

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment


BURKINA FASO

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ECOWAS COMMISSION COMMISSION DE LA CEDEAO COMMISSÃO DA CEDEAO







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Table of Contents

| Acronyms and Abbreviations |
|---|
| Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission |
| Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission7 |
| Preface |
| Executive Summary |
| Introduction11 |
| Research Process11 |
| Terminology and Conceptual Definitions13 |
| Literature Review14 |
| Research Questions |
| Description of the Sample16 |
| Data Analysis16 |
| Scope and Limitations of the Study18 |
| Country Background |
| National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies |
| Population and Demographics (Most Vulnerable Pillar)25 |
| Politics and Governance (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar)27 |
| Economics and Resources (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar) |
| Security (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar) |
| Rule of Law (Least Vulnerable Pillar)32 |
| External Factors |
| Gender Considerations |
| Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region |
| Cascades and Sud-Ouest Regions |
| Centre Region |
| Est Region47 |
| Nord Region |
| Sahel Region |
| Conclusion and Recommendations61 |
| Appendix A: Data Sample |
| Appendix B: Vulnerability Index67 |
| Appendix C: Additional References |
| Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar |

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 3

Acronyms and Abbreviations

| ABBEF | Burkinabé Association for Family Welfare |
|---------|--|
| ACLED | Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project |
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| ASCE | The Higher Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption |
| AQIM | Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb |
| ARAD | The Association of Reflection and Action for the province of Oudalan |
| CAC | Community Action Committee |
| CBNEF | Non-Formal Basic Literacy Centers |
| CERFI | Circle d'Etudes de Recherches et de Formation Islamique |
| CPIA | World Bank Country Policy and Institutional Assessment |
| CRA | Conflict Risk Assessment |
| CREPA | Regional Center for Water and Low-Cost Sanitation |
| CRVA | Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment |
| CSPS | Centre de Santé et de Promotion Sociale |
| CSC | The Higher Council for Communication |
| CSO | Civil Society Organization |
| CVD | Village Development Committee |
| DDR | Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DPA | ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs |
| DPKRS | ECOWAS Directorate of Peacekeeping and Regional Security |
| ECF | Extended Credit Facility |
| ECOWARN | ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network |
| ECOWAS | Economic Community of West African States |
| ECPF | ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework |
| EWD | ECOWAS Directorate of Early Warning |
| FASO | Families Achieving Sustainable Outcomes |
| FGD | Focus Group Discussion |
| GBV | Gender-Based Violence |
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product |
| GSDRC | Governance and Social Development Resource Centre |
| HCRUN | High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity |
| ICC | International Criminal Court |
| IFI | International Financial Institutions |
| IMF | International Monetary Fund |
| IncReps | ECOWARN's Incident Reports |
| KII | Key Informant Interview |
| LCB | The Consumers' League of Burkina Faso |
| MBDHP | Burkinabé Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights |
| NDP | National Development Plan |
| NZAID | New Zealand Agency for International Development |
| OCADES | Catholic Organization for Social Development |
| ONASER | National Road Safety Authority |
| RASALAO | Réseau d'Action sur les Armes Légères |

| REN-LAC | The National Anti-Corruption Network |
|----------|--|
| REWARD | Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa |
| SitReps | ECOWARN Situation Reports |
| SNA | Stakeholder Network Analysis |
| SONAGESS | National Society for the Management of Food Security |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |
| UMEOA | West Africa Economy and Monetary Union |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNAB | Union of the Elders of Burkina Faso |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WANEP | West African Network for Peacebuilding |
| WACSOF | West Africa Civil Society Forum |

Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission

The 15 Member-States of the ECOWAS Community represent a thriving region of the world, with a population of approximately 366 million and a rich human and topographical diversity. From the coastline to the mountain peaks of Fouta Djallon, across the Sahara and the mangroves of the Niger Delta, ECOWAS is home to diverse families, communities, and nations.

Over the last decade, the region has witnessed significant progress in lifting the standard of living for millions. However, along with the richness of natural resources, human capital and great opportunity, there are also challenges to contend with such as natural disasters, pandemics, ethno-sectarian tensions, and security threats caused by extremism and terrorism.

Global developments and changes such as advances in technology, human migration and climate change, have added new levels of complexity, presenting new challenges for strategic planning and preparedness as we look ahead to the future.

This is where Early Warning plays a critical role in helping ECOWAS to understand the changing dynamics so as to strengthen decision making and early response at the regional and national levels. The Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) serve as an important resource in this regard. These reports are useful for strengthening the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework action plans as well as to serve as reference materials for an in-depth understanding of the human security dynamics in our Member States, and for our partners across the region.

I therefore invite national stakeholders, all ECOWAS institutions and our partners to make use of these reports for the entrenchment of peace and progress for the benefit of the Citizens of ECOWAS.

Jean-Claude Brou President of the ECOWAS Commission

Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission

ECOWAS takes pride in finalizing this CRVA report which aims to identify structural vulnerabilities, event driven risks and existing resilience factors in each Member State of the Community. Indeed, this is a remarkable feat towards boosting the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, with ECOWAS setting the pace for the development of an African-owned data set that can be tapped into to enhance human security analysis and accurate forecasting to assist policymakers to make informed decisions on pressing issues in the region. This information can be used as a baseline for ECOWAS and its partners to inform early warning and response efforts, particularly in this time when Early Warning and Response Mechanism is being deployed at the National level.

The CRVA research leverages ECOWARN data—gathered by Field Monitors—to establish a country baseline for monitoring patterns and trends across human security pillars. By comparing ECOWARN data to other data sets, and complementing quantitative data with qualitative findings, the assessments also help the Early Warning Directorate of ECOWAS to gather more robust data that is rich, reliable and empirical. The resulting findings are more representative in terms of geography, time, and theme for each country and needs to be updated periodically.

ECOWAS will consolidate this achievement by applying the knowledge and skills embodied in the CRVA Manual. My conviction for this emanates from the fact that the training of all EWD staff in the development of the CRVA Index, which marks the climax of transfer of knowledge and skills from the USAID REWARD technical staff to ECOWAS, will allow ECOWAS to independently conduct future CRVAs. Already, the EWD has initiated a process to put to practice the defined methodological framework to conduct Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby serving as the first pillar in implementing the decision of the joint ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to engage communities in peacebuilding processes.

We hope the Member States of our Community take ownership of this report and anchor development and peace initiatives upon it, in addressing the risks and vulnerabilities in their communities. As we decentralize Early Warning and Response to the ECOWAS countries, the Commission stands ready to accompany each Member States in the implementation of the actionable recommendations embodied in the CRVA report.

Finda Koroma Vice President, ECOWAS Commission

Preface

The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate has made giant strides in the practice of data driven early warning, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of incidents and situations from multiple sources, with the added benefit of original data generated through the ECOWARN system. Indeed, the Center's state-of-the-art technological tools places it at a vantage position to monitor and analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS region, cutting across the key areas of human security.

ECOWAS has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the monitoring of threats to human security across the region including the Sahelo-Saharan, Mano River, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad and Senegambia conflict systems to improve response for the prevention and management of conflict escalation.

Beyond a narrow focus on violent conflict alone, and consistent with its mandate to promote the socioeconomic and political integration of the sub-region, ECOWAS applies a human security lens with a view towards enhancing the well-being of the population in accordance with the ECOWAS Vision 2020. Thus, this report highlights risks, structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors across five dimensions (demographic, economic, security, governance and rule of law) at the national and sub-national levels.

Each CRVA report represents a myriad of perspectives and experiences from affected stakeholders including community leaders, civil society, administrative officials, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, just to mention a few. In this way, the CRVA report serves as a strategic document to provide an overview of the human security challenges in each ECOWAS member state as well as the social and institutional resilience factors that can help manage those challenges.

We hope that this report will be useful for strategic planning in addressing issues of human security as well as to provide insights to a multitude of stakeholders including policy and decision makers in the public and private sectors for conflict-sensitive engagement within the region.

Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye Director, ECOWAS Early Warning

Executive Summary

From 2016 to 2019. ECOWAS collected quantitative and qualitative data in Burkina Faso to better understand the structural vulnerabilities that may exist, and how those vulnerabilities affect the everyday lives of individuals and communities. This research was done in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) project, as part of a broader assessment of the entire West African region. As part of this process, a series of focus group discussions and interviews were conducted in May 2017 in Burkina Faso to contextualize the findings and to learn more about resilience factors that mitigate risk and promote human security. The purpose of this report is to summarize these insights and perspectives, so that national stakeholders can build on their successes, and also to serve as a baseline for ECOWAS's monitoring of patterns and trends. The report provides an overview of national and subnational vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience conclusions factors. as well as and recommendations.

The CRVA was conducted by ECOWAS to update and expand upon the Conflict Risk Assessment (CRA) 2013-2014 country reports. To better understand the sub-national patterns and trends, the research design began with a desktop study involving a social network analysis based on a survey of peace and security actors in the country and a scoping of experts to be consulted during the fieldwork. This was followed by a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of patterns and trends in escalation dynamics and a quantitative analysis of relative structural vulnerabilities by country and human security pillar.

In Burkina Faso, high levels of vulnerability were found in Population/Demographics, while moderate levels of vulnerability were found in Economics/Resources, Politics/Governance, and Security, and lower levels of vulnerability were found in Rule of Law.

Challenges included high population growth causing pressures on infrastructure, available housing, and social services. With a median age of 17.2 years, rising youth unemployment and school drop-out rates, some at-risk youth were found to be vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Migration, both within Burkina Faso and from neighboring countries, driven by the expansion of mining in the country and by conflict in neighboring Mali also added pressure on natural resources and access to land, while contributing to the rise of violent extremism, especially along the northern border.

However, there were strong social and institutional resilience factors for effective dispute resolution and peacebuilding in Burkina Faso. Communitybased or traditional justice mechanisms were often cited as an important resilience factor. Traditional and religious leaders were widely respected and traditional conflict resolution methods were often the preferred form of justice. At the government level, the Ministry of Territorial Administration's Department for Conflict Management and Prevention was mandated to promote alternative resolution mechanisms conflict aimed at minimizing violent escalation of grievances on issues such as land tenure.

The following report aims to provide an overview so that regional and national stakeholders can have a clear picture of the challenges faced by the country, as well as the capacities that can be leveraged and built upon for the promotion of sustainable human security in Burkina Faso.

Though risk/incident data naturally fluctuates and may therefore have changed since the publication of this report, the structural vulnerabilities are reflective of medium- and long-term trends. These reports focus on the identification of structural vulnerabilities and resiliencies, and how they may impact upon events and developments as they occur.

Introduction

Research Process

The CRVA assesses structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors according to five human security pillars as identified by ECOWAS in a 2016 scoping paper.¹ The pillars are: 1) Economics and Resources, 2) Politics and Governance, 3) Population and Demographics, 4) Rule of Law, and 5) Security. Findings in this report describe how risks flow from vulnerabilities in the context of Burkina Faso both within and across the five pillars. In recognition of the fact that violent conflict has underlying social, economic, political, and security drivers but expresses itself differently depending on the context, a holistic human security framework was used in this assessment, and will be used for the CRVAs in all ECOWAS member states. Furthermore, the analysis also breaks out gender considerations and external factors as cross-cutting issues that need to be

understood for effective early warning and response.²

As shown in the graphic below, the research was conducted in three main phases: Desktop Study, Field Research, and Analysis and Validation.

Phase 1: Desktop Study

The Desktop Study included a preliminary assessment of structural vulnerabilities, eventdriven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors.

For the assessment of structural vulnerabilities, the research used data from dozens of sources, including ECOWARN Situation Reports (SitReps). Drawing on these pre-existing data sets,³ a CRVA Index was created to measure the relative levels of vulnerability across five human security dimensions in Burkina Faso.



¹ The EWD Scoping Paper was developed by ECOWAS to help inform the CRVA process, with the human security pillars identified based on best practice approaches such as ECOWARN guidelines and the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) framework.

International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, the Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace.

² EWD Scoping Paper on "Risk Assessment of Five ECOWAS Pilot Countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso"

³ Data sources used in the development of the CRVA Index include Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the

For the assessment of event-driven risks, event data, including from ECOWARN's Incident Reports (IncReps), was triangulated against data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to estimate the locations and type of conflict issues at the sub-national level over time. Using multiple sources allowed for cross-validation, the filling of gaps, and the ability to identify trends in indicators and sub-indicators using queries and key word searches.

For the assessment of social and institutional resilience factors, a survey was deployed to all of ECOWAS's in-country contacts to learn more about the peace and security actors working to manage and reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the country. Respondents (including representatives of religious institutions, public sector actors, civil society, youth groups, and development actors, among others) were also asked to name organizations that they have partnered with in the last two years on issues of peace and security. Data was then uploaded to a Stakeholder Network Map for quantitative analysis and to identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital. Based on this analysis, key technical experts were identified and were contacted for the next phase of the research.

Phase 2: Field Research

The Field Research began with a scoping workshop in Ouagadougou. Using the Stakeholder Network Map, highly-networked technical experts were convened in a workshop to validate the initial desktop findings and suggest a way forward for the qualitative analysis in the field. The Scoping Workshop was also used to tailor and sensitize the broader research questions and the Key Informant Interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) instruments and questionnaires based on local context. Additionally, the Scoping Workshop also served to attain references and contacts for key actors and stakeholders in the field who would be consulted over the course of the next two weeks during the KIIs and FGDs. Thus, the desktop study phase informed the research questions that needed further context and validation in the field, as well as the sample of respondents to be engaged (what was asked, where, and to whom).

A team of experts and researchers then conducted an in-country assessment between May 15th and May 23rd, 2017 with participants from the regions of Cascades, Centre, Est, Nord, Sahel and Sud-Ouest. The team traveled to the various hotspots identified in the desktop study and validated in the Scoping Workshop to interview key stakeholders affected by violence and with knowledge of local context and capacities. This team included representatives from the ECOWAS Directorates of Early Warning (EWD) and Political Affairs (DPA), as well as participants from USAID and affiliated experts. The KIIs and FGDs conducted during this in-country assessment collected qualitative data and information regarding various perspectives on structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risk factors, and social and institutional resilience factors relating to the different conflict issues across the country. These transcripts have been collated, streamlined to reduce repetition and vagueness, and categorized for analysis and prioritization during Phase 3.

Phase 3: Analysis and Validation

After the quantitative, GIS, and survey data was validated and contextualized in the field, and the qualitative data was collected, organized and summarized, this report was drafted and was then validated by ECOWAS and USAID. This report will serve as a baseline and resource for more targeted early warning products and analysis/planning towards strategic and operational prevention of human insecurity within the country of Burkina Faso as well as associated conflict systems more broadly.

Terminology and Conceptual Definitions

In this CRVA report:

"Vulnerability" is defined as any structural factor that has the potential to be a conflict driver. These can include such things as youth unemployment, poverty, inequality, climate, patronage, demographic factors, etc.

"Risk" is defined as any event-driven factor that has the potential to be a conflict trigger. Risk factors can include specific controversies or events such as disasters or elections that may occur.

"Resilience" is defined as any social or institutional factor that has the potential to help mitigate or manage risks and vulnerabilities. These include political, cultural, and community leadership with significant social capital to influence conflict dynamics in a constructive way, including public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society, opinion leaders, development workers, etc. Resilience factors can include institutions that play a stabilizing role in the short, medium, or longer term.

The CRVA analysis was conducted according to the framework depicted in the figure below, whereby event-driven risk factors flow out of the structural vulnerabilities (per the red downward arrow) while social and institutional resilience factors mitigate and prevent those risks and vulnerabilities (per the green upward arrow).

