Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

SENEGAL

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ECOWAS COMMISSION
COMMISSION DE LA CEDEAO
COMMISSÃO DA CEDEAO

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
AEMO	*Action Educative en Milieu Ouvert* (Open Educational Action)
AfDB	African Development Bank
ANID	African Network for Integrated Development
AU	African Union
AVEC	*Association Villageoise d'Epargne et de Crédit* (Village Association of Savings and Credit)
CAURIE-MF	*Coopérative Autonome pour le Renforcement des Initiatives Economiques par la Microfinance* (Autonomous Cooperative for the Strengthening of Economic Initiatives through Microfinance)
CAVE	*Cellules d'alerte contre les violences* (Violence Alert Cells)
COPI	*Construire La Paix* (Construct Peace)
COSPAC	*La coordination sous régionale des organisations de la société civile pour la paix en Casamance* (Coordination of Sub-regional Organizations for Peace in Casamance)
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CRA	Conflict Risk Assessment
CRVA	Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DEA	*Diplôme d'études approfondies* (Diploma of Advanced Studies)
DIC	Criminal Investigation Department
DPA	ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs
DPKRS	ECOWAS Directorate of Peacekeeping & Regional Security
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EITI	Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
ENDA	Environmental Action and Development in the Third World
EWD	ECOWAS Directorate of Early Warning
FAP	*Futur Au Présent*
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGM/C	Female genital mutilation/cutting
GIABA	Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa
GBV	Gender-based violence
GIE	*Groupements d'Intérêt Economique* (Economic Interest Groups)
GIS	Geographic Information System
IFIs	International financial institutions
KII	Key Informant Interview
MFDC	*Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFNAC/CENTIF	National Office for the Fight Against Fraud and Corruption
PUDC	*Programme d'Urgence de Développement Communautaire*
PUMA	*Programme d'Urgence de Modernisation des Axes et Territoires Frontaliers* (Emergency Program for the Modernization of Roads and Border Areas)
REWARD	Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SitReps	ECOWARN Situation Reports
SNA	Stakeholder Network Analysis
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission

The 15 Member-States of the ECOWAS Community represent a thriving region of the world, with a population of approximately 366 million and a rich human and topographical diversity. From the coastline to the mountain peaks of Fouta Djallon, across the Sahara and the mangroves of the Niger Delta, ECOWAS is home to diverse families, communities, and nations.

Over the last decade, the region has witnessed significant progress in lifting the standard of living for millions. However, along with the richness of natural resources, human capital and great opportunity, there are also challenges to contend with such as natural disasters, pandemics, ethno-sectarian tensions, and security threats caused by extremism and terrorism.

Global developments and changes such as advances in technology, human migration and climate change, have added new levels of complexity, presenting new challenges for strategic planning and preparedness as we look ahead to the future.

This is where Early Warning plays a critical role in helping ECOWAS to understand the changing dynamics so as to strengthen decision making and early response at the regional and national levels. The Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) serve as an important resource in this regard. These reports are useful for strengthening the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework action plans as well as to serve as reference materials for an in-depth understanding of the human security dynamics in our Member States, and for our partners across the region.

I therefore invite national stakeholders, all ECOWAS institutions and our partners to make use of these reports for the entrenchment of peace and progress for the benefit of the Citizens of ECOWAS.

Jean-Claude Brou
President of the ECOWAS Commission

Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission

ECOWAS takes pride in finalizing this CRVA report which aims to identify structural vulnerabilities, event driven risks and existing resilience factors in each Member State of the Community. Indeed, this is a remarkable feat towards boosting the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, with ECOWAS setting the pace for the development of an African-owned data set that can be tapped into to enhance human security analysis and accurate forecasting to assist policymakers to make informed decisions on pressing issues in the region. This information can be used as a baseline for ECOWAS and its partners to inform early warning and response efforts, particularly in this time when Early Warning and Response Mechanism is being deployed at the National level.

The CRVA research leverages ECOWARN data—gathered by Field Monitors—to establish a country baseline for monitoring patterns and trends across human security pillars. By comparing ECOWARN data to other data sets, and complementing quantitative data with qualitative findings, the assessments also help the Early Warning Directorate of ECOWAS to gather more robust data that is rich, reliable and empirical. The resulting findings are more representative in terms of geography, time, and theme for each country and needs to be updated periodically.

ECOWAS will consolidate this achievement by applying the knowledge and skills embodied in the CRVA Manual. My conviction for this emanates from the fact that the training of all EWD staff in the development of the CRVA Index, which marks the climax of transfer of knowledge and skills from the USAID REWARD technical staff to ECOWAS, will allow ECOWAS to independently conduct future CRVAs. Already, the EWD has initiated a process to put to practice the defined methodological framework to conduct Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby serving as the first pillar in implementing the decision of the joint ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to engage communities in peacebuilding processes.

We hope the Member States of our Community take ownership of this report and anchor development and peace initiatives upon it, in addressing the risks and vulnerabilities in their communities. As we decentralize Early Warning and Response to the ECOWAS countries, the Commission stands ready to accompany each Member States in the implementation of the actionable recommendations embodied in the CRVA report.

Finda Koroma
Vice President, ECOWAS Commission

Preface

The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate has made giant strides in the practice of data driven early warning, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of incidents and situations from multiple sources, with the added benefit of original data generated through the ECOWARN system. Indeed, the Center's state-of-the-art technological tools places it at a vantage position to monitor and analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS region, cutting across the key areas of human security.

ECOWAS has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the monitoring of threats to human security across the region including the Sahelo-Saharan, Mano River, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad and Senegambia conflict systems to improve response for the prevention and management of conflict escalation.

Beyond a narrow focus on violent conflict alone, and consistent with its mandate to promote the socioeconomic and political integration of the sub-region, ECOWAS applies a human security lens with a view towards enhancing the well-being of the population in accordance with the ECOWAS Vision 2020. Thus, this report highlights risks, structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors across five dimensions (demographic, economic, security, governance and rule of law) at the national and sub-national levels.

Each CRVA report represents a myriad of perspectives and experiences from affected stakeholders including community leaders, civil society, administrative officials, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, just to mention a few. In this way, the CRVA report serves as a strategic document to provide an overview of the human security challenges in each ECOWAS member state as well as the social and institutional resilience factors that can help manage those challenges.

We hope that this report will be useful for strategic planning in addressing issues of human security as well as to provide insights to a multitude of stakeholders including policy and decision makers in the public and private sectors for conflict-sensitive engagement within the region.

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Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye
Director, ECOWAS Early Warning
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Executive Summary

From 2016 to 2019, ECOWAS collected quantitative and qualitative data in Senegal to better understand the structural vulnerabilities that may exist, and how those vulnerabilities affect the everyday lives of individuals and communities. This research was done in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) project, as part of a broader assessment of the entire West African region. As part of this process, a series of focus group discussions and interviews were conducted in September 2017 in Senegal to contextualize the findings and to learn more about resilience factors that mitigate risk and promote human security. The purpose of this report is to summarize these insights and perspectives, so that national stakeholders can build on their successes, and also to serve as a baseline for ECOWAS's monitoring of patterns and trends. The report provides an overview of national and subnational vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors, as well as conclusions and recommendations.

