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ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

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The Philippines Electoral Security Framework Electoral Security Assessment

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Executive Summary

The Electoral Security Framework, employed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provides policy-makers, electoral assistance providers, and electoral and security practitioners with a toolkit to profile electoral conflict as well as to plan and program for preventing, managing or mediating these conflicts. In May and June 2012, Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk of Creative Associates International (Creative) and Kenneth Barden of USAID used the Framework to conduct an assessment in the Philippines that focused on all electoral cycles since the 1986 “People Power” revolution (with added focus on the 2010 cycle) to recommend strategies and programmatic approaches for an electoral security framework for the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles. The following problem statement and development hypothesis arose from this assessment:

Problem Statement: Efforts by state and non-state stakeholders reduced electoral violence during the 2010 electoral cycle. However, conflict remains embedded in Philippine elections because of the long-standing influence of political clans (‘dynasties’), widespread availability of firearms, and lack of a robust political party system. Unless these obstacles are addressed, elections in the Philippines will continue to experience violence.

Development Hypothesis: If the government of the Philippines is able to solidify and expand effective means of electoral violence prevention, and political parties become a viable as well as sustainable bulwark against political dynasties, then election-related violence should continue to be reduced.

The Electoral Security Framework includes the following four components:

- **Assessment:** This step is divided into three major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis
- **Planning:** Examine donor constraints, United States Government (USG) priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.
- **Programming:** Determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.
- **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** Illustrative indicators.

Electoral Security Assessment

Three major elements were studied during the course of the assessment: 1) Contextual Analysis; 2) Historical Conflict Factors; and 3) Stakeholder Analysis. Based on this analysis and key assessment findings and considerations of local planning restraints, programming recommendations are provided.

1) Contextual Analysis

Politics in the Philippines is heavily influenced by rivalries between families (or clans), whose members have held positions of power and been elected to office in specific regions for years or even decades. Given the protracted nature of rule by these families,

many are referred to as political “dynasties.” The history and tendency of political dynasties fuel electoral violence through various means—in particular, their proclivity to solve disputes via the use of violence (enabled by the widespread availability of legal and illegal firearms), employing private armed groups (PAGs) for protection from and intimidation of rivals, as well as the ‘warlord’ like behavior they exhibit in using any means necessary to retain control over territory and spoils of government. The country’s political party system is weak and has yet to serve as a countervailing force to the role of clans or provide citizens with viable alternatives for representation. Though efforts have been made to strengthen the party system—allowing for party list candidacies and seats in the Legislature, and increasing public subsidies for parties—gains have been minimal. Affiliations remain fixed to clans and associated patronage instead of party or political ideology.

The weakness of state institutions enables or exacerbates the use of violence to achieve political gains in the Philippines context. Contours of the political and administrative system also to varying degrees incentivize or enable the use of violence in the political sphere. The Philippines can be characterized as a weak state that lacks a monopoly on the use of violence within its territorial borders. Compounded by challenges posed by fragmented geography, various insurgent groups continue to operate in the “controlled areas” and clans are able to regularly employ violence—with impunity from the national government—to achieve political gain. Fueled and compounded by other factors that facilitate the use of violence to achieve political gains, the “winner take all” consequences of the country’s First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) system may further motivate candidates to employ violence to influence voter selections and turnout. At the local level in particular, ascending to office is closely associated with obtaining control over resources at the disposal of government. The financial and political opportunities (licit, through power to issue contracts; or illicit, to tax illegal fishing or logging) presented by securing power at the local level incentivize the use of violence to win elections, in particular through elimination of rival candidates in the Pre-Election Phase. In addition, fragile political finance regulations and lack of enforcement capacity, as well as the prevalence of vote buying and selling, combine to create the means and opportunities to finance election-related violence (ERV).

Underlying these institutional frailties and vulnerabilities is a disagreement across governmental and non-governmental sectors as to what constitutes (in definition and timing) ERV or an election-related-violent incident (ERVI). Disagreements over the conceptual definition of ERV (whether lower-level violence such as harassment or coercion should be included) as well as the timeframe in which such incidents must have occurred to be deemed an ERVI (with governmental stakeholders such as the Philippines National Police [PNP] generally employing a narrower timeframe) have implications for cross-sector planning and prevention efforts. Adopting a common definition and timeframe for ERV for use across sectors should be considered.

Prior to the 2010 elections, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), PNP and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) enhanced cooperation to plan and provide security in hotspots across the country. In tandem with efforts such as those coordinated by the

Masbate Advocates for Peace (MAP), this enhanced coordination and implementation reduced violence on Election Day. In addition to improved coordination as it relates to security, according to many stakeholders interviewed, the COMELEC has improved its administration of elections. Nonetheless, its performance at the sub-national level remains uneven and various forms of electoral malpractice such as “flying voters” continue and create vulnerabilities for ERV.

Electronic voting was introduced nation-wide for the 2010 election in the form of Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines and given credit by many state and non-state stakeholders for reducing violence in the Post-Election phase. The PCOS machines were not without controversy, however, and the ability of election technology to reduce violence in the Post-Election Phase of future cycles has been called into question—cunning politicians may simply shift to eliminating rivals in the Pre-Election Phase as opposed to fixing the tally after ballots are cast. This remains a serious vulnerability for the 2013 electoral cycle.

2) Historical Conflict Factors

All elections since the 1986 People Power Revolution have experienced conflict. Although few regions of the country have been devoid of ERVIs, the phenomena has mainly been concentrated in the following areas, referred to as election-violence “hotspots”: Abra, Nueva Ecija, Maguindanao, Masbate, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and the Eastern Visayas Region.

Two broad trends related to ERV since 1986 can be identified. First, retrospectively, although violence associated with national level contests has to some extent decreased, violence in local elections, in particular those for congressional districts and *barangay* posts, persists and in some areas has increased. And second, prospectively, violence may become more intense in the Pre-Election Phase. As rivals are less able to secure victory through manipulating vote tabulation, they may turn to eliminating rivals prior to Election Day so that they do not appear on the ballot.

The Pre-Election Phase can be divided into the pre-campaign and campaign periods. The principal form of violence in the former is the intimidation or murder of candidates. Rivals employ their supporters, clan members, or PAGs to intimidate or assassinate their principal competitor with the motive to force withdrawals from the race or eliminate them via assassination. The campaign period, which consists of the six months prior to Election Day, has consistently been the most lethal of the Filipino electoral cycle. The principal form of violence during this period is the intimidation, kidnapping, or killing of representatives or affiliates of rival politicians, including their supporters, campaign staff (workers as well as main ‘operators’ and in particular *barangay* ‘captains’), and the candidates themselves. The perpetrators of these forms of violence are political rivals, mainly local ‘warlords’ and political dynasties whose family has retained power for an extended period of time. These rivals engage a range of individuals to intimidate or attack the aforementioned victims including campaign staff, family members (or long-standing

associates of or supporters of their clan), PAGs, criminal elements, or insurgent forces. The majority of killings and assassinations are carried out with firearms.

Licit and illicit interests motivate politicians to win. Candidates are motivated by the desire to secure control over governance and the associated spoils. In some cases politicians are also motivated by their links to criminal elements and associated enterprises—in exchange for campaign funds as well as a percentage of revenue, local politicians ensure regulatory authorities turn a blind eye toward illicit enterprises ranging from illegal logging to drug smuggling. Insurgent groups are also engaged in election-related violence in the Pre-Election Phase, with the New People’s Army (NPA) charging “permit to campaign” fees to candidates for the right to operate in specified areas.

Election Day in the Philippines has been more peaceful than the Pre-Election Phase, though it has also experienced violence. Violence ranges in form, though generally centers on candidates employing PAGs to intimidate voters from going to the polls (to cast ballots for their rival) or disrupting rival candidates’ efforts to rally support; and insurgent forces attacking polling stations or officials involved in the process, with the goal of undermining the state’s authority more generally. Supporters of rival candidates have also engaged in fist fights and in some cases shootings due to perceptions of fraud or accusations that poll workers expressed partisanship toward a particular candidate.

Since 1986, violence in the Post-Election Phase has been linked to clashes during vote tabulation as well as to delays in announcement of results. “Poll watchers” hired by candidates to oversee the tabulation process and ensure it is ‘orderly’ clash with each other as well as intimidate or attack poll workers (teachers) to coerce them to forge vote tally sheets. Poll watchers or other supporters of candidates have stolen ballot boxes as well as killed poll workers who were attempting to prevent the theft. The same type of individual has also burned voted ballots, or entire polling centers, to prevent tabulation of votes thought to be cast for their rival. Violence in the Post-Election Phase of the 2010 cycle was reduced from prior contests as a result of, at least in part, the quicker release of results (tied to use of PCOS machines), more effective coordination by COMELEC and security forces, as well as non-state actors’ peace initiatives. Though outside the remit of officially recorded ERVIs, targeted killing of campaign staff/operators or elected candidates also occurs in the weeks or months after results are announced.

3) Stakeholder Analysis

The state stakeholders can be considered in the categories of regulatory, security, and judicial while non-state stakeholders include political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), and media organizations. The principal regulatory stakeholder is the COMELEC, the body mandated to administer the election. The COMELEC is the lead civilian body that coordinates electoral security planning and programming with the PNP and AFP. For the 2010 election, electoral security operations were coordinated through Joint Security Control Centers (JSCCs) established at the national, provincial, and local level, with representation from the three stakeholders.

In an electoral context, CSOs monitor human rights violations during the campaign period as well as coordinate initiatives to decrease the use and acceptance of ERV. Civil society organizations and faith-based organizations have played a positive role in preventing and reducing electoral violence. Domestic groups such as the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), the Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID), and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue have organized peace-building activities and conducted electoral monitoring. In most cases with strong support from USAID, the activities of such organizations have included peace caravans (parades against violence in collaboration with state stakeholders), peace covenants (pacts signed by candidates swearing they will not engage in ERV), as well as ERVI monitoring and reporting. Academic institutions have played a formidable role in studying and documenting the motives behind and prevalence of ERV.

Political parties are institutionally weak by comparison to other political actors. They are characterized by clientelism and used as vehicles for individuals to pursue personal, political, and financial power. This observation has several implications for ERV. First, a lack of party loyalty by elected officials creates volatility within and among parties. Second, while national parties exist, the strength of the party hierarchy at the local level is considerably diminished due to influence of local political powerbrokers. Third, the lack of viable political financial regulations and enforcement creates opaque connections between money and ERV through two means—the “gold” it takes to employ “goons and guns” and the resources to practice vote buying as a “carrot” to influence voting behavior. By some accounts, the national media has at times sensationalized electoral violence, but its attention to the Maguindanao massacre is seen as a critical factor in drawing public attention and fostering widespread public ire over the incident. Local media and journalists are viewed as partial reporters of news and under the influence of local political dynasties.

The International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), the International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), and the Asia Foundation (TAF) are representative organizations from the international community providing assistance to election authorities, police, political parties, and CSOs/faith-based organizations, respectively.

Electoral Security Planning

In order to foster a common vision on what constitutes ERV, state and non-state stakeholders should consider adopting the following definitions on incident profiling and timing as put forth by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP defines ERV as follows, “a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends...(this includes) acts such as assassination of opponents or spontaneous fisticuffs between rival groups of supporters – and threats, coercion and intimidation of opponents, voters, and election officials.” Adopting this or a similar common definition would assist greatly with monitoring and recording ERVIs and, by extension, developing programming to combat such phenomena. Stakeholders should also consider adopting the broader, five-

stage threat calendar (18 months prior to Election Day and including the aftermath of outcomes) that UNDP employs. Similar to adopting a common definition for the concept of ERV, assuming this expanded timeframe would enable stakeholders to develop initiatives to thwart incidents of ERV which occur early in the electoral process and well after Election Day.

In developing initiatives to prevent, manage, or mediate ERV, such programming should be considered from three strategic perspectives: 1) hard power (state stakeholders and electoral security provision and justice enforcement); 2) soft power (non-state stakeholders involved in de-conflicting elections); and, 3) countervailing power (cross-sectoral efforts to counter the influence of clans).

Reflecting these three perspectives, the four strategic objectives for the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles are as follows:

- Build capacity of state institutions in electoral security administration and justice.
- Build the capacity of CSOs, faith-based organizations, and academic institutions as countervailing forces to the influence of political clans and in doing so encourage an environment of public opinion that is intolerant of electoral violence and malpractice.
- Build the capacity of political parties so they may serve as countervailing influences and viable alternatives to political clans.
- Enhance the services rendered to victims of ERV.

USAID should be interested in pursuing these programming objectives because electoral conflict and malpractice cut across nearly all democracy and governance (DG) programming areas for the Philippines Mission. Given the complex nature of ERV, USAID could leverage funding from other internal sources such as the Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) Office and, given its connections with land issues involving the extractive and fishing sectors, Environment and Global Climate Change. Further collaboration with the ICITAP could be pursued in order to leverage existing training infrastructure to expand curriculum for the PNP.

Given the cross-cutting issues that drive ERV, programming to reduce electoral violence in the 2013 and 2016 elections should be multi-sectoral and involve activities throughout the electoral cycle. Programming should also build upon the effective measures in 2010 organized by the PNP, COMELEC, and non-state stakeholders. Due to the USG's involvement in electoral assistance (USAID), police training (ICITAP), and military cooperation (Department of Defense), the domestic environment for assistance in reducing ERV is favorable. The electoral assistance coordination mechanism established through IFES for the 2010 elections can be replicated with an added focus on donor and implementers concerned with conflict and ERV. The program implementation calendar should concern both the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles.

