. The FARC and ELN have suffered military and political set-backs and are changing tactics because of a loss of grassroots support. Guerillas are now reportedly traveling in small groups, dressed as civilians using small arms and explosives, unlike their history of military-style uniforms

and demeanors. The guerillas can be expected to interfere with the election where they have some control or presence.

The term “paramilitary” has changed meaning since the demobilization campaign of 2006. Before demobilization, paramilitaries were organized in a military style with hierarchy, weapons and operations reflecting these characteristics. However, under the current scenario, *Systema de Alertas Tempranas* (SAT) has identified 22 new groups organized along five major structures in the regions where the demobilization of paramilitaries occurred. While still possessing military weapons and training, the new groups appear to be less disciplined than the former ranks and their involvement and tactics in the 2011 municipal elections remain to be seen.

The *bacrim* will remain engaged in electoral violence and pay-offs as long as there is demand for their criminal enterprise and they require acquiescence from public officials to sustain it.

The army has targeted guerilla groups with what has been claimed an excessive use of force and violence directed toward civilian populations subjugated by the guerillas but viewed as FARC sympathizers by the military. There is also a scandal called *false positivos* where the army recruit youth under false pretenses and then portrayed them as captured guerillas.

While the motive of each spoiler may vary, there are three underlying motives that all three groups have in common. These three motives are described in the table below.

Table 7 - Spoiler Motives

Type of Control	Description
Territorial Control	Important from a military perspective to control the flow of merchandise, information and people.
Electoral Control	Important from a legitimacy perspective to control the means by which official are installed into office or not.
Municipal Decision Control	Important from an economic perspective to control the contracting, hiring and transfer subsidies of local governments.

While these commons threads can be identified, each group is motivated by particular objectives. For guerillas, their efforts are designed to strike against the state; whereas paramilitaries have employed violence to influence votes and get their candidates elected.

Guerrillas are beginning to return to public life after redefining their strategies to regain grassroots support. FARC continues to recruit among youth and indigenous communities. Paramilitaries are more complicated because there is a military and economic dimension. Paramilitaries want control of capital where guerillas want drug money to buy guns; they are not interested in the accumulation of capital. The *bacrim* and mafia families form relationships with elected officials and voters and obtain their loyalty. These relationships can be successful because of the fragility of political parties.

The table below describes the perpetrator, electoral phase and tactic against which type of target

Table 8 - Spoiler Tactics and Targets

Spoiler	Electoral Phase	Target	Tactic
Guerilla	Pre-Election	Voters from at risk communities	Threat, intimidation, injury, displacement and murder
	Pre-Election	Officials and Candidates (departmental and municipal)	Kidnapping, assassination and anti-personnel mines
	Election Day	Voters from at risk communities	Road blockages
	Post-Election	Sensitive electoral materials	Road blockages and sabotage
Paramilitary	Pre-Election	Voters from at risk communities	Bribery, intimidation, kidnapping, voter buying, ID document theft and group or unqualified proxy voting for their candidates
		Officials and Candidates (departmental and municipal)	Kidnapping and assassination
	Election Day		
	Post-Election	Officials and Candidates (national, departmental and municipal)	Bribery and intimidation
<i>Bacrim</i>	Post-Election	Public Officials (national, departmental and municipal)	Bribery, intimidation, kidnapping and assassination

3. Electoral Threat Environment

a. Electoral Cycle

Threats associated with each electoral phase are described in the table above.

b. Locations

Spoilers operate in different locations but may also compete in resource rich regions. The FARC has possessed a traditional stronghold in the rural central-southeast to

northeast region stretching from the Ecuadoran and Venezuelan borders. This area includes the departments of Caquetá, Guaviare (February kidnapping attempt on gubernatorial candidate), Meta and Vichada. The ELN has operated in Arauca and other locations in the northern part of the country. The former strongholds for paramilitary violence were the departments of Meta, Arauca, Norte de Santander, Magdalena, Cesar, Cordoba and Nariño. Nariño possesses a large indigenous population. Paramilitaries are emerging as gangs and militias in urban areas such as Cali, Medellin, and south Bogota. And, in the north and elsewhere, families have dominated local politics for decades in a feudal sense and are disposed to work pragmatically even with the *bacrim*. Although the type of conflict varies, the locations of violence are widespread and national in scope. Electoral conflict maps are shown as Annex VI.

c. Intensity

By one report, FARC carried out 1,429 attacks in the first ten months of 2009, a 30 percent increase over the same period in 2008. The violence has triggered the displacement of from three to four million out of a population of 43.6 million, or up to nine percent of the population. The intensity coding for Colombia is a 3.

