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ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

HAITI



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Haiti Electoral Security Framework

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I. Executive Summary

Introduction

From October 24 through November 13, 2012, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Haiti funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Creative team was led by Mr. Jeff Fischer and included Ms. Sophie Lagueny, Mr. Jules Lalancette, and Mr. Rudolf Deroose. The objective of the mission was threefold: 1) to identify the vulnerabilities and history of electoral conflict in Haiti; 2) to develop profiles on potential conflict in the 2013 electoral cycle; and 3) to put forward a set of recommendations on programming to prevent, manage, or mediate this conflict. These three objectives combine to produce an *Electoral Security Framework for Haiti*. The assessment team met with state, non-state, and international stakeholders in Haiti, with a focus on the departments of Northeast (Fort-Liberté and Ouananinthe), South (Les Cayes), Nippes (Miragoâne), and Grand'Anse (Jeremie).

This *Framework* seeks to address the following problem statement and development hypothesis:

Problem Statement: Without new strategic interventions, the cycle of electoral violence in Haiti will continue to de-stabilize governance, politics, and society. The factors contributing to this violence include a “win-at-all-cost” political culture; lack of economic opportunities, particularly for youth; and a culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence and malpractice.

Development Hypothesis: If multi-sectoral interventions can be conducted involving electoral assistance, political party development, rule of law, civic participation, gender, media, security sector reform, and livelihoods, some reduction in electoral violence may be achieved in 2013. However, security, political, social, and economic vulnerabilities for electoral violence have been longstanding, varied, and resistant to reform. These factors will pose ongoing obstacles to development objectives and associated programming.

This approach to developing the *Electoral Security Framework for Haiti* has been guided by USAID's *Electoral Security Framework – Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers* (2010).¹ This *Framework* is organized into the following sections: 1) Executive Summary; 2) Introduction; 3) Contextual Analysis (security, political, social, and economic factors); 4) Historical Electoral Conflict Factors (pre-election, Election Day, and post-election phases); 5) Electoral Security Stakeholder Analysis (state, non-state, and international); 6) Preliminary Electoral Conflict Profile (departments of Northeast, South, Nippes, and Grand'Anse); 7) Mitigating Factors and

¹ The Handbook describing the Framework can be found at the following link:
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf.

“Wild Cards;” 8) Electoral Conflict-Related Issues; 9) Electoral Security Planning and Programming; 10) Monitoring and Evaluation; and 11) Conclusion.

Contextual Analysis

The contextual analysis identifies the fundamental security, political, social, and economic factors which can create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur. The impact of each factor on the potential for violence will vary in weight and timing during the electoral cycle. A description of these factors and their relationships to electoral conflict are discussed in the section below. By identifying these factors, strategic objectives and program interventions can be crafted to address the conflict which they potentially foster. These factors have created vulnerabilities in past elections and will pose similar vulnerabilities for the 2013 electoral cycle.

The security factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict are: a) Haitian National Police (PNH) enforcement capacity; b) availability of firearms; c) private armed groups (PAGs); and d) drug trafficking organizations (DTOs). The political factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict are: a) regime type; b) electoral administration; c) electoral and political party systems; d) money and electoral violence; e) return of opposing political exiles; f) relocation of public officials; g) timing and sequencing of elections; and h) culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence and malpractice. There are two social factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur: a) post-disaster displacement/shelter; and b) youth bulge. Also, Haiti’s economic indicators create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur as a consequence of poverty, unemployment, and lack of economic fairness.

Placing these vulnerabilities into perspective, some may be responsive to development programming such as capacity building for electoral administration, the PNH, and judicial officials. Additional vulnerabilities can be reduced by legislative action such as the electoral framework and political finance reform, and the timing and sequencing of elections. Some vulnerabilities, however, are conditional in nature and may be the least responsive to short term programming including the availability of firearms, regime type, and the economic factors. Other factors are present on such a scale, such as the post-disaster displacement and youth bulge, that comprehensive solutions cannot be anticipated over the short term. It can also be anticipated that DTOs will be unresponsive to development programming and remain targets for law enforcement and anti-drug trafficking initiatives. Finally, some factors are behavioral in nature, such as the “win-at-all-cost” political culture, government pressure on local officials, and engaging armed groups in electoral violence. These vulnerabilities will only diminish if the political will is created for behavioral reform to occur.

Historical Electoral Conflict Factors

Based upon this history of Haitian electoral conflict, the conflict profile is summarized in the matrix below.

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Historical Patterns of Electoral Conflict

Profile Focus	Pre-Election Phase	Election Day Phase	Post-Election Phase
Perpetrators	<i>Primary - State and State Proxies</i> Incumbent youth and Private Armed Groups (PAGs) PNH Elites DTO financing <i>Secondary – Political Rivals</i> Political party agents and enforcers	<i>Primary – State and State Proxies</i> Incumbent agents PNH <i>Secondary – Political Rivals</i> Political party agents and enforcers Voters	<i>Primary – Political Rivals</i> General supporters <i>Secondary – State and State Proxies</i> PNH
Victims	Opposition candidates and supporters Journalists PNH MINUSTAH	Poll workers Candidates Voters Journalists PNH MINUSTAH	Election officials Poll workers Public officials Opposition supporters and voters PNH MINUSTAH General public
Motives	Eliminate or force withdrawal of a candidacy Inhibit campaigning and support for opposition candidates	Suppress voter turnout Disrupt voting Falsify tally sheets Disenfranchisement	Overturn election results
Tactics	Homicide Assaults with firearms Physical assaults Intimidation Bribery	Physical assaults Intimidation Bribery Destruction of property	Street actions Physical assaults Destruction of property Intimidation
Locations	Candidate home towns Constituencies with close contests	Polling stations Areas around polling centers	Public street Election facilities

Electoral Security Stakeholder Analysis

Electoral security stakeholders can be grouped into three categories: 1) state; 2) non-state; and 3) international. State stakeholders can be regulatory, security, or judicial in nature. The primary regulatory stakeholder is the Electoral Council (CEP) and its associated administrative units at the departmental (BED) and communal (BEC) levels, as well as the National Electoral Challenges Office (BCEN). The primary security stakeholder is the Haitian National Police (PNH). Judicial stakeholders are the ordinary courts of Haiti and justices of the peace. Non-state stakeholders include political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), other domestic observer groups, and media organizations. International stakeholders include the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “international community,” and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) involved with electoral assistance, domestic observation, conflict mediation, rule of law, and political party development.

Preliminary Electoral Conflict Profile

There are vulnerabilities which may potentially trigger violence in all phases of the electoral cycle. However, the profile of that violence will vary with each phase. In the pre-election phase, the conflict will be among political rivals as they campaign for votes. Youth may be engaged by candidates to intimidate or assault opposing candidates and supporters. Local PNH officers may also engage in intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters. The perceived closeness of contests could trigger violence, which typically, has been at a higher level in the first round than in the second round of voting. The motives for pre-election violence are to influence the field of candidates and the voters’ choices of candidates. On Election Day, the polling station will be the locus for conflict as voters and election workers emerge as targets. The tactics employed on Election Day will range from intimidation by *mandataires* seeking to influence voting selections, to bribery and intimidation of poll workers to falsify PVs. Post-election violence manifests as street actions and property destruction by losing candidate supporters seeking to overturn the announced election results. Election facilities may become targets for attack.

Six common themes emerged from the departmental interviews in Northeast, South, Grand’Anse, and Nippes. First, the underlying economic factors of poverty and unemployment are considered the dominant vulnerabilities for electoral violence, as compared to other security, political, and social factors. Second, political rivals are the primary category of perpetrators with pro-government enforcers cited as more frequent perpetrators than other parties. Third, the perpetrators employ a range of tactics including intimidation, physical assaults, and property destruction. The availability of firearms provides perpetrators with the weaponry to carry out the violence. Fourth, there is a culture of impunity for electoral violence. As a result of the political protections afforded to perpetrators, the organizers and agents of violence escape penalty. One factor enabling impunity is the government’s use of threats to reassign and transfer departmental and local public officials who fail to represent the political interests of the

government. Fifth, there are gaps in the PNH's enforcement capacity which undermines its ability to provide department-wide security as required during a national election. Sixth, administrative deficiencies, lack of transparency, and perceived pro-government partisanship have diminished public confidence in the CEP. This confidence gap creates vulnerabilities for post-election violence as election results are not considered credible by losing candidates and supporters.

Mitigating Factors and “Wild Cards”

Mitigating factors are positive influences currently in place which may be more effectively leveraged to de-conflict elections. Institutionally, the mitigating factors identified in this assessment involved MINUSTAH, Tolerance Committees, and international and domestic observers. A “wild card” is a factor which could either enable or deter electoral violence, depending upon its use. In this context, SMS texting and social media, such as Facebook and Twitter, can either document, report, and map electoral violence; or be used to widely convey intimidating messages and videos.

Electoral Conflict-Related Issues

Electronic Voting: Favorable views on electronic voting were expressed under the assumption that by eliminating the human factor in vote counting, the integrity and public confidence of the results will be enhanced reducing triggers for post-election violence. While the initial use of electronic voting may produce the credible outcomes as hoped, the voting machines could still become targets of sabotage, theft, or destruction, resulting in no audit trail to reconstruct the voting at those stations. The impact on electoral outcomes would be the same as a quarantined PV.

Diaspora Voting: The new constitution allows for dual citizenship and there is growing debate on the topic of diaspora voting, that is, the first-time enfranchisement of Haitian migrants who reside outside of the country. A number of issues would have to be addressed such as proof of eligibility, types of elections where the franchise can be exercised, and voting modalities (in-person, postal, or proxy). These technical issues aside, while President Martelly stated that the enfranchisement of Haitians abroad would bring down political barriers, in fact, the political consequences of introducing diaspora voting have implications for electoral conflict. First, estimates vary on the number of Haitian residents abroad. As a result, when voter registration occurs, there is no baseline data which can serve to validate as legitimate the numbers of individuals enfranchised. Second, regardless of the exact diaspora population, this voting bloc would be a powerful one and potentially a “king-maker” for some offices.

Electoral Security Planning and Programming

The strategy to address this problem statement and development hypothesis has three thematic pillars: 1) reduce the potential for vulnerabilities to become triggers for electoral violence; 2) enhance capacity in electoral security administration and conflict prevention; and 3) pursue justice and social services for victims. The first pillar is cross-cutting and

involves reducing the threats posted by the security, political, social, and economic factors described in the introduction. The two other pillars involve program activities which are specific to state and non-state stakeholders.

This strategy reflects a multi-sectoral strategy involving programming from elections and political transitions, conflict management and mitigation, civic participation, gender, media, rule of law, security sector reform, and livelihoods. While some of the program areas outside of elections have not traditionally been tasked with electoral activity mandates, introducing an electoral conflict dimension to existing development programming could aid in developing this multi-sectoral approach. The issue of electoral violence possesses a special sensitivity and the openings pursued for program interventions should take into account this sensitivity and be underpinned by a “do no harm” principle so that victims and monitors are not placed at risk. As noted in the departmental conflict profile, suspicions were expressed about DTO activity in elections. However, any such connections are opaque at this time and would require law enforcement investigations to bring into focus.

The organizational impact of this multi-sectoral and diversified intervention strategy suggests that new, cross-organizational staffing may be useful to facilitate implementation of a spectrum of program activities. Such staffing could take the form of a Program Coordination Specialist, a part-time position devoted to electoral security and conflict mitigation measures. The international community could establish a multi-sectoral Electoral Security Interest Group (ESIG), composed of IGOs, embassy representatives, and INGOs which periodically convene to communicate and coordinate on electoral security programming.

In order to implement this strategy, the following five program objectives have been defined:

Program Objective One: Expand electoral security administration training and capacity building for the CEP and PNH for improvements in prevention, planning, enforcement, and operations; incorporate this curriculum into MINUSTAH training programs for 2013 – 2014; and review operations of “mega polling centers.”

Program Activities: This program objective can be implemented through capacity building and training programs for the CEP and PNH, extension and strengthening of the gun ban, and crowd control planning for “mega polling centers.”

Program Objective Two: Include in the new draft electoral law, political party law, and electoral policies and practices, provisions to reduce potential conflict embedded in the electoral legal framework.

Program Activities: This program objective can be implemented through the introduction of reforms to reduce the triggers for violence in the electoral legal framework. They involve four areas of focus: 1) electoral justice; 2) political party and candidate eligibility criteria; 3) political finance regulation; and 4) poll worker and *mandataire* selection.

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Program Objective Three: Provide greater transparency and confidence in the ballot tabulation process in order to reduce post-election phase violence over disputed election results.

Program Activities: This program objective can be implemented through the enhancement of transparency in CTV operations, ballot reconciliation procedures, improved PV management, recounts, and strategic communications.

Program Objective Four: Prevent, manage, or mediate electoral violence among political rivals through initiatives from MINUSTAH, CEP, PNH, CSOs, FBOs, and the international community.

Program Activities: This program objective can be implemented through establishing political party consultative mechanisms, expanding the enforcement of the Code of Conduct, de-mobilizing youth, monitoring electoral conflict, conducting grassroots peace messaging, training for women candidates, strengthening Tolerance Committees in dispute resolution, and establishing a Code of Conduct for media organizations.