The CRVA was conducted by ECOWAS to update and expand upon the Conflict Risk Assessment (CRA) 2013-2014 country reports. To better understand the sub-national patterns and trends, the research design began with a desktop study involving a social network analysis based on a survey of peace and security actors in the country and a scoping of experts to be consulted during the fieldwork. This was followed by a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of patterns and trends in escalation dynamics and a quantitative analysis of relative structural vulnerabilities by country and human security pillar.

In Senegal, moderate levels of vulnerability were found in the area of Rule of Law, while less vulnerability was found in Economics/Resources,

Politics/Governance, Population/Demographics, and Security.

Some potential challenges were noted regarding election protests and the decades-long low-level separatist movement in the Casamance region, particularly given uncertainty regarding the political transition in neighboring Gambia (given the relationship between former Gambian president Yahya Jammeh and the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance - MFDC). Natural resource management and land tenure were also highlighted as important factors, particularly surrounding the mining and timber industries, with impacts on smuggling and cross-border tensions. Finally, inequality with regards to economic development, infrastructure, and service provision were highlighted as key concerns.

However, there were also strong social and institutional resilience factors for effective dispute resolution and peacebuilding in Senegal. There is a long history of ethnic and religious coexistence in the country, partly due to the mediating role played by prominent community figures, especially religious leaders, as well as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society organizations, and locally-driven cross-border committees working on a variety of issues. Microfinance and tontine initiatives are also effective in promoting economic resilience for women in the country.

The following report aims to provide an overview so that regional and national stakeholders can have a clear picture of the challenges faced by the country as well as the capacities that can be leveraged and built upon for the promotion of sustainable human security in Senegal.

Though risk/incident data naturally fluctuates and may therefore have changed since the publication of this

report, the structural vulnerabilities are reflective of medium- and long-term trends. These reports focus on the identification of structural vulnerabilities and resiliencies, and how they may impact upon events and developments as they occur.

Introduction

Research Process

The CRVA assesses structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors according to five human security pillars as identified by ECOWAS in a 2016 scoping paper.[1] The pillars are: 1) Economics and Resources, 2) Politics and Governance, 3) Population and Demographics, 4) Rule of Law, and 5) Security. Findings in this report describe how risks flow from vulnerabilities in the context of Senegal both within and across the five pillars. In recognition of the fact that violent conflict has underlying social, economic, political, and security drivers but expresses itself differently depending on the context, a holistic human security framework was used in this assessment, and will be used for the CRVAs in all ECOWAS member states. Furthermore, the analysis also breaks out gender considerations and external factors as cross-cutting issues that need to be understood for effective early warning, planning and response.[2]

As shown in the graphic below, the research was conducted in three main phases: Desktop Study, Field Research, and Analysis and Validation.

Phase 1: Desktop Study

The Desktop Study included a preliminary assessment of structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors.

For the assessment of structural vulnerabilities, the research used data from dozens of sources, including ECOWARN Situation Reports (SitReps). Drawing on these pre-existing data sets,[3] a CRVA Index was created to measure the relative levels of vulnerability across five human security dimensions in Senegal.

Desktop Study | Field Research | Analysis/ Validation

Stakeholder Mapping Survey | Quantitative Baseline Study | Country Scoping Workshop | Field Research | Participatory Analysis | CRVA Report and Follow-up | Joint analysis and planning

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[1] The EWD Scoping Paper was developed by ECOWAS to help inform the CRVA process, with the human security pillars identified based on best practice approaches such as ECOWARN guidelines and the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) framework.
[2] EWD Scoping Paper on "Risk Assessment of Five ECOWAS Pilot Countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso"
[3] Data sources used in the development of the CRVA Index include Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, the Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace.

For the assessment of event-driven risks, event data, including from ECOWARN's Incident Reports (IncReps), was triangulated against data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to estimate the locations and type of conflict issues at the sub-national level over time. Using multiple sources allowed for cross-validation, the filling of gaps, and the ability to identify trends in indicators and sub-indicators using queries and key word searches.

For the assessment of social and institutional resilience factors, a survey was deployed to all of ECOWAS's in-country contacts to learn more about the peace and security actors working to manage and reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the country. Respondents (including representatives of religious institutions, public sector actors, civil society, youth groups, and development actors, among others) were also asked to name organizations that they have partnered with in the last two years on issues of peace and security. Data was then uploaded to a Stakeholder Network Map for quantitative analysis and to identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital. Based on this analysis, key technical experts were identified and were contacted for the next phase of the research.

Phase 2: Field Research

The Field Research began with a scoping workshop in Dakar. Using the Stakeholder Network Map, highly-networked technical experts were convened in a workshop to validate the initial desktop findings and suggest a way forward for the qualitative analysis in the field. The Scoping Workshop was also used to tailor and sensitize the broader research questions and the Key Informant Interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) instruments and questionnaires based on local context. Additionally, the Scoping Workshop also served to attain references and contacts for key actors and stakeholders in the field who would be consulted over the course of the next two weeks during the KIIs and FGDs. Thus, the desktop study

phase informed the research questions that needed further context and validation in the field, as well as the sample of respondents to be engaged (what was asked, where, and to whom).

A team of experts and researchers then conducted an in-country assessment between September 11 and September 22, 2017 with participants from the regions of Dakar, Diourbel, Kédougou, Kolda, Kaolack, Saint-Louis, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Ziguinchor. The team traveled to the various hotspots identified in the desktop study and validated in the Scoping Workshop to interview key stakeholders affected by violence and with knowledge of local context and capacities. This team included representatives from the ECOWAS Directorates of Early Warning (EWD) and Political Affairs (DPA), as well as participants from USAID and affiliated experts. The KIIs and FGDs conducted during this in-country assessment collected qualitative data and information regarding various perspectives on structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risk factors, and social and institutional resilience factors relating to the different conflict issues across the country. These transcripts have been collated, streamlined to reduce repetition and vagueness, and categorized for analysis and prioritization during Phase 3.

Phase 3: Analysis and Validation

After the quantitative, GIS, and survey data was validated and contextualized in the field, and the qualitative data was collected, organized and summarized, this report was drafted and was then validated by ECOWAS and USAID. This report will serve as a baseline and resource for more targeted early warning products and analysis/planning towards strategic and operational prevention of human insecurity within the country of Senegal as well as associated conflict systems more broadly.

Terminology and Conceptual Definitions

In this CRVA report:

"Vulnerability" is defined as any structural factor that has the potential to be a conflict driver. These can include such things as youth unemployment, poverty, inequality, climate, patronage, demographic factors, etc.

"Risk" is defined as any event-driven factor that has the potential to be a conflict trigger. Risk factors can include specific controversies or events such as disasters or elections that may occur.

"Resilience" is defined as any social or institutional factor that has the potential to help mitigate or manage risks and vulnerabilities. These include political, cultural, and community leadership with significant social capital to influence conflict dynamics in a constructive way, including public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society, opinion leaders, development workers, etc. Resilience factors can include institutions that play a stabilizing role in the short, medium, or longer term.

The CRVA analysis was conducted according to the framework depicted in the figure below, whereby event-driven risk factors flow out of the structural vulnerabilities (per the red downward arrow) while social and institutional resilience factors mitigate and prevent those risks and vulnerabilities (per the green upward arrow).