3. Implications for Electoral Conflict Dynamics

This electoral threat profiling has identified six potential drivers of future electoral conflict. These driver include the following:

- Paramilitary groups, guerillas, and *bacrim* have become an integral part of political competition, particularly at the local (municipal) level in order to secure resources including land, public budgets, and protection for criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking. Illicit money going into politics and violence are interlinked. Many local governments are not considered effective or legitimate by voters. Instead, local governments often represent illegal financial interests;
- Incumbent politicians often receive illicit funds from criminal interests to finance party campaigns in return for privileges and protection to freely conduct illegal activities, resulting in an environment of lawlessness and impunity;
- Colombia has suffered a long history of political violence which is now considered the norm rather than the exception resulting in a fusion of elections and violence;
- Demobilization of paramilitaries is incomplete. While the leaders have been demobilized, their organizational structures remain intact. Demobilization has had a dampening effect on violence in the short-term however, it remains to be seen how these reshaped paramilitaries will respond to the upcoming elections;
- Weak local governments are susceptible to capture by wealthy families, which serves to delegitimize the electoral process; and
- Weak and fragmented political parties have left space that is being filled by the entrance of illegal armed groups into politics. In some cases, these groups are able to portray themselves as more effective advocates and service providers for

constituents than the parties themselves. As a result, violence and politics remain intertwined.

The electoral threat profiling also identified several resiliencies, or opportunities to potentially mitigate conflict dynamics. At the national level, electoral administration in Colombia is generally regarded as meeting international standards. Civil society and government institutions are experienced at monitoring and mapping political violence, enabling them to work with security forces to identify at risk communities and respond accordingly. There are strong central government security forces able to provide a degree of security to the majority of the population. Overall, there has been a reduction in violence since the 2002 elections, due in part to military setbacks for the FARC and demobilization of the paramilitaries; however, the latter has also given rise to uncertainty about the tactics of remaining paramilitaries.

STEP 2 – ELECTORAL SECURITY PLANNING

D. Program Objectives, Partners and Planning

1. Primary Program Objectives

Based upon the electoral threat profiling, two new primary program objectives have been identified for USAID to consider:

- Objective #1: Improved capacity of the CNE to provide electoral integrity and security; and
- Objective #2: Increased civil society capacity to support credible local elections.

The development hypothesis/theory of change underlying objective #1 is that building the capacity of the CNE to improve political finance enforcement will curb illicit financing in politics and links to violence. At the same time, introducing new procedures to protect communities at risk and voters through continued coordination with security forces will enhance electoral security.

The development hypothesis/theory of change underlying objective #2 is that enhancing the ability of CSOs to engage in local government monitoring (watchdog) functions and outreach to voters will improve the legitimacy of local elections.

However, these objectives must also recognize that there are recidivist influences in the environment that will persist and provoke violence. These influences include the following:

- Drugs – eclipses other issues;
- Electoral barons – families of impunity; and
- Culture and history of political violence – latent force and an expectation.

2. Counterparts

The matrix below shows the counterparts and anticipated electoral cycle activity period.