Program Objective Five: Reform the culture of impunity for electoral malpractice and crimes of electoral violence so that perpetrators receive sanctions and victims receive services.

Program Activities: This program objective can be implemented through an extension of international and domestic election monitoring programs to include the prosecution of perpetrators of electoral violence and the partisanship of the CEP; a PNH database of electoral security incidents; and medical, legal, and psychological services provides for victims of electoral violence and their families.

Conclusion

Contextual vulnerabilities creating the potential for electoral violence to occur are longstanding, varied, and resistant to reform. For example, by the next electoral cycle, the PNH capacity will still have limitations; firearms will still be available; and poverty, unemployment, and displacement will persist. However, by strategically focusing on those vulnerabilities which may be responsive to multi-sectoral programming, the potential for electoral violence to occur may be reduced or managed.

The complexity of the conflict dynamics involves the history of electoral conflict, political culture, financial rewards of holding office, and economic hardship. The international community, through IGOs, INGOs, and bilateral government relationships, has a robust “footprint” in electoral administration and security. This *Framework* has endeavored to define a common vision of the problem of electoral violence so that mutually supportive program objectives can be established across sectors and organizations. This multi-sectoral approach may drive the development of a new

coordination mechanism for the international community to effectively manage various streams of programming.

Adding to the complexity of the problem is that the profile of the conflict changes with the phase of the electoral cycle. These shifts in profile drive the need to re-calibrate strategies and tactics to counter the conflict present in a given phase. Such re-calibration will impact the timing, sequencing, and organizational lead for the “basket” of electoral security program interventions by the international community. However, with this cross-cutting approach and a planning horizon which extends beyond a single electoral cycle, electoral violence can be reduced and the debilitating impact of violence on the credibility of elections and the consolidation of democratic institutions.

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III. Contextual Analysis

The contextual analysis identifies the fundamental security, political, social, and economic factors which can create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur. The impact of each factor on the potential for violence will vary in weight and timing during the electoral cycle. A description of these factors and their relationships to electoral conflict are discussed the section below. By identifying these factors, strategic objectives and program interventions can be crafted to address the conflict which they potentially foster. These factors have created vulnerabilities in past elections and will pose similar vulnerabilities for the 2013 electoral cycle.

A. Security Factors


The security factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict are: a) PNH enforcement capacity; b) availability of firearms; c) private armed groups (PAGs); and d) drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).

1. Security Factors: PNH Enforcement Capacity

As of December 2012, the PNH has 10,300 personnel, representing around one officer per 940 inhabitants (based on a population of 9.7 million persons). Since the disbanding of the army, the PNH is currently Haiti's only national security force. The PNH presence is uneven and sparse in some locations. It was also observed that some members of the PNH were perceived as under the control of local politicians or powerbrokers, potentially

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compromising their enforcement priorities. For example, in the Joint Election Observation Mission report, in Grand Anse, on March, 20, 2011, a voter alleged “a police officer assaulted a PLAPH representative, creating a distraction which allowed INITE partisans to stuff the ballot boxes.” The Americas barometer survey of public perceptions about the PNH is shown in Figure 1 below.




The capacity and recruitment gaps of the PNH create vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur in that the force lacks sufficient enforcement power in itself to secure a national election. Moreover, local politicization of police has implications for enforcement actions during local elections.

2. Security Factors: Availability of Firearms

There is a general availability of firearms in Haiti. According to a Small Arms Survey, there are an estimated 190,000 civilian firearms in Haiti, a high number in ratio to the population as measured internationally. Some estimates place the number as high as 215,000 with 15,000 of those in the hands of private armed groups (see below). The going price for an AK-47 pattern assault weapon is \$250.00 (USD), making the purchase of these weapons relatively inexpensive. By comparison to civilian gun possession, it is

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estimated that the PNH has 33,034 firearms for state enforcement.² The Americas barometer survey of public opinion on gun possession is shown in Figure 2 below.



The availability of firearms was a concern expressed by stakeholders in each of the four departments where field assessments were conducted; however, the support for private gun possession varied considerably: Grand'Anse (73 percent - yes), Nippes (58 percent – yes), South (41 percent – yes), and Northeast (40 percent – yes). In these departments, there is higher support for gun ownership compared to the national average and lower than average trust in the PNH. Such a mix of opinion may contribute to the problem of illegal ownership and use in that a broad public consensus on gun bans or other controls is not evident in this survey. However, firearms provide lethal tools for perpetrators to use in carrying out crimes of electoral violence.

3. Security Factors: Private Armed Groups (PAGs)

Political parties and candidates reportedly recruit and arm youth and others to inflict violence against political opponents. The history of PAGs being employed as partisan enforcers include the *Ton Ton Macoutes* in the 1980's, *FRAPPH* in the 1990's, *Fammi*

² Karp, Aaron. 2007. 'Completing the Count: Civilian firearms.' Small Arms Survey 2007: Guns and the City, p. 67. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 27 August.

Lavalas (FL) in the early 2000's, and enforcers now recruited on an election-by-election basis by parties and candidates. Gangs are used as sources for recruitment. It was reported in 2007 that various armed groups operated in Haiti often with the help of former military leaders.³ The activities of armed gangs continue to present a security problem in the most marginalized neighborhoods in Haiti, particularly in areas around Port-au-Prince such as Cité Soleil, Martissant, Carrefour Feuille and Bél-air.⁴ During the 2010 presidential elections, PAGs working for candidates used social networking sites to record and broadcast their acts of violence. Social media is discussed in more detail later in the assessment.

There is also a reported emergence of “shadow” local police forces organized by local powerbrokers and reported in the departments of Les Cayes and Northeast. These so-called *Le Police* remain elusive to qualify and quantify as to their composition and size. The engagement of these forces in electoral matters remains an unknown but also should be noted in the context of local elections.

The presence of PAGs in Haitian politics creates vulnerabilities for violence because of the capacity this provides to employ violence as a means to achieve political objectives.

4. Security Factors: Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs)

DTOs are reported to be active in certain parts of the country, specifically locations with strategic value as transit points for the shipments of narcotics. Suspicions of DTO involvement in local politics were expressed in Northeast, South, and Nippes. As evidenced by DTO electoral operations in Guatemala, the funding of political activities by DTOs creates vulnerabilities for electoral violence through the economic incentives to “capture” local governance and protect access to these locations.

B. Political Factors

The political factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict are: a) regime type; b) electoral administration; c) electoral and political party systems; d) money and electoral violence; e) return of opposing political exiles; f) relocation of public officials; g) timing and sequencing of elections; and h) culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence and malpractice.

5. Political Factors: Regime Type

Freedom House rates Haiti as “Partly Free” with a political freedoms score of 5 on a scale of 1 to 7 (with 1 being the highest level of freedom) and a civil liberties score of 6.⁵ The relevance of these rankings to electoral violence is that such violence more frequently occurs in countries ranked Partly Free than in countries which are ranked as Not Free or

³ “Rule of Law in Armed Conflicts Project”, Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law & Human Rights.

⁴ “Non-state armed groups (Haiti), Non-state armed groups”, Jane’s Information Group.

⁵ Freedom House: Freedom in the World Index, 2012

Free. The concentration of electoral violence in these countries can be explained, in part, through the lack of consolidated institutions for security and governance, compared with Not Free countries, where genuine elections do not occur, or in Free countries, where democracy is consolidated.

6. Political Factors: Electoral Administration

Viewpoints were expressed about partisanship and corruption on the part of electoral administration, which extends from the members of the CEP to poll workers. The CEP members have been regarded as instruments of the government to control the electoral process. This partisanship is reported at the Bureau Electoral Departmental (BED) and Bureau Electoral Communal (BEC) levels of administration as well. Favoritism rather than merit is reported to motivate the hiring of electoral supervisors. These public perceptions about CEP pro-government partisanship have triggered post-election violence as losing candidate supporters dismiss the results as bogus and mount street actions in protest.

These perceptions are documented in the Americas barometer survey illustrated in Figures 3 and 4. Those departments with low levels of confidence in the CEP can be monitored for vulnerabilities for post-election violence.





Figure 4: "To what extent do you trust the Electoral Commission?" (2012)



CEP administration of voter registration was also cited as holding the potential for conflict. This kind of conflict emerges on Election Day as voters are unable to locate their names on polling station registries or have not been provided with National Identity Cards from the National Identification Office (ONI). The National Network for the Defense of Human Rights (Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains RNDDH) and the National Council for Election Observation (Conseil National d'Observation des Elections CNO), a coalition of domestic observer groups, stated in its first report that the ONI "is not up to the task assigned, namely, providing the national identification cards for citizens who file the request" and that "people who have filed applications for several months or several years, are still not satisfied."⁶ The report also stated that thousands of cards were issued since 2005, but were still unclaimed by their owners, while no effort

⁶ Haiti - Elections: National Office of Identification fingered, Haiti Libre, September 28, 2010. (<http://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-1293-haiti-elections-national-office-of-identification-fingered.html>) Also, See Haiti - Elections : Electoral Register OAS-ONI between misinformation and contradictions", Haiti Libre

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had been made by the ONI to deliver the cards to those owners.⁷ The report estimated that a total of 18,510 cards had not been delivered to their owners in time for voting, which included 2,010 individuals in Jacmel, 8,000 individuals in Gonaïves, and 8,500 individuals in Cap-Haitien.⁸ This disenfranchisement can provoke incidents at polling stations where disgruntled voters disrupt the balloting.

At the polling station level, poll workers are the targets of bribes and intimidation by political party agents in an effort to falsify the station's tally sheets or *Procès Verbaux* (PVs). Low turnout has been considered as one factor that facilitates malpractice on the polling station level in that the absence of voters makes it easier to commit acts of deception without significant public notice. In any case, the resulting mistrust of the integrity of the outcomes has triggered post-election phase violence in the form of street protests, attacks on election facilities, and the destruction of property.

7. **Political Factors: Electoral and Political Party Systems**

For the Senate and Chamber of Deputies, the electoral system is a majoritarian, two-round vote. While majoritarian systems have benefits, in this case the culture of political competition emerging from it is “zero sum” in nature with clear winners and losers. There are reported to be considerable financial rewards and impunities associated with obtaining a parliamentary seat, which creates incentives for aggressive political tactics to be employed. Haitian political parties are personalistic and clientelistic, and do not play the de-conflicting role of interest articulation between people and government or aggregation of opinion on public policy positions. Instead, parties are vehicles to obtain personal wealth and power through elected office. The electoral system, stakes and the “win-at-all-cost” strategies by candidates combine to make violence a logical instrument to obtain these economic and political rewards.

However, since local elections are to be conducted in the next electoral cycle, it is worth noting that the electoral system for local councils is that of the Single Round Party Block Vote (SRPBV). In the SRPBV, the voter casts ballots for party lists and not individual candidates. While the “win-at-all-cost” political culture would not necessarily diminish at the local level, voting by list may serve to dampen direct grievances between candidates and strengthen political parties at the local level, where party organization is seen to be the weakest. It should also be noted that local elections have not been conducted since 2006. As a result, incumbent interests can be presumed to be entrenched in many cases with an accompanying reluctance to give up power.

Under new constitutional amendments, there is a minimum quota of 30 percent women “in public life” and in political party structures (though the Chamber of Deputies is not specifically listed). The quota system could impact electoral violence in two ways. First, as women are rarely the perpetrators of electoral violence, their increased participation may serve to dampen conflict in some instances. However, their candidacies should also

⁷ Ibid

⁸ Ibid

be monitored to identify if any women candidates were targets of violence, because they are women, in efforts to suppress their independence from male powerbrokers.

8. Political Factors: Money and Electoral Violence

Funding is required to perpetrate electoral violence. Money is needed to hire enforcers, purchase weapons, and provide logistics for acts of violence to be carried out. Haitian regulations for political finance and campaign spending are weak and rarely enforced. The election law sets spending limits for political campaigns and requires disclosure of expenditures after each election. Article 130 of the election law caps individual donations at 2,000,000 Gourdes (\$46,000 USD). It also limits donations to political parties at 2,000,000 Gourdes (\$46,000 USD) per donor and election. Despite these provisions, there has been a lack of enforcement from the CEP, or the judiciary, on political finance regulation. Parties and candidates rarely disclose their funding sources, which creates speculation about the influence on candidates and elected officials of DTOs, foreign contributors, or other undesirable sources. Though the law provides for public funding of political parties, this provision is only applicable to those parties which manage to obtain 10 percent of the vote in the most recent election. Parties receive this funding as a reimbursement. However, such reimbursements are reported to be rare. The *de facto* lack of enforcement and public financing create opportunities to use campaign funds for illicit and violent purposes without accountability or penalty.

9. Political Factors: Return of Opposing Political Exiles – Aristide and Duvalier

Former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide returned to Haiti in March 2011 after seven years in exile. Although Aristide has remained in his village compound since his return, it is unclear if and how he intends to remerge onto the political scene. Supporters of Aristide staged large-scale protests in Port-au-Prince in October 2012 on the anniversary of the coup that removed him from power. Aristide's FL party has been barred from fielding candidates since 2004, yet former members remain organized.