For ECOWAS, this framework is useful in that it is aligned with the existing ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which is a strategic tool to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa. Key to the ECPF are the categories of *"Operational Prevention,"* or measures applicable in the face of crisis, and *"Structural Prevention,"* or measures that ensure that crises do not arise or re-occur. The CRVA framework is aligned with the ECPF such that identified Vulnerability Factors are to be mitigated by Structural Prevention measures, and Risk Factors are to be mitigated by Operational Prevention measures. This alignment is important for the utility and actionability of this report by users in West Africa.

Economics and Resources	Population and Demographics	Politics and Governance	Security	Rule of Law
Structural and Contextual Vulnerability Factors				
Event-Driven Risk Factors				
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors				

Literature Review

A Human-Centric Approach to Early Warning

In academic literature, the human security lens to conflict early warning is a change from the more state-centric approaches that were in vogue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, early warning was focused on prevention and mitigation of conflict between states. In the post-Cold War period with a surge in intra-state conflict, early warning was focused on identifying the drivers and impacts of civil conflict on states. At that time, analysis focused on terminology of state "collapse" and "failure," emphasizing impacts to neighboring countries or regions, and perpetuating a comparative paradigm of poverty and limited economic growth and conflict in contrast to more developed countries.[4]

However, as a more interconnected human and global security approach emerged in the 2000s, conceptions of state fragility and conflict analysis evolved in both development aid and policy approaches. As the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) describes, "At a very broad level, fragility is the result of a dynamic interplay between internal factors (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity)."[5] While not discounting the role of the state as a key vehicle for managing and preventing conflict, the human-centric approach looks first and foremost at the impact of demographic, economic, political, and security conflict drivers on individuals and communities as well as the role that a wide variety of social and

institutional factors play in preventing conflict. Thus, the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals' lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security outlines a human-centric approach to security in five principles: 1) *People-centered*, with a focus on protecting basic human freedoms; 2) *Multi-sectoral*, encompassing a broad understanding of threats and causes of insecurity; 3) *Comprehensive*, taking into account different types of individuals' security from economic to social; 4) *Context-specific,* emphasizing the need to analyze specific conflict contexts and root causes of insecurity; and 5) *Prevention-oriented,* highlighting locally tailored risk prevention and mitigation measures through early warning mechanisms.[6] This focus on cross-cutting issues and situation-specific analysis and response are central to the CRVA process and broader objectives of integrated conflict early warning and response by ECOWAS and its partners. For the CRVAs, this involves identifying conflict risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies across the human security pillars of Population and Demographics, Politics and Governance, Security, Economics and Resources, and Rule of Law.

Many indices and development frameworks have emerged for measuring resilience and fragility, from the Fund For Peace's *Fragile States Index*[7] to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Bank's *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)*[8] and Mo Ibrahim Foundation's *Index of African Governance*.[9] Today, leading international development actors and multilateral

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[4] "Defining and measuring state fragility: a new proposal", Ferreira, I., The Annual Bank Conference on Africa, June 2015

[5] "Topic Guide on Fragile States", Mcloughlin, C., Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), August 2009

[6] "Human Security in Theory and Practice", Human Security Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, January 2009

[7] Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace

[8] Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB)

[9] Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation

agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the AfDB have also produced strategies, practice areas, and tools, which seek to address the drivers of fragility. The AfDB, for example, has a 2014-2019 Strategy for *Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa*, with a focus on building member state capacities and focusing on "fragile situations rather than fragile states alone."[10]

As the AfDB Strategy notes, however, "there is no single solution and no predefined 'toolbox' for addressing fragility."[11] Older academic and policy conceptions of "state failure" used analysis centered on "traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression," as outlined in a 2009 paper by the United Nations Human Security Unit. Newer models of analysis have taken on a broader human security lens, which was in "response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone."[12]

Thus, a human-centric approach, as opposed to a state-centric approach, is important for analyzing risks and vulnerabilities to society for robust early warning and response mechanisms. Human security provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats which affect individuals' lives, whether through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political, or economic factors. As such, the CRVAs seek to draw upon the more dynamic and interrelated aspects of risk and vulnerability, which look at capacities and

pressures within a society with a view to identifying structural vulnerabilities, resiliencies and risks across key human security pillars. As defined by the United Nations General Assembly, "human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people."[13] This approach is also in line with the ECOWAS Vison 2020 which seeks to promote peace, prosperity, and cohesion across the region,[14] and includes a focus on strengthening many human security aspects within member states.

Research Questions

Based on the initial desktop findings, the team developed a set of framing questions broken out by the five human security pillars. These framing questions were not asked verbatim in the field, but rather informed the design of the KII and FGD instruments. These instruments included simple, open-ended questions intended to prompt a discussion during which respondents could express their opinions, experiences, and perceptions about the ways in which they had been impacted by vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors in Senegal.

Rule of Law: To what extent is the judiciary independent of the executive? What role does the judiciary play as regards questions of justice and impunity? Is there access to justice and legal services throughout the country? Is there reliance on alternative/traditional dispute resolution mechanisms? To what extent do communities rely on police and security forces to provide justice? To what extent are women's rights protected in practice?

Population and Demographics: What role do youth play in social, economic and political life? Is a

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10 "Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, 2014 – 2019", AfDB
11 Ibid.
12 "Human Security in Theory and Practice", Human Security Unit, OCHA, United Nations, January 2009

13 General Assembly resolution 66/290, October 2012
14 ECOWAS Vision 2020: Towards a Democratic and Prosperous Community, ECOWAS, June 2010

disproportionately large population of disenfranchised youth putting a strain on urban resources or public services? To what extent are adverse climatic conditions affecting food security and security in general? What role do women play in social, economic, and political life? How effective is family planning in terms of access and policy? What role has migration played in social and economic life?

Economics and Resources: To what extent has volatility in commodity prices negatively impacted the most vulnerable groups? Has this been a driver of food insecurity or conflict? Are there disparities between urban and rural areas in terms of service provision? What have been the economic impacts of insecurity in the Casamance region? What role could oil exploration play in the Senegalese economy, and are there any potential issues that could arise due to oil exploration, especially in terms of cross-border conflicts and resource management? What role does natural resource management and land tenure play in social cohesion? What role do illicit economic activities play in the local and national economy? What role do the extractive industries play in the economy? What role do women play in the economy?

Security: What role do the security forces play in managing or worsening political unrest and criminality? Are they legitimate, representative, and professional? Are there other conflict drivers such as land disputes or resource competition? Are there cross-border, maritime, or transnational threats? What have been the social, political and economic impacts of historical and ongoing insecurity in the Casamance region? Are there political or sectarian tensions that could pose a threat to security? To what extent have illicit markets (e.g. drug trafficking) contributed to issues of criminality and violence?

Politics and Governance: To what extent do perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government erode the legitimacy of state institutions and electoral process? What role do

non-state actors (e.g. the Muslim brotherhoods) play in Senegalese politics? What are the prospects for peace, national cohesion and regional integration given the ongoing peace process in the Casamance region? What role do women play in politics and decision-making? What role do civil society and social movements play in politics?