Table 9 - Counterparts

Institutional Type	Counterpart	Electoral Cycle Phase
Official Enforcement		
Regulatory Institutions	Consejo Nacional Electoral	Electoral Cycle
Security Institutions	Police	Electoral Cycle
	SAT	Electoral Cycle
Judicial Institutions	Prosecutor General	
	Consejo Nacional Electoral	
Social Enforcement		
Political Organizations	Political Parties	Electoral Cycle
Non-governmental Organizations	Domestic Election Observation Groups	Electoral Cycle
	Domestic Civil Society Organizations	Electoral Cycle
	International NGOs	Electoral Cycle
Traditional Leaders	Community Leaders	Electoral Cycle
	Tribal Chiefs	Electoral Cycle
	Religious Leaders	Electoral Cycle
Inter-Governmental Organizations	International Election Observation Groups	Electoral Cycle

3. Planning Elements

a. Scenario

The planning scenario assumes that the FARC and *bacrim* will continue their tactics in the 2011 municipal elections. While that is assumed, this scenario also includes a continuation of a robust security response to the more militaristic of the illegal armed groups, that is, the guerillas and some of the paramilitaries. Given their apparent success on the national level, the “old” paramilitaries can be expected to reach for influence in the municipal elections and vulnerable municipalities can be identified as potential hot spots.

Further critical planning assumptions include the following:

- CNE will continue to administer free and fair elections by international standards;
- Security will remain at a level that allows civil society organization to operate and fulfill program activities;
- CNE, the Prosecutor General and Congress are willing to work with the USG on legislation and enforcement of political finance issues;
- Political finance reform legislation will be enacted into law

b. International Community

There are several programs underway in Colombia related to electoral security. NDI has an ongoing program providing assistance to political parties on political finance and compliance issues. The EU is funding Peace Laboratories, small scale peace building initiatives. Additionally, UNDP is implementing governance programs. The planning process will require a more extensive inventory of existing international programs and actors.

c. Domestic Actors

Several government and non-state actors are implementing programs around issues of political violence and peace building in Colombia. SAT, a unit of the Public Defender's Office, conducts analysis of early warning signs to monitor the dynamics of armed conflict and its impact on the population. They work with security forces to alert them to communities at risk. There are also civil society programs designed to monitor, document, map and understand political violence being undertaken by organizations such as MOE, Fundacion Nacional, Fundacion Arco Iris and Fundacion Idea de la Pax. The planning process will require a more extensive inventory of domestic actors and programs.

d. US Government Interests and Constraints

This programming supports USAID's overarching goal to achieve a "sustainable reduction in the production of illicit drugs and the promotion of peace in Colombia." It also supports one of USAID's Strategic Objectives, that is, "Enhanced Democratic Governance."

Within Enhanced Democratic Governance, this programming supports the further areas of interest identified by USAID:

- Judicial reform implemented and access to justice broadened;
- Human rights protected;
- Improved transparency and efficiency in the use of public resources; and
- Conflict mitigated

e. Change agents

The CNE is in a position to address issues of illicit funding of candidates and political parties and draw attention to the linkages between this funding and violence. With the appropriate legislative framework, regulations and internal capacity to implement and enforce financial disclosure laws, the CNE has the potential to begin deterring the flow of illicit money to political actors.

Civil society in Colombia is quite strong and sophisticated, particularly at the national level. By working to partner national level NGOs with their community-based

counterparts, there should be opportunities to strengthen CSO initiatives to monitor local governments and educate voters.

STEP 3 – ELECTORAL SECURITY PROGRAMMING

E. Electoral Security System Programming Initiatives

This step provides program concepts that can be considered by the donor community and activities that can be specifically supported by USAID.

1. Official Enforcement Programs

a) Regulatory Institutions

1) Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE)

The CNE has responsibility to enforce political finance disclosure laws for candidates. However, by its own admission, there is insufficient capacity at the CNE to conduct adequate investigation of disclosure reports submitted by candidates. Moreover, while the audit of reported sources of legitimate revenues is limited, investigation into illicit sources is out of reach. Therefore, providing capacity building programs in organizational structure, skills training and employment can be leveraged to combat the influence of “black money” in electoral violence.

The CNE can also introduce some procedural changes to provide communities at risk with added protections. For example, in communities where reporting the outcomes of elections by polling station may place the voters at risk, the CNE could change procedure to only report results by clusters of polling stations, thereby expanding the reporting base and making retaliation more difficult. This could inhibit the practice of “zoning” voters, where illegal armed groups confiscate the identity documents of voters, particularly IDPs, and “register” them to vote at polling stations advantageous to the armed group.