Electoral Security Programming

Based on these strategic program objectives, Creative recommends the following programming in the associated four areas. Proposed activities listed are illustrative. The comprehensive list for each objective can be found in the body of the report.

1) Build capacity of state institutions in electoral security administration and justice.

COMELEC

- Establish within the COMELEC a pillar for electoral security so that the Commission has an on-going focal point for electoral security administration. This pillar should develop a definition of the type and timing of what constitutes an ERVI so that a consistent profile can be used by state and non-state stakeholders. The pillar can also oversee the implementation of an expanded program of services to election workers victimized by ERV;
- Enhance the COMELEC's political finance pillar and the capacity of its political finance unit so that campaign finance regulations can be enforced and the impact of illicit funding and violence can be reduced. Assistance should be provided to enable this pillar and unit to develop a searchable database (accessible to the public) on spending and disclosure reporting;
- Establish a Political Party Consultative Council so that COMELEC can have a formal mechanism of engagement and coordination in order to enhance the role of political parties in the electoral process;
- Advise and provide support to the COMELEC to reform the voter registration process to reduce the numbers of deceased persons' names appearing on the polls and the practice of "flying voters," i.e., registering to vote in communities other than those of their residence. These reforms should reduce the prospect of voter registration irregularities that become triggers for Election Day violence; and
- Strengthen the COMELEC's reach and authority at the sub-national level to enable it to more consistently enforce electoral regulations and reduce the prospect of perceived partisanship on the part of local officials, which can become a trigger for ERV.

PNP/AFP

- Support the completion of the integrated security plan for 2013 including the designation of hot spots, deployments of forces, gun ban, efforts to thwart PAGs, and coordination with non-state stakeholders in peace-building programs; and
- Provide the PNP and AFP training (via a training of trainers' methodology) in the *Electoral Security Framework* (which outlines a threat assessment methodology) and human rights principles. This training could be conducted at the PNP national headquarters and leverage facilities already supported by ICITAP's current efforts as well as the US Embassy's Mindanao Working Group.

2) Build the capacity of CSOs, faith-based organizations, and academic institutions as countervailing forces to the influence of political clans and in doing so encourage an environment of public opinion that is intolerant of electoral violence and malpractice.

Civil Society, Faith-Based, and Academic Organizations

- Support state stakeholders such as the Commission for Human Rights (CHR) and non-state stakeholders such as the PPCRV, National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), and MAP, to conduct ERV and political finance monitoring. Help them develop common, web-based tools for the collection and sharing of this information and in the use of social networking sites to report incidents. The incident reporting should be consolidated into a master database and map to establish a countrywide profile on ERVIs which could be employed by the COMELEC, PNP, and AFP in future electoral security planning.
- Provide support to student groups in the promotion of peaceful elections through university-based short courses on the role of elections in democracy and provide assistance in the conduct of student government elections in order to illustrate best practices in peaceful elections;
- Develop curriculum in partnership with PCID on the role of peaceful elections in society for use in madrassas in Mindanao;
- Provide grants to academic institutions, such as the Ateneo de Manila and De La Salle Universities, to conduct research into ERV, maintain databases and maps, and assess the impact of measures to prevent it. Make these grants contingent on cooperation with state authorities so that analysis (and associated mapping) feeds into effective deployment of violence-prevention assets.

Media Organizations

- Foster relationships between public interest blogs, such as Rappler and Vera Files, and traditional media in order to expand the reporting and transparency of the coverage of electoral violence;
- Support alert systems, safe passage guidelines, safety training, and victim's services for journalists in cooperation with the Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism.

3) Build the capacity of political parties so they may serve as countervailing influences and viable alternatives to political clans.

- Provide capacity building training for political party leaders and their operatives in order to enhance their skills in campaign organization, strategic communications, and compliance to political party regulations;
- Through such mechanisms as the Consortium for Political Party Development, encourage international exchanges and workshops involving political party leaders that will enhance their comparative perspective of political party operations and thus provide information they may apply within their own organizations;
- Promote genuine representatives of designated communities to contest as candidates for the party list seats in order to reduce their political marginalization and the vulnerabilities that such marginalization could produce ERV.

4) Enhance the services rendered to victims of ERV.

- Support CSO Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs to mediate electoral disputes;
- Develop victim's services program such as counseling, medical attention, and compensation, through faith-based organizations.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)

The baseline data collected are intended to measure the level of incidents of conflict in order to both profile the nature of the conflict and assess whether its intensity is responsive to program strategies and activities. With this data, a second level of M & E can be employed to examine the impact of electoral security programming on governance, rule of law, and civil society sectors.

Conclusion

The complex conflict dynamics and stubborn structural vulnerabilities of ERV in the Philippines can be seen as factors which are impossible to overcome. However, in 2010 the combination of effective and impartial security forces and broadly-based public peace campaigns demonstrated that ERV can be reduced. If this incremental perspective is assumed and embedded into programming, gains in reducing ERV can be made with each electoral cycle. Moving forward, and to ensure this momentum is not reversed, programming approaches should assume the multi-sectoral approach employed for the 2010 contest—involving state and non-state stakeholders and thus reflecting participants in civil society, religion, academia, and commerce, is crucial to continue lessening ERV. However, a common definition and timeframe for what is considered to be ERV would go far to harmonize the approaches of these stakeholders into a common vision of the profile and magnitude of the threat. Through building upon the successful measures employed in 2010 and introducing some innovation into conflict prevention programming, the objective of reducing (but not eradicating) ERV in 2013 is achievable. To make further gains toward consolidating democracy in the Philippines, however, political parties must be supported so they may serve as viable and sustainable alternatives to political dynasties as vehicles for representation.

Introduction

From May 22 through June 10, 2012, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in the Philippines under funding from the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) through its Elections and Political Processes Indefinite Quantity Contract. The team members were Kenneth Barden from USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, and Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk from Creative. The objective of the assessment was threefold: 1) to establish a profile on the forms of electoral conflict experienced in the Philippines since the 1986 “People Power” revolution; 2) to examine the effectiveness of measures taken to prevent electoral conflict in the 2010 elections; and 3) to put forward recommendations in planning, programming, and evaluation to prevent, manage, and mediate electoral conflict in the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles. The assessment was conducted through desk research and meetings with electoral security stakeholders in metropolitan Manila, Cabanatuan (Nueva Ecija Province), and Masbate City (Masbate Province). The schedule of meetings is shown as Annex I. A list of acronyms is shown in Annex II.

This assessment seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis:

Problem Statement: Efforts by state and non-state stakeholders reduced electoral violence during the 2010 electoral cycle. However, conflict remains embedded in Philippine elections because of the long-standing influence of political clans (‘dynasties’), widespread availability of firearms, and lack of a robust political party system. Unless these obstacles are addressed, elections in the Philippines will continue to experience violence.

Development Hypothesis: If the government of the Philippines is able to solidify and expand effective means of electoral violence prevention, and political parties become a viable as well as sustainable bulwark against political dynasties, then election-related violence should continue to be reduced.

Based on this Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis, the insights from this assessment are intended to build the electoral security administration capacity of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Philippines National Police (PNP), and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP); strengthen the political party system; and instill a political will into the electorate to resist violence and corruption during elections.

The Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis for this assessment were framed by applying the methodology found in the *Electoral Security Framework*.¹ The structure of this Philippines Electoral Security Framework report is based upon this methodology:

¹ A Handbook describing the Framework can be found at the following link: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf.

There are four sections to this Framework.

1. **Assessment:** This step is divided into three major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis
2. **Planning:** Examine donor constraints, United States Government (USG) priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.
3. **Programming:** Determine specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.
4. **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E):** Establish illustrative indicators for recommended programming.

I. Electoral Security Assessment

The first step in the Framework development is to assess and profile the electoral conflict dynamics.

A. Contextual Analysis

The assessment found broad consensus that election-related violence (ERV) in Filipino elections represents an obstacle to citizen security, good governance, and democratic consolidation. At the same time, the assessment revealed three major differences among stakeholders in the parameters and definitions used to demarcate what constitutes an election-related violent incident (ERVI).

The first difference involves the timing of the ERVI. For the purposes of PNP statistics, incidents are deemed electoral violence only if they occur within the timeframe of the campaign period (120 days before Election Day) and 90 days following Election Day. Other stakeholders employ a broader timeframe to include incidents that occur before the official campaign period begins and well after results are certified. One case that is frequently cited to make this point is the November 2009 massacre in the Mindanao province of Maguindanao, where militia forces associated with the Ampatuan clan murdered 57 people, supporters and relatives of a political rival for provincial governor participating in a caravan to submit documents to file for office. Many journalists were also among those murdered. Post-election incidents involve losing candidates conducting revenge killings months after Election Day to punish individuals or affiliates who facilitated their loss. Though they are outside the official end-date for PNP-recorded ERVIs, these incidents seem undoubtedly linked to the electoral cycle.

Second, ERVIs can be “mixed” with other violent acts, such as insurgent attacks, where the objective may possess broader political objectives but occur in the context of an election; or by criminal syndicates, including Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), seeking to advance their illicit interests by intimidating or eliminating politicians seen as obstacles to these interests. Citing difficulty in determining the motivation behind such acts—and whether they are driven by desire to influence electoral outcomes—some stakeholders opt not to include this more general violence, while others do.

And third, officially recorded ERVIs largely involve the use of firearms to inflict physical harm but at times overlook forms of intimidation that are less obvious than overt acts of violence but nevertheless accomplish the same objective—to eliminate political rivals or influence voters’ ballot selections. In such cases, ERVIs may occur on an escalating scale, beginning with acts of intimidation but becoming progressively more violent if the targets prove unresponsive to initial tactics. Again, given disagreement on the threshold to be considered an ERVI, some cases of harassment and intimidation are recorded, while others are not.

In order to find a common conceptual vision on ERV, stakeholders should consider adopting the following definition in type and timelines used by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). UNDP defines ERV as, “a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends...”² And “Electoral violence includes acts such as assassination of opponents or spontaneous fistcuffs between rival groups of supporters – and threats, coercion and intimidation of opponents, voters, and election officials.”³

UNDP divides the electoral threat calendar into the following five phases:

Phase 1: The long run-up to electoral events (18 months to three months prior)

Phase 2: The campaign’s final lap (three months prior to Election Day)

Phase 3: Polling day(s)

Phase 4: Between voting and proclamation

Phase 5: Post-election outcomes and their aftermath.⁴

In keeping with the *Framework* methodology, this assessment distills these five phases into three major categories (Pre-Election Phase, Election Day, and Post-Election Phase). Nonetheless, where appropriate the report notes when incidents occur in any of the sub-phases of 1 and 2 or 4 and 5.

Having reviewed issues associated with definitions of ERV and ERVIs, the following Contextual Analysis identifies the security, political, economic, and election-specific factors which create vulnerabilities for ERV to occur.

1. Security Factors: Political Dynasties, Private Armed Groups (PAGs), and Warlords

Politics in the Philippines involves rivalries between families (or clans), whose members have held positions of power and been elected to office in specific regions for years, and in some cases, decades. Given the protracted nature of rule by these families, many are

² *Elections and Conflict Prevention: A Guide to Analysis, Planning Programming*, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 4.

³ UNDP, 4.

⁴ UNDP, 20-21.

referred to as political “dynasties.” The history and tendency of political dynasties fuel electoral violence through various means—in particular, their proclivity to solve disputes via the use of violence, employing private armed groups (PAGs) for protection from, and intimidation of, rivals, as well as the ‘warlord’ like behavior they exhibit in using any means necessary to retain control over territory and spoils of government.

The history of political dynasties or clans extends to the period of Spanish and American rule, where these powers created governing elites (*‘Ilustrados’*) in order to have a known and reliable class of domestic counterparts in governance. Over time, “the familial nature of Philippines politics was one of the factors that fueled fierce rivalries and bred persistent violence during each electoral cycle.”⁵ Anecdotally, there are seven “M’s” associated with political dynasties - money, machine, media, marriage, murder and mayhem, myth, and merger. Currently, an estimated 250 political dynasties operate in the Philippines, with widespread representation in governance. According to a study conducted prior to the 2010 elections, 160 of 250 members of the House of Representatives were affiliated with a dynasty, as were 53 of 79 governors and 26 vice governors. Although the number of clan-connected elected officials can be enumerated, Section 26, Article II of the constitution technically prohibits political dynasties from operating. Anti-political dynasty legislation has been introduced in the House, yet linkages of the dynasties to seated representatives make the bill’s passage unlikely.

Clan conflict, termed *rido* in Mindanao, plays out through the use of PAGs as the enforcers of clan interests and objectives. PAGs are defined by the PNP as groupings of two or more persons with firearms (legal or illegal) who are used by clans or candidates. Recent estimates place the total number of PAGs that are operational throughout the Philippines at 107, with high concentrations of these armies in hot spot locations with prevalence of ERVIs—11 in Masbate (120 members), four in Abra (77 members), seven in Sulu (380 members) and three in Maguindanao (1,596 members), to cite but a few.⁶ After elections, PAGs can become loose and undisciplined. In so-called “controlled areas,” where insurgencies and non-state armed groups operate, clans are also reported to have pragmatic affiliations with these groups to achieve mutual financial objectives.