Description of the Sample

Data collected and analyzed for this research included hundreds of ECOWARN SitReps, ECOWARN IncReps, ACLED event data, and a scoping survey, as well as transcripts and notes from FGDs and KIIs in the field. Other sources, integrated to form a vulnerability index (the CRVA Index), included Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace. A complete breakdown is included in Appendix A.

Data Analysis

ECOWARN data shows that vulnerability in Senegal has stayed relatively steady as measured by taking a monthly average of the SitReps overall score from 2010 to 2017. In late 2011, there was a slight escalation in violence, leading to the abduction of several soldiers and about 24 deaths in the Casamance region.

The heatmap above shows hotspots of human security incidents between 2010 and 2018.

Risk and Fatalities (2010-2018)

Vulnerability (ECOWARN SitReps)

Human Security Fatalities (ECOWARN IncReps/ACLED)

The graph above shows the trends in risk layered against
v The map above shows the locations where fieldwork was
v conducted in September 2017.
vulnerability. The y axis on the right (0-35) shows the number
of human security-related fatalities by month.

The CRVA Index, shown below, indicates that in Senegal the human security pillar that exhibits the most severe levels of vulnerability is Rule of Law, which was also prioritized as a challenge by the respondents in the field research. However, in general, structural resilience is quite high, especially in the areas of Security and Politics and Governance. In the graph below, the lower the score on y axis (0-10), the more vulnerable the human security pillar.

Relative Vulnerability by Human Security Pillar

In the last two years, GIS event data shows hotspots, patterns, and trends at the sub-national level, including incidents involving smuggling, criminality, and separatists in the Casamance area (Ziguinchor, Kolda, and Sédhiou regions), protests, criminality and drug trafficking in Touba (Diourbel region), and various incidents around Dakar and on the Mauritanian border in the North.

Field research was undertaken to qualify and contextualize these findings through Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs).

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This report seeks to layer, triangulate, and juxtapose quantitative, GIS, and qualitative data in a way that is accurate, meaningful, and representative. However, limitations to this analysis include the two- year date range for the

event/GIS data and the seven-year date range for the ECOWARN SitReps. If there are conflict cycles that fall outside those parameters, there will be constraints on the ability to analyze those patterns in this report. Furthermore, this research sought to ensure representativeness in the sample of stakeholders engaged through KIIs (37 prominent individuals) and FGDs (21 FGDs). To the extent that these stakeholders were representative, they added vital contextualization and validation of the desktop research.

Scope and limitations also apply to the use and purpose of the study. The CRVA reports support the objectives of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). In particular, the CRVA reports identify vulnerabilities across the human security pillars in order to inform structural prevention. Structural prevention, as defined in the ECPF, comprises "political, institutional (governance) and developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace." While this report can also be used to inform operational prevention, which includes "early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment using interactive means such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force," it seeks primarily to identify the key areas of structural vulnerability at the national and sub-national levels for strategic planning by ECOWAS and other partners in the peace and security space. However, inasmuch that operational prevention can be informed by patterns and trends in the event-driven risk factors highlighted in this report, the CRVA should serve as a baseline analysis of dynamics that are closely monitored over time. Thereby, in addition to informing strategic planning on structural vulnerability issues, the CRVA will also inform early warning products such as weekly, monthly, and quarterly situation reports that inform analysts and potential responders as to heightened conflict risk across one or more indicators, and propose recommendations on response. The CRVA reports can also be used as a foundation to inform more detailed case studies around identified risks,

vulnerabilities and resiliencies for a country of interest or concern.

While many reports that seek to identify structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors focus almost exclusively at the national level, ECOWAS seeks to support a more decentralized early warning and response infrastructure across the region. As such, the CRVA reports also take into consideration dynamics at the sub-national level. These sub-national factors are critical to consider as they help analysts and potential responders understand the context in which specific events (risks) are occurring, which may be markedly different from the national context. A mapping of sub-national level risks, vulnerabilities, and resiliencies can also help inform strategies for engaging at the local level for structural prevention. In particular, as defined by the ECPF, taking "measures to ensure the crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do no re-occur."

Finally, as also noted in the ECPF, conflict in West Africa tends to be highly interconnected, which often leads to cycles of violence that cross borders and can keep countries emmeshed for decades. The CRVA reports, covering all fifteen member states of ECOWAS, are also useful in helping to inform and understand the dynamics of specific regional conflict systems, such as those that occur across the Mano River and Sahel. These regional conflict systems are influenced and interconnected not only historically and culturally, but also share many of the same structural vulnerabilities that give rise to risks and the eventual outbreak of violence, decade after decade. Thus, the CRVA reports present an opportunity to view not only the specific national and sub-national factors that lead to structural vulnerability and heightened risk, they also help highlight the nature of regional conflict systems, and the need for a holistic and systemic lens in both analysis and response.

Country Background

Since gaining independence from France in 1960, Senegal is often considered a model example of rapidly moving into democracy and stability, in contrast to many of its regional neighbours who faced dictatorships, coups and periods of instability in the post-colonial period.[15] The country has had four peaceful political transitions since independence, and will next hold Presidential elections in 2019.[16] Senegal has however struggled to resolve a longstanding insurgency in the southern Casamance region, and continues to face structural challenges with governance, transparency, and poverty.

The country's first president, Léopold Sédar Senghor, came to power in 1960. Following tensions with Prime Minister Mamadou Dia, President Senghor consolidated his power and formed a de facto single-party state in 1966. However, President Senghor eventually returned the government structure to a multi-party system in 1973, and in 1980 resigned to allow his successor, Abdou Diouf, to become President.[17] Political liberalization was gradual during the 1980s; though Diouf did extend political freedoms for the opposition and population following his ascension to the presidency in 1981. Under Diouf, there was increased popular dissatisfaction due to a declining economy and structural adjustment measures.[18] The ruling Socialist Party (*Parti Socialiste* - PS) remained dominant in every election up until 2000, throughout which there were various allegations of fraud from the opposition and violent political clashes between supporters of the two parties – the PS and the

Senegalese Democratic Party (*Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* - PDS).[19] In particular, the 1988 elections led an outburst of violence in urban areas and ultimately led to the declaration of a state of emergency.[20]

The 1990s saw an increasing number of reforms, such as the 1996 Decentralization Code, which devolved powers from the state to local governments.[21] During this decade there was also an increase in the role and power of media and civil society organizations, such as trade unions and rural producers' organizations.[22] Long-time opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade was elected president in 2000, and focused on strengthening the powers of the executive and investing heavily in urban infrastructure. Despite high expectations by voters of the Wade Administration's promises of improving governance and increasing transparency, both household perception surveys and research by the international community suggest corruption remains a pervasive issue within the country.[23] The Wade administration also faced national criticism for its alleged failure to act following the sinking of the Joola ferry boat in 2002, which resulted in the deaths of more than 1500 people.[24]

In 2011, Wade introduced several constitutional changes and announced that he would run for a third term, a move which sparked violent protests led, in part, by the *Y'en a Marre* and the M23 youth movements.[25] While the Constitutional Court eventually ruled that Wade was eligible for a third term, Wade was defeated by opposition leader

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[15] "Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability," Villalón, L., Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), June 2011

[16] "Senegal: Overview," World Bank, April 2017

[17] "Senegal: Assessing Risks to Stability," Villalón, L., CSIS, June 2011

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] "State of emergency declared to quell Senegal election protests," Gaye, S., United Press International, March 1988

[21] "Corruption Assessment: Senegal," USAID, August 2007

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] "Africa's Titanic: Seeking justice a decade after Joola," Jullien, M., BBC, September 2012

[25] "'Enough is Enough' Say Senegalese Rappers," Quist-Arcton, O., NPR, February 2012

Macky Sall in the second round of the 2012 presidential elections and stepped down.