Further assistance can be provided to the National Commission for the Coordination and Monitoring of Electoral processes which is mandated to guarantee the right to vote, promote transparency and prevent fraud but also suffers from a lack of capacity to investigate and respond to citizens’ complaints.

b) Security Institutions

In order to counter the guerilla tactics of road blockages on Election Day and in the post-election period, security forces could adopt an approach that was used in the 1996 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In those elections, voters were entitled to vote in their pre-displacement place of residence. In some cases, this meant that the voter would have to travel from the Bosniac and Croat Federation to the Republika Srpska, potentially hostile travel in the immediate post-conflict period. To make travel safer, the Implementation Force (IFOR) identified a dozen “Recommended Voter Routes” that its troops secured for voter travel. Similarly, Colombia security forces could identify and secure certain routes to assure that there is access to the polls by communities at risk.

Established in 2001, SAT is a unit of the Public Defender's office that conducts analysis of early warning signs to prevent mass violations of human rights, to monitor the dynamics of armed conflict and impact on the population and to warn authorities in to take measures for communities at risk.

The SAT produces three kinds of reports:

- Imminent threats – when a situation of possible risk to a community exists. It is issued to local authorities. The reports identify a risk zone and population at risk. At risk groups include Afro-Colombians, indigenous people, women, children and local leaders.
- Structural reports – investigation to identify the political, social and economic factors that influence a conflict
- Special reports – thematic in nature (electoral violence is one such thematic area)

The information from these reports is used to create risk scenarios and make recommendations on specific preventative actions that can be taken to protect the particular communities at risk.

Although SAT's mandate is a domestic one, the risk that the office monitors possesses a transnational dimension with respect to armed role players that migrate across the borders of Venezuela or Ecuador as well as victims of violence fleeing across border for safety. Internationalizing the outreach of SAT could serve to provide the global community with a better appreciation of the actions taken by the government of Colombia to prevent violence and the complexity of the task which they face. It would also more accurately reflect the transnational character of the violence and its impact on the region. Such an internationalization of outreach can include the availability of SAT materials, reports and electronic archives in English and other languages, and enhanced SAT presence at human right conferences and international internships.

For individual candidates and officials, the Colombian intelligence agency *Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad* (DAS) has deployed over 3,000 agents to protect congressional and presidential candidates. At this writing, 27 candidates had requested and received special protect from the agency.

c) Judicial Institutions

The investigations and prosecution of members of Congress involved with the para-politics scandal should continue. The new Congress should not be immune from investigation as well. Assistance programming can be directed to build such capacity and train staff at the Prosecutor General's office.

2. Social Enforcement Programs

a) Political Parties

While political parties are currently not the perpetrators of electoral violence, they are also not deterrents to it. The 1991 constitution brought a multi-party system into the

Colombia political landscape where previously the scene had been dominated by the PC and PL. There are currently five major political parties including the PC and PL, namely, *Partido de la U*, *Partido Cambio Radical*, *Polo Democratico Alternativo* with over 15 minor parties of varying purpose and identity. This political fragmentation has diminished parties' roles being the grassroots advocates for supporters and amalgamators of public opinion. This gap has been perversely filled, in part, by illegal armed groups. Next year will be 20 years since the adoption of the 1991 constitution and could be an occasion to review the political party system for opportunities to reform it into a more effective stakeholder in Colombian democracy.