Warlords also employ PAGs to protect their territories and economic interests. While it may be difficult in some cases to separate the definition of political clans and warlords, the latter term has been applied more to individuals than families. Warlords are also not typically elected officials, but rather seek to control elected officials, particularly on the sub-national level. By one estimate, there are at least 100 warlords active in each of the 79 provinces.

⁵ Michael Scharff, “Enhancing Security to Restore Credibility Safeguarding Election in the Philippines, 2008 – 2010,” (Innovations for Successful Societies, Princeton University, 2011).

⁶ These statistics on PAG numbers are drawn from the PNP, and statistics on PAG membership in selected provinces are drawn from the Zeñarosa Commission, as reported in “Democracy at Gunpoint – Election-Related Violence in the Philippines (Manila, Philippines: the Asia Foundation [TAF], 2011), 8. Other estimates, including one from 2010, estimate 132 PAGs with approximately 10,000 members in total.

Clans, PAGs, and warlords are the most common perpetrators of violence and thus create direct and obvious vulnerabilities for ERV to occur.

2. Security Factors: Insurgencies and Non-State Armed Groups

Several insurgencies and non-state armed groups actively operate in the “controlled areas” of the Philippines: 1) Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)/Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF); 2) New People’s Army (NPA); 3) Abu Sayyaf; and 4) the Pentagon Gang. The extent to which these groups engage in ERV varies.

There are three principal Islamic insurgent groups in the Philippines: MNLF, MILF, and Abu Sayyaf. The MNLF was founded by Nur Misuari (then of the University of the Philippines) in 1969 in response to government-sponsored killing of 60 Filipino Muslims and has since then sought an independent, Muslim Mindanao. In 1976, the MNLF engaged the government of the Philippines in peace talks, concluding with a Final Peace Agreement with the Philippines Government in 1996. The MILF is a splinter group of the MNLF which seeks a separate Islamic state in the southern Philippines. Hashim Salamat tried to seize control of the MNLF in 1977 and the MILF was eventually established in 1984. Currently, it has an estimated 12,000 members possessing at least 9,000 firearms, principally operating in Mindanao.

The MILF is based in central Mindanao and retains popular support throughout the region’s rural areas in response to the population’s grievances, mainly resulting from poverty and lack of employment opportunities. With regard to its role in ERV, during the 2001 electoral cycle, the MILF was responsible for seven (of 98 total) deaths. Despite peace negotiations and the cease-fire agreement, in January 2005, the MILF attacked government troops in Maguindanao, resulting in at least 23 deaths. Prior to the 2010 elections, MILF signed an ‘electoral pact’ with the AFP. In this agreement, a ‘hands-off’ policy toward elections was declared by the MILF essentially promising to forswear the use of ERV.

The NPA is a 30-year-old Maoist insurgency designated by the US Department of State as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. According to the AFP, as of 2011 the NPA had 4,043 armed soldiers, down from 4,384 in 2010 (at its height, the NPA maintained 24,430 armed followers).⁷ Using tactics similar to other guerilla groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the NPA uses extortion of politicians and businesses to fund its insurgency. Foreign-owned businesses are frequently targeted. The NPA extorts money from candidates through the so-called “permit to campaign” fees to allow candidates to campaign in controlled areas. In some cases, candidates who do not pay the fees are killed by the NPA. The NPA has also imposed “permit to win” fees where the successful candidate must pay to assume office. The amount of the fees varies with the level of office sought. As compared to the MNLF, the NPA has been more

⁷ However, the NPA leader, Jose Sison, who lives in exile in the Netherlands, claims that the group maintains “tens of thousands” of armed supporters.

aggressive in perpetrating ERV throughout the electoral cycle, in particular in the form of coercing officials and candidates through threats and extortion.

The NPA is strongest in Visayas, Luzon and parts of Mindanao. In 2011, the AFP indicated that the primary NPA strongholds were in Bicol, Campostela Valley, Davao Del Norte, Negros, and Samar. As of 2009, the NPA claimed to operate in 200 municipalities in Mindanao and maintain 102 guerilla ‘fronts’ across the Philippines. Cells have been reported in Manila and other urban centers.

Abu Sayyaf, which split from the MNLF in 1991, seeks to establish a pan-Islamic state consisting of the Southern Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Southern Thailand. It is pursuing this objective in collaboration with Jemaah Islamiyah (an affiliate of Al Qaeda in Asia). The USG considers it a terrorist organization, with strongholds in Jolo and Basrian. After recent decreases in force numbers due to AFP assaults, the group is said to now comprise 450 members possessing approximately 360 firearms. During elections, Abu Sayyaf kidnaps and holds for ransom candidates and journalists.

Finally, the Pentagon Gang has around 200 members. A marginal non-state armed group when compared to the other insurgent organizations, the Gang was created by former MNLF members and is principally operational in Mindanao (and chiefly in the Linguasan Marsh area). The Gang’s activities center on performing kidnapping for hire. The group has no formal membership as such, as its leadership engages former MILF or MNLF fighters to carry out kidnappings. Though the government has argued that the Pentagon Gang is a fundraising arm of the MILF (which has overall control of the Linguasan Marsh region), the MILF denies such claims.

While less of a factor in ERV than political clans or warlords, many of these groups exert their influence in controlled areas to derail the electoral process or influence its outcomes in their strongholds.

3. Security Factors: Illegal Firearms

The proliferation of illegal weapons fuels crime and creates a general environment of violence in many areas, with concomitant implications for ERV. By some PNP estimates, 97 percent of crimes are committed with use of illegal weapons. Firearms remain the weapon of choice when committing ERVIs. Although stakeholders agreed that a thriving black market of arms smuggling exists and individuals can easily gain access (legally, due to loose regulations, or illegally) to such arms, the total number of available firearms in the Philippines is subject to dispute. In 2007 the PNP estimated that there were 3.9 million licensed and unlicensed guns in the Philippines, roughly 41 per 1,000 people, and a year later decreased that estimate to 1.5 million. However, non-state stakeholders cite estimates closer to the former figure.

As firearms are the weapons of choice for ERV, this proliferation and availability makes arming the perpetrators an easy task to accomplish.

4. Political Factors: Regime Type

The Philippines can be characterized as a weak state that lacks a monopoly on the use of violence within its territorial borders. Compounded by challenges posed by fragmented geography and as a result of weak institutions, the state has been unable to eradicate insurgent groups and clans are able to regularly employ violence with impunity. Freedom House rates the Philippines as “Partly Free”—with a score of 3 on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 being the highest level of freedom). Similarly, the Polity IV Index rates the Philippines as a +8—where +10 represents full democracy on a scale of -10 to +10. However, despite these rankings, corruption continues to plague governance and business as represented by its 2011 ranking of 129 of 183 countries in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency International.

These factors combine to create a mixed picture of the regime characteristics that create vulnerabilities to electoral violence—generally positive ratings for its democratic qualities, yet the continued need to curb corruption.

5. Political Factors: Electoral System

The legislative branch of government is elected through a First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) and party list system. The legislature is bicameral in composition and consists of an upper chamber, the Senate, with 24 members directly elected, and a lower chamber, the House of Representatives, with 209 members elected from single member districts and 51 members elected from political party lists representing specific groups such as teachers, street vendors, senior citizens, and the urban poor, among others. The FPTP electoral system creates a competitive environment for campaigning that enhances the importance of name recognition, money, and creates a battle for vote margins. The “winner-take-all” consequences of FPTP may further motivate candidates to employ violence to influence voter selections and turnout.

Party list candidacies are intended to provide representation of marginalized groups such as laborers, rural cooperatives, women, and the urban poor. However, according to various stakeholders, party lists are frequently co-opted by established political interests who place their own pseudo-candidates on a given list. Party list candidates have been the targets of electoral violence because they are often part of vulnerable groups; intimidation is used to force withdrawals of *bona fide* party list representatives in favor of another selected candidate.

As UNDP observes, “Another important, even pivotal factor in the evaluation of conditions under which elections stimulate violence contact is the strong impact specific types of electoral systems have on conflict management”.⁸ In the Philippines, both the FPTP and the party list components of representation have implications for conflict. First, “winner-take-all” electoral stakes can foster incentives to retain violence as an option to influence electoral outcomes. Second, the party list component can also foster

⁸ UNDP, page 8

its own form of conflict through the intimidation of *bona fide* party list representatives by powerbrokers seeking their withdrawal in favor of another selected candidate.

6. Political Factors: Sub-National Governance

The 1991 Local Government Code made more financial resources available at the local level through the automatic internal revenue allocations for local government units. Add to those electoral stakes the potential for illicit monies to be obtained through corruption in public contracting and the assessment “fees” on illegal logging or fishing. The financial and political opportunities presented by securing power at the local level create attractive and achievable stakes and violence could be employed to win them.

In addition, the synchronized nature of national and sub-national elections empowers local political interests to be significant players in mobilizing grassroots votes at the local level. National-level politicians rely on local allies to deliver votes. This is at times referred to as a “coalitional pyramid,” whereby votes are delivered from the bottom-up and patronage rewards flow from the top-down. As a result, local elections can be violent when powerbrokers exert pressure to deliver votes for designated candidates. This phenomenon is not unique to the Philippines and in addition to fueling ERV is an impediment to state-building more broadly.⁹

As a result, the decentralized structure of governance creates financial stakes for the victors that can be lucrative and achievable. Those candidates’ interested in seeking or retaining local office may regard violence as an effective means by which electoral victory can be assured.

7. Political Factors: Political Party System and Political Finance

Though political parties exist in the Philippines, they lack the capacity and degree of institutionalization to fill the traditional “Western” role of aggregation of opinion and interest articulation between citizens and government. While parties exist at the national level, their role and function are diminished on the sub-national level as political dynasties and warlords assume these roles. Parties such as the Liberal Party, the current majority in the House of Representative, claim that their political strength is a result of the platform of principles. This is not a common feature and elected officials are known to change party affiliations in a practice termed “shirt changing” if it is in their personal interest to do so. Overall, the party system in the Philippines is weak.

As a result, political parties do not play a role in de-conflicting political dialogue as they do in other country contexts.

⁹ Patrick W. Quirk, “Guns, Goons, and Gold: Subnational Authoritarianism as an Impediment to State-Building in Guatemala and the Philippines,” (Working Paper, Johns Hopkins University, Department of Political Science: Baltimore, MD, 2012).

Regulations for political finance and campaign spending are weak and inadequately enforced. The election law prescribes spending limits for political campaigns and requires disclosure of expenditures after each election. COMELEC is the agency responsible for overseeing compliance with political finance regulations; however, its lack of capacity for genuine enforcement, and the reporting requirement 30 days after the elections, makes the effective prevention of financial abuse undetectable during the critical period of campaigning and voting.

Driven by poverty or opportunism, vote buying is widespread and takes the forms of direct cash payment to influence a voter's selections (or to discourage a voter from casting a ballot) or gifting foodstuffs immediately prior to Election Day. Moreover, cash for votes is indicative of the overall atmosphere of coercion which can manifest as a 'stick' (intimidation of voters to cast ballots for a particular candidate) or 'carrot' (payments to coerce an individual to vote for a specific politician).

The combination of a weak party system, inadequate political finance regulations and enforcement capacity, as well as the prevalence of vote buying and selling, combine to create the means and opportunities to finance ERV and voter intimidation.

8. Political Factors: Culture of Impunity

The Commission for Human Rights (CHR) reports that many prosecutions for ERV are dismissed by the courts or arrests are not made at all. The example most frequently cited was the 2009 Maguindanao massacre, where, at the time of this assessment, of the 196 individuals accused of participating in the massacre only 93 had been arrested, 65 arraigned, and none convicted (trials are on-going at the time of this writing).

Such a culture of impunity allows the perpetrators of ERV to operate without penalty, punishment, or other legal consequence.

9. Economic Factors

Research by Oxford economist Paul Collier and other analysis performed in preparation of USAID's *Electoral Security Framework* suggest that economic factors, including measures of Per Capita Income, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and the GINI Index could indicate vulnerabilities to electoral violence.

The Collier research suggests that countries with an annual Per Capita Income less than \$2,700 are susceptible to electoral violence. In 2011, that figure in the Philippines was \$3,500. While this figure is slightly above the vulnerability threshold, it does not reflect the unevenness in the level of poverty across provinces, making poorer provinces, such as Masbate, potentially more vulnerable to violence than others. Collier's research also suggests that smaller economies may be more violent than larger ones. If a "smaller" economy is defined as less than \$100 billion per year, the Philippines is also above the vulnerability threshold with a 2011 estimated GDP of \$389.8 billion. However, it is once again an issue of the distribution of income. The GINI Index is a measure of income

distribution, with a rating of 40 and above indicating disparity in that distribution. In the Philippines, the GINI index is 45.8 (2006) and was the worst measured among ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) countries. As a result, while economic factors may not indicate a strong susceptibility to ERV, the uneven distribution of income and the poverty found in some provinces creates localized vulnerabilities which the national statistics do not reveal.