Former dictator Jean-Claude Duvalier returned to Haiti in January of 2011 and was quickly charged with crimes committed during his time in power. Despite these charges, a Human Rights Watch report notes the difficulty authorities have faced in prosecuting the former president. Haiti's judicial system appears unable to carry out a successful prosecution, or offer protection to witnesses who may feel intimidated to come forward. Duvalier's political plans are also not common knowledge and did not emerge as an issue in assessment interviews.⁹

Nevertheless, the presence of these two former political foes may create incentives for former supporters to create electoral conflict with each other.

⁹ Human Rights Watch: "Haiti's Rendezvous with History, The Case of Jean-Claude Duvalier", <http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/haiti0411Web.pdf>, April 2012.

10. Political Factors: Relocation of Public Officials

In order to increase its influence over local-level decisions, the government employs a tactic of reassigning or relocating local public officials, such as police or judicial officials, and replacing these individuals with those who are more responsive to direction from the government. The threat of reassignment resulting from insufficient fealty to the government creates incentives for police and judicial officials to ignore or close cases of electoral violence associated with government-affiliated perpetrators.

11. Political Factors: Timing and Sequencing of Elections

The chronology of steps required to organize the next cycle of elections must be considered from the perspectives of two types of calendars: political and technical. The political calendar represents the time that it takes to establish the CEP, adopt legislation, draft a regulatory framework, and certify political contestants. The political calendar is deliberative and thus, somewhat unpredictable, yet drives the process. The technical calendar represents the time that it takes to conduct election operations in procurement, printing, transport, and asset recovery. The vulnerability with respect to calendars and sequencing is that elections conducted too early in the political calendar may be proceed without full political consensus on the legal framework and risk a rejection of the outcomes. On the other hand, the culture of postponement which has typically surrounded Haitian election calendars benefits the *status quo*, so time limits on preparations are reasonable to establish. On the technical calendar, administrative deficiencies can also occur in compressed electoral cycles, potentially triggering violence as a result of suspicions of hidden agendas surrounding these lapses. From a sequencing standpoint, the next electoral cycle will involve parliamentary and local elections. The combination of elections on a single ballot must also be examined for any “spillover” conflict which may result from elections held, for example, at one level (local) triggering violence at another level (parliamentary).

12. Political Factors: Culture of Impunity for Crimes of Electoral Violence and Malpractice


Perpetrators of electoral violence are rarely arrested and, even if detained, are generally released before trial. Impunity may involve the PNH or judiciary as the complicit institutions. Criminal impunity is a general problem and not limited to electoral crimes. The assessment did not reveal any instances of the successful prosecutions of perpetrators of electoral violence or malpractice.

C. Social Factors

There are two social factors identified as creating vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur: a) post-disaster displacement/shelter, and b) the youth bulge.

13. Social Factors: Post-Disaster Displacement/Shelter

As of October 2012, the displaced population is estimated to remain at 358,000 people, living in 496 camps and informal sites.¹⁰ As the Figure 5 illustrates, the displacement is greatest in Delmas (140,000 persons), Crois-des-Bouquets (79,000 persons), and Port-au-Prince (60,000 persons). Communes with high concentrations of IDPs can be monitored for vulnerabilities for violence throughout the electoral cycle.



People in temporary camps are often without jobs and do not attend school, factors which contribute to widespread poverty and illiteracy in those communities. Living conditions become more difficult during the hurricane season when flooding displaces many from the camps to which they have already been displaced. Because of these hardships, such individuals are at risk for recruitment into electoral violence. A map of IDP settlements is shown as Annex III which may suggest locations for potential electoral violence to occur.

14. Social Factors: Youth Bulge

Haiti has a large youth population (approximately 4 million people under 18 years of age), which represents a sizeable pool of potential recruits to serve as perpetrators of

¹⁰ Inter-Agency Standing Committee / -International Organization for Migration Haiti E- Shelter & Camp Coordination and Camp Management (CCCM) Cluster displacement monitoring matrix, October 2012, http://www.eshelter-cccmhaiti.info/jl/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=11&Url

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electoral violence. The average age of the total population is 20.2 years.¹¹ Because of poverty and few employment opportunities, youth remain at risk for being brought into criminal activity and electoral violence. Youth gangs are also active in some areas of Port-au-Prince and reported to be directly engaged by candidates in electoral violence and intimidation.

D. Economic Factors

Haiti's economic indicators create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur as a consequence of poverty, unemployment, and economic fairness. Haiti's Per Capita Income was \$1,300 in 2011 while the unemployment rate in Haiti, as of 2010, was 40.46 percent. The high unemployment is exacerbated by income inequality; Haiti has a GINI index of 59.2 making it one of the bottom ten countries in income equality. Land tenure is a further vulnerability to note; a group of elite families control a significant portion of Haiti's wealth and resources.¹² These economic factors combine to create vulnerabilities for segments of the population to be recruited as agents of violence, or targeted as victims of financial coercion in influencing their voting decisions.

Placing these vulnerabilities into perspective, some may be responsive to development programming such as capacity building for electoral administration, the PNH, and judicial officials. Additional vulnerabilities can be reduced by legislative action such as the electoral framework and political finance reform, and the timing and sequencing of elections. Some vulnerabilities, however, are conditional in nature and may be the least responsive to short term programming including the availability of firearms, regime type, and the economic factors. Other factors are present on such a scale, such as the post-disaster displacement and youth bulge, that comprehensive solutions cannot be anticipated over the short term. It can also be anticipated that DTOs will be unresponsive to development programming and remain targets for law enforcement and anti-drug trafficking initiatives. Finally, some factors are behavioral in nature, such as the "win-at-all-cost" political culture, government pressure on local officials, and engaging armed groups in electoral violence. These vulnerabilities will only diminish if the political will is created for behavioral reform to occur.

IV. Historical Electoral Conflict Factors

Pre-Election Phase

The motives for electoral violence in the pre-election phase have centered on the suppression of voter participation and candidate intimidation. Conflict has been most common among political rivals as they campaign for votes, while local PNH officers have also been reported to intimidate opposition candidates. Victims of pre-election

¹¹ Manuel Roig-Franzia, Dana Hedgpeth and Theola Labbé-DeBosence "Earthquake aftershock in Haiti spurs exodus from Port-au-Prince" Washington Post, January 21, 2010
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2010/01/18/GR2010011804388.html>

¹² Paul Collier, Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places, (New York: Harper Collins, 2009).

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violence have included journalists, candidates, party leaders, government officials, poll workers, the PNH, and MINUSTAH. Violence has also targeted training sessions for poll workers in the days before voting. Election observers have noted that, generally speaking, acts of violence become more frequent as Election Day approaches and political tension continues to increase among rivals. Journalists have been targets of violence, as was the case when a bus carrying reporters was attacked during the 2010 election. Threats have also been made against private media outlets for perceived bias toward certain candidates. This has included threats that have forced journalists into hiding as well as the destruction of two community radio stations in 2010.¹³

Election Day Phase

The polling station has been the locus of Election Day violence. Parties have employed political party agents or *mandataires*, who are supposed to function as monitors for political parties, to engage in intimidation of both poll workers and voters inside polling stations.

In addition to voters and poll workers, the polling station facilities have been targets of Election Day violence. According to the 2010 JEOM report: “The process continued until the stipulated closing time in all departments, despite the destruction of polling stations in some places and the annulment of the vote in more than 10 percent of stations because of increased security issues and acts of violence. According to data supplied by MINUSTAH, the number of polling stations destroyed did not exceed 4 percent of the total across the country.¹⁴” The violence was reported to have significantly decreased in the second round of voting.

Post-Election Phase

Post-election violence has been generally linked to protests over election results. Such protests usually take the form of street actions by supporters of a losing candidate who seek to overturn the announced results. Tactics have included physical assaults on poll workers, the PNH, and MINUSTAH as well as property destruction of election facilities and candidate residences. Post-election violence has been fostered by public perceptions of mistrust in the CEP’s ballot tabulation and results announcements process.

For example, in the 2006 presidential election, René Préval was favored to win the contest in the first round. After the results were tabulated, however, Préval finished with just under 50 percent of the vote, requiring a second round of balloting. The vote percentage for Préval, however, was tabulated using the total number of valid ballots cast – including blank ballots – as a denominator. Had blank ballots not been counted in this equation, Préval would have finished well over the 50 percent margin necessary to win in the first round. Despite the law stating that blank ballots must be counted in the

¹³ Report Of The Joint Electoral Observation Mission Of The Organization Of American States (OAS) And The Caribbean Community (Caricom, Presidential And Legislative Elections First And Second Rounds Republic Of Haiti Organization Of American States (Gs/Oas, November 28, 2010, and March 20, 2011).

¹⁴ Ibid

denominator, Préval organized his supporters into street protests against a second round of balloting. The CEP acquiesced to this demand and a second round was not conducted.

Haiti again experienced post-election violence following the 2010 presidential election. Supporters of eventual winner, Michel Martelly, took to the streets after preliminary first round results placed their candidate in third place. Eventually, all candidates, even first place finisher Mirlande Manigat, alleged fraud. The findings of the Expert Verification Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS) compelled the CEP to change the outcomes because of the level of fraud evidenced by the Mission. With these findings in place, Martelly advanced to the second round against Manigat and emerged as the eventual victor. Two people were killed in post-election related violence during the second round which was significantly diminished from the level experienced in the first round.¹⁵

Based upon this history of Haitian electoral conflict, the conflict profile is summarized in the matrix below.

Table I
Historical Patterns of Electoral Conflict

Profile Focus	Pre-Election Phase	Election Day Phase	Post-Election Phase
Perpetrators	<i>Primary - State and State Proxies</i> Incumbent youth and Private Armed Groups (PAGs) PNH Elites DTO financing <i>Secondary – Political Rivals</i> Political party agents and enforcers	<i>Primary – State and State Proxies</i> Incumbent agents PNH <i>Secondary – Political Rivals</i> Political party agents and enforcers Voters	<i>Primary – Political Rivals</i> General supporters <i>Secondary – State and State Proxies</i> PNH
Victims	Opposition candidates and supporters Journalists PNH MINUSTAH	Poll workers Candidates Voters Journalists PNH MINUSTAH	Election officials Poll workers Public officials Opposition supporters and voters PNH MINUSTAH General public
Motives	Eliminate or force withdrawal of a	Suppress voter turnout	Overturn election results

¹⁵ Clarens Renois and Guillaume Decamme “Singer Martelly tipped to win in Haiti” (AFP). Mar 21, 2011

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	candidacy Inhibit campaigning and support for opposition candidates	Disrupt voting Falsify tally sheets Disenfranchisement	
Tactics	Homicide Assaults with firearms Physical assaults Intimidation Bribery	Physical assaults Intimidation Bribery Destruction of property	Street actions Physical assaults Destruction of property Intimidation
Locations	Candidate home towns Constituencies with close contests	Polling stations Areas around polling centers	Public street Election facilities

V. Electoral Security Stakeholder Analysis

Electoral security stakeholders can be grouped into three categories: 1) state; 2) non-state; and 3) international. State stakeholders can be regulatory, security, or judicial in nature. The primary regulatory stakeholder is the Electoral Council (CEP) and its associated administrative units at the departmental (BED) and communal (BEC) levels as well as the National Electoral Challenges Office (BCEN). The primary security stakeholder is the Haitian National Police (PNH). Judicial stakeholders are the ordinary courts of Haiti and justices of the peace. Non-state stakeholders include political parties, civil society organizations (CSOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), other domestic observer groups, and media organizations. International stakeholders include MINUSTAH/UNDP, “international community,” and international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) involved with electoral assistance, domestic observation, conflict mediation, rule of law, and political party development.

A. State Stakeholders

1. Regulatory

Electoral Council (CEP)

The CEP is a constitutional body, established by the June 2012 amendments as a permanent institution, mandated to supervise all public elections conducted in Haiti. Since 1987, the history of electoral administration in Haiti has been tainted by claims of partisanship and corruption on the part of provisional CEPs. These public perceptions have implications for electoral conflict in the post-election phase as this lack of trust has translated into street protests over announced results by the CEP. The public confidence gap extends downward from the CEP members to BEDs and BECs. Poll workers are reported to commit acts of deception and disruption the polling stations. Concerns were

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also expressed about the CEP's role in electoral dispute adjudication, with the BCEN effectively serving as a defendant, judge, and jury combined into one entity.

2. Security

A. Haitian National Police (PNH)

The Haitian National Police (PNH) are the primary domestic agency mandated to provide electoral security. While their coordination mechanisms with MINUSTAH and the CEP are noteworthy, and its outreach to political parties has been a useful channel of communications, the PNH remains under-staffed and under-resourced, with localized public perceptions of pro-government bias in enforcement priorities. PNH officers do not receive explicit training in electoral security conflict assessment methodologies. Some individuals expressed the view that the PNH performed as well as could be expected under the circumstances and PNH officers were sometimes the victims of electoral violence themselves. However, others considered the institution to be politicized and under the influence of the government or local powerbrokers. From that viewpoint, PNH officers were seen as co-perpetrators of violence because of their use of intimidation tactics against voters or their protection of electoral violence perpetrators. As a result, there is a mixed picture of perceptions in the public mind about the role, capacity, and performance of PNH officers.