Assistance to parties should continue in the area of political finance. For example, NDI has provided parties with software for easy and consistent reporting of political finance in compliance with the law.

b) Civil Society Organizations

Political violence in Colombia is well monitored, documented, mapped and understood. The monitoring programs of such organizations as MOE, Fundacion Nacional, Fundacion Arco Iris and Fundacion Idea de la Pax should be continued for the 2011 elections. Monitoring should be conducted for the March and May 2010 elections in order to identify the tactics and hotspots for the FARC and new paramilitaries so that preparations can be made for the 2011 election to counter these threats. Some monitoring efforts should be focused on communities at risk. Civil society monitoring can also be focused on local governance. In particular, monitoring will ensure issuance of local contracts, management of subsidies and other aspects of municipal financial management. Organizations such as Congreso Visible could be encouraged to adapt and employ their monitoring methodology on the sub-national level. Finally, through organizations such as Transparencia, monitoring political finance disclosures can be conducted and analysis provided to explore links between money and violence. A civil society report on the para-politics scandal should be developed for additional documentation and analysis on the scandal.

In addition to monitoring, civil society can organize civic education programs, particularly in zones that have been cleared of guerillas and paramilitaries. In these areas, the populations have been subjugated and either told how to vote or not to vote. Their experience between voting and governance has been dysfunctional. Therefore, education programs can be useful to provide voters with a basic understanding of the role of elections, a secret ballot and freedom of choice to empower their decision-making and make them less prone to manipulation by political interests that emerge to fill the gaps left by the armed groups.

Small scale peacebuilding initiatives can also be encouraged such as the Peace Laboratories funded by the EU, governance projects by UNDP and the Peace and Development fund of the World Bank. And, protection clusters for populations affected by violence should anticipate an increase in electoral violence next year. Humanitarian services such as housing, medical care, food, water, education and security should be provided for IDPs and other communities at risk for electoral violence.

c) Traditional Leaders

Traditional leaders can play a pivotal role in electoral violence. In some cases, these leaders are reported to be co-opted by the guerillas or paramilitaries and coerce their communities to vote for certain candidates or not vote at all. Regardless, community leaders, particularly in rural areas and among indigenous people among the first contacted as the FARC or paramilitaries seek territorial gains. Strengthening the sub-national SAT reporting network by engaging traditional leaders on a more frequent basis may serve as a earlier “trip wire” to anticipate violence than would otherwise be detected.

3. USAID Program Activities

The following new program activities can be considered by USAID as within its manageable interests.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of the CNE to provide electoral integrity and security.

- Assist the CNE and Congress to draft legislation that will address political finance reform, a critical gap in the existing legal framework that serves to perpetuate political violence;
- Once the legislation is passed, support CNE with drafting, implementing, and enforcing supporting regulations;
- Strengthen the capacity of CNE to effectively regulate revenues and expenditures of legitimate financial transactions submitted as part of financial disclosure;
- Improve ability of CNE to investigate financial disclosure reports filed by candidates and political parties for illicit sources of funding;
- Partner with Transparencia (local chapter of TI) to build on their existing work monitoring financial disclosures at the national level to bring attention to the concrete connections between money and acts of violence;
- Support the international outreach of SAT materials to draw international attention to the cross-border aspects of illicit financing and political violence;
- Assist CNE to introduce procedural changes to better protect communities at risk; and
- Provide assistance to the Prosecutor General (electoral crimes) and CNE (electoral disputes) to conduct adequate investigations, prepare cases, resolve crimes and disputes and assign penalties or compensation.

Objective #2: Increased civil society capacity to support credible local elections.

- Work with organizations such as Congreso Visible to adapt their methodology of monitoring Congress to local governments;
- Partner with organizations such as Congreso Visible to engage CSOs in monitoring key local government financial transactions such as departmental contracts, subsidy distribution, hiring and extraction agreements;
- Support CSO efforts to disseminate information concerning key local government financial transactions to citizens; and
- Work with CSOs to launch civic education programs focusing on areas that have been cleared of paramilitaries and guerillas.

STEP 4 – MONITORING AND EVALUATION**F. Evaluation Framework for USAID Programs****1. Illustrative Indicators**

Although actual programs are highly speculative at this time, the following illustrative indicators may be considered for adaptation. Note that this set of indicators is not adequate to capture all aspects associated with the program objectives, and only serve as examples.