A related economic issue which draws a direct link to ERV is that of land and natural resources. Some provinces are rich in minerals such as gold and natural resources including timber and fish. These resources present lucrative stakes for political and criminal interests to capture through elections. These stakes are won through both the direct control of the resources and the imposition of fees on illicit logging and fishing. Related to the impact of land and natural resources on ERV is the unalterable geographic destiny of the Philippines. As an insular nation, the separation of land by water creates dozens of territories available for capture by licit and illicit interests alike. While not specifically an economic vulnerability, this territorial impact on Philippine society creates vulnerabilities for local monopolies on violence.

10. Election-Specific Factors: Electoral Malpractice

According to many stakeholders interviewed, the current COMELEC has improved its administration of elections over previous Commissions. Nonetheless, various forms of electoral malpractice continue and create vulnerabilities for ERV as stakeholders push back on perceived unfairness or malpractice. One such example is the phenomenon referred to as “flying voters,” where individuals from one municipality are registered and vote in another municipality. Local politicians orchestrate such efforts as one means to bolster turnout in their favor. This form of electoral malpractice has fueled ERV by creating confrontation at the polls on Election Day between resident and non-resident voters. Further, perceptions of vote rigging have triggered Post-Election Phase violence. Supporters and operators of losing candidates have attacked and burned polling stations as well as stolen ballot boxes in response to what they perceive as fraudulent electoral outcomes.

As a result, instances or perception of malpractice can trigger ERV as those who believe that they are disadvantaged by the malpractice resort to violence to express their rejection of the outcomes.

11. Election-Specific Factors: Election Technology

Electronic voting was introduced nation-wide for the 2010 election in the form of Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines. The PCOS system employed Optical Mark Recognition (OMR) with each machine reading and counting the ballots in each poll. The PCOS machines are given credit by state and non-state stakeholders for reducing violence in the Post-Election Phase of 2010 as a result of two core factors—citizens trusted the technology more so than humans (associated with error or subjectivity) in ballot counting; and automated counting allowed results to be released

more quickly than a manual count, reducing the uncertainty and tension usually experienced during this period.

Despite these purported benefits, the PCOS machines were not without controversy and the ability of election technology to reduce violence in the Post-Election Phase of future cycles has been called into question for two principal reasons. First, should technology effectively curb the ability to rig election tallies, politicians may resort to violence in the Pre-Election Phase to eliminate rivals from appearing on the ballot or to intimidate voters to support their candidacies. And second, at the time of the assessment, the PCOS system was being challenged in the Supreme Court on the grounds that technical glitches and problems with transmission of results rendered the electoral results invalid. While the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the use of the PCOS machines in 2013, spoilers who are disadvantaged by this technology will continue to discredit or compromise it.

B. Historical Conflict Factors

All elections since the 1986 People Power Revolution have experienced some form of conflict. Although few regions of the country have been devoid of ERVIs, the violence has mainly been concentrated in the following areas, referred to as election-violence “hot spots” or “areas of concern”: Abra, Nueva Ecija, Maguindanao, Masbate, Lanao del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), and the Eastern Visayas Region. A map of these hot spots is shown in Annex III.

Two broad trends related to ERV since 1986 can be identified. First, retrospectively, although violence associated with national level contests has decreased since that snap presidential election, violence in local elections, in particular those for congressional districts and *barangay* posts, persists and in some areas has increased over time. Second, prospectively, violence may become more intense in the Pre-Election Phase. As rivals are less able to secure victory through manipulating vote tabulation, they may turn to eliminating rivals prior to Election Day so that they do not appear on the ballot and intimidating voters to suppress turnout.

In the 1986 election, there were 364 ERVIs recorded with 153 deaths. Two years later, in the 1988 local contest, 405 incidents and 188 deaths were recorded. Though the number of incidents and deaths for the 1992 national and local elections decreased to 157 and 89 respectively, the 1995 (Congress and local) and 1998 polls (National and local) each saw an increase in violent incidents—from 244 in the former to 322 in the latter. The number of deaths also increased from 77 in 1998 to 98 in 2001.¹⁰ The two subsequent electoral cycles also witnessed high levels of violent incidents—249 in 2004 and 229 in 2007. Perhaps reflecting the trend toward targeted killings, the 2004 and 2007 contests also witnessed higher levels of killings or assassinations than the 2001 cycle. Where 111 people were killed in 2001 (21 candidates or politicians), 148 were slain in 2004 (40

¹⁰ Statistics from military reports, as compiled and presented in Patrick Patino and Djorina Velasco, “Election Violence in the Philippines,” (Manila, Philippines: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004), 8.

candidates/politicians) and 121 in 2007 (37 candidates/politicians).¹¹ The 2010 electoral cycle witnessed fewer overall incidents (180) than the two prior contests, which many attribute to improved coordination between state (COMELEC and national security forces) and non-state (civil society) stakeholders as well as electronic voting, though the number of deaths remained high, at 155 (22 candidates/politicians).¹²

Pre-Election Phase

Although not included in PNP statistics, ERV can occur before the official campaign period begins. The principal form of violence in the pre-campaign phase is the intimidation or murder of candidates. Rivals employ their supporters, clan members, or PAGs to intimidate or assassinate their principal competitors with the motive to force withdrawals from the race or “liquidate” them. For example, prior to the 2007 election in Abra, Representative Luis Bersamin, Jr. was killed, along with his body guard, following the wedding of a family member in Quezon City. The incident followed reports that he intended to run for governor.

The campaign period has consistently been the most lethal of the Filipino electoral cycle. During the six months prior to Election Day, the principal form of violence is the intimidation, kidnapping, or killing of representatives or affiliates of rival politicians, including their supporters, campaign staff (workers as well as main ‘operators’ and in particular *barangay* ‘captains’), and the candidates themselves. These individuals are targeted as they perform campaign-related tasks throughout a given district, as well as at their respective campaign headquarters or a particular rally. Rivals are motivated to intimidate or physically assault candidate supporters to paralyze or disrupt their campaign machinery as well as intimidate candidates into withdrawing. On the other hand, assassination is employed to reduce the field of competitors. Various insurgent groups (addressed further below in this section) also employ targeted bombings and killings to disrupt and discredit the electoral process or extort and coerce officials for financial gain.

The perpetrators of these forms of violence are political rivals, mainly local ‘warlords’ and political clans (dynasties) whose families have retained power for an extended period of time. Concerning tactics, the majority of attacks are carried out with firearms, given the high prevalence and availability of them throughout the Philippines. Candidates and politicians retain private armies or PAGs as tools of electoral violence, and they regularly deploy them to intimidate or murder rival supporters or candidates. For the 2001 contest,

¹¹ Statistics from PNP reports (2001 and 2004) as well as the PNP Directorate for operations, as compiled and presented in “Understanding the Election-Related Violence Incidence of 2007,” (Manila, Philippines: Institute for Political and Electoral Reform, Philippines, IPER, 2007), 2-4.

¹² These statistics for overall incidents and deaths are drawn from the PNP, as reported in “Democracy at Gunpoint – Election-Related Violence in the Philippines (Manila, Philippines: the Asia Foundation [TAF], 2011), 3; Statistics for number of politicians killed are those cited in “Final Report of the International elections - Observation Mission - The Asian Network for Free Elections - ANFREL Foundation,” (2010), 92-93.

PAGs were responsible for 80 percent of ERVIs as well as 68 of 98 deaths¹³ and eight years later were responsible for the worst single incident of election-related violence in Philippines history—where armed supporters of an incumbent governor in Maguindanao (in Mindanao) stopped a convoy of journalists and activists en route to register a rival candidate for the same post, killing 57 people in one afternoon.¹⁴

Political dynasties are intimately linked with use of PAGs for protection and pursuit of electoral gains. According to the Independent Commission against Private Armies (ICAPA), for example, 76 percent of the 123 persons identified as leaders of PAGs as of 2010 were local politicians with links to long-standing political dynasties; the majority of these individuals were candidates in the 2010 election and won seats.¹⁵ One example of dynasties using PAGs in the pre-electoral context is the competition between the Espinosa and Kho families (dynasties) prior to the 2007 election in Masbate. As their chosen family members competed for various offices (in particular the second congressional district and governor), each family reportedly deployed PAGs to intimidate their rival's supporters. During the week prior to the 2010 contest in Zamboanga Sibugay, gunmen (reportedly associated with PAGs of the rival Hoffer and Jalosjos clans) fired at a group of local candidates, and three other candidates were wounded during an ambush on their campaign convoy. And days prior to the 2007 contest, in the town of San Carlos, north of Manila, mayoral candidate Julian Resuello was killed by armed assailants—one of his aides was also killed and others were wounded.

Licit and illicit interests motivate politicians to win. Candidates are motivated by the desire to secure control over governance and the associated spoils—frequently associated with clans and political dynasties, these individuals evoke “warlord” like behavior to stay in power and retain control over the resources (and guaranteed impunity) associated with ascending to office. In some cases, politicians are also motivated by their links to criminal elements and associated enterprises—in exchange for campaign funds as well as a percentage of revenue, local politicians ensure regulatory authorities turn a blind eye toward illicit enterprises ranging from illegal logging to drug smuggling. In Masbate, for example, one of the principal motivating factors to win and maintain control over office is control over the illegal fishing industry—officials allow fishermen from Cebu and other areas to enter the 15-mile radius of water extending from Masbate (prohibited under law) and access the rich sources of fish. In exchange, these local politicians receive consistent payments. The Durano dynasty of Danao (Cebu province) is an example of a dynasty whose consistent victories have enabled it to fortify control over legitimate (cement factories, among others) and illegitimate (construction of illegal guns) economies in their area. Politicians with links to illicit financing and associated criminal elements also engage these organizations and their gunmen to intimidate or kill rivals.

¹³ Statistics from military reports, as compiled and presented in Patrick Patino and Djorina Velasco, “Election Violence in the Philippines,” (Manila, Philippines: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2004), 8.

¹⁴ This incident is commonly referred to as the “Ampatuan massacre,” referring to the town in which the bodies were buried and later found.

¹⁵ According to a study performed by the Political Democracy and Reforms (PODER) Program of the Ateneo School of Government, “Government Response to Election-Related Violence,” (2011).

The trifecta of “guns, goons, and gold” that contributes to ERV is enabled by a political system in which national-level politicians rely on local allies to deliver votes.

Insurgent groups are also engaged in election-related violence in the Pre-Election Phase as well as on Election Day. While other insurgent groups have been cited in this assessment, the two main insurgencies that perpetrate election-related violence are the NPA of the Communist Party of the Philippines and MILF. Though their agendas differ, each group can be seen as motivated by a desire to discredit the electoral process as a means to undermine the authority and legitimacy of the Philippine government. However, both also engage in intimidation and coercion to pursue financial gain. The NPA has also been tied to assassination of candidates known to support, or have been involved in, the government’s counter-insurgency operations. Beginning in approximately 2001, the NPA also began employing intimidation and violence to benefit candidates that the insurgency reportedly supports. In the 2001 elections, there was a party-list organization self-identified with the communist movement that reportedly received financial support from the NPA. The NPA also intimidated and harassed rivals to the organization’s party list, which won three seats in Congress in the 2001 contest

Two days prior to the election has been termed “*ora-de-peligro*,” or “the hour of danger.” Although the victims as profiled above remain at risk during this period, immediately prior to Election Day voters become additional targets of harassment and intimidation. Rivals will deploy operatives to, through threats of bodily harm or vote buying, intimidate voters either to not cast a ballot at all or to do so for the operative’s candidate.

Election Day Phase

Election Day in the Philippines has been more peaceful than the Pre-Election Phase, although it has also experienced violence. Violence ranges in form, but generally centers on candidates employing PAGs to intimidate voters from going to the polls (to cast ballots for their rival); disrupting rival candidates’ efforts to rally support; and insurgent forces attacking polling stations or officials involved in the election. Supporters of rival candidates have also engaged in fist fights and shootings because of the perceptions of malpractice or accusations that poll workers were partisan toward a particular candidate.

In 2010, more than 80 polling stations across the country experienced ERV that ranged in profile from bombings to frighten voters and prevent them from going to vote, to attacks on polling centers and the destruction of voting machines. For example, a bomb exploded at the Mindanao State University in Marawi City, Lanao del Sur, which forced COMELEC to transfer the 17 precincts using that polling center. During the 2007 election, two soldiers were killed and 13 wounded when a military convoy associated with security provision for the election was attacked in Mountain Province in Luzon. On the same day, a *barangay* captain was shot and killed in Bucay, in Abra.

Post-Election Phase

Since 1986, violence in the Post-Election Phase has been linked to clashes during vote tabulation as well as to delays in announcement of results. “Poll watchers” hired by candidates to oversee the tabulation process and ensure it is “orderly,” clash with each other as well as intimidate or attack poll workers (teachers) to coerce them to forge vote tally sheets. Poll watchers or other supporters of candidates have stolen ballot boxes as well as murdered poll workers who were attempting to prevent the theft. This kind of perpetrator has also burned voted ballots, or entire polling centers, to prevent tabulation of votes thought to be cast for their rival. During the counting process for the 2004 election, for example, individuals burned ballots and then an entire polling station, killing two poll workers inside. This incident demonstrates how COMELEC staff and election-workers are vulnerable during the Election Day and Post-Election Phases. During the same election, two police officers in Ilocos Norte province were killed as they guarded ballot boxes.