Today, in addition to combatting corruption, Senegal continues to face challenges in poverty alleviation, improving access to justice, reducing disparities between urban and rural populations, and creating job opportunities for a growing youth population.[26] Economic growth has also remained erratic in recent years, due to factors such as climate pressures which have affected agricultural outputs.[27]

The country also faces an ongoing conflict in the southern Casamance region, where separatists (the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* - MFDC) have been waging a long-term secessionist struggle. Isolated geographically from the rest of Senegal, with The Gambia to its north and Guinea-Bissau to its south, the Casamance region – which encompasses the administrative regions of Ziguinchor, Sédhiou and Kolda – is rich in natural resources and arable land. The region is also home to a majority Djola ethnic population – a

group which only accounts for four percent of the overall ethnic makeup in Senegal – contributing to a distinct regional identity.[28] For much of the colonial period, Casamance was also administered separately to the rest of Senegal by the governor of French West Africa, and was only integrated in 1939.[29] This historical decentralization, along with the physical isolation, lack of investment in development and services after independence, and perceived discrimination over education and land policies by the post-colonial government, formed a backdrop for the conflict which emerged in the 1980s.[30] Key trigger points came in December 1982 and 1983 when the Senegalese authorities launched crackdowns against peaceful demonstrations, leading to violence and reprisal attacks.[31] After over three decades of conflict between the MFDC and the Senegalese army, and a number of failed ceasefire treaties, a ceasefire was signed in 2014 by one of the MFDC factions. Despite a decrease in violence since 2014, there are ongoing mediation efforts, and cross-border illicit flows and criminality persist in the region.[32]

[26] "Senegal: Overview," World Bank, April 2017
[27] "Bank Group's Country Strategy Paper for Senegal, 2016-2020," African Development Bank, July 2016
[28] "Caught between two fronts – in search of lasting peace in the Casamance region: An analysis of the causes, players and consequences," Gehrold, S., Neu, I., KAS International, October 2010
[29] "Understanding the Casamance Conflict: A Background," Fall, A., Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), December 2010

[30] "Senegal and Mali," Humphreys, M., Mohamed, H., Columbia University, 2005
[31] "Caught between two fronts – in search of lasting peace in the Casamance region: An analysis of the causes, players and consequences," Gehrold, S., Neu, I., KAS International, October 2010
[32] "Casamance: neither war nor peace," Serna, T., Peace Direct, December 2015

National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies

Based on desktop research using the ECOWARN and ACLED data sets, surveys of peace and security actors in key regions in Senegal, field research that included KIIs and FGDs, and participatory analysis by the CRVA field research team, the following national-level risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors were identified:

Structural Vulnerabilities	**Rule of Law** • Alleged corruption and impunity in the justice system • Lack of popular knowledge of legal rights and existing legal instruments • Alleged lack of independence of the judicial system • Inadequate or limited access to the justice system by women due to cultural barriers • Delays in the judicial process **Population and Demographics** • High rate of youth unemployment • Low rate of family planning • Disparities between rural and urban areas in terms of social services and infrastructure • Limited access to social services, especially healthcare • Emigration of youth to Europe • Immigration into Senegal from surrounding countries • *Enfant talibé* phenomenon and weak enforcement of child protection measures • Environmental degradation • Land competition • Climate change **Economics and Resources** • Price volatility for staple foods • Food insecurity • Poverty • High rates of youth unemployment • Limited opportunities for vocational training • Rural-urban inequalities • Illicit economic activity, especially drug trafficking • Barriers to credit and land access for women • Environmental degradation • Overfishing and illegal fishing

- Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors
- Inadequate transportation infrastructure
- Limited access to food preservation and processing infrastructure
- Economic impacts of Casamance conflict (including decline in tourism and agriculture, closure of businesses)

Security
- Under-staffed and under-resourced security forces
- Perception of corruption in security forces
- Networks of drug trafficking, smuggling and prostitution
- Porous borders
- History of grievances and perceptions of marginalization among local communities in the Casamance region

Politics and Governance
- Perceptions of corruption within the political system
- Underrepresentation of women and youth in political decision-making
- Limited or inadequate provision of health, education and social services
- Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors

Event-Driven Risks

Rule of Law
- Violent protests against the justice system
- Politicization of high-profile cases
- Under-reported gender-based violent crimes
- Incidents of corruption within the court system

Population and Demographics
- Disease outbreaks
- Malnutrition and food insecurity
- Tensions around natural resources
- Coastal erosion
- Floods and droughts

Economics and Resources
- Tensions related to start of Astron zircon extraction operations
- Drug trafficking
- Illegal logging
- Increasing competition for land; land grabbing
- Decline in fishery resources
- Money laundering

Security
- Crime, including armed banditry
- Land and resource-based conflicts

	• Cross-border and maritime tension and disputes between fishing communities • Failure of mediation or withdrawal of Sadio-led MFDC faction from negotiations • Renewal of hostilities by MFDC factions • Incidents of cattle rustling • Smuggling of small arms and light weapons (SALW) • Terrorism and radicalization • Drug cultivation and trafficking **Politics and Governance** • Political protests • Electoral violence • Politicization of religious leaders
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	**Rule of Law** • Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms • Religious, traditional, and customary leaders • Free legal counsel "Maisons de Justice" • Existence of the "Médiateur de la République" • National Office for the Fight against Fraud and corruption (OFNAC/CENTIF) **Population and Demographics** • Cohesion among ethnic and religious groups • Contribution of immigrants and diaspora to the local economy (remittances) • Existence of social safety net and social security measures such as free health care for the elderly and infants • The roles of the "Badienou Gokh" in supporting pregnant women • Campaign to reduce FGM and child marriage **Economics and Resources** • Establishment of community development programme (*Programme d'Urgence de Développement Communautaire* PUDC) • Ongoing construction of feeder roads to ease access to markets • Implementation of the EITI • Presence of GIABA Regional Office to fight organized crime and financing of terrorism **Security** • Professionalism of security forces and defense forces • Proximity policing

- Community policing

- Existence of non-violent religious ideology (*confrérie de mouride et de tidianiyya*)
- Legacy as one of the West African countries that did not experience military coup
- Participation of the security and defense forces in peacekeeping operations in neighboring countries
- Existence of women platforms intervening in the Casamance
- Reconstruction programs through government agencies and international stakeholders

Politics and Governance
- Vibrant civil society groups, including NGOs, women, and youth groups
- Existence of the 2010 Parity Law
- Vibrant media
- Highly influential religious leaders in maintaining social cohesion
- Long-standing inter-religious dialogue/tolerance
- Availability of progressive gender laws including equal parental authority

Rule of Law (Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Alleged corruption and impunity in the justice system • Lack of popular knowledge of legal rights and existing legal instruments • Alleged lack of independence of the judicial system • Inadequate or limited access to the justice system by women due to cultural barriers • Delays in the judicial process
Risks	• Violent protests against the justice system • Politicization of high-profile cases • Under-reported gender-based violent crimes • Incidents of corruption within the court system

Vulnerabilities and Risks

According to the CRVA Index, Rule of Law is the most vulnerable of the five human security pillars examined in Senegal. Participants in the fieldwork reported that perceptions of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness within the formal judicial system are key vulnerabilities. Additionally, a lack of popular knowledge of legal rights and mistrust were noted as widespread concerns in Senegal. Access to justice was discussed by fieldwork participants as a key vulnerability. Interviewees reported that the judicial system is biased toward the wealthy and that the high cost of obtaining a lawyer is a barrier to many citizens.