3. Judicial

The judiciary has facilitated impunity for perpetrators of electoral violence by not acting or unofficially ordering their release. Justices of the peace play an early investigative role looking into incidents of electoral violence before turning over their investigations to the courts. However, justices of the peace have remarked that their cases are not followed up after being submitted to the courts. Judges and justices of the peace, as well as department government officials and PNH chiefs, are subject to forced transfers by the government for insufficient fealty to its interests. The threats of these transfers create further incentives for judges to ignore cases of electoral violence associated with the government. As a result, violence can be employed as a political tactic without legal penalty.

B. Non-State Stakeholders

1. Political Parties

There are currently 18 parties represented in the Chamber of Deputies; however, only a few have a nationwide presence. A total of 29 parties are registered, although the political landscape remains fluid with parties regularly formed and disbanded. The parliament is currently dominated by the Inite (Unity) platform, which controls 46 out of 99 seats. President Martelly's previous entity, the Farmers Response Party, only has three seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Martelly is in the process of forming a new entity. Inite was formed in 2010 by then-President Préval, who left the Lavalas party that had dominated

parliament. That new platform was able to recruit prominent leaders from other parties such as Lespwa, the OPL, and the National Christian Union for the Reconstruction of Haiti (UNCRH), as well as some members of FUSION. The fact that a platform of parties could be created so quickly, and obtain support so quickly, underscores the personalistic nature of political party leadership. At the local level, the traditional party system model is even weaker, as politics is dominated by local politicians who use PAGs and intimidation to secure influence. The abundance of political parties and candidates fragments politics and creates more opportunities for divisions, rivalries, and violence. Political rivals are the primary sources of electoral violence in the pre-election phase in attacks on candidates and supporters, on Election Day through intimidation tactics in polling stations by *mandataires*, and in the street in post-election protests.

The return of Aristide and the reappearance of *Famni Lavalas* (FL) supporters create a kind of “wild card” on electoral violence. FL was barred from fielding candidates after 2004 because Aristide was in exile and the CEP determined that political party leaders must be present to sign nominating documents for their candidates. Through its network of supporters, the FL was able to mobilize Port-au-Prince street protests in October 2012, ostensibly over economic conditions. Such a capacity to mobilize street actions makes FL a potential threat to electoral security throughout the electoral cycle, particularly in the West department where its traditional strength has resided. The matrix below summarizes information about the political parties.

Table II
Political Party Matrix

Parties	Leader	Seats
Unity (<i>INITE</i>)	Levaillant LOUIS-JEUNE and Paul DENIS	32
Alternative for Progress and Democracy (<i>ALTERNATIF</i>)	Victor BENOIT and Evans PAUL	11
Ansam Nou Fò (<i>ANSAMN NOU FO</i>)	Mario DUPUY	10
Haiti in Action (<i>AAA</i>)	Youri LATORTUE	8
Lavni Organisation (<i>LAVNI</i>)	Yves CRISTALIN	7
Rally (<i>RASAMBLE</i>)(<i>partis: PNDPH (Turneb Delpe, PLH Jean Andre Victor, REPARE'N (Judy C. Roy)</i>)	Jean Andre VICTOR, Turneb DELPE and Judy C. ROY	4
Konbit Pou refè Ayiti (<i>KONBIT</i>)	Claire Lidy PARENT and Jean Jacques Clark PARENT	3
Christian Movement for a New Haiti (<i>MOCHRENHA</i>)	Henri Renold BAZIN	3
Liberation Platform (<i>PLATFORME LIBERATION</i>)	Dr. Serge JEAN LOUIS	3
For Us All (<i>PONT</i>)	Dr. Evaliere BEAUPLAN	3
Farmers' Response (<i>REPONS PEYZAN</i>)	Michel MARTELLY	3
Socialist Action Movement (<i>MAS</i>)	Jean Petion FAVARD	2
Independents	NA	2
Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Haiti–Revolutionary Party of Haiti (<i>MODELH–PRDH</i>)	Dr. Guy THEODORE	1
Platform of Haitian Patriots (<i>PLAPH</i>)	Dejean BELISAIRE and Himler REBU	1
Respect (<i>RESPE</i>)	Charles-Henri BAKER	1
Veye Yo (<i>VEYE YO</i>)	Lavarice GAUDIN	1

2. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), Faith Based Organizations (FBOs) and other domestic observer groups)

Two of the main roles played by CSOs and FBOs at the time of elections are civic and voter education, and observation. In the case of CSOs involved in civic and voter

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education, their role has been recognized as useful but limited. Domestic CSOs increasingly engaged in observing the second round of elections in March and even provided a list of recommendations on reforms in technical areas as well as oversight of elections in Haiti, which was shared with the CEP.¹⁶

In March 2011, domestic CSOs confirmed substantial improvement in the second round of elections compared to the first round. The CNO and its partners deployed the largest number of observers in Haiti in March 2011. In a press release, they concluded that apart from certain logistical and administrative issues, as well as violence in certain areas of the country, the presidential and legislative elections resulted in better conditions than the first round.¹⁷

The CSOs known as the Coalition of Election Observation (La Coalition d'observation électorale)¹⁸ comprised the National Election Observation Council (Conseil National d'Observation des Elections, CNO), the Civil Society Initiative (Initiative de la Société Civile) ISC, the Haitian Council of Non State Actors (CONHANE), the Centre d'Education, de Recherches et d'actions en Sciences Sociales et pénales (CERESS), and Mouvman Fanm Aktif Kafou (MOFKA). The coalition held an event on March 15, 2011 prior to the second round of elections, which was attended by media outlets, the diplomatic corps, and CEP representatives. Following the election on March, 23, 2011 observer groups stated that lack of transparency was noted at tabulation centers and the reason for CEP's reluctance to publish results from individual polling stations was not clear to the observers.¹⁹

C. International Stakeholders

I. MINUSTAH/UNDP

As mandated by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, MINUSTAH has provided technical assistance to the CEP on elections, training, security, communications, and logistics in past elections and will do so in the 2013 electoral cycle. MINUSTAH partners with the PNH on electoral security for the CEP. A discussion of the role and contributions of MINUSTAH can be found in the section on Mitigating Factors.

¹⁶ US Department of State, Official Blog

¹⁷ United States Institute for Peace April 20, 2011 Panel Discussion Post-Election Haiti: What Happens Next? Presentation by Jim Swigert, Senior Associate, National Democratic Institute (as prepared for delivery) http://www.ndi.org/files/Jim-Swigert-USIP-Haiti-presentation-April_2011.pdf and National Election Observation Council (Conseil National d'Observation des Elections, CNO) [http://www.gndem.org/sites/default/files/CNO%20Post-Election%20Statement%2023-23-2011%20\(ENG\).docx_.pdf](http://www.gndem.org/sites/default/files/CNO%20Post-Election%20Statement%2023-23-2011%20(ENG).docx_.pdf).

¹⁸ Haiti-Élections : La Coalition d'observation électorale demande au CEP de s'expliquer sur les 18 % de procès verbaux écarté”, <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article13884>

¹⁹ “Haiti-Élections: La Coalition d'observation électorale demande au CEP de s'expliquer sur les 18 % de procès verbaux écarté”, <http://www.alterpresse.org/spip.php?article13884>, March 29, 2011. Also, please see, “CNO (Haiti) Press Release, Post Election: Second Round [Eng]”, <http://www.gndem.org/CNO-Press-Release-Post-Election-Second-Round>, March 23, 2011

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) played a role as a major provider of long-term technical assistance and capacity building for the CEP, as well as manager of the international “basket fund” of donor financing for the elections. Areas of UNDP’s program emphasis were: 1) management of funds; 2) direct support in procurement of goods and services; and 3) implementation of technology for the improvement of electoral operations including production of electoral documents, electoral results management, and voter education, among other assistance activities. UNDP has also been responsible for payroll management for temporary electoral staff of the CEP.

2. International Community

The “international community” is distinguished from MINUSTAH/UNDP in that the term here refers to regional IGOs and the bilateral relationships between donor governments and the government of Haiti. The international community has a substantial role in the financing and operation of elections. This assistance is rendered through bilateral programs as well as the “basket fund” of donor monies directed toward electoral assistance and managed by UNDP.

Electoral violence has been noted by regional IGOs. In 2010/2011, the OAS/Caribbean Community (CARICOM) observation mission stated that in terms of security, “The observers received numerous unverified complaints of intimidation and aggression by certain candidates and their sympathizers when they came upon other political players. There were isolated acts of violence, including the ambush of a bus carrying journalists to a public meeting featuring the presidential candidate Jaques Edouard Alexis in the north of the country; the attack on the home of the Executive Director of the Respè party, and the ransacking of the automobile of the Minister of Justice, Paul Denis. Other complaints were filed concerning isolated confrontations between sympathizers of different political parties, gunfire and the illegal carrying of weapons by certain candidates and their partisans, verbal threats, and destruction of campaign posters.”²⁰

Previously, the issue of electoral violence has also been noted by the European Union (EU). In its overview of the political situation in Haiti in 2006, the EU observation mission posited that “The two burning issues are security and the reform of the judiciary. Although the security situation has improved markedly since the presidential election with, in particular, a drop in the number of kidnappings, security is still a major problem. The availability of small-caliber light weapons remains a major source of concern. In addition to this, the justice system is universally described as corrupt and ineffective and, owing to the absence of legal certainty, is a serious impediment to the country's economic development. [...] MINUSTAH may remain in Haiti beyond the electoral period, precisely to address these challenges by providing support to the police and justice system.”²¹

²⁰ OAS/CARICOM: Report of the Joint Electoral Observation Mission of the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) – Presidential and Legislative Elections – First and Second rounds – Republic of Haiti November 28, 2010 and March 20, 2011

²¹ EU – Election Observation of Presidential, Legislative and Senatorial elections in Haiti on 7 February and 21 April 2006 – Report”

Bilateral relationships between donor countries and the government of Haiti can be useful in conveying priorities to Haitian officials about international interest in peaceful elections. Outreach and dialogue between governments can be through embassies and bilateral development agencies as well as special visits by senior donor-country officials.

3. International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs)

INGOs, such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), have provided electoral assistance in Haiti. IFES has served as technical advisor to the CEP with particular emphasis on the polling and counting procedures, the training of trainers, the accreditation of domestic and international observers, and the development and implementation of the civic and voter education campaigns for the 2009 senatorial elections and the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections. At the end of its project in 2011, IFES also organized, with the assistance of the research section of Internews, an evaluation of the CEP's communications strategy, focusing on civic education and voter information campaigns. The objective of this evaluation was to provide recommendations for improvement of the CEP's current communications department structure, communication strategy, and long-term voter education and information initiatives. This evaluation included 30 focus groups and a survey of 3,000 individuals. The summarized conclusions of the evaluation showed that voter/civic education was justified and appreciated by the public, but the programs were considered insufficient in terms of duration and scale.

The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has provided assistance in domestic observation, and developing Tolerance and Initiative Committees, initiatives to make elections more transparent, mitigate local conflicts and identify and respond to development needs. To complement direct grants to Haitian groups from the European Union and Canada, NDI provided technical assistance and worked with Haitian partners to train approximately 700 domestic observers for the first round of the 2010 elections. Approximately 3,500 - 5,000 domestic observers were ultimately fielded by a range of Haitian groups. For two election cycles, NDI has also helped Haitian groups carry out pilot Parallel Vote Tabulations (PVTs) as a means of providing an independent check on official results. However, this tool has not yet been successfully implemented in Haiti. The Initiative Committees emerged from a civic education program launched in the late 1990s, called Civic Forum, which prepared citizens to become more involved in community problem solving. Tolerance Committees were later created to encourage peaceful cooperation among candidates at the local level. The committees involved political parties, community leaders and CSOs, and conducted activities designed to increase awareness of the importance of peaceful elections. Activities included messages at sporting events, public marches, and cultural activities. At the communal level, the Initiative Committees operate as coalitions and usually involve approximately 10 to 12 members representing their respective local organizations. The committees generally organize activities to respond to self-identified community needs, having conducted activities related to elections, infrastructure, and providing support during the cholera outbreak. For past elections, NDI has also helped to organize presidential and

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parliamentary candidate debates. Such events provide opportunities for peaceful political dialogue and public pledges for peaceful elections.

VI. Preliminary Electoral Conflict Profile

There are vulnerabilities potentially triggering violence in all phases of the electoral cycle. However, the profile of that violence will vary with each phase. In the pre-election phase, the conflict will be among political rivals as they campaign for votes. Youth may be engaged by candidates to intimidate or assault opposing candidates and supporters. Local PNH officers may also engage in intimidation of opposition candidates and supporters. The perceived closeness of contests could trigger violence, which typically, has been at a higher level in the first round than in the second round of voting. The motives for pre-election violence are to influence the field of candidates and the voters' choices of candidates. On Election Day, the polling station will be the locus for conflict as voters and election workers emerge as targets. The tactics employed on Election Day will range from intimidation by *mandataires* seeking to influence voting selections, to bribery and intimidation of poll workers to falsify PVs. Post-election violence manifests as street actions and property destruction by losing candidate supporters seeking to overturn the announced election results. Election facilities may become targets for attack.