Violence in the Post-Election Phase of the 2010 cycle was reduced from previous years. Several factors contributed to this decline. First, as post-election violence had been linked to mistrust and delays in the announcement of results, electronic voting alleviated some of these concerns and associated violent outbursts. Second, the COMELEC, PNP, and AFP coordination mechanisms were effective. This was an indicator of the political will of security forces to reduce violence. Third, there were task forces of coalitions of non-state stakeholders to promote peaceful elections.

Although post-election violence is most often associated with the period immediately following Election Day, targeted killings of campaign staff/operators or elected candidates also occur weeks or months after results are announced or the individual takes office. With regard to post-election assassination of campaign operators, local officials who were given funds to ‘deliver votes’ for a candidate but failed to do so may be murdered as retribution. This form of revenge killing generally occurs months after the election, which some indicate is a result of rivals taking advantage of decreased coordination and attention by security forces following the ‘official’ end of the election period.

One measure of the intensity of ERV has been constructed by Straus and Taylor through a coding of 0 to 3, with 0 designating no violence and 3 indicating 20 or more deaths during the electoral cycle.

Electoral Incident Coding¹⁶

Code Level	Description
0	No reported electoral violence before or after a vote
1	The first level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspaper being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents
2	The second level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture
3	The third level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths

Under these metrics, historically the Philippines can be considered in the Code 3 category.

C. Stakeholder Analysis**1. State Stakeholders****a. Commission on Election (COMELEC)**

COMELEC is the body constitutionally mandated to oversee elections in the Philippines. Commissioners are assigned to specific “pillars” or areas of focus, including Dispute Adjudication, Political Finance, Out-of-Country Voting, Information Technology, Empowering Marginalized Groups, and External Stakeholders. It is the lead civilian body that coordinates electoral security planning and programming with the PNP and AFP. Within its constitutional authority, the COMELEC can deputize members of the AFP to support electoral security in areas of concern. During the 2010 electoral cycle, the COMELEC issued a total gun ban and tightened restrictions on employing armed security guards by candidates.

COMELEC has established several mechanisms to manage electoral security initiatives that aim to prevent ERV or address its consequences. First, COMELEC works with the AFP and PNP to coordinate gun bans prior to Election Day. In order to manage this process, COMELEC created a Committee on the Gun Ban, led by a Commissioner, to review applications for exemptions. Though the gun ban was imposed for 2010, individuals were nonetheless able to submit applications to be deemed exempt from it—and some have questioned the effectiveness of this review process to determine cases where genuine exemptions should be granted.

¹⁶ Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, “Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990-2007,” 2009, 9 - 11.

Second, to ensure coordination with the PNP and AFP, COMELEC appointed liaison officers to work with each institution on electoral security planning and administration. COMELEC representatives participated in national and regional Command Conferences with the PNP, AFP, and other law enforcement agencies to plan and organize for electoral security. After the 2010 election, COMELEC worked with its military and law enforcement partners to conduct provincial sorties to assess the effectiveness of its electoral security measures and to further refine the identification and intensity of hot spots including the presence of PAGs and other armed groups.

COMELEC provides victim's services for poll workers subjected to violence including financial, medical, and burial services. In addition, a bill is pending in the House of Representatives to increase benefits and insurance for poll workers. The bill was introduced by the party list organization that represents teachers (who serve as poll workers).

While the current COMELEC at the national level is seen as an improvement in the effectiveness and integrity over previous ones, its performance at the sub-national level was viewed as uneven and in some cases partisan. In this regard, it can be noted that in the assessment team's visits outside of metropolitan Manila, the COMELEC officials were found to be guarded in their responses to questions. In some areas, local election officials are considered under the influence of local politicians, political clans, or warlords. Finally, some of those interviewed questioned COMELEC's role in adjudicating electoral disputes both from the standpoint of capacity, in that it should focus on administration, and impartiality, in that it may adjudicate disputes against itself.

b. Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

During the electoral cycle, the CHR monitors human rights violations during the campaign period and on Election Day as they relate to six vulnerable sectors of the electorate including: 1) first time voters/youth; 2) elderly; 3) Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs); 4) indigenous peoples; 5) people with disabilities; and 6) persons deprived of liberty. Although its target groups were not generally included as victims of electoral violence in the Philippines, the CHR nonetheless participates in electoral security efforts by coordinating its monitoring activities, conducted through Human Rights Action Centers established in approximately 80 percent of *barangays*, with the COMELEC, PNP, and AFP. The CHR coordinates with the Department of Interior and Local Government to establish the Centers. The CHR promotes a human rights approach to elections as well as provides human rights training for police, prosecutors and candidates for public office. However, public officials did not reference these trainings and their effectiveness remains unclear.

The CHR conducts its own investigations and deploys Quick Reaction Teams to perform such investigations. Incidents involving ERV are given "fast-track" consideration in investigation, where CHR uses as a minimal threshold for ERV "the denial of rights," which need not involve physical assault or intimidation. The CHR also coordinates with

the families of victims and the families of detainees, mainly to provide guidance on their cases, as well as offers witness protection programs.

c. Philippines National Police (PNP) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

Both the PNP and AFP are involved in planning and provision of electoral security services. The PNP is the principal national security force in this effort, while the AFP, as deputized by the COMELEC, provides logistical and security support. For the 2010 election, the PNP conducted its electoral security operations through Joint Security Control Centers (JSCCs) and coordinated its efforts with the COMELEC and AFP. Such JSCCs were established at the national, provincial, and local level, with representation from COMELEC, AFP, and PNP at each. The terms of reference for the coordination were put forward in a Memorandum of Understanding signed by the heads of the participating agencies. For the 2013 elections, the JSCCs have been renamed as Joint Peace and Security Centers. Electoral security stakeholders have initiated monthly coordination meetings focused on the upcoming election.

To be able to respond to ERVIs, in 2010 the PNP stationed Special Action Strike Forces at the regional and provincial level as well as in specific hotspots. While the PNP coordinates its activities with local police forces, only national police are employed in the special strike forces. In order to reduce the impact of local powerbrokers on police priorities, police chiefs are rotated among different posts, but the officers are locally recruited. In areas where insurgents are active, the AFP deployed two soldiers for every estimated insurgent in an area. The AFP also oversees the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU) as counter-insurgency forces. The CAFGU are issued small arms as a grassroots force to combat insurgents.

In cooperation with the COMELEC and with input from the local police, the PNP conducts security area surveys in order to designate certain *barangays* and municipalities as “hot spots” or “areas of concern” based upon anticipated intensity of political activity and a previous history of electoral violence. The PNP’s Directorate of Intelligence describes the criteria used to designate a municipality as a hot spot as follows: history of electoral conflict; the extent to which PAGs and other illegal armed groups are operational; and the extent to which rivalries between political clans have intensified (or weakened). Based on a combination of these factors, municipalities are given a ranking of One or Two. Hot spots receive a One designation where ERV are likely based upon a history of such violence. Areas designated Two are those with active influence and operation of insurgents, PAGs, and criminal organizations. A map of hot spots for 2010 is included as Annex III.

For candidates under threat of violence, the PNP’s Security Agencies and Guards Supervision Division accredits “protective agents” to provide close protection. Protective agents must be licensed private detectives and are required to attend a 10-day training session. Protective agents are permitted to carry firearms but must also wear uniforms. Candidates can also request protection directly from the PNP with the approval of the

COMELEC's Protection Unit. Similarly, candidates can request police protection at political rallies. If a threat is determined to be imminent, candidates can be provided with a one-week protection detail. Longer periods of police protection are provided based upon an assessment of the threat. To cover the costs of electoral security operations, the PNP prepares a budget for its anticipated vehicles, logistics, and personnel expenses, which it submits to the COMELEC to be included in the overall election budget.

In the Pre-Election Phase, six months before Election Day, the PNP conducts a campaign against hired guns and wanted people. The PNP in Masbate indicated that they were moving up the schedule for this campaign from January 2013 to October 2012 in preparation for the May 2013 elections; and the national office of the PNP stated that their efforts to de-mobilize PAGS would begin in June 2012. The PNP have formed community partnerships at the local level to organize unity rallies, prayer rallies, and peace caravans as elements of their concept of operations. Firearms are used in most ERVIs to injure and "liquidate," but harassment is common and bombings occasionally occur. On Election Day and in the Post-Election Phase, the PNP focuses on protecting polling stations—in the former to ensure orderly and peaceful voting and following Election Day to prevent or respond to attacks on polling stations. In their protection of polls, however, police must remain at least 50 meters from the polls unless called in to quell a disturbance. This policy is intended to reduce any intimidating aspects of police presence at polling stations while still positioning them in proximity to the poll to quickly respond to incidents, if requested to do so. In the Post-Election Phase, the PNP also accompanies transport of PCOS machines, along with poll watchers, to COMELEC offices. In some areas, the AFP performs similar functions.

While the PNP was largely regarded as effective in 2010 in its electoral security administration, some police are still considered by the CHR as a source of human rights violations. In some locations, it has been observed that the PNP has ties to the political clans and PAGs. These assertions imply that it is more than a training issue alone to instill human rights values in politicized police forces. In the case of the Philippines, it is a decentralized form of politicization with local police forming ranks with local political dynasties for the benefits which accrue from such relationships.

2. Non-State Stakeholders

a. Political Parties

Political parties are institutionally weak by comparison to other political actors, characterized by clientelism, and used as vehicles for individuals to pursue personal, political, and financial power. This observation has several implications for ERV. First, a lack of party loyalty by elected officials, reflected in the "shirt changing" tactic, creates volatility within and among parties. Second, while national parties exist, the strength of the party hierarchies at the local level is considerably diminished and more under the control of local political powerbrokers than national leaders. Third, the lack of viable political finance regulations and enforcement creates opaque connections between money and ERV through two means—the "gold" it takes to employ "goons and guns" and the

resources to practice vote buying as a “carrot” to influence voting behavior. The consequences of these characteristics are to diminish the traditional role of political parties as aggregators of opinion and vehicles to broker communications between citizens and government.

There are three types of political parties in the Philippines: 1) national parties; 2) “party list” parties; and 3) regional or provincial parties. Nationally, the Liberal Party is the current majority party in the House of Representatives and is led by President Aquino. The Liberal Party claims to owe its relative dominance to the fact that it offers policy positions and undertakes grassroots organizational efforts to support its candidates. The other national parties holding a double digit number of seats in the House are the Christian-Muslim Democrats of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; the Nationalist People’s Coalition of Eduardo Conjuangco, Jr.; and The Nationalist Party of Manuel Villar Jr.

Party list candidates represent various groups including senior citizens, women, agriculture, *barangay* concerns, teachers, trade unions, and volunteer educators, among others. For this list, the entire country is one district and candidates are elected to one, two or three seats available to their group, depending upon the group. Candidates for these positions have proven vulnerable to intimidation as clans and other political interests attempt to field their own candidates to fit these descriptions, regardless of whether they are *bona fide* members of those communities.

Finally, there are dozens of local political parties which operate on the provincial, regional, municipal, or congressional district levels. As a result of the “coalitional pyramid” described above, candidates engaged in higher level contests for the Senate and House of Representatives (as well as that for the executive) must strike deals with local parties to ensure delivery of votes. In turn, these relationships become clientelistic, fostering patronage, corruption, and vote buying.

b. Domestic Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Faith-Based Organizations, and Academia

Civil society organizations (CSOs) and faith-based organizations have played a positive role in preventing and reducing electoral violence. Domestic groups such as the Institute for Political and Electoral Reform (IPER), the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting (PPCRV), the Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy (PCID), and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue have organized peace-building activities and conducted electoral monitoring. Many of their activities have been funded through USAID. The Philippines Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR) provides documentation on ERV and related violence. In particular, the PIPVTR has been involved in documenting the manufacture and flow of firearms including a video of a firearms factory in Mindanao.

IPER has been a leading CSO in monitoring, researching, and reporting on ERV. It has encouraged a comprehensive and multi-sectoral approach to de-conflicting elections and

joined forces to coordinate with some of the organizations listed above in peace-building activities. One such organization is the PPCRV. In the 2010 election, the PPCRV promoted the signing of peace covenants by political rivals and fielded 660,000 volunteer election monitors to conduct a Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT). To coordinate these activities, the PPCRV leveraged the parish structure and the hierarchy of priests and bishops. The parish system of communications and services is considered as viable even in areas where local government is weak.

The PCID was established in 2002 as a network of Muslim democracy advocates. Since then, PCID has established a nation-wide network of Muslim religious organizations as well as a network of Muslim women religious leaders. PCID developed an Islamic peace education model for the Philippines (available in book form) and in 2010 hosted an International Workshop on Islamic Peace Education. In addition to providing analysis on issues related to peace and security in Mindanao, PCID implements seminars on Islamic peace education in madrassas.

Prior to the 2010 elections, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD Centre), launched its Preventing Election Related Violence (PERV) program in Sulu, an island province in ARMM, to work through civil society to monitor and report ERVIs and political violence more broadly. The PERV-Sulu monitoring program worked through 25 volunteers in 19 municipalities who gathered and reported on incidents of violence. These reports were then shared with a local group of ‘eminent persons’ referred to as the “Together we move forward” group (known by its acronym TSS, for its translation in Tausag to *Tumikang Sama Sama*). In collaboration with the Sulu Office of the Mufti, the HD Centre supported the TSS, which reviewed the PERV-Sulu group monitoring reports and, collectively, decided how to address reported incidents including bringing involved parties together to dialogue and resolve disputes or reporting incidents to the police or military.