During the fieldwork, participants noted widespread perceptions of corruption and bias within the justice system. Interviewees reported that prisoners are released if they have powerful connections. Extended detention times and delays in bringing cases to trial were also reported to be key concerns throughout the country. These vulnerabilities have contributed to feelings of mistrust among the Senegalese population. While there are criminal penalties for corruption, these provisions are poorly enforced.[33] The judiciary is not fully independent; reported abuses by state agents are often not investigated and are rarely punished.[34] In addition, there is reported impunity and corruption within the police and gendarmes. Even though there is a Criminal Investigation Department (DIC) to investigate police abuses, it does not effectively address impunity or corruption.[35] There is also the perception of corruption within the National Assembly and among local government officials.[36]

In addition, women face discrimination within the legal system. The law prohibits rape and assault, but these laws are poorly enforced.[37] The law does not address spousal rape, there are no rape shield laws, and police rarely intervene in family disputes.[38] Similarly, laws against Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting (FGM/C) are poorly enforced.[39] Even though the law provides for equal status and rights for both genders, men continue to be considered heads of household, meaning that women often do not have inheritance rights, legal access to land, or equal and fair employment.

[33] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016

[34] "Senegal Country Report," Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, 2016

[35] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016

[36] "Senegal Country Report," World Justice Project, March 2015

[37] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016

[38] Ibid.

[39] Ibid.

Women also face discrimination within customary law, especially in rural areas. Although the state has formally abolished the customary laws within Senegal, the rules remain a predominant reference, especially for populations who are unaware of or do not trust the state laws. Part of this mistrust stems from the mistrust in state institutions and an unfamiliarity with the official language (French).[40]

Furthermore, women face barriers to accessing justice and the legal system. According to the UN Human Rights Council, many Senegalese women are distrustful of the courts, the police and the gendarmerie, due to fears of stigmatization, the high cost of processing complaints, lack of access in rural areas and poor training of personnel.[41] As a result, legal resources are underutilized by many Senegalese, particularly women.

Fieldwork participants highlighted concerns over separation of power between the judiciary and executive branches. The judiciary, which constitutionally should be independent, is however vulnerable to external influences due to the prevalence of corruption and inadequate pay and resources.[42] Several high-profile controversies in recent years, including the so-called *Chantiers de Thiès"* corruption affair in the 2000s[43] and the pardon of Karim Wade in 2016,[44] have raised concerns over the role of the executive branch in granting pardons and influencing court decisions. Moreover, the body which nominates candidates for the Supreme Court is chaired by the president, and the president also directly appoints the majority of the judges on the Constitutional Council.[45]

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Participants in the fieldwork identified local traditional and religious leaders as a resilience factor, citing their role in conflict resolution and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Traditional justice mechanisms were also cited as resilience factors in Senegal.

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[40] "The Three Most Important Features of Senegal's Legal System that Others Should Understand," Camara, F., University of Dakar, 2007
[41] "Report of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in practice on its mission to Senegal," Human Rights Council, United Nations General Assembly, April 2016

[42] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016
[43] "Tout sur l'Affaire des Chantiers de Thies: Les Derives," Skyrock
[44] "Senegal's Karim Wade freed by Macky Sall and 'flies to Qatar,'" BBC, June 2016
[45] "The World Factbook: Senegal," CIA, 2017

Population and Demographics (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	- High rate of youth unemployment - Low rate of family planning - Disparities between rural and urban areas in terms of social services and infrastructure - Limited access to social services, especially healthcare - Emigration of youth to Europe - Immigration into Senegal from surrounding countries *Enfant talibé* phenomenon and weak enforcement of child protection measures - Environmental degradation - Land competition - Climate change
Risks	- Disease outbreaks - Malnutrition and food insecurity - Tensions around natural resources - Coastal erosion - Floods and droughts

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Senegal is an ethnically diverse country, with no one group comprising the majority. The largest ethnic groups in Senegal include the Wolof (38.7 percent), Pular (26.5 percent), and Serer (15 percent).[46] About four percent of the population is Mandinka, 2.3 percent is Soninke, and the remaining 9.3 percent is comprised of other minority ethnic groups.[47] There is a largely geographic and ethnic divide between the southern Casamance region and northern Senegal. The Djola ethnic group represents a minority in the overall Senegalese population (4 percent) but are the majority ethnicity in the southern Casamance region.[48] Based on 2010/2011 estimates, about 95 percent of the population of Senegal is Muslim,

4.2 percent identify as Christian, and 0.4 percent follow animist beliefs.[49]

Senegal has a population of over 15 million, which is growing at a rate of 2.42 percent per year.[50] Senegal's urban population has also steadily increased in recent decades, with 44 percent of the population living in urban areas in 2016.[51] According to the World Bank, this rapid urbanization has put increased pressure on urban infrastructure and service provision.[52]

During the fieldwork, participants reported inadequate access to basic social services, especially in rural areas, high youth unemployment, poor infrastructure, and child labour as salient demographic vulnerabilities in Senegal. Interviewees also highlighted an increase

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[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] "Understanding the Casamance Conflict: A Background," Fall, A., Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), December 2010

[49] "The World Factbook: Senegal," CIA, 2017
[50] "Senegal," World Bank, 2017
[51] "Senegal: Urban Population (% of total)," World Bank, 2017
[52] "Cities for an emerging Senegal," Rouhana, S., Ranarifidy, D., World Bank, June 2016

in migration, both emigration to Europe from Senegal and the immigration of foreign workers into Senegal, as a key concern.

Interviewees highlighted several issues created by migration patterns. Internal migration has reportedly contributed to demographic pressures such as rising housing costs, increasing criminality in urban areas, and negative environmental effects. Fieldwork participants also noted the negative effects of youth emigration to Europe, including "brain drain" and the loss of able-bodied workers.

Like many countries in the region, Senegal has a large youth population; about 42 percent of the population falls between 0 and 14 years old, while approximately seven percent are 55 years old and above.[53] The growing youth population suffers from low levels of education and professional training, meaning that many have little to no qualifications for higher-paying work.[54] During the fieldwork, participants reported that youth unemployment has driven an increasing trend of youth migration to Europe. Interviewees also reported concerns around youth vulnerability to radicalization or recruitment to terrorist or criminal groups. A 2013 study of urban Senegalese found that a small minority of the population supported the jihadist takeover of northern Mali, mostly youth and those in low-income peri-urban areas.[55] In addition, there have been reports of Senegalese nationals joining the Islamic State.[56]

Child poverty and child labour were key vulnerabilities highlighted in the fieldwork. Interviewees reported that the phenomenon of the *enfant talibé*[57] continues in many regions of Senegal, as child protection measures have been poorly implemented or are weakly enforced.