Six common themes emerged from the departmental interviews in Northeast, South, Grand'Anse, and Nippes. First, the underlying economic factors of poverty and unemployment are considered the dominant vulnerabilities for electoral violence, as compared to other security, political, and social factors. Second, political rivals are the primary category of perpetrators with pro-government enforcers cited as more frequent perpetrators than other parties. Third, the perpetrators employ a range of tactics including intimidation, physical assaults, and property destruction. The availability of firearms provides perpetrators with the weaponry to carry out the violence. Fourth, there is a culture of impunity for electoral violence. As a result of the political protections afforded to perpetrators, the organizers and agents of violence escape penalty. One factor enabling impunity is the government's use of threats to reassign and transfer departmental and local public officials who fail to represent the political interests of the government. Fifth, there are gaps in the PNH's enforcement capacity which undermines its ability to provide department-wide security as required during a national election. And sixth, administrative deficiencies, lack of transparency, and perceived pro-government partisanship have diminished public confidence in the CEP. This confidence gap creates vulnerabilities for post-election violence as election results are not considered credible by losing candidates and supporters.

While this profile provides a general description of the conflict, the following section examines the conflict profiles by department in focus. These profiles were developed from observations made in interviews conducted in each of these departments.

A. Northeast Department – Commune of Ouanaminthe

1. Contextual Vulnerabilities

Security factors which create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur include inadequate PNH enforcement capacity, the availability of firearms, and suspicions of DTOs financing electoral activities. Ouanaminthe is a border town with a population of 120,000 to 125,000 people and 20 to 25 PNH officers. That force level translates into a ratio of one officer per 6,000 inhabitants, which is well below the national average. Firearms are reported to be readily available and used by candidates against their rivals and to suppress voter turnout. Political factors include the “win-at-all-cost” culture among political rivals, the forced transfer of public officials viewed as insufficiently loyal to the government, and the impunity provided by local officials for perpetrators. One social factor said to contribute to tensions is the diversity of the population, with people from all ten departments migrating and residing there. This diversity has not fostered social cohesion in the city but rather generated social cleavages, which can be potentially exploited by politicians. In addition, economic factors of poverty and unemployment create vulnerabilities for recruitment into electoral violence.

2. Electoral Conflict Profile

In the pre-election phase, the conflict has been among political rivals employing intimidation and assault to influence the field of contestants and intimidate opposition supporters. Within the Northeast Department, the communes where electoral violence has been experienced in the past are Terrier Rouge, Trou du Nord, and Carice. Conflict locations may be targets of opportunity, but electoral facilities, political party offices, and the residences of candidates may also be targeted. It is early during this phase that the forced transfers of public officials occur for those viewed as insufficiently loyal to the government. On Election Day, the conflict will focus on the polling stations and the intimidation of voters to cast ballots for certain candidates and poll workers to falsify the PVs. Post-election violence may be triggered by the announcement of election results and the street protests by losing candidate supporters.

B. Northeast Department – Commune of Fort-Liberté

1. Contextual Vulnerabilities

Security factors which create vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur remain the PNH enforcement capacity, availability of firearms, and suspicions of DTOs financing electoral activities. Police sources reported that their forces were stretched to provide security throughout the department during elections. Firearms are employed by candidates to intimidate and assault other candidates or their supporters. Some public information efforts are made by the PNH to encourage self-enforcement of gun bans on Election Day at polling stations, but these efforts have not been viewed as effective in the past. Political factors which create vulnerabilities include the forced transfer of public officials and the culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence. Police sources

reported that even if arrests are made, unofficial judicial orders for release are inevitably issued. The CEP's credibility gap is also a political factor with implications for post-election violence surrounding the public acceptance of announced results. In addition, economic factors of poverty and unemployment persist in creating vulnerabilities for violence.

2. Electoral Conflict Profile

In the pre-election phase, the conflict is principally among political rivals who seek to suppress campaigning or force withdrawals of opposing candidates. Some individuals interviewed described a recidivist dimension to the perpetrators in that the same political "names" came up in connection with violence during each election. Conflict locations are both targets of opportunity as well as locations such as electoral facilities and candidate residences. Firearms are used in intimidation and assaults. In this phase, the forced transfers of public officials are reported to begin in order to have local officials in office during the elections who will be cooperative with government interests. On Election Day, political party *mandataires* cause disruption and intimidation at polling stations. At night, during the ballot tabulation, polling stations have been attacked by PAGs who have destroyed ballots and other sensitive election materials. The perceived lack of transparency within the CTV creates post-election tensions over the credibility of announced election results.

C. South Department – Commune of Les Cayes

1. Contextual Vulnerabilities

The security factors creating vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur here are, again, the PNH enforcement capacity, availability of firearms, and suspicions of DTOs financing electoral activities. The department has deployed 214 police officers for a population of 621,600 people, or a ratio of one officer per 2,905 inhabitants. This ratio is also well below the national average and makes securing a department-wide election challenging for such a force level. Political factors include forced transfers of public officials, immunity for perpetrators of electoral violence, and perceptions of pro-government partisanship by the CEP. Economic factors of poverty and unemployment continue to undermine the environment for peaceful elections to be conducted.

2. Electoral Conflict Profile

Political rivals are the primary perpetrators in all phases of the electoral cycle; however, those associated with the government were seen to be more frequent perpetrators than others. Pre-election violence takes the form of candidate and supporter intimidation, reflecting the "win-at-all-cost" approach to elections. Political parties are reported to distribute firearms to their enforcers. On the eve of Election Day, candidate supporters may intimidate opposing supporters in attempts to suppress turnout. Election Day violence is centered at polling stations where either polling station staff disrupt the process themselves or become targets of violence and intimidation by *mandataires*.

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Threats to poll workers by *mandataires* are seen to intensify as the polls close and ballot tabulation begins. Post-election phase violence in protest to election results has been described as the most intense in scale by comparison with the violence from other two phases. One mitigating factor cited was the presence of MINUSTAH, which is viewed as a deterrent against violence in general.

D. Nippes Department – Commune of Mirogoane

1. Contextual Vulnerabilities

Security factors creating vulnerabilities for electoral conflict to occur here also include insufficient PNH enforcement capacity, the availability of firearms, and the suspicion of DTOs financing electoral activities. Police sources expressed concern about force levels in their department and their capacities to secure an election. Firearms are reported to be readily available and used by political rivals. Political factors include the forced transfers of public officials by the government enabling impunity for the perpetrators of violence, as well as the use of state resources for political purposes, which give incumbents unfair advantage over challengers. Pro-governmental partisanship of the CEP also creates vulnerabilities for post-election phase violence. Economic factors of poverty and unemployment continue to create vulnerabilities for violence.

2. Profile of Electoral Conflict

In the pre-election phase, SMS texting is employed to convey messages of intimidation directed at supporters of political opponents of the government. However, when these messages start there has been a tendency to escalate their use by other parties as well. Radio and graffiti are also used to convey messages of intimidation. The violence can be linked to the perceived closeness of contests. Pro-government candidates are seen as more frequent perpetrators of violence than others. Random enforcers can be recruited from locations called “bases,” where such laborers wait to be hired. Election Day conflict possesses an administration dimension; the PNH reports that the so-called “mega polling centers” present crowd control challenges in that there is no requirement that voters exit the center after casting their ballots. Post-election violence is linked to delays in the announcement of election results, the credibility of those results, and the belief that violence can be employed to overturn the results. The CEP’s role as the adjudicator of disputes was cited as a weakness because of the perceptions of the body’s pro-government partisanship in general. Poorer neighborhoods, subject to more violence on a daily basis, are also higher incident locations for electoral violence. Mitigating factors include a requirement by the PNH to assure that competing political rallies are not conducted in the same place at the same time, as well as MINUSTAH support of the PNH.

E. Grand'Anse Department – Commune of Jeremie

1. Contextual Vulnerabilities

Security factors creating vulnerabilities for electoral violence mainly concern insufficient PNH enforcement capacity; police sources and others have expressed concern about force levels and enforcement capacity, particularly during elections. However, the availability of firearms was also cited as a factor. Political factors include the forced transfers of public officials for political reasons, a culture of impunity for perpetrators of electoral violence, and a lack of confidence in the CEP's impartiality. Economic factors of poverty and unemployment are also considered vulnerabilities for violence.

2. Electoral Conflict Profile

Electoral violence is perpetrated by candidates from all political parties throughout the electoral cycle, reflecting a “win-at-all-cost” approach to campaigning. The PNH are seen by some to be compromised by local politicians and are outgunned by perpetrators possessing higher caliber weapons. Communes at particular risk for electoral violence have been Abricots, Anse d'Ainault, Bonbon, Pestel, Les Irois, and Moron. On Election Day, polling stations in more remote areas are at a high risk of attack by PAGs and voting materials destroyed. In the post-election phase, delays in the announcement of election results have triggered violence. One mitigating factor is the MINUSTAH presence and support of the PNH.

VII. Mitigating Factors and “Wild Cards”

Mitigating factors are positive influences currently in place which may be more effectively leveraged to de-conflict elections. Institutionally, the mitigating factors identified in this assessment involved MINUSTAH, Tolerance Committees, and international and domestic observers. And, in this context, a “wild card” is a factor which could either enable or deter electoral violence, depending upon its use.

MINUSTAH: MINUSTAH's mitigating influence on electoral violence can be described on several levels. First, it has been active in promoting peaceful elections through the good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) and through the programs of the Communications and Public Information Office. For electoral security planning and operations, MINUSTAH established weekly, departmental coordination mechanisms involving the PNH, the Departmental Delegate, and the BED to discuss issues related to elections, including security. The BED offices assisted in identifying potential hot spots for electoral violence. MINUSTAH also provided logistical support to the CEP in the form of secure transport and communications. MINUSTAH-initiated meetings were also held with political parties and candidates in order to discuss their electoral security concerns. In 2010, MINUSTAH conducted 118 such meetings between the first and second rounds of voting. The meetings resulted in the signing of a Code of Conduct for the stakeholders. However, compliance and enforcement of the terms of the Code proved to be difficult. Community outreach

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meetings have also been initiated by the PNH with political parties, not involving MINUSTAH but employing the MINUSTAH coordination model. Finally, the presence of MINUSTAH forces has been a deterrent to violence, that is, the physical deployment of MINUSTAH has been seen as a superior show of force to electoral violence perpetrators.

Tolerance Committees: Under a USAID-funded initiative of NDI, a total of 43 Tolerance Committees have been established “to promote a peaceful electoral process and mitigate conflict between competing candidates and parties.” Members of the Committees represented 29 political parties, CSOs, FBOs, and the business community. Committee activities included public marches, hosting tolerance awareness days and sporting and cultural activities with peaceful elections as themes. The Committees were active in traditionally conflict-prone departments such as Artibonite, Central Plateau, Grand’Anse North, South and West.

International and Domestic Observers: The presence of international observers was reported to be a deterrent to electoral violence. While this deterrent may be limited to those locations where a physical presence is obvious and strongest on Election Day, the strategic deployment of observers over both the short and long term could diminish potential triggers for incidents to occur. While not an observation mission as such, the OAS Verification Mission has been credited with easing tensions after the first round of presidential voting in 2010 through its efforts to restore confidence in the first round election results.

In post-conflict and conflict-prone countries, domestic observation can play an important role in mitigating the potential for electoral violence. Domestic citizen observers play two key roles in reducing tensions: identifying risks and combating impunity related to electoral violence. Employing a “people-to-people” approach to conflict mediation, this aspect of citizen observation can build local trust and facilitates communication among diverse segments of the population. When political tensions rise, the lines of communication that have been established by these citizen observers can encourage peaceful resolution of complaints and spread a message of nonviolence. Also, through systematic election monitoring, citizen observers collect accurate information on incidents and verify reports of violence or misconduct. Such reports, when integrated into citizen groups’ analysis of the election environment, help combat misinformation and present a reliable picture of the scope of problems across the country. Independently verified reports of violations can help victims seek legal recourse; providing a peaceful means of redress for victims and fighting systemic impunity that is common in conflict-prone countries.

Social Media “Wild Card”: Social media has been employed to document, report, and map incidents of electoral violence, but it has also been used as the conveyance for threats and intimidation. Tools such as SMS texting and mobile telephone reporting into Ushahidi-based mapping platforms can provide CSOs, FBOs, and other domestic monitoring groups with organized data and maps on the violence, thus identifying patterns of victimization and perpetration. However, SMS texting has also been used to

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widely spread messages of intimidation, and public video venues such as YouTube become arenas to post intimidating videos. Monitoring such web sites and SMS texts for intimidating messages and videos can be included in an overall electoral conflict monitoring strategy. Links to social media web sites with videos on Haitian electoral violence are shown as Annex IV.

VIII. Electoral Conflict-Related Issues

Two electoral issues under discussion, which have implications for electoral conflict, involve electronic voting and diaspora voting.

Electronic Voting: Favorable views on electronic voting were expressed by PNH officers, BED officials, and the FUSION Party. The assumption is that by eliminating the human factor in vote counting, the integrity and public confidence of the results will be enhanced reducing triggers for post-election violence. However, the dissenting view looked at issues of illiteracy and cost as reasons to forego electronic voting at this time. While the initial use of electronic voting may produce the credible outcomes as hoped, the voting machines could still become targets of sabotage, theft, or destruction, resulting in no audit trail to reconstruct the voting at those stations. The impact on electoral outcomes would be the same as a quarantined PV. Transparency in procurement, long-term costs, maintenance, poll worker training, and voter education are also sustainability issues which can be raised in evaluating the viability of electronic voting and its impact on electoral conflict.