The National Citizens Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL) has conducted activities in pre-election monitoring, media, voter advocacy, and good governance, and has conducted a PVT for each national election since the People Power revolution in 1986. NAMFREL produces the *Bantayng Bayan*, which is a repository of the “reports on observation, findings, and recommendation on the critical aspects of the election process given at regular intervals to the Filipino people.”¹⁷ In assessing the performance of COMELEC, NAMFREL representatives were the most critical about its capacity and impartiality while recognizing improvements in this regard of the current COMELEC over those of past elections.

In an electoral context, Libertas, a domestic CSO, is focused on adjudication of electoral disputes. The authority to adjudicate electoral disputes is diversified among the COMELEC, judicatory and special panels devoted to levels of office – presidential, senate, and representatives. This fragmentation of process became an acute legal issue with the introduction of the PCOS machines and had implications for conflict. With

¹⁷ For an overview of these activities, see the NAMFREL site:
<http://www.namfrel.com.ph/v2/activities/electionmonitoring.php>.

respect to judging the validity of a vote and the legal interpretation of the voter's intent, each jurisdiction had its own criteria. As a result, on a given ballot, differing decisions could be made about the validity of a voter's selection in a given race. Without a harmonization of the viewpoints, judging ballot invalidity could be viewed as arbitrary and manipulative. Libertas provided assistance to these adjudicative institutions to successfully harmonize their approach and de-conflict ballot validation processes.

The province of Masbate has been cited as a location where ERV has been severe and longstanding. However, through the efforts of the Masbate Advocates for Peace (MAP), which is a consortium of CSOs, individuals, and local businesses and an initiative of Father Leo Casas, Election Day was violence free. While ERVIs occurred in the Pre-Election and Post-Election Phases, the absence of violence on Election Day was seen as exceptional. This was accomplished through the instruments of peace covenants, rallies, and fostering the political will among local politicians not to engage in violence. Given the lack of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) infrastructure in the province, these activities were conducted on a person-to-person level which emphasized the importance of relationships and trust.

In the Philippines, the academic community has played a role in analyzing and documenting ERV. The Ateneo de Manila University's School of Government conducted a policy study of ERV in the provinces of Abra and Nueva Vizcaya. It examined the institutional weaknesses, actors, and the cultural factors which contribute to ERV in those locations. Its findings revealed that in the provinces studied, among the poorest provinces in terms of Per Capita Income, poverty was a significant contributor to ERV manifested in at least three ways. First, the lack of income of many residents created vulnerabilities to be "bought" by local politicians, either in the form of their votes or in exchange for employment to commit ERVs. This poverty is related to the second contributing factor – political clans. These clans engaged impoverished residents in acts of ERV. Local state stakeholders such as the municipal government officials, COMELEC, security forces, and the judiciary were subject to capture by these clans. A third common factor was the presence of insurgencies, particularly the NPA in these provinces. Insurgencies contributed to ERV through their direct attacks on the process, but were also shown to be engaged by political clans as enforcers. The proliferation of firearms and a "machismo" culture were also included in the list of fundamental vulnerabilities in their study.

Further, the Ateneo study found that candidates, particularly the party list candidates, were the most frequent targets of ERV, with capture of local governance as the motive behind much violence, and firearms as the weapons of choice. The pattern of violence remained consistent throughout electoral cycles in terms of victims, perpetrators, motives, and tactics.

c. Media Organizations

By some accounts, the national media has at times sensationalized electoral violence, but its attention to the Maguindanao massacre is seen as a critical factor in drawing public

attention and fostering widespread public ire over the tragedy. Many journalists were murdered in that incident.

Local media and journalists are viewed as partisan reporters of news and under the influence of local political dynasties. Indeed, some local media organizations are also owned by political dynasties. In addition to offering little protection to their journalists, smaller media organizations at the local level are often referred to as practicing ‘AC/DC’ journalism—Attack and Collect/Defend and Collect, which refers to the money they receive to skew their stories, either against or in favor of particular interests. As such, even those local media organizations which retain some independence are generally conflated with “block timers”—individuals who purchase large blocks of airtime and then run their own politically-oriented programming during these time periods.

According to the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, journalists are particularly vulnerable and subject to attack during the electoral cycle. Since 1986, 150 journalists have been murdered in job-related violence. Almost all those killed were from community outlets and not national media. Around 80 percent of journalists killed possessed firearms in the mistaken notion that they could defend themselves against PAGs. Many of the cases involved attacks on senior politicians by unidentified assailants with journalists caught in the crossfire. Journalist intimidation may also take the form of “near death” experiences such as harassment, libel suits, and physical assaults. The Freedom Fund for Philippines Journalists provides victims’ services such as medical care, scholarships for the children of murdered journalists, and covering burial costs. Self-preservation training on such issues as safe passage techniques is also provided.

3. International Community

The International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES), the International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program (ICITAP), the Friedrich Ebert Foundation (FES), and the Asia Foundation (TAF) are representative organizations from the international community providing assistance to election authorities, police, political parties, and CSOs/faith-based organizations, respectively.

Under funding from USAID, IFES initiated programming in the Philippines in 2004 centered on promoting electoral reform and building electoral administration capacity. Through its Advancing Reforms in Philippine Election Administration Project (2005-2008) and subsequent contract extension, IFES worked through civil society and directly with the COMELEC to support modernized electoral reform in key areas such as voter registration, legal framework and voter education. The project also aimed to enhance the institutional capacity of COMELEC, providing among other gains a set of internal training manuals and improving capacity to perform strategic planning. Through the project, IFES helped create Citizen Care, which is to date the only volunteer-based civil society network in ARMM performing election monitoring. IFES continues to provide technical assistance and guidance to COMELEC and, through Citizen Care, supports monitoring initiatives in ARMM.

ICITAP does not provide electoral security training in its current program with the PNP, which includes three lines of effort: 1) Model Police Station; 2) Mindanao activities; and 3) Maritime Police Project. However, the training program does present a platform where such training could be introduced. Through the Model Police Station initiative, good practices in public order management during elections and electoral security planning techniques can be put forward. As Mindanao has typically been a hot spot for ERV, a special focus on electoral security for police forces assigned there could be included in the program. And, as illegal fishing has been connected to ERV in such locations as Masbate, communications protocols for documenting these linkages between maritime patrols and local police could be established. The PNP's observation that they require more maritime asset for island-to-island mobility should also be noted in this regard.

Fostering a more robust political party system is the focus of FES. Its overall mission is to facilitate dialogue and promote a comparative understanding of political systems, grounded in the belief that social-democratic values and principles should be embedded in such systems. To this end, FES works to address what civil society and other actors perceive to be deficiencies in the country's political party system. FES has funded various studies and facilitated discussions and roundtables to identify and discuss the weaknesses of the system. To promote comparative understanding of political (party) systems, FES has coordinated study tours for representatives of CSOs or party list organizations to Europe to obtain, first-hand, a perspective on the operation of parties and politics in these polities. Upon return to the Philippines, the participants hold roundtable discussions to compare and contrast the systems in countries visited to that of the Philippines and identify areas where the Filipino system might adopt some examined institutions or elements thereof. Though the intent of such programming is to promote reform to the political system of the Philippines, the FES does not lead any campaigns—they foster dialogue and try to transfer knowledge, but remain firm that local actors must lead any reform efforts.

Through USAID funding, TAF has focused its assistance efforts on supporting work through CSOs and faith-based organizations. TAF has conducted programming in electoral reform and conflict management. It has employed several strategies in this regard including building constituencies for electoral reform, collecting conflict data, documenting good practices in conflict resolution and organizing peace summits that involve religious authorities, traditional leaders, and the COMELEC. Through its experience in peace-building, TAF has identified local religious leaders, both Christian and Muslim, as particularly effective partners in this regard.

In order to coordinate the electoral assistance activities of the international community, in 2009 and 2010, IFES brought the international community together to discuss different aspects and issues relating to the 2010 Synchronized Elections. Presentations were made by members and staff of the COMELEC and leading civil society groups on topics such as Automation of Elections, Campaign Finance Monitoring, Election Monitoring, and Election Adjudication, among others. Such a coordination of efforts has been proposed by IFES for the 2013 electoral cycle. The objective of the coordination effort is to encourage support of existing electoral reform efforts and to avoid duplication in

providing assistance with a proper understanding of the issues. This objective can be accomplished through conduct of regular, quarterly coordination meetings for the international community with specific topics or issues identified and presentations made by local experts. The different members of the international community will be encouraged to host a meeting so that the venue will be rotated. IFES staff can handle secretariat work, including preparation and sending of invitations, coordinating logistical requirements with the host international member, and inviting guest speakers.

II. Electoral Security Planning: Program Objectives and Planning

This programming seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis.

Problem Statement: Efforts by state and non-state stakeholders reduced electoral violence during the 2010 electoral cycle. However, conflict remains embedded in Philippine elections because of the long-standing influence of political clans (‘dynasties’), widespread availability of firearms, and lack of a robust political party system. Unless these obstacles are addressed, elections in the Philippines will continue to experience violence.

Development Hypothesis: If the government of the Philippines is able to solidify and expand effective means of electoral violence prevention, and political parties become a viable as well as sustainable bulwark against political dynasties, then election-related violence should continue to be reduced.

Definition of ERV: In order to foster a common vision on what constitute ERV, state and non-state stakeholders should consider adopting the following definitions on incident profiling and timing as put forth by UNDP. UNDP defines ERV as follows, “a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends...(this includes) acts such as assassination of opponents or spontaneous fisticuffs between rival groups of supporters – and threats, coercion and intimidation of opponents, voters, and election officials.”¹⁸ Adopting this or a similar common definition would assist greatly with monitoring and recording ERVIs and, by extension, developing programming to combat such phenomena.

With regard to timeframe, UNDP divides the electoral threat calendar into the following five phases.

Phase 1: The long run-up to electoral events (18 months to three months prior)

Phase 2: The campaign’s final lap (three months prior to Election Day)

Phase 3: Polling day(s)

Phase 4: Between voting and proclamation

Phase 5: Post-election outcomes and their aftermath.¹⁹

¹⁸ UNDP, 4.

¹⁹ UNDP, 20-21.

Similar to adopting a common definition for the concept of ERV, assuming this expanded timeframe would enable stakeholders to develop initiatives to thwart incidents of ERV which occur early in the electoral process and well after Election Day.

A. Mitigating Factors

Mitigating factors are those which can be leveraged in programming to reduce ERV. The following twelve such factors have been identified.

A “clean election” precedent exists – The landslide election of President Benigno Aquino III was not marred by controversy or accusations of rigging, and it was viewed as representing an accurate expression of popular will. Freedom House recently described the 2010 elections as one of the few noteworthy advances in democracy where the global trend has been a democratic retreat for the past five years. This “clean” election can demonstrate to the voting public the relationship between genuine elections and good governance.

Momentum toward reversing the culture of impunity – The impeachment of Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato C. Corona occurred during time of the assessment. It was thought by some of those interviewed that this impeachment could be leveraged to send a strong signal that impunity for legal violations at any level will no longer be tolerated.

Election technology has reduced some forms of ERV – The PCOS machines proved effective at reducing violence in the Post-Election Phase. Though this represents a mitigating factor, public expectations must be managed and tempered regarding the extent to which technologies can alleviate problems associated with the conduct of elections.

Youth are not exploited as agents of ERV – Youth are not systematically recruited as the agents of violence by candidates and are generally viewed as peace-builders. In ARMM, youth are engaged as peace-builders and through a program established by IFES engaged in ‘democracy camps.’ Frustrated with unemployment and desiring to promote peace, youth can be leveraged as change agents. That being said, youth remain vulnerable to other forms of exploitation or coercion—they have been targets for recruitment by such insurgent groups as Abu Sayyaf and elected Youth Councils are sometimes co-opted by politicians to prevent them from voting or to influence their voting selections.

Women are generally not targeted as victims – Women are generally not singled out as targets of electoral violence. Nonetheless, in some cases women contesting as candidates are targeted, in particular if they replace husbands who are no longer eligible to run for office. Despite the general tendency for women not to be targets of ERV, some cited the Maguindanao massacre as a sign that this tendency may be shifting, as many of the individuals killed in that incident were female.

Overseas Foreign Workers (OFWs) play a neutral role – OFWs play a neutral role in elections by not fueling conflict through rhetoric or financing. In fact, some of those

interviewed argued that remittances from OFWs made those at home less susceptible to vote buying. In the 2004 elections, 359,297 individuals overseas registered and 65 percent cast ballots. This number decreased markedly to 16 percent for the 2007 elections (of 504,124 registered), for various reasons including backlash from the “Hello Garcia” scandal of 2004, inadequate voter information campaigns, and concerns by those overseas with the affidavit requirement that in order to register they must declare their intent to return to the Philippines. In the 2010 election, participation increased to 25.99 percent (of 589,830 registered).²⁰

MILF Peace Negotiations are ongoing – Peace negotiations continue in Malaysia between the government of the Philippines and the MILF. If a peace agreement is achieved, this development can be leveraged to fragment insurgencies and reduce their impact on electoral violence.