For ECOWAS, this framework is useful in that it is aligned with the existing ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which is a strategic tool to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa. Key to the ECPF are the categories "Operational Prevention," of or measures applicable in the face of crisis, and "Structural Prevention," or measures that ensure that crises do not arise or re-occur. The CRVA framework is aligned with the ECPF such that identified Vulnerability Factors are to be mitigated by Structural Prevention measures, and Risk Factors are to be mitigated by Operational Prevention measures. This alignment is important for the utility and actionability of this report by users in West Africa.

| Economics and Resources | Population and Demographics | Politics and Governance | Security | Rule of Law |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------------------|------------------|-------------|
| | Structural and (| Contextual Vulner | rability Factors | 1 |
| - - | Even | t-Driven Risk Fac | tors | |
| | Social and In | stitutional Resilie | nce Factors | |

A Human-Centric Approach to Early Warning

In academic literature, the human security lens to conflict early warning is a change from the more state-centric approaches that were in vogue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, early warning was focused on prevention and mitigation of conflict between states. In the post-Cold War period with a surge in intra-state conflict, early warning was focused on identifying the drivers and impacts of civil conflict on states. At that time, analysis focused on terminology of state "collapse" and "failure," emphasizing impacts to neighboring countries or regions, and perpetuating a comparative paradigm of poverty and limited economic growth and conflict in contrast to more developed countries.⁴

However, as a more interconnected human and global security approach emerged in the 2000s, conceptions of state fragility and conflict analysis evolved in both development aid and policy approaches. As the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) describes, "At a very broad level, fragility is the result of a dynamic interplay between internal factors (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity)."5 While not discounting the role of the state as a key vehicle for managing and preventing conflict, the human-centric approach looks first and foremost at the impact of demographic, economic, political, and security conflict drivers on individuals and communities as well as the role that a wide variety of social and

institutional factors play in preventing conflict. Thus, the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals' lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security outlines a human-centric approach to security in five principles: 1) People-centered, with a focus on protecting basic human freedoms; 2) Multisectoral, encompassing a broad understanding of threats and causes of insecurity: 3) Comprehensive, taking into account different types of individuals' security from economic to social; 4) Context-specific, emphasizing the need to analyze specific conflict contexts and root causes of insecurity; and 5) Prevention-oriented, highlighting locally tailored risk prevention and mitigation measures through early warning mechanisms.⁶ This focus on cross-cutting issues and situationspecific analysis and response are central to the CRVA process and broader objectives of integrated conflict early warning and response by ECOWAS and its partners. For the CRVAs, this involves identifying conflict risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies across the human security pillars of Population and Demographics, Politics and Governance, Security, Economics and Resources, and Rule of Law.

Many indices and development frameworks have emerged for measuring resilience and fragility, from the Fund For Peace's *Fragile States Index*⁷ to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Bank's *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)*⁸ and Mo Ibrahim Foundation's *Index of African Governance*.⁹ Today, leading international development actors and multilateral

⁴ "Defining and measuring state fragility: a new proposal", Ferreira, I., The Annual Bank Conference on Africa, June 2015

⁵ "Topic Guide on Fragile States", McIoughlin, C., Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), August 2009

⁶ "Human Security in Theory and Practice", Human Security Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, January 2009

⁷ Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace

 ⁸ Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB)
 ⁹ Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation

agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the AfDB have also produced strategies, practice areas, and tools, which seek to address the drivers of fragility. The AfDB, for example, has a 2014-2019 Strategy for Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, with a focus on building member state capacities and focusing on "fragile situations rather than fragile states alone."¹⁰

As the AfDB Strategy notes, however, "there is no single solution and no predefined 'toolbox' for addressing fragility."11 Older academic and policy conceptions of "state failure" used analysis centered on "traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression," as outlined in a 2009 paper by the United Nations Human Security Unit. Newer models of analysis have taken on a broader human security lens, which was in "response complexity and to the the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats - from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone."12

Thus, a human-centric approach, as opposed to a state-centric approach, is important for analyzing risks and vulnerabilities to society for robust early warning and response mechanisms. Human security provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats which affect individuals' lives, whether through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political, or economic factors. As such, the CRVAs seek to draw upon the more dynamic and interrelated aspects of risk and vulnerability, which look at capacities and

pressures within a society with a view to identifying structural vulnerabilities, resiliencies and risks across key human security pillars. As defined by the United Nations General Assembly, "human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people."¹³ This approach is also in line with the ECOWAS Vison 2020 which seeks to promote peace, prosperity, and cohesion across the region,¹⁴ and includes a focus on strengthening many human security aspects within member states.

Research Questions

Based on the initial desktop findings, the team developed a set of framing questions broken out by the five human security pillars. These framing questions were not asked verbatim in the field, but rather informed the design of the KII and FGD instruments. These instruments included simple, open-ended questions intended to prompt a discussion during which respondents could express their opinions. experiences. and perceptions about the ways in which they had been impacted by vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors in Burkina Faso.

Politics and Governance: Given that 2015 marked the first democratic transition of power since independence (with the election of Roch Marc Christian Kaboré) what are the prospects of a sustainable political process, especially in the upcoming elections of 2020 and 2025? What are some challenges to state legitimacy, including lingering political patronage and factionalized elites? To what extent will the recent democratic transition help resolve past sociopolitical and economic grievances? To the extent that civil

 $^{^{10}}$ "Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, 2014 – 2019", AfDB

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² "Human Security in Theory and Practice", Human Security Unit, OCHA, United Nations, January 2009

 ¹³ General Assembly resolution 66/290, October 2012
 ¹⁴ ECOWAS Vision 2020: Towards a Democratic and

Prosperous Community, ECOWAS, June 2010

society and popular interests have been able to influence the political process in a way that they never could before, what role will they play in democratic process going forward?

Population and Demographics: To what extent is ethnic polarization or land tensions between farmers and pastoralists a salient factor in the socio-political landscape? Is religious sectarianism or radical extremism a divisive issue or are issues of terrorism and radical extremism primarily externally influenced? Is a disproportionately large population of disenfranchised youth putting a strain on urban resources or public services? To what extent are adverse climatic conditions affecting food security and security in general? Are there groups who are structurally marginalized from political representation or opportunity?

Economics and Resources: To what extent do natural resource management and disputes over concessions undermine social cohesion [e.g. gold mining]? To what extent do volatility in commodity prices, including food and oil prices, affect the most vulnerable and contribute to instability?

Security: To what extent does conflict in the region impact security and stability in Burkina Faso, such as refugees and cross-border issues with neighboring countries? Does radical extremism in the region increase the risk of terrorism or undermine social cohesion? Given the history of military mutinies and coups in Burkina Faso, what role will the security apparatus play in ensuring national security?

Rule of Law: Considering the recent democratic transition, what role does the judiciary play as regards questions of justice and impunity? Is the judiciary independent of executive or legislative influence? Outside of the administrative center, is there access to justice and legal services? How are law enforcement and judiciary dealing with

emergent trans-border threats such as arms, human, or drug trafficking?

Description of the Sample


Data collected and analyzed for this research included hundreds of ECOWARN SitReps. ECOWARN IncReps, ACLED event data, and a scoping survey, as well as transcripts and notes from FGDs and KIIs in the field. Other sources, integrated to form a vulnerability index (the CRVA Index), included Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace. A complete breakdown is included in Appendix A.

Data Analysis


ECOWARN data shows that vulnerability in Burkina Faso has stayed relatively steady as measured by taking a monthly average of the SitReps. There were multiple spikes in risk, as measured by fatalities recorded in the ECOWARN IncReps and ACLED data. The first and fourth guarters of 2016 saw significant spikes in reported conflict fatalities. The increase in violence during the first guarter was due to a terrorist attack on a hotel in the capital, Ouagadougou, which led to the deaths of at least 28 people. This attack was claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Mourabitoun, a militant jihadist organization with ties to AQIM.¹⁵ In the fourth guarter of 2016, an attack on a military post in the north of the country by unidentified gunmen caused the deaths of at least 11 Burkinabé soldiers.

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 16

¹⁵ "Attack at Hotel in Burkina Faso's Capital", Stack, L. and Callimachi, R., The New York Times, January 2016.



The heatmap above shows hot spots of human security related fatalities between 2015 and 2018.




The graph above shows the trends in risk layered against vulnerability. The y axis on the left (0-80) shows the level of vulnerability with a score of over 60 reflecting higher levels of vulnerability. The y axis on the right (0-100) shows the number of conflict fatalities by month.



The map above shows regions where CRVA fieldwork was conducted in May 2017.

The CRVA Index, shown below, indicates that in Burkina Faso the human security pillars that exhibit the most severe levels of vulnerability are Population and Demographics, followed by Politics and Governance and Economics and Resources. Data suggests that the area of Rule of Law is the most resilient pillar in the country. See Appendix B for a brief description of how the indicators and sources were selected, as well as how the data was normalized, scaled, and integrated. In the graph below, the lower the score on the y axis (0-10), the more vulnerable the human security pillar.



Event data shows hotspots, patterns, and trends at the sub-national level, including incidents of political tension and violence in the capital, Ouagadougou, and cross-border conflict issues in the Sahel region. Field research was undertaken to validate and contextualize these findings through KIIs and FGDs.

Quantitative data shows moderate levels of structural vulnerability in Burkina Faso, particularly in the area of Population and Demographics. However, in terms of dynamic risk factors, lethal violence has been increasing, particularly along the northern border with Mali, as measured by GIS and event data. Field research was then conducted to validate and contextualize these preliminary findings. As illustrated in the pages below, FGDs and KIIs did validate these findings, and helped to provide context and proportionality. This qualitative data, for instance, highlighted the extent to which the population relies on non-state militias for security in an environment in need of capacity building and Security Sector Reform.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This report seeks to layer, triangulate, and juxtapose quantitative, GIS, and qualitative data in a way that is accurate, meaningful, and representative. However, limitations to this analysis include the two- year date range for the event/GIS data and the seven-year date range for the ECOWARN SitReps. If there are conflict cycles that fall outside those parameters, there will be constraints on the ability to analyze those patterns in this report. Furthermore, this research sought to ensure representativeness in the sample of stakeholders engaged through KIIs (23 prominent individuals) and FGDs (15 focus group discussions). To the extent that these stakeholders were representative, they added vital contextualization and validation of the desktop research.

Scope and limitations also apply to the use and purpose of the study. The CRVA reports support the of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention obiectives Framework (ECPF). In particular, the CRVA reports identify vulnerabilities across the human security pillars in order to inform structural prevention. Structural prevention, as defined in the ECPF, comprises "political, institutional (governance) and developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace." While this report can also be used to inform operational prevention, which includes "early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment using interactive means such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force," it seeks primarily to identify the key areas of structural vulnerability at the national and sub-national levels for strategic planning by ECOWAS and other partners in the peace and security space. However, inasmuch that operational prevention can be informed by patterns and trends in the event-driven risk factors highlighted in this report, the CRVA should serve as

a baseline analysis of dynamics that are closely monitored over time. Thereby, in addition to informing strategic planning on structural vulnerability issues, the CRVA will also inform early warning products such as weekly, monthly, and quarterly situation reports that inform analysts and potential responders as to heightened conflict risk across one or more indicators, and propose recommendations on response. The CRVA reports can also be used as a foundation to inform more detailed case studies around identified risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies for a country of interest or concern.

While many reports that seek to identify structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors focus almost exclusively at the national level, ECOWAS seeks to support a more decentralized early warning and response infrastructure across the region. As such, the CRVA reports also take into consideration dynamics at the sub-national level. These sub-national factors are critical to consider as they help analysts and potential responders understand the context in which specific events (risks) are occurring, which may be markedly different from the national context. A mapping of sub-national level risks, vulnerabilities, and resiliencies can also

help inform strategies for engaging at the local level for structural prevention. In particular, as defined by the ECPF, taking "measures to ensure the crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do no re-occur."

Finally, as also noted in the ECPF, conflict in West Africa tends to be highly interconnected, which often leads to cycles of violence that cross borders and can keep countries emmeshed for decades. The CRVA reports, covering all fifteen member states of ECOWAS, are also useful in helping to inform and understand the dynamics of specific regional conflict systems, such as those that occur across the Mano River and Sahel. These regional conflict systems are influenced and interconnected not only historically and culturally, but also share many of the same structural vulnerabilities that give rise to risks and the eventual outbreak of violence, decade after decade. Thus, the CRVA reports present an opportunity to view not only the specific national and sub-national factors that lead to structural vulnerability and heightened risk, they also help highlight the nature of regional conflict systems, and the need for a holistic and systemic lens in both analysis and response.

Country Background

Burkina Faso, formerly known as Upper Volta, is a landlocked country with a growing population of 18.1 million.¹⁶ Its longest shared border is with Mali to the north, along which a spate of crossborder attacks was reported in 2016 and 2017. Other neighboring countries include Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, and Niger.

Burkina Faso achieved independence from France in 1960. In the years following independence, the country saw repeated coups, frequent and violent transitions of power, and civil unrest until 1987, when Blaise Compaoré led a successful coup against then-leader Captain Thomas Sankara. Compaoré led the country for 27 years, until he resigned in 2014 following massive popular protests against a proposed constitutional referendum to extend his mandate. An interim government was established, and former Foreign Minister Michel Kafando became the temporary acting president. In September 2015, allies of Compaoré, led by members of the elite Regiment of Presidential Security (RSP), attempted to overthrow the transitional government but were ultimately unsuccessful. Presidential elections were held in November 2015 and Prime Minister Roch Marc Christian Kaboré was elected president. The 2015 elections were considered to be the most transparent and peaceful elections in Burkina Faso in decades.

During this period of political transition, Burkina Faso also faces significant economic and demographic pressures. The United Nations Development Programme's 2016 Human Development Index ranked Burkina Faso 183rd out of 188 countries¹⁷, and 43 percent of the Burkinabé population lives below the international

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 20

poverty line.¹⁸ The country's economy is heavily dependent on agricultural production, with an estimated 80 percent of the population engaged in the sector, and its biggest exports are gold and cotton, which are subject to fluctuations in global market prices.¹⁹ There have also been reports of child labor and human trafficking in the cotton and mining industries.²⁰ The agricultural sector regularly experiences low crop yields and livestock productivity, which has been exacerbated by irregular rainfall, deforestation and desertification. Due in part to the regional impacts of the Ebola epidemic and uncertainty around the country's political transition, GDP growth slowed in 2014 and 2015, but is expected to rebound slightly in 2016 and 2017.21

Burkina Faso's economic challenges are further compounded by demographic and environmental pressures. The population is rapidly increasing and has doubled since 1985, burdening infrastructure and social services, particularly in the fast-growing urban areas. Food access continues to be a critical issue in Burkina Faso, with USAID estimating that roughly 20 percent of the population is food insecure and 50 percent of rural households are unable to produce sufficient quantities of food.²² The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) anticipates that more than 860,000 people in Burkina Faso will need humanitarian aid in 2017.²³

Finally, Burkina Faso is susceptible to spillover effects from conflicts in neighboring countries, including ongoing insecurity in northern Mali. As of April 2017, Burkina Faso was hosting more than 33,000 registered Malian refugees, putting

¹⁶ "Population, total", World Bank

¹⁷ "Statistical Annex, Human Development Report", United Nations Development Programme, 2016.

 $^{^{\}rm 18}$ "Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.90 a day (2011 PPP) (% of population)", World Bank

¹⁹ "Burkina Faso: Overview", World Bank

²⁰ "Child Labor and Forced Labor Reports: Burkina Faso", US Department of Labor: Bureau of International Labor Affairs

²¹ "Burkina Faso Economic Outlook", AfDB

²² "Burkina Faso: Agriculture and Food Security", USAID

²³ "Global Humanitarian Overview 2017", UNOCHA

additional economic, political and societal pressure on an already-burdened government.²⁴

Burkina Faso is currently in a period of political transition and faces a number of significant internal and external pressures, increasing the risk of conflict. Burkina Faso's future growth and resilience will largely depend on the new government's ability to encourage development, foster strong and inclusive institutions, and address security threats.