Diaspora Voting: The new constitution allows for dual citizenship and there is growing debate on the topic of diaspora voting, that is, the first-time enfranchisement of Haitian migrants' resident outside of the country to cast ballots in elections. A number of issues would have to be addressed such as proof of eligibility, types of elections where the franchise can be exercised, and voting modalities (in-person, postal, or proxy). These technical issues aside, while President Martelly stated that the enfranchisement of Haitians abroad would bring down political barriers, in fact, the political consequences of introducing diaspora voting have implications for electoral conflict. First, estimates vary on the number of Haitian residents abroad. As a result, when voter registration occurs, there is no baseline data which can serve to validate as legitimate the numbers of individuals enfranchised. Second, regardless of the exact diaspora population, this voting bloc would be a powerful one and potentially a "king-maker" for some offices. Finally, with enfranchisement comes political engagement where the diaspora community rhetorically and financially engages in elections in a positive or negative way. Such issues should be noted when diaspora voting mechanisms are designed and managed.

IX. Electoral Security Planning and Programming

This *Framework* seeks to address the following problem statement and development hypothesis:

Problem Statement: Without new strategic interventions, the cycle of electoral violence in Haiti will continue to de-stabilize governance, politics, and society. The factors contributing to this violence include a “win-at-all-cost” political culture, lack of economic opportunities, particularly for youth, and a culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence and malpractice.

Development Hypothesis: If multi-sectoral interventions can be conducted involving electoral assistance, political party development, rule of law, civic participation, gender, media, security sector reform, and livelihoods, some reduction in electoral violence may be achieved in 2013. However, security, political, social, and economic vulnerabilities for electoral violence have been longstanding, varied, and resistant to reform. These factors will pose ongoing obstacles to development objectives and associated programming.

The strategy to address this problem statement and development hypothesis has three thematic pillars: 1) reduce the potential for vulnerabilities to become triggers for electoral violence; 2) enhance capacity in electoral security administration and conflict prevention; and 3) pursue justice and social services for victims. The first pillar is cross-cutting and involves reducing the potential conflict posed by the security, political, social, and economic factors described in the Introduction. The two other pillars involve program activities which are specific to state and non-state stakeholders.

In order to implement this strategy, the following five program objectives have been defined

Program Objective One: Expand electoral security administration training and capacity building for the CEP and PNH for improvements in prevention, planning, enforcement, and investigation skills and operations and incorporate this curriculum into MINUSTAH training programs for 2013 – 2014.

Program Objective Two: Include in the new draft electoral law, political party law, and electoral policies and practices, provisions to reduce potential conflict embedded in the electoral legal framework.

Program Objective Three: Provide greater transparency and confidence in the ballot tabulation process in order to reduce post-election phase violence over disputed election results.

Program Objective Four: Prevent, manage, or mediate electoral violence among political rivals through initiatives from MINUSTAH, CEP, PNH, CSOs, FBOs, and the international community.

Program Objective Five: Reform the culture of impunity for electoral malpractice and crimes of electoral violence so that perpetrators receive sanctions and victims receive services.

The program activity priorities will vary with the phase of the electoral cycle. In the pre-election phase, there is a twofold set of priorities: 1) “upstream” legislative remedies; and 2) managing political rivalries. Of the legislation potentially adopted before the next election, one priority would be reforms in the selection of *mandataires* and poll workers. This could diminish the pool of “for hire” perpetrators by breaking the traditional loyalty patterns. Initiatives by state and non-state for political party consultative mechanisms can also be program priorities to address the primary manifestation of pre-election violence, that is, violence among political rivals. A focus on de-mobilizing youth can also be considered a related priority in this phase. While reforming the selection of *mandataires* and poll workers could pay peace dividends on Election Day, the polling station will likely remain the locus of conflict and require organized protection by the PNH, MINUSTAH, and the CEP’s security agents. The risk color coding of polling centers, deployments based upon these assessments, and more ambitious crowd control measures in “mega polling centers” can be program priorities for Election Day. Finally, confidence building measures in the ballot tabulation process can address the fundamental trigger for post-election violence - mistrust of the announced election results. Such confidence building measures can involve procedural changes, enhanced opportunities for domestic observation of CTVs, and a strategic communications plan by the CEP for election results reporting. Once again, reforms in the selection of poll workers would aim to improve the quality PV reporting and other source tabulation documents. Also, program location priorities can take into account USAID’s three development corridors – Saint Marc, Port-au-Prince, and Cap Haitian. Programming for those locations can be crafted to be responsive to the conflict factors in each of these corridors.

These program objectives reflect a multi-sectoral strategy potentially involving programming from elections and political transitions, conflict management and mitigation, civic participation, gender, media, rule of law, security sector reform, and livelihoods. While some of the program areas outside of elections have not traditionally been tasked with electoral activity mandates, introducing an electoral conflict dimension to existing development programming could aid in developing this multi-sectoral approach. The issue of electoral violence possesses a special sensitivity and the openings pursued for program interventions should take into account this sensitivity and be underpinned by a “do no harm” principle so that victims and monitors are not placed at risk. As noted in the departmental conflict profiles, suspicions were expressed about DTO activity in elections. However, any such connections are opaque at this time and would require transnational law enforcement investigations to bring into an electoral conflict focus.

The organizational impact of this multi-sectoral and diversified intervention strategy suggests that new, cross-organizational staffing may be useful to facilitate implementation of this spectrum of program activities. One such post could be a Program Coordination Specialist, a part-time position devoted to electoral security and conflict mitigation initiatives for the 2013 electoral cycle. While not statutory or internationally mandated, this coordinator could be generally agreed to pursue the following tasks:

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- To work with state, non-state, and international stakeholders and foster the development of electoral security assistance projects and initiatives;
- To promote communications and coordination on electoral security issues among relevant stakeholders;
- To identify potential triggers for conflict and report these triggers to electoral security authorities;
- To offer “honest broker” mediation services among potential perpetrators; and
- To compile periodic reports and a final report on electoral violence during the electoral cycle.

The international community could establish a multi-sectoral Electoral Security Interest Group (ESIG), composed of IGOs, embassy representatives, and INGOs which periodically convene to communicate and coordinate on electoral security programming.

Program Objective One - Expand electoral security administration training and capacity building for the CEP and PNH, for improvements in prevention, planning, enforcement, and investigation skills and operations. Incorporate this curriculum into MINUSTAH training programs for 2013 – 2014.

CEP

The capacities of the CEP to prevent and manage electoral conflict can be enhanced through the following development assistance:

- Conduct training for CEP members and staff on the principles of electoral security administration.
- Develop capacity of the electoral security unit within the CEP as the staff focal point for the issue and decentralize its functions to the BED and BEC levels.

PNH

The capacities of the PNH to protect electoral stakeholders, facilities, events, and sensitive materials can be enhanced through the following development assistance.

- Incorporate curriculum on elections, democracy, and electoral security administration in courses at the Academy and the PNH’s on-the-job training. An illustrative curriculum framework is shown as Annex V.

- Extend and strengthen the enforcement of the gun ban throughout the electoral cycle, beginning several months before Election Day, through checkpoints, random searches, and monitoring known violators.
- In addition to the risk color coding of polling centers, conduct joint PNH/MINUSTAH/CEP reviews of “mega polling centers” to assure that, at a minimum, if these centers are used, improved plans for ingress, egress, and evacuation are in place and security officials have been trained on these plans. Also identify those private polling locations whose owners have not been paid for their facility rental and the prospect that the owners will go on “strike” on Election Day until payment is made.

Non-Program Note: While these capacity development initiatives can be effective, the limitation of their impact will be linked to the overall number of PNH officers who have been recruited, vetted, trained, and deployed. In each of the four departments, the limited number of PNH officers deployed was noted by those interviewed. As a result, while the existing force will benefit from this training assistance, the issue remains whether there are a sufficient number of PNH officers in total to secure a nation-wide election.

Program Objective Two - Include in the new draft electoral law, political party law, and electoral policies and practices, provisions to reduce potential conflict embedded in the electoral legal framework.

Introducing reforms to reduce the triggers for violence in the electoral legal framework involve four areas of focus: 1) electoral justice; 2) political party and candidate eligibility criteria; 3) political finance regulation; and 4) poll worker and *mandataire* selection.

A. Electoral Justice

Disputes over electoral outcomes have been a repeated trigger for post-election phase violence. As the CEP essentially hears and adjudicates complaints brought against itself, it is the defendant, judge, and jury combined. The current National Electoral Dispute Resolution Tribunal (BCEN) consists of nine members divided into three groups, with two CEP-recruited lawyers assigned to each. Although requiring a constitutional amendment, the model and composition of the tribunal could be reformed to exclude CEP members, while including such members as retired judiciary. Appointments could be made through a diversified process involving nominees from the President, Chamber of Deputies, Senate, and the courts. Some system of de-centralizing the electoral justice mechanisms could also be considered to enhance access to the system at the local level.

B. Political Party and Candidate Eligibility Criteria

From an electoral conflict perspective, the proliferation of political parties and candidates creates more potential perpetrators and victims. It also enhances the personalistic dimensions to political party organizations. Consideration can be given to increasing the legal threshold for political parties to be certified in order to foster alliances, coalitions,

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and dialogue among former rivals and reduce the political fragmentation which can result in violence.

C. Political Finance Regulation

As campaign monies may be used to fund violence, legislative or regulatory steps can be taken to enhance the transparency of political finance transactions and create obstacles in funding violence by strengthening and enforcing political finance rules. Political finance legislation/regulation can include mandatory disclosures of contributions and expenditures, ceilings on spending, and prohibited sources and expenditures. While enforcement would remain problematic, by enhancing the codification of standards for political finance, the line between legal and illegal funding would be strengthened and could be acted upon accordingly. A focus on political finance accountability may also be a deterrent for the use of state resources for political purposes. The reform can include establishing a Political Finance Regulator (PFR) in law that is independent from the CEP and mandated to oversee political finance enforcement.

D. Poll Worker and *Mandataire* Selection

Granting political parties the exclusive mandate to appoint poll workers has resulted in over-fealty by poll workers to political masters and a vulnerability to falsify electoral records to their sponsor's advantage. In order to reduce the over-fealty syndrome, the process by which poll workers are selected can be reformed into a non-partisan approach and involve teachers, professionals, religious figures, and university students. CSOs, FBOs, student associations, and other groups can nominate these poll workers. This issue is linked to Program Objective Three in that the poor quality, incomplete submissions, and falsification of PVs are done by poll workers either intentionally or through the lack of arithmetic and literacy skills. In either case, it disadvantages the CTV operations because these PVs are the source documents which the CTV is required to use in the ballot tabulation. Polling supervisors should be selected based upon merit by the operational managers within the CEP staff.

The nomination and selection process for political party agents or *mandataires* should be reformed to improve the quality and ethics of individuals chosen for this role. *Mandataires* should be prohibited from changing party affiliation during the course of Election Day. And, as the perpetrators of electoral violence are usually males, establishing a 30 percent gender quota for women to serve as *mandataires* could be introduced in compliance with new constitutional amendments. Polling station presidents should have the authority to revoke the credentials of *mandataires* who intimidate poll workers or voters and expel them from the polling station.

Program Objective Three - Provide greater transparency and confidence in the ballot tabulation process in order to reduce post-election phase violence over disputed election results.

This intervention strategy places a special focus on building confidence in the ballot tabulation process in order to reduce the potential for post-election violence to occur as a result of this lack of confidence.

In this regard, the following action points can be considered.

- Review measures to enhance the transparency and accelerate the conclusion of the tabulation process.
- Introduce ballot reconciliation procedures through numbered counterfoils and accounting for all ballot stock – voted, un-voted, and invalid.
- Review PVs completion procedures in order to reduce mistaken and fraudulent reporting and assess its impact on the criteria for quarantining PVs.
- Support UNDP’s initiatives to assure that the paper PV is posted in a secure location at the polling station with electronic recording and transfer of it to the CTV. In addition, signed copies should be provided to *mandataires*, and photographs of signed copies should be permitted as evidence in electoral complaints.
- Establish criteria to recount ballots in disputed locations or where PVs have been quarantined to reduce uncertainty about the veracity of the PVs and the validity of the results.
- Develop a strategic communications plan to de-conflict the results announcement process and build confidence in the announced results.

Program Objective Four - Prevent, manage, or mediate electoral violence among political rivals through initiatives from MINUSTAH, CEP, PNH, CSOs, FBOs, and the international community.

Political rivals have been the primary perpetrators of electoral violence and these behaviors are embedded in a “win-at-all-cost” political culture and financial stakes associated with victory. As a result, approaches to de-conflict political relationships among rivals should come from different sources and involve both direct engagement of parties and indirect public messaging to build public intolerance for electoral violence.

Inter-Party Conflict Management

CEP

- Establish a political party consultative mechanism (PCM) for holding regular meetings and information sharing between the CEP and certified political parties.

- Create a set of standards, expectations, and prohibitions on political behavior by expanding the development of a Code of Conduct for candidates and parties, and establish a joint EMB/political party code enforcement mechanism.
- Conduct an on-going program of civic education aimed at informing the public about democracy and their role in civic participation.