Fieldwork participants noted that the *enfant talibé* phenomenon is often a result of poverty.

"Children are abused and exploited. A national strategy for the protection of children has been adopted since 2013. But since then we find that children are still subjected to dangerous work, abuse and sexual exploitation. These phenomena can be explained by conditions of vulnerability experienced by families, but also by harmful practices or behavior related to religion or tradition."

- Representative from the Ministry of Women, Family, and Children (MFFE)

Finally, gender-based violence (GBV), female genital mutilation (FGM) and early marriage are salient issues facing women in Senegal, especially in rural areas. Interviewees report that incidents of rape and domestic violence are prevalent, and that cultural stigma around these issues remains high. Additionally, Senegal continues to have high rates of early and child marriage (although these rates have begun to decline over time). Nearly one-third (31.4 percent) of women aged from 18-22 were married before the age of 18, and the mean age for marriage was 16.4 years old in 2014.[58]

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Participants in the field research reported that civil society groups and NGOs are a source of resilience in the country, especially regarding sensitization around issues such as FGM, family planning, and early marriage. Government agencies and initiatives working to improve infrastructure and social services were also highlighted as resilience

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[53] "The World Factbook: Senegal," CIA, 2017
[54] "The 'missing middle' – tackling youth unemployment," IRIN, March 2009
[55] "Study: Small Senegal Minority Supports Mali Jihadists," VOA, May 2013

[56] "From Senegal to Libya: an African student joins Islamic State," Farge, E., Reuters, March 2016
[57] *Talibé* children are children studying at traditional Koranic schools, *"daaras"*. Some *talibé* children are forced to beg on the streets.
[58] "Basic Profile of Child Marriage in Senegal," Malé, C., Wodon, Q., World Bank, March 2016

factors. Additionally, women's groups have played an important role in awareness-raising activities around social issues. Interviewees also reported high levels of social cohesion between ethnic and religious groups throughout the country.

Economics and Resources (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Price volatility for staple foods • Food insecurity • Poverty • High rates of youth unemployment • Limited opportunities for vocational training • Rural-urban inequalities • Illicit economic activity, especially drug trafficking • Barriers to credit and land access for women • Environmental degradation • Overfishing and illegal fishing • Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors • Inadequate transportation infrastructure • Limited access to food preservation and processing infrastructure • Economic impacts of Casamance conflict (including decline in tourism and agriculture, closure of businesses)
Risks	• Tensions related to start of Astron zircon extraction operations • Drug trafficking • Illegal logging • Increasing competition for land; land grabbing • Decline in fishery resources • Money laundering

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Senegal's economy is largely agricultural, with 60 percent of the workforce engaged in agriculture or fishing, though industry (e.g. extractives, food and chemicals) and the service sector are driving economic growth in the country.[59] The Senegalese economy grew at a rate of 6.6 percent in 2016, making it the second-fastest growing economy in West Africa after Côte d'Ivoire.[60] The most prevalent form of agriculture in Senegal is small scale subsistence farming, commonly of staple crops such as millet, sorghum, rice, as well as some cash crops of peanuts and cotton.[61] Key exports include petroleum, seafood products, peanuts and peanut oil, cement and horticulture products.[62] Fishing in Senegal, off its 2,684 kilometer coastline, provides employment for around 600,000 people.[63] Most of the fishing is performed on a small scale, but large scale commercial fleets are also present.

During the fieldwork interviews, participants identified rising food prices, food insecurity, youth unemployment, rural-urban disparities, resource-based conflicts and environmental degradation and climate pressures as key vulnerabilities.

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59 "Senegal: Overview," World Bank, April 2017
60 Ibid.
61 "Senegal: Country Fact Sheet on Food and Agriculture Policy Trends," FAO, September 2015

62 "Senegal: Country Development Cooperation Strategy April 2012 – October 2017," USAID, June 2015
63 "USAID/Senegal Environmental Threats and Opportunities Assessment (ETOA)," USAID, November 2015

Rising prices for staple foods, particularly during festive occasions such as *tabaski* (Eid al-Adha), were identified as a concern in all regions of the country, and in 2013 a national survey found that 245,000 households (18.8 percent of households or approximately 2.2 million people) were considered food insecure.[64] Some fieldwork participants attributed the price volatility to a lack of government controls, while interviewees in the Casamance area (Kolda, Sédhiou and Ziguinchor regions) reported that the region's poor infrastructure and isolation from the rest of the country results in higher prices for goods.

> *"Even in Dakar there are people who can only eat once a day, at mid-day. The prices are too high. This can lead to food insecurity, because people cannot nourish themselves. It won't lead to revolts though. If you're hungry, you can't revolt. But when you're hungry, you can be violent."*
>
> *- Youth focus group discussion, Dakar City*

Youth unemployment was also a primary concern among fieldwork participants, and interviewees linked the lack of employment opportunities to a rise in youth emigration to Europe, as well as to the prevalence of criminality and illicit economic activities. The growing youth population suffers from low levels of education and professional training, meaning that many have little to no qualifications for higher-paying work.[65] Fieldwork participants reported that many youths now work as Jakarta taxi-motorcycle drivers or in petty trade. In mining areas, such as Tambacounda and Kédougou, youth are increasingly engaged in artisanal gold mining operations.

Interviewees highlighted the critical economic role played by women in Senegal, who often serve as the breadwinners in their households. Women in Senegal make up the majority of the informal workforce (e.g. in agricultural and livestock production in rural areas or self-employed small trade), in part due to lower levels of education and literacy. However, customary practices limit women's ability to own land, and women face barriers to accessing credit and other financial services.[66] To fill these gaps, fieldwork participants noted the importance of microfinance, *Groupements d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE) and *tontine* initiatives (in which a group of women contribute to a collective pot of money that is disbursed on a rotating basis, allowing women to make larger, longer-term investments) in promoting women's economic empowerment.

A sharp rural-urban divide is also visible in Senegal. As of 2010, 46.7 percent of the population lived below the national poverty line,[67] but in rural areas roughly two out of three residents are considered poor whereas in urban areas it is one in four.[68] Fieldwork participants throughout the country also reported that rural areas often lack basic infrastructure, including potable water, electricity and roads, and have limited access to services such as healthcare and education.

Land competition and resource-based conflicts are a growing concern, according to fieldwork participants. Tensions and conflict between herders and farmers are common, often centering on access to water and grazing land. Interviewees reported cases of land expropriation by the government, sales of land to multiple people, and intra-communal conflicts over land inheritance. There are concerns that population growth, climate change and environmental degradation could spur

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[64] "Senegal: Agricultural Sector Risk Assessment," D'Alessandro, S., Fall, A., Grey, G., Simpkin, S., Wane, A., World Bank, August 2015
[65] "The 'missing middle' – tackling youth unemployment," IRIN, March 2009

[66] "Senegal," Social Institutions & Gender Index, OECD, 2017
[67] "Senegal: Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of total population)," World Bank, 2011
[68] "Senegal: Overview," World Bank, April 2017

migration and increase the risk of conflicts through greater competition for land.