²⁴ "Operational Portal: Refugee Situations: Mali Situation", UNHCR

National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies

Based on desktop research using the ECOWARN and ACLED data sets, surveys of peace and security actors in key regions in Burkina Faso, field research that included Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), and participatory analysis by the CRVA field research team, the following national-level risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors were identified:

| Structural Vulnerabilities | Population and Demographics |
|----------------------------|---|
| | Poor management of water resources and access to land |
| | Demographic changes: population growth and rural-urban migration |
| | Large youth population |
| | Environmental degradation, including water pollution, due to mining activities |
| | Low capacity of health and education services, especially family planning and maternal health |
| | Politics and Governance |
| | Lack of popular civic education |
| | Under-representation of women in politics |
| | Lack of state presence and public services in some regions (esp. health/education/family planning/maternal health) leading to a sense of exclusion or abandonment |
| | Inadequate oversight of the security sector |
| | Perceptions of patronage, corruption or bias of politicians and government institutions |
| | Economics and Resources |
| | Dependency on commodity prices; undiversified economy |
| | High levels of unemployment, poverty, and inequality |
| | Illegal mining activity |
| | Food insecurity/low agricultural output |
| | Weak implementation of environmental protection policies |
| | Ineffective implementation of land tenure |
| | Security |
| | Inadequate natural resource management contributing to inter- |
| | communal conflicts |
| | Spillover of conflict from neighboring countries |
| | Porous borders |
| | Underequipped security forces |

| | Reliance on non-state security actorsCriminality |
|--|--|
| | Rule of Law Perceptions of corruption and impunity within the justice system Exclusion of women from the justice system |
| Event-Driven Risks | Population and Demographics Movements by IDPs and refugees Environmental pressures (impact of floods and drought on agriculture and food security) |
| | Politics and Governance Elections Attempted coups d'état Constitutional/electoral reforms |
| | Economics and Resources Fluctuations in global commodity prices Expropriation of landowners for mining activities |
| | Security Conflict between groups over access to arable land and other natural resources Terrorist attacks; spillover of conflict from neighboring countries Conflict over land use; herder-farmer conflicts |
| | Rule of Law Incidents of corruption within the court system Human rights violations Incidents of mob justice |
| Social and Institutional Resilience Factors | Traditional and customary leaders; religious leaders Application of customary laws for conflict mitigation Development and awareness-raising activities by civil society organizations, international donors, and government agencies Existence of gender frameworks and legislation <i>Koglwéogo</i> and <i>Dozo</i> groups Co-existence between religious groups; inter-religious dialogue Cultural practice of the 'joking relationship' Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives Government conflict mitigation initiatives, including the Ministry of Territorial Administration's Directorate for Conflict Management and Prevention |

- Role of the vibrant informal economy in supporting livelihoods
- Government initiatives to support farmers and small-scale producers
- Microfinance activities, particularly to support women's groups
- Efforts to strengthen state institutions to improve governance

In addition to the spill-over of conflict from neighboring Mali, key themes that emerged in the CRVA research included 1) the urgency of consolidating recent democratic progress to avoid stagnation or backslide, 2) the need for security sector reform (SSR) in the context of a history of mutinies and a widespread reliance on non-state actors to provide security, 3) natural resource management and associated social pressures as related to mining and agriculture, and 4) and gender inequities in the political sphere.

Population and Demographics (Most Vulnerable Pillar)

| Vulnerabilities | Poor management of water resources and access to land Demographic changes: population growth and rural-urban migration Large youth population Environmental degradation, including water pollution, due to mining activities Low capacity of health and education services, especially family planning and maternal health |
|-----------------|--|
| Risks | Movements by IDPs and refugees Environmental pressures (impact of floods and drought on agriculture and food security) |

Vulnerabilities and Risks

According to the CRVA Index, Burkina Faso is most vulnerable in the area of Population and Demographics. The population and demographics score is comprised of data measuring median age. population growth, and health and reproductive empowerment indicators. Burkina Faso has a median age of 17.2 years and a significant youth bulge: 45 percent of the population is below the age of 15, while only 2.4 percent is above the age of 65.25 The country has a maternal mortality rate of 371 deaths per 100,000 live births,²⁶ compared to 319 for Ghana²⁷ and 814 for Nigeria²⁸. While Burkina Faso did not report any cases of Ebola during the 2014-2015 Ebola epidemic in the region, the country did experience some of the secondary effects of economic slowdown in the sub-region.29

In the field research, interviewees identified population growth as a key vulnerability in this category, emphasizing the related pressures on infrastructure, available housing, and social services. Participants cited widespread aversion to or a misunderstanding of family planning as a contributing factor to Burkina Faso's population growth. Participants also identified youth as a particularly vulnerable population, citing youth unemployment and school drop-out rates as concerns. During the team's meeting with the Ministry of Security, it was noted that youth who lack education or employment prospects remain vulnerable to extremist recruitment. Similarly, officials at the Ministry of Territorial Administration highlighted that poverty and a youth bulge had led to many children and young people becoming involved in the illegal mining sector.

Migration, both within Burkina Faso and from surrounding countries, has put additional pressure on natural resources and access to land. Interviewees noted that the expansion of the mining sector, both illegal and legal, has further contributed to migration and created additional pressures in this category. Mining has also contributed to land degradation and pollution, exacerbating competition over land access and leading to health concerns and pollution as mining companies use mercury and cyanide to separate wastes form the gold ore.

Burkina Faso is an ethnically diverse country, with an estimated ethnic breakdown of 52.5 percent Mossi, 8.4 percent Fulani, 6.8 percent Gurma, 4.8 percent Bobo, 4.5 percent Gurunsi, and smaller

²⁵ "Burkina Faso Demographics Profile", Index Mundi

²⁶ "Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)", World Bank

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ "Burkina Faso: Overview", World Bank

percentages of Senufo, Bissa, Lobi, Dagara, Tuareg/Bella, and Dioula.³⁰ The fieldwork identified ethnic tensions as a potential driver of conflict in several regions throughout the country, particularly when coupled with issues of land competition.

Due to the ongoing insecurity in northern Mali, Burkina Faso is also host to a sizable population of Malian refugees. As of April 2017, there were approximately 33,000 registered Malian refugees living in northern Burkina Faso.³¹ Burkina Faso has struggled to adequately accommodate these refugees,³² and interviews in the Sahel and Nord regions revealed high levels of mistrust between the refugee populations and local communities, especially related to concerns over extremism and access to resources.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Inter-religious coexistence was cited throughout the fieldwork as a resilience factor in Burkina Faso. In several regions, religious diversity is celebrated and communities work together to maintain positive relationships and mediate conflict. Participants discussed the important role played by religious leaders in conflict mitigation. Local radio programs supported by civil society organizations have also played a role in mitigating religious tensions and promoting understanding between groups.

³⁰ "Burkina Faso Ethnic Groups", Index Mundi

³¹ "Operational Portal: Refugee Situations: Mali Situation", UNHCR

³² "Malian Refugees In Burkina Faso Risk Losing Life-Saving Support", World Food Programme, March 2016.

Politics and Governance (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar)

| Vulnerabilities | Lack of popular civic education Under-representation of women in politics Lack of state presence and public services in some regions (esp. health/education/family planning/maternal health) leading to a sense of exclusion or abandonment Inadequate oversight of the security sector Perceptions of patronage, corruption or bias of politicians and government institutions |
|-----------------|---|
| Risks | Elections Attempted coups d'état Constitutional and electoral reforms |

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Burkina Faso has made rapid progress in the area of Politics and Governance since 2014, but there is a sense of overall urgency among many interviewees throughout the country that this progress be consolidated to avoid stagnation or backslide. The country has a higher than average rate of political participation and voter turnout compared to other countries in the region, averaging a 65 percent turnout rate between 2011 and 2015.³³ The massive 2014 popular protests that led to the end of the Compaoré administration, and the subsequent protests against the attempted military coup in 2015, also demonstrate the potential political energy of the Burkinabé population, particularly among youth.

The transitional government passed many reforms in 2015, some of which were controversial. In April 2015, the legislature voted to modify the electoral code, blocking supporters of former president Compaoré from running in the presidential and legislative elections. While proponents of the modified electoral code suggest the law has allowed for more competitive elections, critics maintain that it is unconstitutional and undemocratic. The transitional government also passed a law that limits jail time in defamation cases: however, defamation convictions can still result in fines between 1 and 5 million West African CFA francs (1,700 to 8,000 US dollars), which critics warn could put media outlets out of business.³⁴ In addition, while Burkina Faso's constitution guarantees freedom of expression, the right to assemble and freedom of movement, in practice there have been numerous violations of these rights. In the realm of civil and political rights, protestors, journalists and nongovernmental organizations have historically been suppressed or attacked by security forces.³⁵ The 1998 assassination of Norbert Zongo, the publisher and editor of l'Indépendant who was investigating a case relating to President Compaoré's brother, caused widespread protests and has become a salient symbol of media suppression in Burkina Faso.³⁶ Protesters are often confronted with excessive force or long detention times if taken into police custody.37

³³ "Burkina Faso", International Foundation for Electoral Systems

³⁴ "Freedom in the World 2016: Burkina Faso", Freedom House

³⁵ "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2015: Burkina Faso", U.S. Department of State

³⁶ "Burkina Faso: Press Commemorate the 18 Anniversary of the Assassination of Journalist Nortbert Zongo", Media Foundation for West Africa, December 2016.

³⁷ "Freedom in the World 2016: Burkina Faso", Freedom House

Across the country, participants in the field research reported a lack of popular knowledge around the functions and responsibilities of government, which has, in some areas, contributed to dissatisfaction around the pace of reforms or perceptions of unfulfilled promises. Interviewees also reported perceptions of corruption or bias among politicians and government institutions, which has damaged trust in the state and the political process.

"The political divide is deepening because of the lack of inclusiveness. How can you talk about justice when you do not want to do an introspection?"

- Meeting with WACSOF, Ouagadougou

During fieldwork meetings in Ouagadougou, one of the main vulnerabilities identified by the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF), was the lack of political representation and inclusiveness. Building strong governance institutions and encouraging inclusive political participation is crucial to sustainable peace and resiliency, particularly in a post-crisis period. If post-crisis governance is perceived to be partisan, this undermines the potential for the reconciliation and inclusive engagement that should be fostered in the political sphere, as well as in broader society. The High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRUN), which was set up by President Kaboré in 2016 to investigate political-related human rights abuses committed since 1960, has been perceived by many as inefficient. This lack of faith in a transparent truth and reconciliation process has the potential to spark a new wave of conflict, according to one interviewee at WACSOF.

During this period of political transition, there is a clear need to consolidate democratic gains and build inclusive and responsive institutions to encourage trust in the state. Interviewees identified a need for greater civic education and engagement, particularly among youth. In addition, given the history of military rule and coups d'état in Burkina Faso (most recently in 2015), the need for SSR is inextricably tied to the country's political future.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Traditional and religious leaders were widely considered by fieldwork participants to be a source of resilience. However, participants in the fieldwork noted that the legitimacy of these leaders is undermined by perceived politicization. Civil society groups, including local and international NGOs who implement civic education, voter education and awareness-raising programs were also identified as a key source of resiliency.

Economics and Resources (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar)

| Vulnerabilities | Dependency on commodity prices; undiversified economy High levels of unemployment, poverty, and inequality Illegal mining activity Food insecurity/low agricultural output Weak implementation of environmental protection policies Ineffective implementation of land tenure |
|-----------------|--|
| Risks | Fluctuations in global commodity pricesExpropriation of land owners for mining activities |

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Burkina Faso's recent economic growth has been hampered by uncertainty around the political transitions, the regional impacts of the Ebola epidemic, and drops in global gold and cotton prices.³⁸ As of 2015, Burkina Faso has a GDP per capita of 589.8 USD, a decrease from a peak of 698.3 USD in 2013.³⁹ Economic productivity tends to be low, primarily due to poor agricultural productivity, a lack of electricity, and limited access to financial services, which inhibits output and increases production costs.⁴⁰ Food security is a critical issue in Burkina Faso, with 20 percent of the population considered food insecure.⁴¹.

In the fieldwork, participants cited poverty, inequality, unemployment, and resource degradation as key vulnerabilities in Burkina Faso. Several participants reported that there has been a general downturn in economic activity. Many of Burkina Faso's economic issues are tied to population pressures and disputes over land use. Interviewees discussed the rapid growth of mining, both legal and illegal, in Burkina Faso, linking it to increased school drop-out rates, land competition issues, and criminal activities as well as public health concerns around mining towns. Lack of public infrastructure and services, especially in more rural regions within the country, remains a major vulnerability. As part of the Government's push to improve infrastructure in the country, officials interviewed from the Ministry of Economy and Finance noted that they are doubling their investment this year in large infrastructure projects to 1.285 billion CFA. In acknowledging the challenges that the Burkina Faso economy faces with reliance on commodity prices (in 2016 gold contributed to 60 percent of national exports), Ministry officials highlighted plans for further government investment in the agricultural sector to boost the production of food products and exports of cash crops such as cotton and shea butter.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Local credit unions and microcredit lending have been a source of resiliency in some regions of the country, providing the means for economic advancement. Non-Formal Basic Literacy Centers (CBNEF), which provide vocational training for youth, were also cited as a source of resiliency in the fieldwork. NGO and CSO support has played an important role in creating positive nutritional, agricultural and educational initiatives throughout the country.

³⁸ "Burkina Faso: Overview", World Bank

³⁹ "GDP per capita (current US\$)", World Bank

⁴⁰ "IMF Staff Team Concludes Visit to Burkina Faso for ECF Review and Article IV Consultation", International Monetary Fund, November 2016.

⁴¹ "Burkina Faso: Agriculture and Food Security", United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Security (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar)

| Vulnerabilities | Inadequate natural resource management contributing to inter-communal conflicts Spillover of conflict from neighboring countries Porous borders Underequipped security forces Reliance on non-state security actors Criminality |
|-----------------|--|
| Risks | Conflict between groups over access to arable land and other natural resources Terrorist attacks; spillover of conflict from neighboring countries Conflict over land use; herder-farmer conflicts |

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Burkina Faso has not seen extended periods of violent conflict in recent decades. However, there are communal tensions, often along ethnic lines, over land access and natural resource management, including some disputes between pastoralist and farming communities. Participants in the fieldwork also noted several instances of local conflicts stemming from the gold mining sector. Land tenure, resource competition and intra-communal chieftaincy disputes were noted as key conflict drivers in the country, according to interviewees from the Ministry of Territorial Administration.

In the field research, criminality was identified as a key concern among local populations across the country, and the police or gendarmerie were generally perceived to be ineffective in providing security (whether due to poor equipment, lack of training, lack of presence, or corruption). This has contributed to a proliferation of self-defense groups, known as the *Koglwéogo*, or the transformation of traditional hunters (the *Dozo*) into security providers or community self-defense groups. The roles and attitudes toward these groups vary across regions. In some areas, the *Koglwéogo* are viewed as the sole providers of security, while in others they operate in close

coordination with local police. Many participants welcomed the increased level of security provided by the *Koglwéogo*, but others expressed concern about the lack of training and oversight of these groups, who have been accused of using harsh tactics.

"From the olden days, the Koglwéogo had been there to protect the forest and enforce traditional rules and regulations about hunting seasons and also to uphold cultural practices. ...Now over the last years there is a proliferation of the group in certain localities where the state has a weak presence. So, the population is now relying on the Koglwéogo for safety and protection."