PNH

- Organize departmental political party outreach meetings to allow party representatives to express their security concerns and issues so that the PNH can take protective and enforcement measures in response.

Demobilization, Community Outreach, and Messaging

CSOs/FBOs and Other Domestic Observer Groups

- Introduce anti-gang programming to provide livelihood alternatives for gang members, educational or training opportunities, and special inter-gang peace-building activities such as sporting events.
- Organize casual labor projects of 60 days in the month preceding Election Day and one month following it to employ youth as an alternative to recruitment into electoral violence. Such projects could involve street clean-up efforts, public gardening, and other public works projects.
- Provide training for CSO, FBO, and other domestic election observers to monitor, report, and map incidents of electoral conflict. The monitoring methodology can reflect the USAID *Electoral Security Framework* profiling approach. The reporting can be web-based and employ incident reporting using SMS texts and telephone calls. The Ushahidi mapping and SwiftRiver crowdsourcing platforms can be employed for use across monitoring organizations.
- Facilitate coalitions of domestic observer groups to be formed and adopt common methodologies so that the reach of domestic monitoring as a potential deterrent can be widespread and strategically deployed. As the women's quota of 30 percent will be applied for the first time, the monitoring should include a gender component in order to track if women candidates become singled out for acts of violence.
- Organize a grassroots campaign to promote peaceful elections, enhance public intolerance of violence, and encourage voter participation as a deterrent to malpractice and conflict. Messages can follow three themes: 1) community and civic participation; 2) peaceful political engagement; and 3) admonition against conflictive political behavior. The first theme can be conducted over the long term

and offer a standardized program of civic education for adults and students alike. This third theme can be further divided into admonitions to the perpetrators of electoral violence; and admonitions to those who essentially steal votes in elections, the “vole vot.”

- Engage political rivals in a variety of programs intended to build positive political competition among them. Such activities should support the provisions of the Code of Conduct and include candidate debates so that opportunities are created for issued-based campaigning and peaceful political dialogue to occur and all-party workshops and training programs. Engage media organizations to co-sponsor and cover such events.
- Provide women candidates with training in campaign organization and vote-seeking in order to develop their effectiveness in competing for elected office.
- Strengthen the activities of the Tolerance Committees to focus on electoral peace-building. During the electoral cycle, Tolerance Committees could play an Alternate Dispute Resolution (ADR) role as informal bodies to which electoral disputes can be taken. Given the issues surrounding the CEP’s role in electoral justice, developing an ADR mechanism for monitoring disputes can lower tensions.
- Provide media organizations with standards and guidelines for the responsible coverage of incidents of electoral violence and malpractice, and develop a Code of Conduct for these organizations to sign and agree to abide by these standards.

Non-Program Note: The international community can continue the good offices of its Embassies to dialogue with Haitian political parties and express the position that peaceful elections are important to the donor community.

Program Objective Five - Reform the culture of impunity for electoral malpractice and crimes of electoral violence so that perpetrators receive sanctions and victims receive services.

PNH

- As a component of the MINUSTAH capacity building program, develop and maintain a database of crimes of electoral violence which profiles incidents by victim, perpetrator, type, location, and timing. Such a database can be informed by reporting from domestic monitoring groups as well as through its own sources of incident data and reporting.

CSOs/FBOs and Other Domestic Observer Groups

- Employ the incident data collected through monitoring electoral violence, and conduct additional monitoring of the arrests, trials, and prosecution of the perpetrators.
- Extend the parameters of long-term domestic and international election monitoring to include scrutiny of the CEP for evidence of pro-government bias. The monitoring can be conducted on four levels: 1) Executive (central); 2) CEP (decisions); 3) Secretariat (actions); and 4) BEDs and BECs (staff selections and actions).
- CSOs and FBOs can provide social services to victims of electoral violence including legal, medical, and psychological services.

These activities are summarized in the matrix below by stakeholder and phase of the electoral cycle.

Table III
Program Matrix
Electoral Security Framework for Haiti

State Stakeholder	Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)	Management (Election Day Phase)	Mediation (Post-Election Phase)
CEP	Electoral security administration training	Enhance authority of polling station officials to restrict illicit activities of <i>mandataires</i>	Revise PV completion and quarantining procedures to reduce fraudulent reporting and the number of votes invalidated
	Develop capacity of electoral security unit at the headquarters, BED, and BEC levels	Introduce ballot reconciliation procedures at polling stations	Protect and photograph posted PVs
	Establish a PCM		
	Expand a Code of Conduct through the PCM		
	Review vote tabulation process to build confidence in results and develop a strategic communications plan to build confidence in announced election results		
	With the PNH and MINUSTAH, review the viability of “mega-centers” and improve Election Day crowd management planning and those center where private owners have not been paid		

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	Continuing program of civic education about governance and civic participation	Continuing program of civic education about governance and civic participation	Continuing program of civic education about governance and civic participation
PNH	Principles of democracy, electoral security administration, electoral violence investigation included in curriculum at Academy and in on-the-job training		
	Create and maintain an electoral violence database	Create and maintain an electoral violence database	Create and maintain an electoral violence database
	Extend and strengthen the enforcement of the gun ban through the electoral cycle	Extend and strengthen the enforcement of the gun ban through the electoral cycle	Extend and strengthen the enforcement of the gun ban through the electoral cycle
	Conduct outreach meetings with political parties, community-based organizations, and Tolerance Committees	Conduct outreach meetings with political parties	Conduct outreach meetings with political parties
Judiciary	Provide training prosecution of crimes of electoral violence and malpractice		
Parliament	Reform the system of electoral justice		
	Review legislative eligibility criteria for establishing political parties		
	Strengthen political finance regulation		
	Reform laws on poll worker and <i>mandataire</i> selection criteria		
Non-State Stakeholder	Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)	Management (Election Day Phase)	Mediation (Post-Election Phase)
Political Parties	Participate in establishing a PCM		
	Participate in development of a Code of Conduct		
	Provide training on electoral complaints procedures		
CSOs/FBOs/Domestic Observer Groups	Conduct youth gang demobilization programs		
	Organize casual labor opportunities for youth		
	Monitor incidents of electoral violence	Monitor incidents of electoral violence	Monitor incidents of electoral violence
	Monitor CEP decisions and	Monitor CEP decisions	Monitor CEP decisions and

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	actions	and actions	actions
	Grassroots peace messaging campaigns and candidate debates	Grassroots peace messaging campaigns	Grassroots peace messaging campaigns
	Strengthen Tolerance Committees	Strengthen Tolerance Committees	Strengthen Tolerance Committees
	Conduct on-going PCM activities	Conduct on-going PCM activities	Conduct on-going PCM activities
	Provide training for women candidates in elections and campaigning		
CSOs/FBOs/Legal Aid and Bar Associations	Provide victims with legal, counseling, and medical services	Provide victims with legal, counseling, and medical services	Provide victims with legal, counseling, and medical services

X. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)

The development of an M&E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs can consist of three basic components: baseline data, program targets, and custom indicators.

Baseline Data

The baseline data creates a record of the frequency and profile of incidents of electoral violence so that the occurrence of such incidents can be tracked as programs are implemented. The baseline data can contain the following fields:

- Date of Incident (Electoral Cycle Phase);
- Time of Day of Incident;
- Targets or Victims – political candidates, their family members and supporters, election official, police, journalists, voters, or others;
- Number of Victims Involved by each Tactic (Disaggregated by Gender);
- Spoilers or Perpetrators – political candidates, family members or supporters, criminals, police, voters, or others;
- Type of Incidents/Tactics – multiple homicides, individual homicide, physical assault, sexual assaults, kidnapping, destruction of physical property, destruction of sensitive electoral materials, riots and street actions; and
- Location – Department, Municipality, and Point of Conflict.

This data collection plan can coincide with the establishment of the incident reporting by CSO, FBOs and other domestic observer groups and the PNH's incident database.

An illustrative set of standard USAID and custom indicators is shown below. The final indicators employed would be designed with specific program interventions in mind and drawn from USAID's *Governing Justly & Democratically (GJD) F Framework Indicators*.

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Custom and Standard USAID F Indicators

1. Good Governance

GJD 1.6 – Governance and the Security Sector
Indicator Title 1.6.2-14: Number of people participating in USG-supported events, trainings, or activities designed to build mass support for peace and reconciliation
1.6.2-14a: Number of men
1.6.2-14b: Number of women
Custom Indicator
Number of participants in electoral security training programs from the CEP and PNH
GJD 1.6 – Governance and the Security Sector
Indicator Title 1.6.2-12: Number of USG-funded events, trainings, or activities designed to build support for peace or reconciliation on a mass scale

2. Political Competition and Consensus Building

GJD 2.3– Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title 2.3.2-11: Number of Domestic Election Observers and/or party agents Trained with USG Assistance
GJD 2.3a: Number of men
GJD 2.3b: Number of women
Custom Indicator
Number of domestic observers trained in electoral conflict incident monitoring and reporting
GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title 2.3.2-12: Number of individuals receiving voter and civic education through USG-assisted programs
2.3.2-12a: Number of men
2.3.2-12b: Number of women
2.3.2-12c: Minorities, Disadvantaged/marginalized
2.3.2-12d: Percent of eligible voters reached through USG assistance
Custom Indicators
Number of voters reached, by media type, with messages from the CEP on governance and civic participation
Number of voters reached, by media type, with messages to discourage vote selling and voter complicity in electoral crimes

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GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title 2.3.2-6: Number of Laws or Amendments to Ensure Credible Elections Drafted with USG Technical Assistance
Custom Indicators
Number of reforms enacted to de-conflict the electoral legal framework including the system of electoral justice, political finance, political party formation, and poll worker and <i>mandataire</i> appointments
GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes
Custom Indicators
Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance
GJD 2.4 – Strengthen Democratic Civic Participation
Indicator Title 2.4.1-9: Number of civil society organizations (CSOs) receiving USG assistance engaged in advocacy interventions
Custom Indicators
Number of CSOs/FBOs and other domestic groups monitoring and advocating on peaceful elections. Number of cases of electoral violence brought before local judicial authorities? Number of decisions in these cases which reflect in their judgments use of internationally and domestically recognized fair trial standards?

XI. Conclusion

Contextual vulnerabilities creating the potential for electoral violence to occur are longstanding, varied, and resistant to reform. For example, by the next electoral cycle, the PNH capacity will still have limitations; firearms will still be available; and poverty, unemployment, and displacement will persist. However, by strategically focusing on those vulnerabilities which may be responsive to multi-sectoral programming, the potential for electoral violence to occur may be reduced or managed.

While the profile of electoral conflict varies with the phases of the electoral cycle, one constant is the role of political rivals as perpetrators of violence. Assault tactics in the pre-election phase are intended to intimidate the opposition and suppress participation. Political rivals employ intimidation tactics on Election Day through their *mandataires* to influence voters and poll workers at polling stations. In the post-election phase, political rivals engage in street actions and destruction of property in attempts to overturn announced election results. These distinctions are important to note because, even with the same set of perpetrators, each phase will require a different set of strategies and interventions to address the profile of the conflict in that phase.

It is important to define the universe of state, non-state, and international stakeholders which play some role in electoral security or conflict. State stakeholders can be

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regulatory, security, or judicial in nature. In Haiti, the primary regulatory stakeholder is the CEP and its associated administrative units at the BED and BEC levels and the BCEN. The primary security stakeholder is the PNH. Judicial stakeholders are the ordinary courts of Haiti and justices of the peace. Non-state stakeholders include political parties, CSOs, FBOs, other domestic observer groups, and media organizations. International stakeholders include MINUSTAH, government-to-government relationships and international non-governmental organizations involved with electoral assistance, domestic observation, conflict mediation, and political party development. Given the cross-cutting nature of electoral security programming, this identification of stakeholders puts institutional “faces” on specific activities.

While considering new electoral security interventions, it is also useful to note the mitigating factors which may be leveraged in support of the overall program objectives. There are three mitigating factors that have been identified as potential deterrents to electoral violence including MINUSTAH, Tolerance Committees, and international and domestic election observers. MINUSTAH’s presence, training, security assistance, and logistical support have been effective at reducing, but not eliminating, electoral violence. Its assistance to the PNH in electoral security-specific training and capacity building can be supported. The Tolerance Committees could play a larger role in electoral dispute mediation as ADR mechanisms to the formal mechanisms of electoral justice. The presence of international and domestic observers could be leveraged to report on incidents of electoral violence as well as be “time and place” deterrents.

In addition, there are also “wild cards” which can serve to enable or deter electoral violence. Social media is one such “wild card” to monitor and mine for evidence of victimization and perpetrators. However, women in public life may be at a pivotal point in the next electoral cycle as a result of the new 30 percent quotas. It is noted in this context because women were not previously reported to be targets of electoral violence specifically because of their gender. In addition, women have typically not been the perpetrators of electoral violence, a domain principally occupied by men. The issue posed here is whether the statutory presence of women in public life will change the political dynamic and reduce electoral violence; or if this new empowerment will create women activists and candidates as targets. The implementation of the quota systems should be monitored from the perspective of electoral conflict as well as other criteria.