Objective #1: Improved capacity of the CNE to enhance electoral integrity and security.**Table 10 - M & E Illustrative Indicators**

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of election officials trained with USG assistance.
	Number of laws or amendments to ensure credible elections drafted with USG technical assistance.
	Number of electoral administration procedures and systems strengthened with USG assistance.
	Number of organizations receiving USG support to promote development of and compliance with political finance regulations and legislation.
Custom Indicators	Degree to which new draft legislation addresses illicit funding in politics.
	Incidents of electoral violence in at risk communities.
	Number of financial disclosure cases prepared by CNE prosecuted by Prosecutor General.
	Level of public awareness of linkages between illicit financing and political violence.

Objective #2: Increased civil society capacity to support credible local elections.

Indicator Type	Description of Indicator
Standard Indicators	Number of people reached by USG assisted voter education.
	Number of CSOs strengthened that promote political participation and voter education.
	Number of organizations receiving USG support to promote development of and compliance with political finance regulations and legislation.
Custom Indicators	Level of public awareness of linkages between illicit financing and political violence.
	Documented incidents of local government financial misconduct identified by CSOs.
	Incidents of local government financial misconduct disseminated to public by CSOs.
	Targeted citizens' abilities to identify and understand basic elements of the electoral system.

G. Conclusion

While the duration and intensity of electoral violence in Colombia has exceeded that of the other two cases, recent military gains offer some prospect for a resolution of guerilla-instigated electoral violence. However, this threat has persisted since the 1960s and guerilla strongholds, while diminished, still remain. The corrosive dynamics of the paramilitaries have emerged on two levels: 1) the “old” paramilitaries using “black money” to buy votes and influence at all levels of government; and 2) the “new” paramilitaries who are trained and militarily equipped but lack the fighting discipline of their predecessors. These threats will test the fortitude of Colombia judicial and prosecutorial institutions as well as security forces as they engage with the new paramilitaries. Recognizing that the 2011 municipal elections are potential magnets for violence, the steps above can be taken to contain the violence and, through predictive and pre-emptive actions, prevent some of the violence from occurring.

V. COMPARATIVE POINTS FROM ASSESSMENT

While each of these cases is distinctive in terms of targets, spoilers' tactics and intensity, they all possess some common features which may be instructive in developing strategic, policies and programs for electoral security in general.

A. Money and Violence

In each case, connections emerged between violence and illicit sources of political finance. For example, in Bangladesh the term “money and muscle” is used to describe the coercive tactics employed by political parties – vote buying and assault – to influence voting. The prospect of rents and patronage for the winning party fuels intra-party violence in the post-election period.

In Zimbabwe, public and natural resources are used to finance the violence. To fund the 2008 post-election violence, the government had only to print more Zimbabwean dollars to pay the perpetrators to act. With the economy now *“dollarized,”* the government does not have this funding option, but it reportedly has used diamonds as currency for weapons purchases by the state.

And, in Colombia, the guerillas seek drug money, kidnapping ransoms and extortion to fund its arms and operations. The paramilitaries have sought to leverage the wealth that they accumulate for bribes to public officials and vote buying for their candidates. And, illicit funds and violence from *bacrim* are used to influence local authorities.

B. Land and Electoral Violence

Each case demonstrated some connection between land issues and electoral violence. In Bangladesh, the post-election economic shifts described above also involve land acquisition pursuits by the winners and land grabs from minorities who pressured to sell.

In Zimbabwe, there has been a recurring pattern of commercial farm invasions escalating in the pre-election period with farmland appropriated for ZANU PF supporters. In addition, to break up the urban base for MDC, in 2005 Operation Murambatsvina, *“clear the filth”* was conducted by the government around Harare. Thousands of homes were razed and people displaced. This tactic was repeated in 2006 and 2007 through Operation Chikorokoza Chapera, *“stop the gold panning,”* against miners. Post-election violence in 2008 saw further destruction of homes and displacements.

And, in Colombia, land is the territorial control of the *“non-state”* that FARC seeks to dominate and suppress voting; the territorial control of natural resources that the paramilitaries seek to exploit and buy votes; and the territorial control needed by the *bacrim* for criminal safe havens and contraband transits routes.