- Meeting with Ministry of Security, Ouagadougou

During discussions with officials from the Ministry of Security, the *Koglwéogo* were highlighted as an influential group in maintaining community security in areas where public security resources are limited. While it was noted that the *Koglwéogo* hold a long-standing place in cultural practices, there were also concerns over their role attempting to overtake that of public security. For example, one interviewee suggested that "Their justice is instant and this creates abuse and violation of human rights principles. They are substituting themselves for the security forces." The Ministry officials also noted incidents involving the *Koglwéogo* hijacking people in rural areas for ransom, and another report in which six people were killed during altercations between the group's members and the local population in the Centre Ouest region. Given this reliance on non-state security groups, as well as the country's history of military mutinies and attempted coups d'état, there is a clear need for security sector reform (SSR) in Burkina Faso.

During an interview with members of the Ministry of Security, the insecurity in the Sahel region was highlighted as an ongoing concern. It was specifically noted that the absence of state authority in some areas of the region and porous borders with Niger and Mali have led to criminality and terrorist activities. The Ministry officials also noted that the high levels of youth unemployment in the Sahel region has made it easier for terrorist groups to recruit young people. Since 2015, the Sahel region has seen a number of attacks on police and military outposts, as well as the forced closure of schools. Several of these attacks have been claimed by Ansarul Islam, an extremist group operating in the Sahel region with close ties to Mali's Ansar Dine. The AQIM-affiliated group al-Mourabitoun kidnapped a Romanian national from Burkina Faso in early 2015, and sporadic attacks and reports of intimidation by this group have also been recently reported.⁴² In January 2016, the attack on a hotel and restaurant in Ouagadougou was claimed by AQIM and al-Mourabitoun, highlighting the country's increasing vulnerability to extremism and terrorist activity.43 The Kaboré government has announced its commitment to combat the threat of terrorism, but is plagued by a lack of resources and poorly-equipped security forces. In November 2016, President Kaboré announced that he would recall Burkinabé forces from the U.N. missions in Mali and Sudan to reinforce domestic security.⁴⁴

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

In the fieldwork, participants identified non-state security actors (the *Koglwéogo* and the *Dozo*) as potential sources of resilience and security. SSR initiatives, although limited to date, are also a potential resiliency factor.

Within the government, the Ministry of Territorial Administration's Directorate for Conflict Management and Prevention seeks to promote alternate conflict resolution mechanisms, which can be effective within communities to enhance social cohesion and avoid a 'winner-loser' outcome.

In addition, participants in Centre, Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions identified good relationships between religious groups as a resilience factor that could mitigate the rise of extremism. Religious and traditional leaders were viewed as playing an important mediating role in local and national-level conflicts. Finally, the tradition of the 'joking relationship' (*parenté à plaisanterie*)⁴⁵ was identified as an important source of relationshipbuilding and conflict prevention between ethnic groups, particularly in Cascades, Sud-Ouest, Est and Nord regions.

⁴² "Country Reports on Terrorism 2015: Chapter 2. Country Reports: Africa Overview", U.S. Department of State

⁴³ "Attack at Hotel in Burkina Faso's Capital", Stack, L. and Callimachi, R., The New York Times, January 2016.

⁴⁴ "Burkina Faso: Extremism & Counter-Extremism", Counter Extremism Project

⁴⁵ The joking relationship is a relationship that exists between individuals or groups that may involve well-mannered teasing and mocking, which can curb conflict.

Rule of Law (Least Vulnerable Pillar)

| Vulnerabilities | Perceptions of corruption and impunity within the justice system Exclusion of women from the justice system |
|-----------------|--|
| Risks | Incidents of corruption within the court system Human rights violations Incidents of mob justice |

Vulnerabilities and Risks

According to the CRVA Index, Burkina Faso is least vulnerable in the area of Rule of Law. The country's score for Judicial Independence, however, is below the regional average. The highest court within Burkina Faso is the Court of Appeals, or *Cour de Cassation*, and judge selection for this court was historically controlled by the executive branch.⁴⁶ Burkina Faso has dealt frequently with allegations of judicial corruption and inappropriate influence from high profile government officials, and the judicial system is further hampered by a lack of citizen awareness of their individual and collective rights.⁴⁷ The currently precarious political situation could be considered a vulnerability when it comes to the independence of Burkina Faso's judiciary.

Throughout the fieldwork, interviewees identified a lack of confidence and mistrust in the judiciary as a widespread concern across the country, citing perceptions of corruption, bias, impunity, and ineffectiveness. Participants noted that local populations generally believe that only the wealthy have access to justice. As a result, communitybased or traditional justice mechanisms are widely preferred over the formal court system. In several regions, interviewees described a system that involves dispute resolution first within the family unit. Then, if unsuccessful, the dispute is taken to religious or traditional leaders. Then, only after other options are exhausted, are disputes taken to the official justice system. "In my experience, the conflicts that resort to court rulings become the most violent conflicts."

- Meeting with the Ministry of Territorial Administration, Ouagadougou

After the periods of political crisis and unrest in Burkina Faso's recent history, the need for a truth and reconciliation process that is perceived to be efficient, transparent and credible is crucial for peace and stability in the country. As noted by an official from WACSOF interviewed during the fieldwork, "We have to guard ourselves against victor's justice, so we don't fall back into the past." While the new HCRUN is designed to investigate and settle cases related to human rights abuses and social grievances, there remains concern about the lack of progress since the commission's 21 members were appointed in 2016. In May 2017, it was reported that 16 of HCRUN's members signed a petition registering their concerns about the dysfunction of the organization, and the lack of concrete results which could lead to reconciliation.48

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Throughout the fieldwork, interviewees identified traditional and religious leaders as a resiliency

⁴⁶ "The World Factbook: Burkina Faso", Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

 $^{^{\}rm 47}$ "Freedom in the World 2016: Burkina Faso", Freedom House

⁴⁸ "HCRUN : Victime d'une tare congénitale ou d'une inconséquence de son président ?", Le Faso, May 2017.

under the Rule of Law pillar. Traditional conflict resolution methods and local forms of justice were cited many times as the preferred method of justice.

At the government level, the Ministry of Territorial Administration's Department for Conflict Management and Prevention and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts (ONAPREGECC) work to promote alternative conflict resolution, peace, tolerance and civic education. In particular, the Department for Conflict Management and Prevention promotes alternative conflict resolution mechanisms aimed at minimizing the violent escalation of grievances around issues such as land tenure.

External Factors

Burkina Faso has been affected by insecurity in neighboring countries, particularly the ongoing crisis in Mali. Due to the fluidity of Burkina Faso's northern border, armed militants and extremists, as well as arms and illicit goods, are able to move between Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger with relative ease. There has been an increase in extremist attacks along the Burkina Faso-Mali border since 2015, and Malian refugees have crossed into Burkina Faso seeking to escape insecurity in their own country. Burkina Faso is also active in regional and international counter-terrorism operations, including the French-led Operation Barkhane and the U.S.-backed Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership. The G5 Sahel countries comprising Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger have also agreed to set up a joint counter-terrorism force to rein in the threat of terrorism in the Sahel region.

In the area of economics, Burkina Faso is impacted

by changes in global commodity prices and the activities of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor country governments. The IMF's Extended Credit Facility (ECF) supports an ongoing economic program in Burkina Faso that aims to stimulate economic activity and growth.⁴⁹

Finally, Burkina Faso faces pressures from climate change and environmental degradation stemming from human activities such as overgrazing and deforestation, which lead to environmental pressures such as cycles of drought and flooding. These pressures have contributed to Burkina Faso's economic vulnerabilities, including in the area of food access. A prolonged drought in early 2016 led to water shortages and power cuts for millions of residents.⁵⁰ while severe flooding in July and August 2016 affected more than 10,000 people.⁵¹ Climate insecurity and the damage to arable land from human impacts risk spurring regional migration, exacerbating competition for endangering security, and impeding land. prospects for development.52

Jazeera, May 2016.

⁴⁹ "IMF Executive Board Completes Sixth Review Under the ECF Arrangement, Approves US\$6 Million Disbursement, and Concludes 2016 Article IV Consultation with Burkina Faso", International Monetary Fund (IMF), December 2016.

⁵⁰ "Burkina Faso drought triggers water and power shortages", Al

⁵¹ "West Africa – Deadly Floods in Mali and Burkina Faso", FloodList, August 2016.

⁵² "Income share held by lowest 20%", World Bank

Gender Considerations

Throughout the country, and across all five human security pillars. women are generally underrepresented and face significant risks and vulnerabilities in their daily lives. At the political level, women played a significant role in the prelude to the 2014 regime change, coming out onto the streets en masse to oppose the government of President Blaise Compaoré, wielding wooden spoons (to signify their departure from the traditional sphere of the kitchen) and singing protest songs.⁵³ However, despite turning out in significant numbers during the political turmoil leading to the Compaoré's overthrow, women's actual political, social, and economic power and access throughout the country remains quite low.

At both the national and sub-national levels, women's participation in politics is low, despite the gender quotas for legislative and municipal elections that require political parties to ensure that persons of each gender make up at least 30 percent of candidate lists. In 2012, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) found that these quotas had not significantly affected women's political participation.⁵⁴ And during the fieldwork interviews, participants confirmed the low levels of women in political decision-making. Some interviewees expressed that women's votes or candidacies are "bought" or manipulated by politicians or local leaders. Specifically, in FGDs and KIIs conducted throughout the country, participants noted that impoverished women are often bribed with household goods such as soap or food in exchange for their support of a particular party or candidate, yet they are rarely ever given a platform to express their own needs. Strong social and religious customs in certain regions, particularly the Cascades, Sud-Ouest, and the Sahel, also

⁵³ "How Burkinabe women cooked 'revolution soup' and other unusual protests from around Africa", Kiruga, M., Mali & Guardian Africa, November 2014. stigmatize women for participating in politics, and believe women should submit to the will of the "male head of household." For example, in one commune in Sahel, it was noted that out of 172 government counselors, only six were women, far below the required gender quota. Additionally, throughout the country, women reported that they "are not taken seriously" and are actively dissuaded from taking an interest in matters outside of the home and family, if not ridiculed outright and ostracized for doing so.

Women and girls also remain at high risk for gender-based violence throughout Burkina Faso, including rape and sexual harassment, and contracting sexually transmitted diseases such as HIV/AIDS. This is particularly prevalent around mining sites. Women are also vulnerable to sexual and physical abuse during pastoral conflicts, and are often first to be rendered homeless when their husbands or other heads-of-households are killed or driven off in land disputes. As women in some parts of the country are prevented from owning or controlling land, and are employed primarily in the informal sector, they have little in the way of a social safety net, particularly in rural communities. Additionally, in some regions, particularly in the Cascades, gender-based violence often takes the form of the abduction, assault and murder of women, especially pregnant women, for ritualistic purposes. Children are also considered vulnerable to being kidnapped, maimed or killed during ritual ceremonies.

Women and girls are highly vulnerable in regions where there are significant security risks, such as in the Nord and Sahel regions, where there are both cross-border attacks from insurgent and terrorist groups as well as ongoing military operations. In the Nord region, some interviewees noted the threat of kidnappings and abductions in the area; in both regions participants noted the increased prevalence of rape and sexual abuse

⁵⁴ "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women", United Nations, June 2016. amid the general environment of insecurity.

Early marriage is also a human security vulnerability in Burkina Faso, with an average of 52 percent of women aged 20 to 24 married or in a union before the age of 18.55 The government has taken strides to improve female education, with the girl-boy ratio in enrollment in secondary education at 0.62 in 2014, compared to 0.51 in 2004 (a 1 indicates an equal number of girls and boys enrolled). In addition, a majority of women in the country are reported to be employed, with a 2.3 percent unemployment rate as a percentage of the overall female labor force. However, many women continue to work in the informal sector. During the field interviews, women in the Centre region expressed the value of microcredit and microlending schemes in helping women transition to formal employment or build more resilience to times of low commodity prices or market shocks. They also noted that women's organizations tend to be active in helping women with family planning and access to medical care, although this is largely concentrated in urban areas in the Centre region. The lack of access to adequate medical care, particularly maternal and child care, puts women at high risk, especially in rural areas. In most of the country, the discussion of family planning or contraception is considered taboo and information on the topic is not widely available.

Finally, in terms of risk and vulnerabilities, women overall reported that they did not trust the police or the judicial system, which they view as not only unfairly biased towards more wealthy members of society, but also controlled by men. General popular perceptions of corruption in the security and judicial sectors result in a heavy reliance, particularly in rural areas, on traditional or local/informal decision-making processes and selfdefense groups. Again, as women are not traditionally allowed to hold positions of authority in the village or community structures, they are also generally excluded from having any input in decision making processes at the local level. This is particularly true in cases related to land and land tenure, even when the area in question may have been inherited or acquired through marriage. Their input on issues of security, particularly for women and girls left vulnerable in regions like the Nord or Sahel, is rarely sought out, even though women were reported to have access to better information at the community-level than men.

Despite the many gender-based risks and vulnerabilities inherent in Burkina Faso, in areas where women are able to organize and have gained access to training or microcredit, they have generally become a key resilience factor in society. Women and girls who have had access to national and international NGO trainings on health, finance, and family planning have reported that they tend to pass this information on to other women and girls their communities. As noted above, women also played a key role of protest and mobilization during the 2014 political turmoil, where their appearance "outside of the home" was a signal of how united the entire population was in demanding change. In areas like the capital and the Centre where women have been given a role in the political sphere, they are generally able to mobilize and attempt to articulate the needs of women and girls throughout the country. However, as in other overwhelmingly rural and agrarian societies, traditional gender stereotypes are deeply entrenched, and innovative thinking and outreach is needed to help women and girls maximize their potential. The government has taken some positive and proactive strides, legislatively and educationally, in this direction. By encouraging partnerships with civil society, religious, and women's groups throughout the country, these initiatives will stand a better chance of reaching more of Burkina Faso's women and girls.


Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 36

^{55 &}quot;Child Marriage", United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region

Cascades and Sud-Ouest Regions

Located in the south of the country, the population of the Cascades region is 739,497⁵⁶ and the population of Sud-Ouest is 795,549.⁵⁷ Agriculture, artisanal gold mining and livestock are the main economic activities in this region. The Sud-Ouest region is home to the Lobi ethnic group, as well as the Fulani and Mossi ethnic groups.



| Structural Vulnerabilities | Limited provision of public services, especially education and health Population influx, creating divide between 'immigrants' and 'natives' Gender-based violence, and common instances of underage pregnancies and marriage Criminality and illicit trade, notably high drug use |
|--|--|
| Event-Driven Risks | Communal conflicts, predominately related to land/resource competition |
| Social and Institutional Resilience Factors | Associations (RAJS, AVO-SIDA) Ministry of Human, Health and Youth Rights Religious leaders (Muslims and Catholics, including the religious sisters) promoting messages of peace, and working as mediators to resolve conflict Local community connections, such as 'joking relationship' practice which promotes social cohesion ("le vivre-ensemble") between communities Opinion Leaders as influential advocates for addressing social issues |

⁵⁶ "Burkina Faso: Data Portal: Cascades", Open Data For Africa

^{57 &}quot;Burkina Faso: Data Portal: Sud-Ouest", Open Data For Africa

Population and Demographics

Population influxes from the north and central parts of the country were highlighted as an issue for communities in the Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions, leading to increased land competition. Some interviewees noted that the practice of artisanal gold mining in the area had attracted new residents from other regions. Herders and farmers in search of new arable land due to climate pressures, have also contributed to land tension in Cascades. This has created perceived ethnic divides in many areas between 'native' landowners, and 'immigrants'.

The Sud-Ouest region is predominantly home to the Lobi ethnic group, which accounts for about 2.5 percent of the overall population in Burkina Faso.58 For respondents in the Sud-Ouest Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), there was a perception of exclusion and stigmatization because of their ethnicity, particularly as a region in the wider political sphere. Respondents discussed a lack of social integration and mistrust between ethnic groups, specifically between the Lobi ethnic group and the Fulani and Mossi ethnic groups. These tensions are tied to farmer/herder conflicts and land tenure issues and there is a perception that these issues are poorly managed by local authorities. Traditionally, in Lobi society, land cannot be sold, only leased. Respondents reported that Lobi communities have been pushed off their traditional lands and that norms and customs surrounding land have been ignored by those leasing the land.