Two new voting modalities, electronic voting and diaspora voting, are currently under discussion and have implications for electoral conflict. While the introduction of electronic voting would resolve the problems with falsification of paper PVs, sabotage or destruction of the machines would mean an absence of election results for entire polling stations, an effect which is equivalent to quarantining the PVs. In addition, there are issues of financing, procurement, sustainability, maintenance, programming, training, and voter education which reduce the attractiveness of introducing electronic voting at this time. The new constitutional amendments also enfranchise citizens with dual nationalities. This provision could result in calls for diaspora voting. While President Martelly stated that this measure would bring the diaspora and home communities closer,

it also holds the potential for divisions as out-of-country voters could become “king-makers” in some contests.

The complexity of the conflict dynamics involves the history of electoral conflict, political culture, financial rewards of holding office, and economic hardship. The international community, through IGOs, INGOs, and bilateral government relationships, has a robust “footprint” in electoral administration and security. This *Framework* has endeavored to define a common vision of the problem of electoral violence so that mutually supportive program objectives can be established across sectors and organizations. This multi-sectoral approach may drive the development of new coordination mechanism for the international community to effectively manage various streams of programming.

Adding to the complexity of the problem is that the profile of the conflict changes with the phase of the electoral cycle. These shifts in profile drive the need to re-calibrate strategies and tactics to counter the conflict present in a given phase. Such re-calibration will impact the timing, sequencing, and organizational lead for the “basket” of electoral security program interventions by the international community. However, with this cross-cutting approach and a planning horizon which extends beyond a single electoral cycle, electoral violence can be reduced and the debilitating impact of violence on the credibility of elections and the consolidation of democratic institutions.

Annex I – Meetings – Individuals and Organizations

Meeting List	
Name	Title/Organization
Philippe AUGUSTIN	Voter Registry Director, CEP
Anthony BARBIER, Rosemond PRADEL, Serge GILLES	Representatives of FUSION
Jacques Feder BASTIEN	Police Commissioner, Grand’Anse (in PAP)
Herod BIENAIME	Commissaire du Gouvernement for Northeast
David BOUANCHAUD	European Union
Jean-Pierre CARL-ARINCKS	Departmental Delegate
Fenelon Pierre CELOT	Police Commissioner
Cheristil CENLUSCA	Coordinator, Communal Coordination of the Ouanaminthe Initiative Committees
Huguette CHARLES	Coordinator of TKFD (Tet Kole Fanm Dile)
Lucas CIBOR	European Union
Ronyde DEGRAFF	Member of CNO (observation, Grand’Anse – by phone)
Rosny DESROCHES	President of CSI (Civil Society Initiative)
Jean DESIR	Current President BED
Matt DIPPEL, Claudia PIRELA	NDI (DC Office)
Almaye DORESTAN	President of BED, Grand’Anse
Chrisma DORFEUIL	Departmental Director at Ministry of Religions
Thelusma ELUCIEN	Police Commander for commune of Ouanaminthe
Doudonne FELINARD, Bertina BELVAL, Adeline MENELUS, Gracieuse PIERRE, Juliana MOMPRIEMER, Charina VICTOR	ODIFF (Organisation pour le Developpement Integre des Femmes de FL)
Marie Yolette FENELON	Justice of the Peace
Gabriel FORTUNE	Ex-Senator, Lavalas
Pierre FRANCIQUE, Huguette CHARLES	OICDCO
Lourdes GONZOLEZ Prieto, Roly DAVILA, Pierre Antoine ARCHANGE	UNDP
Marie Yolene GILLES	RNDDH (Human Rights)
Wanda ARISME GILLES	Focal point for the joint programs “Conflict Prevention and Social Cohesion”, UNDP
Jane HURTIG	NDI (Haiti office)

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Wisner JANVIER	Coordinator Peasants Organization, ex candidate
Pastor Gabriel JEAN-BAPTISTE	Coordinator, Pastors of the Northeast
CDR Kevin KLEIN, Lt Col. George THOMPSON, Kevin KENNEDY, David LENOTRE, Elizabeth CULLITY, Micela MARTINET, Nuzhat, AHMAD, Wouter DE WEERDT	MINUSTAH
Patrick LABE	Founding member and Deputy Secretary General of CNO (Observation National Council)
Pierre Richard LOISEAU, Frandy LAINE	VDH (Volunteers for Development of Haiti) Ouanaminthe
Eliane MENELUS	Deputy Coordinator, SODNE (Solidarite pour le Developpement du NE)
Luis Guilherme NASCENTES	Embassy of Brazil
Jean Yves Roger OLIVIER	Ex-President BED
Pierre-Louis OPONT	Former DG of the CEP
Catherine POGNAT	OAS
Roselene PIERRE	Coordinator of RAFAO (Rassembleman Fanm Angaje Wanament)
Father Pierre PIQUION	
Robert PLAISIMOND	Deputy Chief of Police for Northeast
Michelle Sylvie RAMEAU	Ex-Deputy Mayor of Les Cayes
Bernice ROBERTSON	International Crisis Group
Antoine Rosny SAINT LOUIS	Commissaire du Gouvernement, Grand'Anse
Jean-Marie SALOMON	Prosecutor (Commissaire du Gouvernement)
Jean Michelet SHOUTE	Police Comissionner
Marie Carme SINEAS	President of Chamber of Commerce, future candidate for Senate
Darline TOUSSAINT	Member, CONEFEL (Coalition Nordesienne des Femmes Leaders)
Gary VALBRUN	Departmental Coordinator for the North and Northeast, NDI
Jonas VICTOR	President of the BED (Departmental Elections Office)
Oklema VICTOR	Coordinator, AJPDNE (Association des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Developpement du NE)
Stephanie VONWESTARP	Canadian International Development Agency
Stephan ZIEGLER	International IDEA

Annex II – List of Acronyms

ADR	Alternate Dispute Resolution
AJPDNE	Association des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Developpement du NE
BCEN	Bureau du Contentieux Electoral Departemental
BEC	Bureau Electoral Communal
BED	Bureau Electoral Departmental
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEP	Conseil électorale provisoire
CEP	Conseil électorale permanent
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNO	Conseil National d’Observation des Elections
CONEFEL	Coalition Nordesienne des Femmes Leaders
Creative	Creative Associates International
CSI	Civil Society Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSPJ	Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire
CTV	Vote Tabulation Center
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organizations
EMB	Electoral Management Body
ESIG	Electoral Security Interest Group
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FL	Famni Lavalas
FUSION	Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtienne
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICG	International Crisis Group
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRI	International Republican Institute
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American
ODIFF	Organisation pour le Developpement Integre des Femmes de FL
OPL	Organisation du peuple en lutte
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PAG	Private Armed Groups
PAP	Port-au-Prince
PCM	Party consultative mechanism
PNH	Haitian National Police
PV	Procès Verbaux

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PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulations
RAFAO	Rasanbleman Fanm Angaje Wanament
RNDDH	Réseau national de défense des Droits Humains
SMS	Short Message Service
TKFD	Tet Kole Fanm Dile
UDMO	Unité Départementale de l'application des lois
UNCRH	Union Nationale Chrétienne pour la Reconstruction d'Haiti
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDH	Volontaires pour le Développement d'Haïti

Annex III – IDP Settlements



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Annex IV – Social Media and Haitian Electoral Violence

Source	Title	Link
YouTube	<i>Haiti Election Violence,</i>	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j0sZGUoJRc4
YouTube	<i>Violence flares in Haiti Post-Election</i>	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtBsCmUB8Hw
YouTube	<i>Protests over Haiti poll turn violent</i>	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LtBsCmUB8Hw
YouTube	<i>Haiti Election Protest 2010,</i>	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XsQLQGyUOHk
YouTube	<i>Haiti Riots Over Presidential Vote, Euro News</i>	http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bbKrHT7mSvI
Ushahidi-based crowdsourcing map	<i>Mwen Konte</i>	https://mwenkonte.crowdmap.com/main?l=tr_TR

Annex V – Illustrative Curriculum Framework – Elections and Civilian Security Forces

The learning objective of this course is to provide civilian security forces with knowledge of international electoral policy and practice; fundamentals of electoral security administration; and the roles of non-state stakeholders in electoral conflict and security. With this knowledge, civilian security forces can obtain the skills to assess electoral threats and formulate effective responses to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral conflict. The course consists of 20 hours of classroom lecture and discussion (two hours per module) and four hours of small group exercises. The course can be conducted over a period of six days.

Module I – Elections as Instruments of Governance

This module will introduce the types, concepts, and basic elements of elections including electoral security, Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs), voter registration, electoral systems, political party systems, electoral justice, and electoral observation. The module will describe the features of elections conducted in different security environments including conflictive, post-conflict, transitional (from an authoritarian regime), or stable.

Module II – Elections and the International Community

This module will discuss international standards for the conduct of elections and for the rules of engagement by civilian security forces during electoral periods. These international standards include gender-sensitivity and the enforcement of fundamental freedom of speech, organization, and assembly as well as protecting the security and integrity of the ballot. This session will also discuss models of international electoral security assistance in enforcement of these standards.

Module III - Electoral Threat Assessment Methodologies

The module provides a presentation of the USAID *Electoral Security Framework* methodology for electoral threat profiling. This methodology provides a set of early warning indicators that could trigger electoral conflict. These early factors may be security, political, social, or economic in nature. The methodology provides approaches to profile perpetrators, victims, motives, tactics, locations, and intensity as evaluated in different phases of the electoral cycle - Pre-Election, Election Day, or Post-Election.

Module IV – Principles of Electoral Security Administration

This module provides the fundamentals of electoral security administration. These fundamentals include developing an electoral security concept based upon the profile of the threats and the resources available. Electoral security administration may also require inter-agency task forces to coordinate among military, police, and electoral stakeholders and define the institutional roles for regulatory, security, and judicial stakeholders. This coordination effort may also involve establish a Joint Election Operations Center as a control and communications hub. An introduction to electoral conflict mapping will be

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included in this module. Electoral security administration should also be de-centralized in order to be responsive to localized threats. Organizational models for electoral security administration involving these factors will be discussed.

Module V – Electoral Management Bodies (EMBs)

Election Management Bodies (EMBs) are the principal partners of civilian security forces in electoral security. This module will provide an introduction to the models of EMBs from the standpoints of the relationship to government, size, membership, appointment, and portfolio of duties. The relationship to government can be considered as either government directed, government directed with an independent supervisory, or independent from the government. Its size will represent a political trade-off between representation and efficiency. The membership model will be either that of experts, political parties, judges, or some mixed version of the three. And, the portfolio of responsibilities which can comprise EMB mandates will be discussed.

Module VI – Political Rivalries and Electoral Conflict

This module explores the role of political parties and political party systems in electoral conflict. Political rivals are often the primary perpetrators of electoral violence. The module will explore the use of political party “militias” as partisan enforcers. In addition, the financing of political parties and campaigns can be linked to electoral conflict. This session will examine the elements of a political finance regulation system and how the enforcement of such regulations can reduce the linkage of money and electoral conflict. The roles of civilian security forces in preventing, managing, or mediating conflict among political rivals will be discussed.

Module VII – Electoral Malpractice

This module will focus on electoral malpractice. Electoral malpractice can be identified as acts of deception, acts of coercion, acts of damage or destruction, and failures or refusals to act. Mis-practices can include failure to follow-up due diligence by poll workers, acts of intimidation, mis-information and dis-information, and improper facilitation payments. A methodology will be introduced to analyze electoral crimes through identifying opportunities, perpetrators, and tactics so that preventative, remedial, and investigative measures can be undertaken.

Module VIII – Electoral Justice

Electoral justice can be defined as “the adjudication of civil challenges to the electoral process which can be filed by voters and political contestants.” (ACE) Plaintiffs can dispute voter registration, balloting arrangements, and election outcomes. Electoral justice is a critical electoral concept because fair and transparent dispute adjudication mechanisms must be in place for electoral outcomes to be ultimately considered as legitimate. This module will identify the models of electoral justice and principles of

adjudication for high courts, special electoral tribunals, and EMBs. The role of civilian security forces in electoral justice cases will be discussed.

Module IX – Marginalized Electorates

The module explores policies and practices employed to enfranchise marginalized electorates. Two categories of marginalized electorates can be identified – victims and spoilers. Victims are those electors who are more vulnerable to disenfranchisement or disadvantaged than other segments of the polity. Victims include women, internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, persons with disabilities, detainees, illiterate voters, language minorities, and the rural poor, among others. In some cases, the military is disenfranchised. The other category of marginalization is the spoiler. Spoilers include ex-combatants, insurgents, party militia, and criminals, among others. The session will examine policies whereby victims can be mobilized, and spoilers de-mobilized and integrated into an electoral process. The module will discuss best practices for civilian security force protection of potential victims and de-mobilization of potential spoilers.

Module X– Electoral Observation

This module will explore the organizations employed to observe and validate electoral outcomes. It will describe the international and domestic organizations as well as the organizational configuration associated with election observation and monitoring missions. It will discuss the rights and responsibilities of election observers under international standards. The Code of Conduct for international observers will be discussed. The models of civilian security force protection of election monitors will be discussed.

Small Group Exercises

In this module, the participants will be divided into small groups and given a hypothetical conflictive election scenario to secure and to develop an electoral security plan for the process. Presentations on the plans will be made to the plenary session.