C. Militaries Play an Active Role

In all three cases, the military plays an active role in the electoral process. In Bangladesh, 50,000 troops were deployed around election time and the army played a key logistical role in the conduct of voter registration. The army plays a similar security role in Colombia, with over 100,000 troops and police deployed on Election Day to protect polling station. To the contrary, in Zimbabwe, the military is a key actor in the state security apparatus which provides leadership and funding for electoral violence against MDC supporters and other opponents to the regime.

D. Election Day is Relatively Peaceful

In each case, most of the electoral violence occurs in the pre-election and post-election periods. Election Day is generally peaceful.

E. First-Past-the-Post

For each country, the electoral system of the lower chamber is First-Past-the-Post conducted on a single-mandate district system. The system produces *“winner take all”* results creating high stakes for each election. However, the impact of the system varies from country to country. In Bangladesh, the electoral system drive the conflict from the

standpoint of violence in competition, whereas in Zimbabwe electoral districts are drawn to favor ZANU PF candidacies. In Colombia, the electoral system does not appear to be one of the central drivers of conflict.

F. Weak Judiciaries and Culture of Impunity

In each country, the prosecution of suspects and the award of reparations to victims are impeded by weak and politicized judicial institutions resulting in a culture of impunity surrounding electoral violence

G. Role of Tradition Leaders

In each country, traditional leaders played a role in mediating or enabling electoral violence. In Bangladesh, to engage women in the process, voter education messages were disseminated employing local mosques and mullahs. In Zimbabwe, traditional leaders may serve as the enforcement agents for ZANU PF on the community or tribal level. And in Colombia, may also play a pivotal role in protecting or co-opting their communities by illegal armed groups.

H. Political Freedom

In none of the cases is the country considered “Free” by the Freedom House rating system. As Freedom House political rights ratings, Bangladesh is Partly Free (3) Zimbabwe is Not Free (6), and Colombia is Partly Free (3).

I. Economic Indicators

Some research has suggested that there are economic thresholds that may trigger violence. Such indicators employed for this purpose are the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Capita and the GINI coefficient of income inequality. For the GDP Per Capita figure, the threshold for electoral violence is benchmarked at \$2,700 per year, that is, countries where the GDP is lower than that figure are at risk. Both Bangladesh and Zimbabwe fail to meet that threshold. If the GINI coefficient is higher than 40, then income inequality may make an election vulnerable to violence. Both Zimbabwe and Colombia have GINI coefficients higher than 40 with Bangladesh approaching that figure. A comparative graph of these indicators is shown as Annex VII

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The intention of this assessment is threefold. First, it is intended to test a methodology to conduct electoral security assessment with the objective of identifying program interventions that can result from the assessment findings. Second, the cases explored in this assessment will be incorporated in the Technical Guidance Handbook on Electoral Security. And third, the assessment is intended to provide the USAID Missions in Bangladesh, Zimbabwe and Colombia and others in the international community with tangible program initiatives to address electoral violence in their host countries.

This series of assessments tested a methodology for electoral security program development. Past approaches to electoral security programming have been met with varying levels of effectiveness because, in part, the program responses have been

reactive and episodic. While any programming intended to de-conflict elections must take into account the country context, conditions and history, the program strategies, planning and activities can be better served by employing tested analytical methodologies for program design. Moreover, the effectiveness of programming can be better measured employing standard and custom indicators that have also been tested.

This assessment methodology is intended to provide the DG Officer with a comprehensive toolkit to address electoral security issues. The assessment first examines the conditions and history in order to learn about the past drivers of conflict. Through field research and interviews, a profile of the relevant electoral threats is developed through the lens of official and social stakeholders. This allows the DG Officer to identify targets, spoilers, motives and tactics. The assessment then examines the threat environment for guidance on the timing, locations and intensity of potential conflict. With this electoral threat profiling in hand, programming consideration for USAID and others in the international community are described as is a plan for monitoring and evaluation.