During the women's FGD for Cascades, some respondents noted the large youth population in the region. They suggested that this had perpetuated issues such as increased drug use, illegal abortions, school-age pregnancies, and underage marriage.

Politics and Governance

Limited provision of public services, including poor access education, has contributed to ongoing poverty and illiteracy in the Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions. Access to healthcare was also noted as a vulnerability, with one respondent noting that only one cardiologist existed for the whole Cascades region, despite cardiovascular disease becoming more prevalent.

"Governance is not inclusive. Instead of everything starting from the base, it's like a presewn dress that one wants to make the population wear."

- Male interviewee, Cascades Region

For several participants in the Sud-Ouest and Cascades region, politics is not perceived as representative or inclusive. In Cascades, some described webs of political patronage, such as plots of land being distributed based on political interests, and political advancement along ethnic lines. Women in the FGD also suggested that female representation in government and politics was limited due to entrenched perceptions that their skills were less valuable or developed than those of men.

"My father [gave me] a plantation field in the village ... an indigene came to invade my field with his herd of cattle. When my employee wanted to intervene, he was threatened with a knife. Since he was bleeding, he went to see the chief of his canton who inflicted 100,000 FCFA that I had to pay. I understood that this happened to me because I was a woman and an immigrant."

- Female interviewee, Cascades Region

⁵⁸ "The World Factbook: Burkina Faso", Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

However, local opinion leaders were identified as playing a positive role in alerting political authorities and the public about ways to address social problems. Respondents also cited youth as a resilience factor, stating that youth groups are working toward social cohesion and political awareness.

Economics and Resources

A widely-held perception of those participating in the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and FGDs was that there was a downturn in economic activity in Cascades and Sud-Ouest. Some respondents noted that the political turmoil in 2014 had negatively impacted economic resources flowing to the region.

For the Sud-Ouest Region, illegal mining was noted as a major source of income – and attracted youth to drop out of school to pursue artisanal gold panning. Respondents in the FGD noted that the gold sector attracted people from outside the region, and this influx had driven up costs of living. Illegal artisanal mining practices have also had negative impacts on the local environment, with deforestation and contamination from cyanide and mercury, which is used to purify gold by the miners.

For youth respondents in the Cascades region, they emphasized the importance of Non-Formal Basic Literacy Centers (CBNEF) which provide youth training in trades such as carpentry, sewing and hairdressing. They expressed concern that some of these centers had been closed by the government.

Security

Conflict between ethnic groups over land tenure and access to resources was a major risk factor for Cascades and Sud-Ouest. This has been driven by land competition between 'native' ethnic landowners, and 'immigrant' herders and farmers who are in search of agricultural and pastoral land. Conflict, often along ethnic lines, was also reported in the artisanal mining sector. One example given during the FGDs, involved clashes between gold miners from Haussa and Karaboro ethnic groups, resulting in at least one reported fatality. This was followed by an armed reprisal attack on the opposing community, causing three fatalities.

Religion was noted as a social resilience factor, with one Sud-Ouest respondent summarizing that "All the religions live in harmony". As conflicts over other issues such as land and ethnicity arise, religious leaders, including Muslims and Catholics, often play key roles in mediation between groups and promote peace messaging in their sermons. Some youth participants in Cascades, however, did note concerns about the possible radicalization of individuals within certain factions of Islam, while others expressed fear of terrorist attacks.

Several participants also noted the positive role of *parenté à plaisanterie* ("joking-relationship"), which is a social practice performed between communities and individuals to promote peace and solidarity.

Gender-based violence (GBV), and violence against children, was highlighted as an issue in Cascades. Reported incidents included rape of women and children, physical assault and the murder of pregnant women for ritual purposes.

"After my husband's death, I was expelled from my father's house by my own brother because he felt that I should [be] under the roof of another husband. It's my own experience but I'm sure many other women are experiencing the same thing."

- Female interviewee, Cascades Region

Rule of Law

Mistrust of judicial institutions was prevalent among KII and FGD discussions in Cascades and Sud-Ouest. Much of this is related to perceived corruption and lack of impartiality on the part of magistrates, and the general prevalence of criminality. Respondents cited the perception that justice is only available for the wealthy. People generally prefer to solve problems among themselves, rather than using the judicial system.

Land rights also proved a major issue for local stakeholders, with traditional land titles causing controversy between 'natives' and 'foreigners' to the regions.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

During the KIIs and FGDs, several social and institutional resilience factors were identified by participants in the Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions. One respondent cited youth as a resilience factor, stating that youth groups are working toward social cohesion, peace, and democracy. The respondent also noted that women's organizations are becoming increasingly important in the realm of politics and peace. Successful collaboration between Muslims and Christians was also cited.

Civil society organizations were noted as resilience factors in the areas of politics and rule of law. Local traditional and religious leaders were cited multiple times as effective arbitrators of conflict, especially regarding land disputes in both the Cascades and Sud-Ouest regions.

Several respondents referenced the *Dozo*, a traditional hunting group, as a respected group that provides security in the Cascades region.

Recommendations

Population and Demographics

Civil society, the private sector, and donor organizations should support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage youth, particularly in rural areas. Traditional leaders, local government, and civil society organizations should facilitate sustained dialogue and interactions across ethnic and political divides.

Politics and Governance

The Burkinabé government should expand social services, especially to rural regions, and build trust with local communities. Regional organizations and the Burkinabé government should support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels. NGOs, INGOs, political parties, and the donor community should work with local civil society organizations to create programs that educate, train and support women in the field of politics and improve civic awareness. The local and national governments should carry out awareness raising campaigns focusing on civic education for youth.

Economics and Resources

The local government and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Quarries should provide accessible paths to formal small-scale mine licensing - which includes training on health. safety and environmental practices, and couple this with stronger regulation and policing of the small-scale sector. This should include better education about paths for informal to formal small-scale mining, as well as environmental conservation practices to reduce pollution and contamination. The Burkinabé government (including the Ministry of Youth, Training and Professional Integration), civil society organizations, and international donors should support and provide investment. microcredit lending, and training to promote youth entrepreneurship and job creation in the private sector. The Ministry of National Education and Literacy and local governments should invest in vocational training programs and education support, particularly for youth.

Security

Local leaders, civil society organizations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Directorate of

Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts (ONAPREGECC) should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land and resource allocation. The Ministry of Women, National Solidarity, and Family and civil society organizations should work with regional and international partners to promote awareness-raising activities around domestic and sexual violence and the prevention of ritual killings. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Women, National Solidarity, and Family should enforce existing legal protections around domestic and sexual violence. The Burkinabé government should implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including, but not limited to, training and oversight of community-based self-defense groups, such as the *Dozo*.

Rule of Law

Regional governments should work with the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion, civil society organizations and international partners to support efforts to reform the judicial system, including transparency initiatives and expanding access to judicial services, particularly in rural areas.

Centre Region

The Centre Region of Burkina Faso is home to the nation's largest city and capital, Ouagadougou.⁵⁹ It is the most populous of Burkina Faso's 13 administrative regions with a population of 2,532,311, making up about 14 percent of the total population of the country.⁶⁰ Unlike other parts of the country, the economy of the Centre region relies primarily on industry and commerce in Ouagadougou rather than on mining and agriculture.



| Structural Vulnerabilities | Demographic changes: population growth, rapid urbanization, and rural-urban migration Limited or inadequate health, education and social services Food insecurity Perceptions of political clientelism, including manipulation of youth, corruption and lack of transparency in the political system which feeds into low levels of civic education and political participation Underrepresentation of women in political decision-making Unemployment, particularly for youth Land degradation and deforestation Farmer-herder conflicts related to water management and land access Mistrust between security forces and local populations Lack of equipment and training for security forces Lack of oversight/training for <i>Koglwéogo</i> groups Perceived corruption in the judicial system; lack of confidence in the judicial system; impunity Criminality Sexual and domestic violence |
|----------------------------|---|
| Event-Driven Risks | Strikes and protests Land and resource-based conflicts Terrorist attacks Election violence Coup d'états Price surges for staple products and the rising cost of living |

⁵⁹ "Biggest Cities In Burkina Faso", World Atlas

⁶⁰ "Burkina Faso: Data Portal: Centre", Open Data For Africa

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 42

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

- Traditional and customary leaders; religious leaders
- Development activities by civil society organizations, international donors, and government agencies
- Koglwéogo groups
- Co-existence between religious groups; inter-religious dialogue
- Credit unions and microcredit lending schemes

Population and Demographics

The Centre region has been the site of rapid urbanization over the past several decades, with the country's urban population more than doubling between 2000 and 2015.⁶¹ The growth of the urban population, and the resulting expansion of the city of Ouagadougou itself, has in turn put pressure on available housing, social services, infrastructure and natural resources. During interviews, participants also expressed concerns around high rates of youth unemployment and the resulting potential for recruitment by extremist groups or manipulation by politicians.

"Ouagadougou grew in width and not in height."

- Interviewee, Centre Region

Patterns of urbanization and rural-urban migration are also compounded by the country's overall population growth rate, which is above the regional mean.⁶² A Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with local female participants revealed a widespread lack of family understanding around planning, contraception and sex education. They noted that contraceptives are widely rejected by religious leaders and men within their communities, to the extent that women who are prescribed contraceptives do not tell their husbands for fear of being rejected.

Though Burkina Faso is religiously diverse, those interviewed did not identify religion as a source of division in the Centre region. Instead, interviewees pointed to inter-religious coexistence and the practice of inter-religious dialogue as resilience factors. One Key Informant Interview (KII) participant described a framework of inter-religious dialogue in which leaders from all faith backgrounds participate in the events and holidays of the other religions, thereby maintaining relationships between religious communities and leaders.

Politics and Governance

The Centre region has been the site of political protests and strikes in recent years, including the massive popular protests that resulted in President Compaoré's removal in 2014, as well as demonstrations against the attempted military coup in 2015. Protest has played an important role in Burkinabé political history, and the political engagement and energy of the population can be viewed as both an asset and a potential vulnerability.63 While some field interviewees identified improvements in governance since the Kaboré government took power in 2015, others noted widespread popular frustration and impatience at the slow pace of reforms and unfulfilled political promises. Overburdened or ineffective state bureaucracy results in slow processing times of files and reduces trust in government. Some respondents warned that disillusionment with the political process could

^{61 &}quot;Urban population", World Bank

 $^{^{\}rm 62}$ "Population growth (annual %)", World Bank

⁶³ "The legacy of revolution and resistance in Burkina Faso", Hagberg, S., SIPRI, February 2016.

result in non-participation in future elections, particularly among youth.

Interviewees also highlighted perceptions of political clientelism, bias and corruption within the government. It was reported that some women, youth and civil society organizations are manipulated or bribed by politicians to gain votes.

Elections were cited as a potential risk factor. One interviewee reported that there is fighting between political parties during election periods, and pointed to incidents of election-related violence in Ouagadougou's 7th Arrondissement during the 2016 municipal elections.

Several interviewees highlighted the mediating role played by religious leaders and traditional leaders (the example of the Mogho Naba, the monarch of the Mossi ethnic group who mediated the return to civilian rule in 2014, was cited multiple times) and civil society organizations. However, it was noted that any perceived politicization of these figures or organizations severely undermines their authority and effectiveness.

Economics and Resources

A key concern expressed by respondents was the rising cost of living, particularly reported spikes in the prices of staple items such as rice, sugar, oil and soap. In the past, increases in food prices and the cost of living have been a mobilizing point and have spurred violent protests in Ouagadougou and other cities in Burkina Faso – most recently in 2008, when prices for staple items such as meat and cooking oil increased by 30-50 percent.⁶⁴

Those interviewed from the region also described pressures resulting from the growth of Ouagadougou's urban population. such as overcrowded schools. overburdened health systems, difficulty obtaining potable water, energy

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 44

shortages, the growth of slums on the periphery of the city, and a rise in the number of children begging in the streets, among other concerns. Increasing land degradation and deforestation as a result of the city's expansion were also identified, which has contributed to conflicts between herder and farmer communities and has caused grievances among indigenous populations whose

"[Politicians] say anything. They accuse each other. They are trying to get rich."

- Focus group discussion, Centre Region

land has been sold by local authorities. Residents reported that the cost of purchasing land has increased, putting it out of reach of local populations. Some resource-based conflicts involving the Fulani/Peulh community were reported in the periphery of the region, but these incidents were not viewed as a primary concern.

It was noted that local credit unions and microcredit lending schemes have been a source of economic resilience, notably in providing capital for women. As women in Burkina Faso are often prevented from owning and controlling land⁶⁵, and work primarily in informal employment sectors, the provision of credit and financing is a key step in promoting women's economic advancement.

Security

Criminality was identified as a key concern for local populations; interviewees noted instances of armed robbery, organized crime, kidnapping, rape, organ trafficking and drug trafficking. Youth radicalization and fear of terrorism were raised as concerns as well, as the Centre region was the location of the January 2016 terrorist attack in Ouagadougou claimed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al-Mourabitoun. Participants

⁶⁴ "Social movement struggles against the high cost of living in Burkina Faso", Engels, B., Canadian Journal of Development Studies, February 2015.

⁶⁵ "Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women", United Nations, June 2016.

in one focus group noted that the risk of terrorism has caused people to distrust gatherings in public spaces, such as festivals, ceremonies and places of worship.

In addition, strikes and protests in the Centre region have historically been a security concern. The largescale demonstrations in 2014 and 2015 resulted in clashes between security forces and protestors and serious damage to government buildings.

Those interviewed during the field research also expressed mixed feelings about the role of local police and the *Koglwéogo* groups. The *Koglwéogo* self-defense groups were identified as having contributed positively to security, particularly in preventing livestock theft and robberies. However, several respondents noted the need to train and oversee these groups as they have been accused of employing harsh or violent tactics and operate outside of the formal judicial and security systems. Some respondents attributed the proliferation of the *Koglwéogo* to the October 5, 2016 ministerial decree to integrate the *Koglwéogo* into "proximity policing" in the rural areas of Burkina Faso.

Rule of Law

Interviewees in the Centre region described a general lack of confidence in the judicial system, stemming from perceptions of corruption, impunity and bias in the judicial system. Extended detentions and slow processing times for court cases were also reported (as one respondent put it, "the dossiers sleep in drawers"). There was a reported sense that the justice system operates differently according to the defendant's wealth and status. As a result, people prefer to resolve disputes through community-based or traditional mechanisms, rather than going to the courts. Some noted that women may be disadvantaged by cultural practices in these traditional justice mechanisms. However. several noted improvements since the 2014 uprising, particularly in the separation of powers since the president no longer has the power to appoint magistrates.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Traditional leaders (such as the monarch of the Mossi people) and religious leaders (the Cardinal and Grand Imam of Ouagadougou were both cited) were seen as a key source of community resilience, as long as they remain politically neutral.

Government agencies working in infrastructure development and social services were also viewed as resilience factors - in particular, respondents named the National Road Safety Authority (ONASER), the local Sanitation Department, the National Population Council, the National Office of Water and Sanitation, The Higher Authority for State Control and Anti-Corruption (ASCE), The Higher Council for Communication (CSC), National Society for the Management of Food Security (SONAGESS), and the Ministry of Security.

Local and international civil society organizations were also cited as resilience factors, specifically the Burkinabé Association for Family Welfare (ABBEF), Regional Center for Water and Low-Cost Sanitation (CREPA), The Consumers' League of Burkina Faso (LCB), Coalition Against the High Cost of Living, Burkinabé Movement for Human and Peoples' Rights (MBDHP), the National Anti-Corruption Network (REN-LAC), and the international NGOs Save the Children and the National Democratic Institute. Specific programs run by these groups included awareness-raising activities through theater skits and radio programs.