Stiffer penalties for electoral violence have been proposed – Legislation has been introduced in the House of Representatives to increase the penalties for electoral violence. Though such offenses are referenced in the Omnibus Election Code, the Penal Code is largely silent on such acts. However, debate continues over what can legally be considered an act of electoral violence—in particular, whether the defining characteristic is timeframe, victim, or motive (or what combination thereof should be used).

Social media are gaining traction and could be used for violence prevention – Social media and networking can be leveraged to bring greater transparency and accountability in electoral violence. Text messaging is a wildcard in terms of electoral violence—though it has been used for incident reporting and providing tips to the police, it has also been used to issue threats and intimidating messages.

Infrastructure exists to expand training of Police and Army – Programs of training and cooperation between PNP, AFP, and the US (military and ICITAP) can be expanded to include instruction on electoral security administration, human rights, and the role of the military as defenders of democracy.

Religious Authorities play a positive role – Organizations such as the PPCRV and the National Ulama Conference of the Philippines can continue to provide incident monitoring, education, and peace-building programs for members of the Christian and Muslim communities.

Constituency Delimitation is a Grand Bargain – Although an un-transparent process, the House of Representatives delimits its own districts without engaging in open conflict. It may be assumed that district boundaries are determined by clan tradition, natural resource capture, geography, and political deals. While delimitation processes can spark violence during the mapping process in the Pre-Election Phase and the allocation of seats in the Post-Election Phase, incumbents agree to a congressional map without reported conflict or “going to war with each other” as one observer framed it.

²⁰ Statistics from COMELEC.

B. USAID Constraints and Objectives

As stated in the overview of its Democracy and Governance program, “USAID engages a diverse set of stakeholders for a broad range of democracy and governance programs in the Philippines. USAID supports electoral reform, judicial reform and the rule of law, anticorruption, local governance, conflict resolution, human rights and anti-trafficking.” As shown in the assessment and with the possible exception of anti-trafficking programs, there are issues related to ERV which concern each of these programming areas.

In the area of electoral assistance, USAID’s program with IFES in assisting the COMELEC represented the largest program of its kind among international donors. Additionally, USAID funded the development of over 380,000 quick guides on Election Day operations which were distributed to poll workers in 76,000 polling stations; supported voter education and election monitoring efforts involving over 400,000 domestic observers; and provided training programs to resolve disputes over the PCOS system. USAID also supported the CSO and faith-based peace building initiatives described in this assessment

Given the complex nature of ERV, USAID could leverage funding from other internal sources such as the Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) Office and, given its connections with land issues involving the extractive and fishing sectors, Environment and Global Climate Change. Further collaboration with the ICITAP could be pursued in order to leverage existing training infrastructure to expand curriculum for the PNP.

C. Strategic Program Objectives

In developing initiatives to prevent, manage, or mediate ERV, such programming should be considered from three strategic perspectives: 1) hard power; 2) soft power; and 3) countervailing power. Hard power programs are those that involve the COMELEC, PNP, and AFP (state stakeholders) and concern electoral security administration, the enforcement of laws, and the adjudication of disputes. Soft power (non-state stakeholders) involves the role of CSOs and religious authorities in the development of programming to de-conflict relationships and protect electoral stakeholders. And, countervailing power involves both state and non-stakeholders to build capacity to counter the influence of political dynasties and warlords in the electoral process.

Reflecting these three perspectives, the four strategic objectives for the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles are as follows:

1. Build capacity of state institutions in electoral security administration and justice.

For the 2010 electoral cycle, the COMELEC and PNP/AFP policies and practices resulted in reduced violence on Election Day and in the Post-Election Phase. Despite these gains, violence persists in Filipino elections, at least in part as a result of insufficient state capacity in electoral security administration and justice. As the tactics of perpetrators shift according to obstacles and opportunities, the COMELEC and PNP/AFP

must have the increased capacity and the associated dexterity to respond to varying threats and perpetrators.

2. Build the capacity of CSOs, faith-based organizations, and academic institutions as countervailing forces to the influence of political clans and in doing so encourage an environment of public opinion that is intolerant of electoral violence and malpractice.

In tandem with efforts to build state capacity to provide electoral security (objective 1), and empower political parties to begin to serve as viable alternatives for representation (objective 3), other non-state countervailing forces must be supported so that the influence of political clans can remain in check. Efforts during the 2010 electoral cycle by these non-state stakeholders (principally CSOs, faith-based organizations, and religious authorities) demonstrated that public opinion can be leveraged to promote opposition to ERV. Building on this momentum, activities under this objective focus on grassroots efforts to reduce participation in, and acquiescence to, ERV through building the capacity of organizations to implement initiatives such as peaceful election public messaging and associated events.

3. Build the capacity of political parties so they may serve as countervailing influences and viable alternatives to political clans.

To fully address ERV over the long-term, the role of clans in elections and politics must be reformed and replaced by effective political parties. Strengthening political parties so that they may begin to serve as reliable forms of representation is the primary focus of activities under this objective. It is to be accomplished through strengthening internal democracy mechanisms, fostering a policy-based approach to governance, encouraging accountability and transparency from other parties and candidates, and encouraging reforms to provide sufficient resources that may encourage behavioral independence of officeholders and candidates from local clans.

4. Enhance the services rendered to victims of ERV.

Coupled with efforts to further reduce ERV in the short-term, more can be done to deal with the consequences of this violence. Though two formal programs of victim's compensation were identified on this assessment,²¹ the primary targets of ERV – candidates, campaign operatives and their family members, and those outside of a protective circle of the core of political clans – have no such formal compensation or services available. As efforts to reduce ERV occur, those directly affected by it should in the meantime receive further assistance to deal with associated consequences.

Given the cross-cutting issues that drive ERV, programming to reduce electoral violence in the 2013 and 2016 elections should be multi-sectoral and involve activities throughout

²¹ 1) COMELEC, which provides services for poll workers and staff; and 2) the reporter's union, which provides services for journalists.

the electoral cycle. Programming should also build upon the effective measures in 2010 organized by the PNP, COMELEC, and non-state stakeholders.

Given the USG's involvement in electoral assistance (USAID), police training (ICITAP), and military cooperation (Department of Defense), the domestic environment for assistance in reducing ERV is favorable. The electoral assistance coordination mechanism established through IFES for the 2010 elections can be replicated with an added focus on donors and implementers concerned with conflict and ERV.

The program implementation calendar should concern both the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles. It should also be noted that the elections in ARMM will be synchronized with other elections held in these cycles. As the incumbent power exemplified by the Ampatuan clan will not be exerting its full strength in these elections, this vacuum may create a vulnerability to ERV not found in previous elections.

III. Electoral Security Programming

A. Strategic Objective One - Build capacity of state institutions in electoral security administration and justice.

The objective of programming under this objective is to strengthen the capacity within the Philippines to prevent conflict and protect electoral stakeholders, events, materials, and facilities by the COMELEC and PNP/AFP. In support of the fulfillment of this objective, the following program activities can be considered:

COMELEC

The coordination and electoral security mechanisms employed in 2010, such as the JSCCs, gun ban, checkpoints, and PAG demobilizations, should be replicated for the 2013 and 2016 electoral cycles. However, these activities should begin prior to 120 days before Election Day to ensure more effective enforcement and to document ERVIs which occur during this early phase of the Pre-Election Phase.

Additionally, building upon the assistance provided by IFES, the following program activities support the strategic objectives for the COMELEC in the prevention of ERV:

- Establish within the COMELEC a pillar for electoral security so that the Commission has an on-going focal point for electoral security administration. This pillar should develop a definition of the type and timing of what constitutes an ERVI so that a consistent profile can be used by state and non-state stakeholders. The pillar can also oversee the implementation of an expanded program of services to election workers victimized by ERV;
- Enhance the COMELEC's political finance pillar and the capacity of its political finance unit so that campaign finance regulations can be enforced and the impact of illicit funding and violence can be reduced. Assistance should be provided to

enable this pillar and unit to develop a searchable database (accessible to the public) on spending and disclosure reporting;

- Provide the teachers who serve as poll workers with conflict mediation training to enable them to resolve minor disputes at polls on Election Day;
- Establish a Political Party Consultative Council so that COMELEC can have a formal mechanism of engagement and coordination in order to enhance the role of political parties in the electoral process;
- Advise the COMELEC to re-examine the clustering of precincts and the assignment of voters to PCOS machines in order to reduce the number assigned to each and the associated prospect of delays or overcrowding, which can be triggers to Election Day violence;
- Advise and provide support to the COMELEC to reform the voter registration process to reduce the numbers of deceased persons' names appearing on the polls and the practice of "flying voters" registering to vote in communities other than those of their residence. These reforms should reduce the prospect of voter registration irregularities that become triggers for Election Day violence; and
- Strengthen the COMELEC's reach and authority at the sub-national level to enable it to more consistently enforce electoral regulations and reduce the prospect of perceived partisanship on the part of local officials, which can become a trigger for ERV.

In order to dampen the prospect of electoral disputes becoming triggers for ERV, the following activity should be considered:

- Potentially in partnership with Libertas, advise the COMELEC to support reforms to the fragmented electoral dispute resolution mechanism that would harmonize the approach for a consistent application of judgments and precedents. This would allow petitioners to have a clear understanding of the process by which they file complaints.

PNP/AFP

- Support the completion of the integrated security plan for 2013 including the designation of hot spots, deployments of forces, gun ban, efforts to thwart PAGs, and coordination with non-state stakeholders in peace-building programs; and
- Provide the PNP and AFP training (via a training of trainers' methodology) in the *Electoral Security Framework* (which outlines a threat assessment methodology) and human rights principles. This training could be conducted at the PNP national headquarters and leverage facilities already supported by ICITAP's current efforts as well as the US Embassy's Mindanao Working Group.

B. Strategic Objective Two - Build the capacity of CSOs, faith-based organizations, and academic institutions as countervailing forces to the influence of political clans and in doing so encourage an environment of public opinion that is intolerant of electoral violence and malpractice.

The objective of programming under this objective is to further support the activities and build the capacity of those non-state stakeholders who have through past initiatives contributed to development of public opinion in opposition to use of ERV. In support of the fulfillment of this objective, the following program activities can be considered:

Civil Society, Faith-Based, and Academic Organizations

The ERV prevention activities conducted in 2010 such as peace covenants, caravans, and rallies should be continued in 2013 and 2016. USAID should consider further assistance to these initiatives. In addition, civil society and religious authorities can be enlisted to provide education and monitoring in ERV preventative efforts through the following activities:

- Support state stakeholders such as the CHR and non-state stakeholders such as the PPCRV, NAMFREL, and MAP, to conduct ERV and political finance monitoring and help them develop common, web-based tools for the collection and sharing of this information and in the use of social networking sites to report incidents. The incident reporting should be consolidated into a master database and map to establish a countrywide profile on ERVIs which could be employed by the COMELEC, PNP, and AFP in future electoral security planning.
- Encourage OFW promotion of peaceful elections through social networking sites;
- Provide support to student groups in the promotion of peaceful elections through university-based short courses on the role of elections in democracy and provide assistance in the conduct of student government elections in order to illustrate best practices in peaceful elections;
- Develop curriculum in partnership with PCID on the role of peaceful elections in society for use in madrassas in Mindanao;
- Continue programs in Mindanao to engage youth in democracy and electoral education so that this generation's vision of elections can be shaped as violence-free;
- Engage commercial interests not associated with political clans in the funding of CSO programs; and
- Provide grants to academic institutions, such as the Ateneo de Manila and De La Salle Universities, to conduct research into ERV, maintain databases and maps, and assess the impact of measures to prevent it. Make these grants contingent on

cooperation with state authorities so that analysis (and associated mapping) feeds into effective deployment of violence-prevention assets.

Media Organizations

- Foster relationships between public interest blogs, such as Rappler and Vera Files, and traditional media in order to expand the reporting and transparency of the coverage of electoral violence;
- Encourage international media to cover elections as politicians are sensitive to the coverage in the international press and such exposure may inhibit acts of violence to be committed; and
- Support alert systems, safe passage guidelines, safety training, and victim's services for journalists in cooperation with the Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism.

C. Strategic Objective Three - Build the capacity of political parties so they may serve as countervailing influences and viable alternatives to political clans

The objective of the political party programming is to strengthen political parties (and thereby help foster a robust political party system) so they may, in the short-term, become a countervailing force to political dynasties and, in the long-term, replace them as platforms for political dialogue and competition. In fulfillment of this objective, the following activities can be pursued:

- Provide capacity building training for political party leaders and their operatives in order to enhance their skills in campaign organization, strategic communications, and compliance to political party regulations;
- Through such mechanisms as the Consortium for Political Party Development, encourage international exchanges and workshops involving political party leaders that will enhance their comparative perspective of political party operations and thus provide information they may apply within their own organizations;
- Establish a consistent system of “primaries” or determining candidacies within parties to reduce intra-party conflict in candidate selection; and
- Promote genuine representatives of designated communities to contest as candidates for the party list seats in order to reduce their political marginalization and the vulnerabilities that such marginalization could produce ERV.