For the Handbook, this assessment will provide case studies of electoral violence each of which is distinctive in the profile of electoral violence while possessing some common characteristics that may be applicable to general electoral security programming. It also provides opportunities to examine existing programs to prevent, manage or mediate electoral violence for the insights into effective techniques, partners and expectations.

Finally, the assessment has relevance for upcoming elections in Bangladesh (2013), Zimbabwe (2011 – 2013) and Colombia (2011). As the assessment shows, each of these elections holds the potential for violence. The programming initiative described in the assessment provide USAID and others in the donor community with a systematic approach to programming design and development while proposing activities to counter the specific threats identified in the profile.

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Consejo Nacional Electoral
CREA/Colombia
Universidad de los Andes – Facultad de Derecho
Universidad de los Andes – Facultad de Ciencias Sociales
Foro Nacional
Independent Consultants
Mision de Observacion Electoral
MSD
Registraduria Nacional del Estado Civil
Sistema de Alertas Tempranas
Tranparencia por Colombia
United States Agency for International Development
Universidad Del Rosario

ANNEX II: ACRONYMS

AAEA – Association of African Election Authorities
AL – Awami League (Bangladesh)
Ansar – Bangladesh local defense force
AUC – Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia
Bacrim – Bandits and Criminals (Colombia)
BEC – Bangladesh Election Commission
BNP – Bangladesh National League (also Jatiyotabadi Chattra Dal)
CHT – Chittagong Hill Tracts
CIO – Central Intelligence Office
CNE – Consejo Nacional Electoral (Colombia)
CRP – Constitutional Reform Process
CSO – Civil Society Organization
CTG – Care-Taker Government
DAS – Departamentos Administrativo de Seguridad (Colombia)
DG – Democracy and Governance
ELN – Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (Colombia)
EPP IQC – Elections and Political Processes Indefinite Quantity Contract
EU – European Union
EVER – Election Violence Education and Resolution Project
FARC – Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FEMA – Fair Election Monitoring Alliance (Bangladesh)
GPA – Global Peace Agreement
ICC – International Criminal Court
ICITAP – International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance
IDP – Internationally Displaced Persons
IFES – International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IGO – Inter-Governmental Organization
IOM – International Organization for Migration
JEOC – Joint Elections Operations Center
JOC – Joint Operation Command (Zimbabwe)
NDI – National Democratic Institute
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization

MDC – Movement for Democratic Change (Zimbabwe)
MOE – Mision de Observation Electoral (Colombia)
MSD – Management Sciences for Development
PC – Conservative Party (Colombia)
PL – Liberal Party (Colombia)
PVT – Parallel Vote Tabulation
RAB – Bangladesh Rapid Action Battalion
SADC – South African Development Community
SAT – Sistema de Alertas Tempranas
SoE – State of Emergency
UP – Union Patriótica (Colombia)
UN – United Nations
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF – United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
ZANU PF – Zimbabwe African National Union
ZAPU – Zimbabwe African People’s Union
ZEC – Zimbabwe Election Commission
ZESN – Zimbabwe Election Support Network


ANNEX III: VIOLENCE INTENSITY SCALE

Electoral Incident Coding	
Code Level	Description
0	No reported electoral violence before or after a vote
1	The first level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspaper being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents
2	The second level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture
3	The third level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths


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ANNEX IV: MAP OF BANGLADESH ELECTORAL VIOLENCE 2008



CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL




ANNEX V: MAP OF ZIMBABWE ELECTORAL VIOLENCE 2008

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² Sokwanele Zimbabwe Civic Action Support Group. Terror Map produced by Google Maps for Sokwanele, June 18, 2008. Zimbabwe Civic Action Support Group

ANNEX VI: MAP OF PROJECTED ELECTORAL VIOLENCE IN COLOMBIA - 2010


RIESGO CONSOLIDADO POR VIOLENCIA PARA ELECCIONES CONGRESO 2010



³ Misión de Observación Electoral-MOE, *Mapas de riesgo electoral por Factores de Violencia –elecciones 2010*

ANNEX VII: ECONOMIC INDICATORS

GDP Per Capital (\$2,700-)



GNNI (40.0+)