As noted above, the *Koglwéogo* self-defense groups were viewed as both a vulnerability and resilience factor in the Centre region. While some respondents acknowledged their contributions to improving local security, concerns remain about their tactics and the need for oversight.

Recommendations

Population and Demographics

Civil society, the private sector, and donor organizations should support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage youth. The Burkinabé government (including the Ministry of Health) should improve and expand social services and ensure that the population has access to affordable health care, including family health services, and medication. Religious leaders and civil society organizations should continue to support existing frameworks of inter-religious dialogue and engage youth.

Politics and Governance

Regional organizations and the Burkinabé government should support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels. NGOs, INGOs, and the donor community, in collaboration with the Burkinabé government, should carry out civic education activities, especially for youth and women.

Economics and Resources

The Burkinabé government (including the Ministries of Youth, Training and Professional Integration, Commerce, Industry and Handicraft, and Economy, Finance and Development), civil society organizations, and international donors should support and provide investment, microcredit lending, and training to promote entrepreneurship and job creation for women and youth. The Ministry of National Education and Literacy and local government should invest in vocational training programs and education support, particularly for youth. Local leaders, civil society organizations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Directorate of Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts (ONAPREGECC) should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land and resource allocation.

Security


The Burkinabé government should partner with civil society organizations and regional or international partners to train security forces on best practices to prevent election-related violence and respect human rights in the course of strikes and demonstrations. The Ministry of Women, National Solidarity, and Family and civil society organizations should work with regional and international partners to promote awarenessraising activities around domestic and sexual violence. The Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Women, National Solidarity, and Family should enforce existing legal protections around domestic and sexual violence. The Burkinabé government should implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including, but not limited to, training and oversight of community-based self-defense groups. such as the Koglwéogo.

Rule of Law

Local governments should work with the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion, civil society organizations and international partners to support efforts to reform the judicial system, including transparency initiatives and expanding access to judicial services. Local and international NGOs and civil society organizations should create programs that provide oversight and uphold the rights of women in both traditional justice mechanisms and in the court system.

Est Region

One of the more populous regions of Burkina Faso, the population of Est region is 1,615,740.⁶⁶ Mining, especially illegal mining, has grown significantly in the region.



| Structural Vulnerabilities | Failing health sector due to lack of resources Political and judicial corruption and lack of public confidence in political and legal systems (including political biases of traditional leaders) Limited confidence in security forces (leading to the creation of self-defense militia group, the <i>Koglwéogo</i>) Exclusion of women and stigmatization from politics and decision-making Widespread illegal mining practices contribute to environmental degradation |
|--|---|
| Event-Driven Risks | Upcoming electionsViolence related to land competition |
| Social and Institutional Resilience Factors | Inter-ethnic and religious coexistence Support from NGOs and CSOs to address health, environment, and women's rights Women's and youth groups, unions Conflict resolution mechanism |

Population and Demographics

Residents of the region expressed concern with the health sector, citing a shortage of staff and inadequate medical facilities and equipment, which contributes to the outbreak of epidemics and high infant mortality rates. Issues specific to youth were also noted during the field work, such as unemployment, illiteracy, early pregnancies, and sexually transmitted diseases.

Migration and land issues were also noted as vulnerabilities in interviews. Respondents noted that there has been increased migration to the region because of mining and access to arable land. Local populations reported fear over

^{66 &}quot;Burkina Faso: Data Portal: Est", Open Data For Africa

monopolization of resources in the region by foreigners and groups from other parts of the country.

However, participants also noted that there is nutritional support through NGOs, such as the Catholic Organization for Social Development (OCADES) and Families Achieving Sustainable Outcomes (FASO), as well as support from the Village Committee of Development. The community is able to settle disputes through municipal councils and community organizations, and has trust in the *Koglwéogo*, a self-defense militia taking action against criminality. There is also peace between ethnic and religious groups.

Politics and Governance

Most participants interviewed expressed a lack of confidence in elected representatives, viewing them as corrupt and removed from local issues. Political parties and candidates seek the support of traditional leaders to secure votes. As such, traditional leadership is undermined in the public view due to the leaders' perceived biases. For example, due to these biases, some villages have two customary chiefs and it is difficult for them to maintain neutrality. Also, local city council spots can only be won by one party, resulting in one party in power that rules exclusively without opposition. Moreover, heads of family influence the decisions of family members, especially women, during election period. Otherwise, women are excluded from politics and decision-making; those who are in politics are not well-regarded by the community. Participants also noted that these issues fostered the centralization of decisions in the government, where "decisions come from the top and the populations can only submit." There is also the

"It is he who has the money or a sugared mouth that wins elections. We do not vote on the basis of ideas, but rather on the individual."

- Focus group discussion, Est Region

perception that politicians use their power to perpetuate a cycle of poverty to be able to manipulate and dominate the people.

Participants also noted the presence of many unions to raise the quality of life, such as the National Union of the Elders of Burkina Faso (UNAB), and women and youth associations, as well as "joking relationships" contributing to conflict resolution. Regarding security, it was noted that the *Koglwéogo* have recently been cooperating with the gendarmerie in this region. There are also initiatives within families to ease tensions and divisions caused by political differences.

Economics and Resources

The agriculture of the Est region is greatly affected by climate change and there is a high risk of deforestation. There is also widespread poverty, scarcity of food, and difficult access to water in the region. Old infrastructure contributes to the low quality of life, as well as the lack of health centers and schools. Participants noted that illegal gold mining has been an issue in the region that creates insecurity and health-related problems. Mining causes degradation to the environment, encourages the use of child labor and, encourages school dropout among the youth population.

The government and OCADES, an NGO, have installed boreholes in villages, and this has contributed to more amicable resolutions between farmers and herders. The Water and Forestry Services, with some other associations, are fighting forest degradation, and the National Society for the Management of Food Security (SONAGESS) is developing new strategies to support the marketing of local products and the facilitation of easy access to food. There is an overall lack of financial products, such as access to credit, for women and youth to start economic activities and entrepreneurship, but women are gaining economic opportunities through microcredit NGOs.

Security

The Est region has security issues with regards to banditry and porous borders. The population does not trust the local police and gendarmerie—some allegedly turned to becoming highway robbers who do not possess the logistical support or equipment to effectively do their jobs. In response, the self-defense militia group *Koglwéogo* formed to combat the banditry and other criminality. The *Koglwéogo* is financed and supported by the population and is trusted more that the local police and gendarmerie. Some participants hoped for the *Koglwéogo* to become better trained, but overall, they are viewed in a positive light.

Rule of Law

The judiciary is perceived to be corrupt. Criminals are set free in exchange for money and there are "fixers" who negotiate for reduced sentences with judges and authorities. Participants observed that criminals and gang members are affiliated with the local authorities, while the police and gendarmes are perceived to be corrupt and supportive only of the people with the most money. The application of law is difficult and there is no confidence in the judicial system, which contributes to a lack of patriotism, corruption, and impunity. Even within the traditional leadership system there is widespread corruption and inequity of justice because the traditional leaders are co-opted into politics, which can drive intercommunal conflict. Women's rights are upheld by authorities who act when a woman is attacked, though if the disagreement is between a married couple, authorities encourage the couple to resolve it within the family.

There are efforts to educate the population and to invest in informal education by a local NGO called Tin-Tua. There is also a layered conflict resolution mechanism: first, the Village Development Committee (CVD), then, the municipal councilors, the village chiefs, the mayor and prefects, and finally, the justice system.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

There are many resilience factors in the Est region. For one, NGO and CSO support is ameliorating nutritional, agricultural and educational initiatives. The local population, in response to perceived corruption in the judiciary, has employed a municipal conflict resolution mechanism. The population also supports the *Koglwéogo* selfdefense groups, although some feel this undermines the legitimacy of state institutions.

Recommendations

Population and Demographics

The Burkinabé government (including the Ministry of Health) should improve and expand social services and ensure that the population has access to affordable health care and medication. Civil society, the private sector, and donor organizations should support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage youth. The Ministry of National Education and Literacy should expand access to education opportunities for youth - particularly literacy initiatives, as Est has the second-lowest literacy rate in the country - and invest in technology and infrastructure for vocational training programs. Traditional leaders, civil society the organizations. Ministrv of Territorial Administration (Directorate of Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts (ONAPREGECC) should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land and resource allocation.

Politics and Governance

Regional organizations and the Burkinabé government should support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels. NGOs, INGOs, and the donor community, in collaboration with the Burkinabé government, should carry out civic education activities, especially for youth and women. Civil society organizations should provide training and resources to encourage greater political participation among women.

Economics and Resources

The local government and the Ministry of Energy, Mines and Quarries should provide accessible paths to formal small-scale mine licensing - which includes training on health. safety and environmental practices, and couple this with stronger regulation and policing of the sector. This should include better education about paths to formalization for informal small-scale miners, as well as environmental conservation practices to pollution and contamination. reduce The Burkinabé government (including the Ministry of Youth, Training and Professional Integration), civil society organizations, and international donors should support and provide investment. microcredit lending, and training to promote entrepreneurship and job creation for women and youth. NGOs, donor organizations, and the Burkinabé government should allocate resources to improve and expand infrastructure for roads and water (both for drinking and for irrigation). NGOs, IFIs, and donor organizations should support regulation of practices such as charcoal-burning, overgrazing, and deforestation that lead to the degradation of land and ultimately to climate change.

Security

The Burkinabé government should implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including, but not limited to, training and oversight of community-based self-defense groups, such as the *Koglwéogo*. The Burkinabé government, with support from regional international partners, should enhance the institutional and operational capacity of the police force and Gendarmerie, including improved recruitment and training, higher salaries, and provision of material resources. Security forces, including the police, Gendarmerie, and the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) should work with local communities to improve proximity policing.

Rule of Law

Local governments should work with the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion, civil society organizations and international partners to support efforts to reform the judicial system, including transparency initiatives and expanding access to judicial services. Local and international NGOs and civil society organizations should create programs that provide oversight and uphold the rights of women in both traditional justice mechanisms and in the court system. Local leaders, civil society organizations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Directorate of Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of (ONAPREGECC) Communal Conflicts should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land and resource allocation.

Nord Region

Located in the north of Burkina Faso between the Sahel and Boucle du Mouhoun regions, the population of the Nord region is 1,502,527.⁶⁷ The region is comprised of several ethnic groups, including the Mossi, the Fulani, and the Samos. The region is home to pastoralist groups, who raise livestock utilizing transhumance.



| Structural Vulnerabilities | Land/resource competition Criminality Porous borders with Mali Perceived corruption and opacity in judicial and political systems Group divisions along Religious/Ethnic lines Lack of trust of police and security forces Poverty and income inequality Poorly equipped/insufficiently trained security forces Limited capacities in the healthcare system Lack of community awareness of political and formal legal systems |
|--|--|
| Event-Driven Risks | Religious/ethnic conflict Land Conflict Elections Protests |
| Social and Institutional Resilience Factors | Civil society (Religious leaders; Traditional leaders; Opinion leaders; Local radio programs; NGOs) The Koglwéogo International organizations Practices of the "joking relationship" between communities |

^{67 &}quot;Burkina Faso: Data Portal: Nord", Open Data For Africa

Population and Demographics

Participants interviewed in the Nord region emphasized population growth as a vulnerability.⁶⁸ This growth has led to increasing competition for resources, making it difficult to meet the basic needs of the population. Seventy-six percent of the population in the Nord region lives in severe poverty.⁶⁹ Respondents also noted that agricultural yields in the region have been affected by frequent droughts and poor water quality. High levels of unemployment and the inability of much of the population to procure arable land due to the sale of land to developers and businesses were also cited as prominent vulnerabilities.

Interviewees reported that the practice of polygamy and an overall societal aversion to family planning contributes to increased population pressures and competition for basic goods and services, including healthcare, access to education, housing, and land.

Respondents also highlighted religious tensions in the region, between Christians and Muslims, and between Muslim groups. One respondent discussed ethnic cleavages in the Nord Region, stating that the Mossi are the majority ethnic group in the region; other ethnic groups in the region include the Fulani and the Samos ethnic group. The respondent noted some tensions with the Fulani over herding issues, but also cited the use of the "joking relationship" between groups that appears to maintain civility.

"The Mossi are the majority in the north, with a few Peuhls and Samos with whom the Mossi maintain the joking relationship."

- Focus group discussion, Nord Region

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 52

Politics and Governance

Interviewees from the Nord region reported that women are excluded from some political parties, and that the gender quota has not been sufficiently implemented.⁷⁰ One focus group participant reported that women's votes are "bought" by politicians in exchange for basic items like clothing Some respondents expressed or soap. dissatisfaction with the practice of some traditional and religious leaders influencing votes. They also reported a broad lack of knowledge of the functions and responsibilities of government in the region, which is further exacerbated by a perception that the local government is not fully transparent. Interviewees suggested that administrative processes are frequently slow and that the government is perceived as being lax in fulfilling campaign promises and developing infrastructure. However, one Focus Group Discussion (FGD) noted that since the 2014 uprising to uphold presidential term limits, there has been a rise in popular political engagement, specifically in the form of protests to reject legislation and circumstances that people find unfavorable.

Economics and Resources

Poverty, inequality, and resource degradation are key vulnerabilities in the Nord region. Environmental issues like desertification combined with population growth have put pressure on scarce resources and land, which contributes to pastoral and land tenure conflicts. Respondents reported that during the transhumance period,⁷¹ there are more conflicts between farmers and herders, which are sometimes fatal.

A lack of arable land leads to lower crop yields. A 2009 land tenure law decentralized authority over land and legitimized traditional land tenure rules. The 2012 revision of the law ended the state's

^{68 &}quot;Population growth (annual %)", World Bank

⁶⁹ "MPI Country Briefings", Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative

 $^{^{70}}$ The gender quota law requires that party candidate lists for the National Assembly must include at least 30% of either sex

⁷¹ "Transhumance" refers to the seasonal cycle of moving livestock from one grazing area to another, and often fuels pastoral conflicts between nomadic herding groups and settled farming communities.

exclusive property on all lands. It also created conciliation committees to resolve land disputes.⁷² However, land distribution and issues related to buying and selling land are still noted as additional conflict risk factors in the region. Compounding these pressures is the lack of access to mechanized agricultural equipment and a lack of infrastructure to retain water for farming. It was also noted in Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and FGDs that women are typically left out of negotiations on land distribution or denied the right to own or manage property, and this increases their overall vulnerability.

The Nord region is also the site of gold mining operations, both formal and informal. Respondents reported that local perceptions of mining activities in the region are generally negative. Mining can lead to the degradation of the environment and aggravate tensions and is a frequent cause for protests due to disputes over land and compensation. They also noted that the presence of mining operations encourages prostitution near mines and leads to children dropping out of school to work in the mines. One person also mentioned the death of livestock near mining sites due to contamination of water with cyanide for leeching purposes.

Security

Although respondents did not report specific incidents of terrorism, many identified the country's porous northern border with Mali as a risk factor for terrorism and spill-over effects of the Malian conflict. This is amplified by the perception of the region's overall vulnerability to cross-border incursions due to weak border control measures and an inadequately trained and equipped gendarmerie and police force. Interviewees disagreed as to whether banditry was a vulnerability in the Nord region, however they did report armed robbery, thefts, and abductions of children. While some people in the Nord region support the local self-defense groups, known as the *Koglwéogo*, for the perceived security they bring, others denounce their violent methods.