D. Strategic Objective Four - Enhance the services rendered to victims of ERV

The purpose of programming under this objective is to expand service provision to a wider range of ERV victims, in particular through non-state stakeholder initiatives. In fulfillment of this objective, the following activities can be pursued:

- Support CSO Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) programs to mediate electoral disputes;
- Develop victim's services program such as counseling, medical attention, and compensation, through faith-based organizations.

E. Electoral Security Program Matrix

The matrix below summarizes the Electoral Security Framework programming as described by stakeholder, phase, and activity.

Program Matrix
Electoral Security Framework for the Philippines

State Stakeholder	Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)	Management (Election Day Phase)	Mediation (Post-Election Phase)
COMELEC	Establish a pillar for electoral security administration and related services		Harmonize electoral dispute resolution mechanisms
	Enhance the enforcement capacity of the pillar on political finance regulation		
	Provide conflict mediation training for poll workers		
	Establish a Political Party Consultative Council		
	Re-examine precinct clustering and the assignment of 1,000 voters to each PCOS		
	Reform voter registration to remove the names of deceased persons		
	Strengthen consistency in electoral regulation enforcement at the sub-national level		
PNP/AFP	Support the completion of the 2013 electoral security plan		
	Provide training on the <i>Electoral Security Framework</i> and human rights		
Non-State Stakeholder	Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)	Management (Election Day Phase)	Mediation (Post-Election Phase)
Political Parties	Provide training and capacity building for party leader and operators		

	Conduct international exchanges of political party leaders		
	Encourage legislation to restrict political “shirt changing” by elected officials		
	Establish a primary system of candidate selection		
	Support genuine representation on party lists		
CSOs, Faith-Based Organizations, and Academics	Conduct electoral incident monitoring and documentation		Support ADR mechanisms
	Foster positive OFW engagement in elections through voting and peace-building rhetoric conveyed in social networking sites		Provide victim’s services for targets of ERV
	Support student groups in peace-building and electoral reform		
	Develop madrassa curriculum in peaceful elections for Mindanao		
	Continue the electoral and democracy education programs for youth in Mindanao		
	Engage commercial interests in electoral conflict prevention		
	Provide grants to academic organizations to conduct ERV research		
Media Organizations	Foster cooperation between new and traditional media on incident documentation and reporting		
	Encourage international media coverage of ERV		
	Support later systems, training, and victim’s services for journalists and their families		

IV. Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E): Evaluation Framework for USAID Program

The development of an M & E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs can consist of three basic components: baseline data; program targets; and custom indicators.

A. Baseline Data

This data must be harmonized into a common structure. In doing so, the following entry fields can be considered:

- Date of Incident (Electoral Cycle Phase);

- Time of Day of Incident;
- Targets or Victims – political candidates, their family members and supporters, election official, police, journalists, voters, or others;
- Number of Victims Involved by each Tactic (Disaggregated by Gender);
- Spoilers or Perpetrators – political candidates, family members or supporters, criminals, police, voters, or others;
- Type of Incidents/Tactics – multiple homicides, individual homicide, physical assault, sexual assaults, kidnapping, destruction of physical property, destruction of sensitive electoral materials, riots and street actions; and
- Location – Province, Municipality, *Barangay*, and Point of Conflict.

B. Program Targets

1. Rule of Law and Human Rights

GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights
Indicator Title: Number of Retributive and Restorative Justice Institutions Created or Supported with USG Assistance
Custom Indicators
Promote victim's compensation as elements of judgments concerning electoral crimes from Philippines authorities
GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights
Indicator Title: Number of Campaigns Supported by USG to Foster Public Awareness and Respect for Rule of Law
Custom Indicator
Engage CSO and faith-based partners in developing civic education campaigns to promote the rule of law by fair and peaceful elections
GJD 1.3 – Justice System
Indicator Title: Number of Communities Assisted in Crime Prevention with USG Support
Custom Indicator
Employing the conflict profile baseline data, map the impact of electoral violence prevention programs by type of victim or target
GJD 1.3 – Justice System
Indicator Title: Number of Individuals/Groups Who Receive Legal Aid or Victim's Assistance with USG Support
Custom Indicator

The number and compensation that victims of electoral violence receive from the courts through state or non-state assisted legal services

2. Good Governance

GJD 2.6 – Governance and the Security Sector
Indicator Title: Number of Government Officials Undergoing USG Assisted Security Sector Governance Training
Custom Indicator
Number of participants in electoral security training programs from the COMELEC, PNP, AFP, and other public agencies

3. Political Competition and Consensus Building

GJD 3.1 – Consensus Building Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Groups Trained in Conflict Mediation/Resolution Skills with USG Assistance
Custom Indicator
Number of election workers trained by the COMELEC in conflict mediation/resolution in voter registration sites and polling stations
GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Domestic Election Observers Trained with USG Assistance
Custom Indicators
Number of domestic observers trained in electoral conflict incident monitoring and reporting
Number of domestic observers trained in media monitoring
Number of domestic observers trained in political finance monitoring
Number of domestic observers trained in electoral dispute resolution monitoring
GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of People Reached by USG Assisted Voter Education
Custom Indicators
Number of voters reached, by media type, with messages from COMELEC to discourage vote buying and other political malpractice
Number of voters reached, by media type, with messages to discourage vote selling and voter complicity in electoral crimes
GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes

Indicator Title: Number of Laws or Amendments to Ensure Credible Elections Drafted with USG Technical Assistance
Custom Indicators
Legal framework for political finance is strengthened and sanctions increased for violations
GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance
Custom Indicators
Reforms enacted in the appointment of COMELEC Commissioners and instances of electoral malpractice by election workers are reduced.
Conduct training for political finance system administration and regulation enforcement including vote buying
GJD 3.4 – Political Parties
Indicator Title: Number of USG-Assisted Political Parties Implementing Program to Increase the Number of Candidates and Members Who are Women, Youth and from Marginalized Groups
Custom Indicators
Number of women candidates for presidential, parliamentary, and provincial council offices and political party leadership
GJD 3.5 – Political Parties
Indicator Title: Number of Organizations Receiving USG Support to Promote Development of and Compliance with Political Finance Regulations and Legislation
Custom Indicator
Number of participants in USG-funded workshops on compliance to political party regulations and political finance reforms
GJD 4.1 – Strengthen Democratic Civic Participation
Indicator Title: Number of USG Assisted Civil Society Organizations that Engage in Advocacy and Watchdog Functions
Custom Indicators
Number of CSOs/faith-based organizations monitoring and advocating on electoral crimes and conflict
Number of CSOs/faith-based organizations monitoring and advocating on media fairness
Number of CSOs/faith-based organizations monitoring and disclosing political finance data

Number of CSOs/faith-based organizations monitoring electoral crimes and disputes and advocating against impunity
GJD 4.2 – Media Freedom and Freedom of Information
Indicator Title: Number of Journalists Trained with USG Assistance
Custom Indicator
Number of journalists trained in workshops on standards for coverage of electoral violence

V. Conclusion

The complex conflict dynamics and stubborn structural vulnerabilities of ERV in the Philippines can be seen as factors which are impossible to overcome. However, in 2010 the combination of effective and impartial security forces and broad-based public peace campaigns demonstrated that ERV can be reduced. If this incremental perspective is assumed and embedded into programming, gains in reducing ERV can be made with each electoral cycle. Moving forward, and to ensure this momentum is not reversed, programming approaches should assume the multi-sectoral approach employed for the 2010 contest—involving state and non-state stakeholders and thus reflecting participants in civil society, religion, academia, and commerce, is crucial to continuing to lessen ERV. However, a common definition and timeframe for what is considered to be ERV would go far to harmonize the approaches of these stakeholders into a common vision of the profile and magnitude of the threat. Through building upon the successful measures employed in 2010 and introducing some innovation into conflict prevention programming, the objective of reducing (but not eradicating) ERV in 2013 is achievable. To make further gains toward consolidating democracy in the Philippines, however, viable and sustainable alternatives to political dynasties as vehicles for representation must be created. Programming should therefore focus not only on reducing election violence in the short-term (and institutionalizing those approaches to do so) but also to supporting political parties as countervailing forces to the influence of dynasties as well as sustainable and democratic forms of representation. In doing so, ERV will be further reduced and made less relevant as a tool for political gain in the future.

Week 2: May 30 – June 6, 2012

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Wednesday, May 30th	
Time	Meeting
10:00 am	Ms. Maribel Buenaobra, Cheryll Reyes and Emil Tornio The Asia Foundation (TAF)
2:00 pm	Dr. Francisco Magno, Director and Dr. Cleo Calimbahim-Associate Professor La Salle Institute of Governance
4:30 pm	Attorney Vince Yambao Libertas

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Thursday, May 31st	
Time	Meeting
10:00 am	Rene V. Sarmiento, Commissioner Commission on Elections (COMELEC) – National Capital Region (NCR)
12:00 pm	Ms. Beverly Hagerdon Thakur, Chief of Party International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) - Philippines
4:30 pm	Ms. Malou Mangahas Philippines Center for Investigative Journalism

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Friday, June 1st (Nueva Ecija Province – Cabanatuan City and San Isidro)	
Time	Meeting
09:00 am	Police Superintendent Eli G. Depra, Chief of Police Philippine National Police (PNP) - Cabanatuan
11:00 am	Attorney Panfilo C. Doctor Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor & Ms. Josephine V. Galang-San Isidro COMELEC - Nueva Ecija

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Sunday, June 3rd (Transit to Masbate Province)	
Time	Meeting
	Departing from Manila going to Masbate City

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Monday, June 4th (Interviews in Masbate Province – Masbate Island, Masbate City)	
Time	Meeting
9:00 am	Judge Igmedio Emilio Camposano, President Masbate Advocates for Peace and Head of the Gawad Kalinga in

	Masbate
10:30 am	Father Leo V. Casas, Executive Director Diocese of Masbate Social Action Foundation, Inc. (DIMASAFI)
2:00 pm	Police Superintendent Heriberto Obias Olitoquit, Chief of Police Police Superintendent Jeffrey Fernandez PNP Masbate Police Provincial Office
5:00 pm	Attorney Alberto T. Canares III COMELEC - Masbate City

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Tuesday, June 5th (Return transit to Manila, Meetings in Manila)	
Time	Meeting
3:00 pm	Mr. Augustus Cerdana, Program Coordinator Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung

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Week 3: June 6 - 12, 2012

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Wednesday, June 6th (Manila)	
Time	Meeting
9:30 am	Dr. Richard Miller, Senior Law Enforcement Advisor International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP), U.S. Department of Justice
1:00 pm	Senior Superintendent Chavez-Chief Intelligence Division Colonel Seloteo Gonzalgo – Assistant Chief – Foreign Liaison Division Senior Superintendent Jimmy Manangan – Chief - Foreign Liaison Division Senior Superintendent Benito Durana – Intelligence Research Center Directorate for Intelligence
3:00 pm	Professor Rommel C. Banlaoi, Chairman of the Board & Executive Director Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research (PIPVTR)
4:30 pm	Congressman Jesus Crispin Remulla Attorney Armi Corpuz Nacionalista Party

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Thursday, June 7th (Manila)	
Time	Meeting
9:00 am	Ms. Amina Rasul Philippine Center for Islam and Democracy

11:30 am	Ms. Corazon dela Paz Bernardo, Chairperson Mr. Damaso Magbual, Counsel Member National Citizens' Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL)
2:00 pm	Mr. Remegio Apit, Program Operations Manager Educational Research and Development Assistance Foundation (ERDA)

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Friday, June 8th (Manila)	
Time	Meeting
10:00 am	Exit Briefing with USAID
1:30 pm	Michael Frank Alar, Project Officer Center for Humanitarian Dialogue

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Annex II – List of Acronyms

AC/DC	Attack and Collect/Defend and Collect
ADR	Alternative Dispute Resolution
AFP	Armed Forces of the Philippines
ANFREL	The Asian Network for Free Elections
ARMM	Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CARGU	Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Units
CER	Consortium on Electoral Reform
CHR	Commission on Human Rights
CMM	Conflict Management and Mitigation
COMELEC	Commission on Elections
CPI	Corruption Perception Index
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DG	Democracy and Governance
DIMASAFI	Diocese of Masbate Social Action Foundation, Inc.
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organization
ERDA	Educational Research and Development Assistance Foundation
ERV	Election-Related Violence
ERVI	Election-Related Violent Incident
FES	Friedrich Ebert Foundation
FPTP	First-Past-the-Post
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HD	Humanitarian Dialogue
ICAPA	Independent Commission against Private Armies
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigation Training and Assistance Program
ICT	Information Communication Technology
IDPs	Internally Displaced Persons
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral System
IPER	Institute for Political and Electoral Reform
JSCCs	Joint Security Control Centers
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MAP	Masbate Advocates for Peace
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
NAMFREL	National Citizens Movement for Free Elections
NCR	National Capital Region
NPA	New People's Army
OFWs	Overseas Foreign Workers
OMR	Optical Mark Recognition
PAG	Private Armed Group
PCID	Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy
PCOS	Precinct Count Optical Scan
PERV	Preventing Election Related Violence
PIPVTR	The Philippines Institute for Peace, Violence and Terrorism Research
PNP	Philippines National Police
PODER	Political Democracy and Reforms Program
PPCRV	Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulation
TAF	The Asia Foundation
TSS	<i>Tumikang Sama Sama</i> (“Together we move forward”)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

Annex III – COMELEC 2010 Map of Hot spots