Rule of Law

Respondents in the Nord region expressed a lack of confidence in the judicial system. In local communities, conflicts are first addressed within the family unit, then if unsuccessful, the conflict will be brought to religious and traditional leaders, then the gendarmerie, and lastly, the formal judicial system. Many perceive the judicial system to be slow-moving and the lack of fair trial and prosecutorial measures result in people being imprisoned before due process is executed. There is also the perception that there is corruption in the government, and limited access to justice for everyday Burkinabé. The interviewees indicated that, in general, women are excluded from formal justice mechanisms.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Despite the vulnerabilities and risks listed above, the Nord region has a number of social and institutional resilience factors that mitigate these risks. While some religious and traditional leaders are perceived to be too involved in politics, there are positive perceptions of these leaders on the whole as a force that sensitizes the public and helps ease conflict. Local radio programs also broadcast content to ease religious tensions, which is a positive influence. Cercle d'Études, de Recherches et de Formation Islamique (CERFI) was mentioned as a positive force conducting interreligious dialogue. Some interviewees highlighted efforts to sensitize people to laws, such as a mural in Ouahigouya, theater-forums to raise awareness. Finally, the Koglwéogo are a controversial group, but those interviewed say they do bring a genuine sense of security to the region. while the police do not.

⁷² "2015 Investment Climate Statement – Burkina Faso", U.S. State Department

Recommendations

Population and Demographics

The Burkinabé government (including the Ministry of Health) should improve and expand social services and ensure that the population has access to affordable health care, including family health services and medication. Traditional leaders, civil society organizations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Directorate of Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts (ONAPREGECC) should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land and resource allocation. Traditional and religious leaders, local government and civil society organizations should facilitate sustained dialogue and interactions across ethnic, religious and political divides.

Politics and Governance

NGOs, INGOs, and the donor community, in collaboration with the Burkinabé government, should carry out civic education activities, especially for youth and women. Regional organizations and the Burkinabé government should support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels. Civil society organizations should provide training and resources encourage to greater political participation among women. Local government, civil society organizations, traditional leaders, the media, and other relevant actors should work together to promote peaceful mediation and dialogue to reduce pastoral conflicts, perhaps drawing upon other successful interventions in other ECOWAS member states.

Economics and Resources

Traditional leaders, civil society organizations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Directorate of Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts

(ONAPREGECC) should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land and resource allocation. NGOs, donor organizations. and the Burkinabé government should allocate resources to improve and expand infrastructure for roads and water (both for drinking and for irrigation). NGOs, IFIs, and donor organizations should support regulation of practices such as charcoal-burning, overgrazing, and deforestation that lead to the degradation of land and ultimately to climate change. The local government and the Ministry of Agriculture, Water, Sanitation and Food Security should prioritize investment in agricultural technology and mechanization. Private sector and international donors should provide access to funding, training and supplies, such as seeds and fertilizer, to improve farmer resiliency to drought and the effects of climate change. Civil society and the international community should play a greater oversight and advocacy role to ensure that mining operations in Burkina Faso are adhering to international best practices on business and human rights, with clear mechanisms in place for affected communities to seek redress.

Security


The Burkinabé government should implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including, but not limited to, training and oversight of community-based self-defense groups, such as the *Koglwéogo*. The Burkinabé government, with support from regional international partners, should enhance the institutional and operational capacity of the police force and Gendarmerie, including improved recruitment and training, higher salaries, and provision of material resources. The Ministry of Defense and the Burkinabé government should work with regional and international partners to address larger regional trends of extremism and insecurity, including strengthening border controls.

Rule of Law

Local government should work with the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion, civil society organizations and international partners to support efforts to reform the judicial system, including transparency initiatives and expanding access to judicial services. Local and international NGOs and civil society organizations should create programs that provide oversight and uphold the rights of women in both traditional justice mechanisms and in the court system.

Sahel Region

The Sahel region is located in the north of the country, along the Burkina Faso-Mali border. The population of the region is 1,272,545.⁷³ The Sahel is home to seminomadic pastoralists, such as the Fulani, that raise livestock utilizing transhumance, the seasonal movement of livestock between pastures.⁷⁴ Two of Burkina Faso's large-scale gold mines are located in this region.



| Structural Vulnerabilities High youth unemployment Geographic isolation of the region Poverty and famine Lack of social services, including education Limited public security capacities Radicalized segments of the population Early marriages | |
|---|--|
| Large refugee population Perceived political exclusion Nepotism and corruption Stigmatization of non-indigenous Malian refugee groups Porous borders with Niger and Mali Criminality, including illicit drug crime Tensions between the security forces and the Koglwéogo | |
| Event Driven Dieke | |
| Event-Driven Risks Elections Protests Inter-ethnic violence Terrorism | |

^{73 &}quot;Burkina Faso: Data Portal: Sahel", Open Data For Africa

⁷⁴ "Pastoralism Development in the Sahel: A Road to Stability?", De Haan, C., Dubern, E., Garancher, B., and Quintero, C., "Global Center of Conflict, Security and Development", June 2014.

Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment: Burkina Faso | 56

Social and Institutional Traditional and religious leaders Local administrative officials Peace Through Development (PDEV II) Project⁷⁵ Committee of Community Action (CAC) Civil society organizations, e.g. The Association of reflection and action for the development of the Province of Oudalan (ARAD) SONAGES (National Society for the Management of Food Security)

Population and Demographics

Those interviewed in the region reported high levels of youth unemployment in the Sahel region, primarily due to low literacy rates and lack of economic opportunities. Schools in the region are over-populated and sometimes far from settlement areas, increasing the likelihood of school dropouts. Due to the lack of educational and economic opportunities, youth are vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups, or recruitment to work in the gold sector as underage labor.

Participants also noted that there has been a decline of livestock in the region because of tensions and violence between farmers and herders. Land degradation was also cited as an ongoing vulnerability affecting livelihoods in the region. The proliferation of sites used by the mining sector has led to less arable and fertile farmlands. Droughts and floods over time have also caused a decrease in farming activities, causing the price of staple foods to rise. As prices have increased, malnutrition and famine have become more widespread. In addition, trade and commerce have suffered as the security situation continues to worsen.

Respondents also discussed the presence of Malian refugees in the region since 2012. The Sahel region currently hosts most of the 33,692 Malian refugees who have fled violent conflict in the northern part of Mali.⁷⁶ The region is home to two of Burkina Faso's refugee camps, Mentao

Camp in Soum Province and Goudoubou Camp in Seno Province. Tensions exist between local and refugee populations due to suspicion and accusations that the refugee population is complicit in terrorist activities. The growing refugee population has also intensified land disputes in the region and has further strained scarce resources. The prevalence of health risks was also noted as a vulnerability in the Sahel region. Respondents noted a lack of adequate health facilities, shortage of medicines in the region's one CSPS⁷⁷ and insufficient health staff to attend to the needs of the population.

Politics and Governance

Many interviewees from Sahel expressed mistrust towards the government, due to perceptions of neglect and isolation in the Sahel region. This sentiment continues to grow as politicians have failed to deliver services promised during political campaigning. Respondents also cited a tendency towards tribal and ethnic loyalty, which often supersedes a sense of national identity and loyalty. These tendencies become particularly acute during elections. Interviewees also expressed the sentiment that politics separates families and divides ethnic groups, deepening polarization and undermining efforts towards a more cohesive national identity. Women reported that they are not taken seriously by the political apparatus; there is discrimination widespread gender in the management of political affairs and women are mostly excluded from politics. For example, in the

^{75 &}quot;Peace Through Development II (PDEV II), USAID

⁷⁶ "Despite Mali Peace accord, more flee persistent violence", Pes, H., UNHCR, November 2016.

⁷⁷ Bush Hospitals or CSPS (*Centre de Sante et de Promotion Sociale*) usually consist of a general medical unit and a maternity ward. It is a government program which ensures that every Burkinabé has access to health facilities.

commune of Dori, out of 172 government counselors, there are only six women.

Economics and Resources

Respondents cited poverty. inequality and unemployment as prevalent economic vulnerabilities in the region. Many interviewees reported a surge in the price of staple foods because of floods and droughts in the area. Others mentioned that the cattle market, traditionally one of the main sources of income in the Sahel, is disappearing because of migration flows and internal displacement due to the terrorist attacks. Trade has been stunted due to the continued security issues.

Since 2012, Burkina Faso has been the third biggest site for gold exploration and fourth biggest gold producer in Africa.⁷⁸ The Sahel is home to two of the two dozen gold mines in Burkina Faso; the Belahouro (Inata) gold mine in Soum Province and the Essakane mine in Oudalan Province. In 2015. Burkina Faso's Parliament passed a new mining code which abolished a previous 10 percent tax break on mining company profits and obliges firms to pay one percent of their monthly revenue into a local development fund. This code also requires the state to pay 20 percent of its mining revenues into the fund and includes provisions for the creation of a fund to rehabilitate artisanal mining sites and prohibit the use of harmful chemicals.79 Participants reported that the mining firms in this region have thus far failed to meet the obligations laid out in the 2015 mining code. Respondents also cited increased cost of living and increased housing prices in mining areas. Investigations by NGOs have also suggested forced displacements have occurred by the government to make way for the mining concessions.80

Security

Those interviewed in Sahel emphasized the persistence of violent extremism as the main security threat in the region. The Ansarul Islam group, a jihadist movement led by Malam Dicko Ibrahim, is believed to have been behind many of the incidents of violent extremism in this region. This group has links to other jihadist movements in neighboring Mali, such as Ansar al-Dine, and the porous Malian- Burkinabé border is perceived as a facilitating factor for the spread of terrorism from Mali to Burkina Faso. The group is thought to have been behind two attacks on police stations in the Soum Province in February 2017, and has claimed the December 2016 attack on the military base in Nassoumbou, which killed a dozen soldiers.81 There were reports of incidents in schools where armed men forced the teachers to conduct their lessons in Arabic instead of French, and a primary school was set on fire in Baraboule in Soum Province.82 The increase of these security threats has led to the closure of over 600 schools in Oudalan and Soum Provinces.83 Insecurity also impacts access to other social services such as health and food supply. Respondents emphasized a general sense of fear in the region and the perception that the central government has neglected the Sahel in matters of security.

Participants also discussed criminality as a vulnerability in the Sahel region, citing fatal violence, robberies, and kidnappings. There has been a rapid proliferation of self-defense groups (the *Koglwéogo*) as a result of the perceived lack of security provided by the state. In the Sahel, the *Koglwéogo* started as police informants, but eventually developed into an organization that makes arrests, enacts justice, and assess fines. They are usually armed with hand-crafted weapons and 12-calibre rifles.⁸⁴ Respondents discussed

⁸⁰ "Etude sur l'extraction d'or: le profit plus important que les droits

humains?", Pain pour le prochain, February 2016.

 ⁷⁸ "Burkina Faso parliament adopts new mining code", Reuters, June 2015.
 ⁷⁹ Ibid

⁸¹ "Burkina Faso: Fears Grow Over Domestic Militant Threat", Sehmer, A., The Jamestown Foundation, April 2017.

⁸² Ibid

 ⁸³ "Burkina Faso Insecurity in Sahel Region", ACAPS, March 2017.
 ⁸¹ "Burkina Faso: qui sont les Koglweogo, ces milices rurales?"

Boudani, Y., RFI, March 2016.

reports of violence allegedly orchestrated by the *Koglwéogo* against the police force, and tensions between the different *Koglwéogo* groups across the region.⁸⁵ However, participants reported that the local population generally trusts the *Koglwéogo* more than they trust the police and the military.

Conflict between farmers and herders is also a source of insecurity in the region, stemming from land use competition. However, participants reported that some herdsmen have migrated south in order to avoid conflicts with the farmers in the north.

Rule of Law

Participants reported that there is mistrust in the judicial system, as it is generally perceived to be corrupt by local populations. There is the perception that justice is available only for the rich. Participants reported that the local population lacks an understanding and familiarity with the formal legal system, which leads to the misapplication of laws and texts. Local women are underrepresented in the judicial system and are not generally included in local decision-making processes. The village head plays a significant role in the settlement of disputes, with the formal legal system only being utilized as a last resort.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Religious leaders were cited as a resiliency factor in the Sahel region. It was noted that, unlike in other parts of the country, they are generally not involved in political life, allowing them to be impartial and contribute to mitigating situations of tension. Youth associations have been another resiliency factor. They have been created to stimulate an interest in development and conduct and promote outreach activities.

Civil society organizations contribute to the social, political and economic awareness of the

population. The National Inventory Management Company (SONAGES) helps to relieve hunger, especially during famine by subsidizing food so that it can be easily accessed. A USAID-funded project, Peace through Development II Project (PDEVII), works to reduce country risk of instability and increase their resilience to violent extremism. They do so by empowering youth through activities and trainings focused on civic education, vocational and entrepreneurial skills and leadership. The PDEVII also was cited as successful in preventing conflict linked to transhumance as they drew out corridors of pasture for herders. Additionally, the Association of Reflection and Action for the development of the province of Oudalan (ARAD) conducts activities to raise awareness for peace and security. The Community Action Committee (CAC) convenes security and defense forces to collaborate with the local population to encourage protection of the civilian population. Members of the CAC appeared on radio shows to disseminate peace messages and helped security forces to learn local customs, especially with regards to their interactions with herders, so they can be more effective in their security functions.

Recommendations

Population and Demographics

The donor community and INGOs should work with local NGOS and the Ministry of National Education and Literacy to improve education infrastructure in the region. Specifically, the region needs school buildings and safe classrooms that provide an environment conducive to learning. Civil society, the private sector, and donor organizations should support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage youth. The Burkinabé government (including the Ministry of Health) should improve and expand social services and ensure that the population has access to affordable health care and medication. Regional and sub-regional organizations should work with

⁸⁵ "Burkina Faso: The Koglweogo's rough justice", SouthWorld, August 2016.

the Burkinabé government to create a system to provide responses to public health incidents, such as drinking water contamination and disease outbreak. Civil society organizations and local leaders should implement dialogue and relationship-building activities between refugee populations and local communities to mitigate tensions and build trust.

Politics and Governance

Civil society organizations should work to set up radio stations in the communities in the Sahel to help better inform the public and communicate with rural populations. The Burkinabé government should expand social services, especially in rural regions, and build trust with local communities. Regional organizations and the Burkinabé government should support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels. Civil society organizations should provide training and resources to encourage greater political participation among women.

Economics and Resources

The Burkinabé government should enforce the provisions of the 2015 mining code to encourage investment in local development by mining companies. Civil society and the international community should play a greater oversight and advocacy role to ensure that mining operations in Burkina Faso are adhering to international best practices on business and human rights, with clear mechanisms in place for affected communities to seek redress. NGOs, donor organizations, and the Burkinabé government should allocate resources to improve and expand infrastructure for roads and water (both for drinking and for irrigation). NGOs, INGOs and the donor community should work with the Burkinabé government to provide loans and financial support for small-scale farmers and herders in the region, particularly around efforts to increase their resiliency to the effects of climate change.

Security

The Burkinabé government should implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including, but not limited to, training and oversight of community-based self-defense groups, such as the Koglwéogo. The Burkinabé government, with support from regional international partners, should enhance the institutional and operational capacity of the police force and Gendarmerie, including improved recruitment and training, higher salaries, and provision of material resources. The Ministry of Defense and the Burkinabé government should work with regional and international partners to address larger regional trends of extremism and insecurity, including strengthening border controls. Where relevant, traditional leaders, civil society organizations, the Ministry of Territorial Administration (Directorate of Conflict Mitigation and Prevention) and the National Observatory for the Prevention and Management of Communal Conflicts (ONAPREGECC) should collaborate to mitigate tensions over land access and resource management.

Rule of Law

Local government should work with the Ministry of Justice, Human Rights and Civic Promotion, civil society organizations and international partners to support efforts to reform the judicial system, including transparency initiatives and expanding access to judicial services. Programs should particularly focus on expanding access for vulnerable populations, promoting popular legal education, and upholding the rights of women, both in traditional justice mechanisms and in the court system.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Burkina Faso has experienced significant challenges over recent decades, with political crises, authoritarian leadership, and violence; which have eroded social trust in government institutions and rule of law. Burkina Faso is rich in resources and opportunities for economic growth, with a young population eager to work. To address cycles of poverty and violence, especially in regions such as Sahel and Nord, the country must focus on stimulating the economy through significant investment in infrastructure and provision of public services, as well as economic diversification to reduce dependency on volatile commodity prices such as gold.

Large structural changes take time however, and everyday experiences of the Burkinabé population such as spikes in staple food prices, criminality, corruption in law and order institutions, lack of access to basic health and education, and competition over land and resources, are drivers of discontent. Gaps in the state security apparatus notably provision of police - has given rise to Koglwéogo self-defense militias, which are seen to many communities as a valuable source of local security. However, the risk of the Koglwéogo usurping the role of public security forces could further undermine the role of the state in these areas and have already led to some reports of human rights abuses perpetrated by the militias. The Koglwéogo represent just one part of a broader need for security sector reform within Burkina Faso, both in terms of provision of law and order capacities to reduce criminality, communal violence and illegal mining practices, and securing border regions to reduce terrorist footholds in the country. The role of inter-religious dialogue has been a source of longstanding resilience in regions such as Cascades, Sud-Ouest and Centre; and can be used as a central tool for countering violent extremism, as well as resolving communal tensions.

Women continue to face systematic discrimination in the political, social and economic spheres, manifested in risk factors such as gender-based violence and high maternal mortality rates. They also face challenges such as disinheritance of property and exclusion from political appointments. Women, along with the growing youth population, should be used as sources of resiliency within the country, leveraging their participation in politics and economics to build a more prosperous and stable future.

Population and Demographics

- Leverage existing frameworks of interreligious dialogue to promote social cohesion
- Support programs to promote cooperation, social cohesion and dispute resolution between local communities and refugee populations
- Invest in rural development to improve infrastructure and service provision
- Support CSO initiatives for culturallysensitive promotion of women's health, including family planning

Politics and Governance

- Implement sensitization programs on civic responsibilities, with particular emphasis on women and youth
- Allocate greater resources to the High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRUN) and other mechanisms for reconciliation
- Improve the management of future electoral processes to promote transparency and help prevent incidents of electoral violence
- Support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels

- Promote meaningful implementation and enforcement of the gender quota
- Support programs to promote women's political participation and leadership
- Strengthening of State Institutions to improve good governance

Economics and Resources

- Support and expand microfinancing and vocational training, particularly in support of youth and women-led initiatives
- Develop and improve infrastructure for the transformation and storage of agricultural products and access to market
- Create awareness and enforce regulations to minimize the negative environmental effects of illegal mining, charcoal-burning, overgrazing and deforestation
- Support macroeconomic reforms to diversify the economy
- Allocate resources to expand infrastructure for roads and public services
- Within the mining sector:
 - Regulate informal small-scale mining licensing and provide stronger oversight
 - Strengthen land tenure legislation to protect vulnerable populations from forced displacement

 Ensure that large-scale mining companies are adhering to international best practices on business and human rights, with mechanisms in place for affected communities to seek redress

Security

- Implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including training and oversight of Koglwéogo and Dozo groups
- Enhance the operational and institutional capacity of the security forces
- Promote initiatives to build trust between local communities and security forces
- Enhance cooperation among local, regional and international partners to address larger regional trends of insecurity

Rule of Law

- Promote transparency and efficiency in the formal justice system
- Create programs that provide oversight and protect women's rights in both the traditional justice mechanisms and the courts

Appendix A: Data Sample

| Phase | Dimension | Source | Metric | Sample |
|------------------|---------------|-------------------------------|---|---|
| Phase 1: Desktop | Resilience | SNA | Survey | 24 Peace/Security Actors |
| Phase 1: Desktop | Vulnerability | ECOWARN | SitReps | 929 reports |
| Phase 1: Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections is/are protected from political interference | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election. | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | EIU Democracy Index | Electoral process and pluralism | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | EIU Democracy Index | Political Participation | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | EIU Democracy Index | Functioning of Government | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | IDEA | Average Voter Turnout Parliamentary | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Transparency International | Corruption Perception | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | BTI | Political and Social Integration | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Freedom House | Political Rights | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Mo Ibrahim Index | Personal Safety | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UN, ECOWAS, AU | Peace Operations | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | ACLED | Conflict Fatalities per capita | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |

| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UPPSALA | Presence/Conflict | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
|------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|
| Flidse I Desklop | vullerability | UFFGALA | with Non-State | states normalized and |
| | | | Armed Groups | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | PTS | Political Terror Scale | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Thase I Desktop | vuncrability | 110 | – Amnesty | states normalized and |
| | | | - Annesty | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | PTS | Political Terror Scale | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Thase I Desktop | vumerability | 115 | - State | states normalized and |
| | | | - State | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | PTS | Political Terror Scale | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Flidse I Desklop | vumerability | FIS | – HRW | states normalized and |
| | | | | scaled) |
| Dhana 1 Dealstan | Vulnerability | UNHCR | | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UNHCR | Refugees by country | |
| | | | of origin per capita | states normalized and |
| Dhara (Daalataa | Multa and all the | | Defecte a human start | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UNHCR | Refugees by country | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | of origin (difference | states normalized and |
| | | | 2015-2014) per | scaled) |
| Dhara (D. 1) | Mada 1 222 | | capita | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UNHCR | IDPs by Country of | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | Asylum per capita | states normalized and |
| | | | | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UNHCR | IDPs by country of | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | asylum (difference | states normalized and |
| | | | 2015-2014) per | scaled) |
| | | - | capita | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, the | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | independence of the | states normalized and |
| | | | judiciary is | scaled) |
| | | | guaranteed. | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, national- | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | level judges give | states normalized and |
| | | | reasons for their | scaled) |
| | | | decisions/judgments. | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | allegations of | states normalized and |
| | | | corruption against | scaled) |
| | | | senior level | |
| | | | politicians and/or | |
| | | | civil servants of any | |
| | | | level are investigated | |
| | | | by an independent | |
| | | | body. | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, the | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | body/bodies that | states normalized and |
| | | | investigate/s | scaled) |
| | | | allegations of public | |
| | | | sector corruption | |
| | | | is/are effective. | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | Global Integrity | In practice, the | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| | | | mechanism for | states normalized and |
| | | | citizens to report | scaled) |
| | | | police misconduct or | |
| | | | abuse of force is | |
| | | | effective. | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | WB Human Rights | % of Women on | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| • | | and Law Report | Constitutional Court | states normalized and |
| | | | | scaled) |
| | | | | scaled) |

| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | WB – Women, Business, and Law | Does the law mandate equal remuneration for | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
|-----------------|---------------|----------------------------------|--|---|
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | WB – Women, Business, and Law | work of equal value? Does the law mandate nondiscrimination based on gender in | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | WB – Women, Business, and Law | hiring? Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited? | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Gini coefficient | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Gini WYD | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Income Share Held by Highest 10% | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Population with Improved Sanitation (Urban-Rural Difference) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Population with Improved Water Source (Urban-Rural Difference) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UN Stats | Children under 5 moderately or severely underweight, percentage | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Depth of the food deficit (kilocalories per person per day) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Prevalence of Underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | GDP per capita, PPP (current international \$) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UN Stats | Literacy, 15-24, Women | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | School enrollment, primary and secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, female (%) (modeled ILO estimate) | 15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled) |

| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UN Stats | Median Age | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Thase I Desklop | vumerability | UN Stats | Median Age | states normalized and |
| | | | | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Population Growth | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Thase I Desklop | vumerability | Wond Bank Data | | states normalized and |
| | | | | scaled) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | UN Stats | Prevalence of | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Thase I Desktop | vuniciability | 011 01213 | underweight, weight | states normalized and |
| | | | for age, female (% of | scaled) |
| | | | children under 5) | Scaleu) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Maternal mortality | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Thase I Desktop | vumerability | Wond Bank Data | ratio (modeled | states normalized and |
| | | | estimate, per | scaled) |
| | | | 100,000 live births) | Scaleu) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Contraceptive | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Phase I Desklop | vumerability | WORLD BARK Data | prevalence, any | states normalized and |
| | | | methods (% of | scaled) |
| | | | women ages 15-49) | Scaleu) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Vulnerability | World Bank Data | Life expectancy at | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Phase I Desklop | vumerability | WORU BARK Data | birth, female (years) | states normalized and |
| | | | Dirtri, Ternale (years) | scaled) |
| Dhana 1 Dealstan | Vulnerability | | Dereente de ef | 15 (all ECOWAS member |
| Phase 1 Desktop | vumerability | WB – Women, Business, and Law | Percentage of | states normalized and |
| | | business, and Law | women aged 20-24 years old who were | |
| | | | married or in a union | scaled) |
| | | | | |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Risk | ECOWARN | before age 18 | 712 (after reducing for |
| Phase I Desklop | RISK | ECOWARN | IncReps | duplicates and relevance) |
| Phase 1 Desktop | Risk | ACLED | Incidents | 495 |
| Phase 1 Desktop Phase 2 Field | Risk and | Focus Group | | 15 |
| | | Discussions | Broken out by Men, Women, and Youth | 10 |
| Research | Vulnerability Risk and | | Prominent | 23 |
| Phase 2 Field | | Key Informant | | 23 |
| Research | Vulnerability | Interviews | individuals and local | |
| | | | experts | |

Appendix B: Vulnerability Index

Index Data Sources

Based on the five human security pillars, a series of indicators were identified based on relevance and measurability. Data sources were then identified from recognized institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations, as well as universities, research institutions, and think tanks. A full list of data sources is attached in *Appendix A*. During selection and testing of the index, the availability of data was assessed to ensure an even distribution of scores.

Process: Calculating the Scores

The index is scored on a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability, and 10 the lowest level of vulnerability. Each raw data set is normalized and scaled, before being integrated into the indicator and pillar scores.

1. Normalization

An index, by definition, integrates and compares data sets with very different curves and distribution. As a first step, therefore, it is necessary to normalize the data so that it can be properly compared. Without framing the data within the context of the wider group of numbers, its meaning can become skewed. Therefore, the process of finding the mean and calculating the Standard Deviation (SD) of the data set, then using those elements to approximate a normal distribution, can be used to provide this meaning. The Gaussian normalization formula is outlined below.

Where
$$\mu$$
 is the mean
 σ^2 is the variance
 $f(x, \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\sigma} e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}$

SD is the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for a group of numbers as a whole. Normal distribution is then used to find how the variables are approximately normally distributed. In the context of this tool, it will help to understand where countries sit in relation to each other within the group distribution of a particular data set.

For raw data sets that have gaps (e.g. data is unavailable for some countries but not others), country data points are left blank. This ensures countries are not provided with an artificial score, where data does not exist.

2. Scaling

To create an index where countries are scored within a defined range, the data sets must be scaled so the scores can be integrated. This process of scaling transforms the normalized data into a number between 1 and 10, with 10 representing the lowest level of vulnerability. The below formula was applied to standardize the distribution values from [min, max] to [MIN, MAX], matching the new scale of values both for the highest and lowest edges of the distribution.

$$X = MIN + \frac{(MAX - MIN)}{(max - min)} \times (x - min)$$

3. Aggregation

Each indicator may be made up of either one or multiple data sources. In cases where multiple data sets were used to make up the one indicator, the data sets were each scaled to preliminary index scores (1-10), as outlined in the above steps. The average was then taken of these scores to reach a final index score for that indicator. This process was repeated at the pillar level, first averaging, then scaling the indicator scores.

Appendix C: Additional References

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Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar

| | Vulnerabilities | Risks | Resilience Factors | Recommendations |
|------------------------------|--|---|---|--|
| Population & Demographics | Water management and land access Demographic changes; population growth; and rural- urban migration Large youth population Environmental pressures (floods and drought-impact on agriculture and food security) | IDPs and cross- border population movements Koglwéogo and Dozo groups | Co-existence between religious groups; inter- religious dialogue Cultural practice of the 'joking relationship' Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiatives Government conflict mitigation initiatives, including the Ministry of Territorial Administration's Directorate for Conflict Management and Prevention | Leverage existing frameworks of inter- religious dialogue to promote social cohesion Support programs to promote cooperation, social cohesion and dispute resolution between local communities and refugee populations Invest in rural development to improve infrastructure and service provision Support CSO initiatives for culturally- sensitive promotion of women's health, including family planning |
| Politics & Governance | Lack of popular civic education Under- representation of women in politics Lack of state presence and public services in some regions Inadequate governance of the security sector | Elections Coups d'état attempts Constitutional/ electoral reforms Politicization of religious and traditional Institutions Local governance deficit | Traditional/ customary/religious leaders (e.g. Moro Naba) Application of customary laws for conflict mitigation Development and awareness-raising activities by civil society organizations, international donors, and government agencies | Implement sensitization programs on civic responsibilities, with particular emphasis on women and youth Allocate greater resources to the High Council for Reconciliation and National Unity (HCRUN) and other mechanisms for reconciliation Improve the management of future electoral processes to promote transparency and help prevent |

| | | | - Existence of gender frameworks and legislations | incidents of electoral violence - Support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the local and national levels |
|--------------------------|---|---|--|--|
| | | | | - Promote meaningful implementation and enforcement of the gender quota |
| | | | | - Support programs to promote women's political participation and leadership |
| | | | | - Strengthening of State Institutions to improve good governance |
| Security | Inadequate natural resource management contributing to inter- communal conflicts Porous borders Underequipped security forces Reliance on non- state security actors | Conflict between groups over access to arable land and other natural resources Conflict over land use Terrorist activity; spillover of conflict from neighboring countries Criminality Farmers-herders conflicts | Role of local, regional and international organizations to manage fragility <i>Koglwéogo</i> and <i>Dozo</i> groups who fill in security gaps in communities with weak State presence | Implement security sector reform (SSR) initiatives, including training and oversight of <i>Koglwéogo</i> and <i>Dozo</i> groups Enhance the operational and institutional capacity of the security forces Promote initiatives to build trust between local communities and security forces Enhance cooperation among local, regional and international partners to address larger regional trends of insecurity |
| Economics & Resources | - Undiversified economy - Unemployment, poverty, and inequality | Illegal mining activity Environmental degradation including water pollution due to mining | - Vibrant informal economic sector - Government initiatives to support farmers and small-scale producers through subsidies and | Support and expand microfinancing and vocational training, particularly in support of youth and women- led initiatives Develop and improve infrastructure for the |
| | | activities | fertilizers | transformation and storage of agricultural |

| | | - Ineffective implementation of land tenure - Weak implementation of environmental protection policies | - Access to micro- credits to women groups for economic activities | products and access to market Create awareness and enforce regulations to minimize the negative environmental effects of illegal mining, charcoal-burning, overgrazing and deforestation Support macroeconomic reforms to diversify the economy Allocate resources to expand infrastructure for roads and public services Within the mining sector: Regulate informal small-scale mining licensing and provide stronger oversight Strengthen land tenure legislation to protect vulnerable populations from forced displacement Ensure that large-scale mining companies are adhering to international best practices on business and human rights, with mechanisms in place for affected communities to seek |
|-------------|---|---|--|--|
| Rule of Law | - Perceptions of | - Incidents of | - Sanctioning of | redress - Promote transparency |
| | corruption and impunity within the justice system | corruption within the court system - Human rights violations | judges and public servants over corruption - Strengthening of government | and efficiency in the formal justice system - Create programs that provide oversight and protect women's rights |

| - Low representation of women from the justice system | - Mob justice | institutions to improve governance | in both the traditional justice mechanisms and the courts |
|---|---------------|--|---|
| justice system | | governance | and the courts |