"Here it is the future zircon operation in Niafarang which could pose a problem, because the population opposes it, citing health risks. And the state is in the process of securing the place with a strong army presence. …There is also talk of the discovery of oil at the border with Guinea, which risks creating a conflict between the two states."

- Women's focus group discussion, Ziguinchor

In addition, the growth of the extractive industry in Senegal has contributed to vulnerabilities in some regions. The discovery of gas reserves off the coast of the Saint-Louis region was, by and large, viewed positively as a potential stimulant for future infrastructure development and economic growth, but some participants warned that extraction poses risks in the region, including land expropriation, environmental degradation, and tensions between companies and local communities. Interviewees in the Kaolack region also reported low-level tensions between communities and salt and mining companies around hiring practices and the lack of investment in local companies. In the Casamance region, the proposed site of a zircon mining operation in Niafarang by the Australian company Astron is drawing criticism from local communities and challenges to the government by some factions of the MFDC rebel group. There is a risk of escalation into a larger conflict if not properly managed.

Mining and logging operations, as well as agricultural production, have also reportedly contributed to environmental degradation throughout Senegal, including significant deforestation, salinization of soil, pollution of water, and overfishing. These concerns are compounded by climate change pressures, including rising sea level, changes in rainfall patterns, drought and flooding.

Finally, illicit economic activities, including smuggling and the trafficking of timber and drugs, are identified as major risk factors in Senegal. In Saint-Louis, fieldwork respondents reported the presence of smuggling networks along the Senegal-Mauritania border and the influx of cheap smuggled Mauritanian goods in the local economy. Regions such as Kaolack reportedly serve as transit points for regional trafficking networks of cocaine and heroin, while cannabis production is centred in the southern Casamance region.[69] Fieldwork participants also revealed the prevalence of illegal logging in the Ziguinchor and Kolda regions and the smuggling of timber from Senegal to The Gambia.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

As noted above, fieldwork participants reported that microfinance and *tontine* initiatives are a key source of resilience by extending economic opportunities to women. In the area of environmental protection and restoration, interviewees in Ziguinchor, Kolda and Sédhiou identified several community-based initiatives to combat deforestation, including the creation of cross-border forest monitoring committees and the establishment of a forest festival to raise awareness around deforestation. Finally, neighborhood councils and local and religious leaders reportedly play a role in resolving land disputes, including between farmers and herders.

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[69] "The Impact of Organized Crime on Governance in West Africa," Alemika, E., Gueye, A., Ikoh, M., Koroma, A., Diallo, B., Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, August 2013

Security (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Under-staffed and under-resourced security forces • Perception of corruption in security forces • Networks of drug trafficking, smuggling and prostitution • Porous borders • History of grievances and perceptions of marginalization among local communities in the Casamance region
Risks	• Crime, including armed banditry • Land and resource-based conflicts • Cross-border and maritime tension and disputes between fishing communities • Failure of mediation or withdrawal of Sadio-led MFDC faction from negotiations • Renewal of hostilities by MFDC factions • Incidents of cattle rustling • Smuggling of small arms and light weapons (SALW) • Terrorism and radicalization • Drug cultivation and trafficking

Vulnerabilities and Risks

In the field research, crime and armed banditry, as well as drug trafficking and land conflicts, were identified as key security concerns among local populations. Fieldwork participants attributed the prevalence of crime and armed banditry to a number of factors, including poverty and high levels of unemployment among youth. Several interviewees noted that Jakarta taxi-motorcycle drivers are often involved in criminality and trafficking.

In addition, while fieldwork participants reported that security forces are present throughout the country, these forces often lack the equipment, staff and training to adequately protect the population. In the Kaolack region, for example, one interviewee explained that the toll-free emergency number is rarely used, because the police who respond will ask callers to purchase gasoline for them in order to respond to the emergency. Perceived corruption among security forces was also highlighted as a vulnerability, with some

fieldwork respondents stating that security forces are complicit in illicit timber and drug trafficking operations.

Though Senegal is situated in a region that has seen multiple terrorist incidents in recent years, the threat of terrorism within the country's borders is relatively low, according to fieldwork participants. In Dakar, several interviewees expressed concerns about the potential for radicalization among disenfranchised urban youth; in the rest of the country, however, these fears were minimal. Across the country, fieldwork participants highlighted Senegal's history of inter-religious coexistence, the role of religious leaders in promoting tolerance, and the moderate form of Sufi Islam practiced by many of the Muslim brotherhoods (*confréries*) as key resilience factors in deterring radicalization.

Senegal does have some history of political violence. In the lead-up to the 2012 elections, opposition protests turned violent in Dakar, leading the government to deploy the army to end the

riots.[70] Security forces have cracked down on protests and demonstrations in recent years, with human rights organizations alleging that security forces exercise excessive force, ban demonstrations and arrest peaceful demonstrators.[71] Fieldwork participants in the Dakar region confirmed this, noting that security forces often lack the skills and knowledge to defuse situations peacefully. Participants in other regions reported past incidents of politically motivated violence, particularly among youth supporters. However, political violence was not viewed as a primary security threat in Senegal.

"There is a very good cohabitation between Muslims and Christians. In the department of Kébémer (Muslim majority), land was allotted for Christians to build their church. Religious leaders are the regulators of society here in Senegal. These are mechanisms defusing the crises in the country."

- Representative from the Parti Démocratique Sénégalais (PDS)

While Senegal has not experienced large-scale violent conflict in recent years, the country continues to face an ongoing low-level conflict in the southern Casamance region (the area of Senegal between the Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, encompassing the administrative regions of Ziguinchor, Kolda and Sédhiou). As noted above, the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC) has fought for independence for the Casamance region since the early 1980s.[72] Although the level of violence in the Casamance region has declined since one faction of the MFDC declared a ceasefire in 2014 following mediation by the Community of Sant'Egidio,[73] fieldwork

participants in Ziguinchor, Kolda and Sédhiou broadly expressed the sentiment that peace has not yet been consolidated in the region. Interviewees described a situation of "armed peace" in which the level of violence has declined but both the Senegalese military and the MFDC combatants remain armed and active. Several participants expressed concerns at the potential for conflict to re-ignite, whether due to failed or incomplete peace negotiations or other triggers such as new mining projects in the region (including the proposed zircon extraction operation in Niafarang). MFDC combatants – primarily from factions who are not involved in peace negotiations - are also reportedly involved in criminality, illegal logging, cannabis production and drug trafficking.

Finally, cross-border and maritime disputes with Mauritania, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau constitute an ongoing security risk. Fieldwork participants in the Saint-Louis region reported tensions between Senegalese and Mauritanian fishermen, as well as cross-border conflicts over land. Similarly, in the Ziguinchor region, interviewees cited examples of land conflicts in border areas, often caused by contested border demarcation. In the Kolda region, illicit timber smuggling from Senegal into The Gambia reportedly contributed to tensions between the two countries following the arrest of Senegalese forest rangers who crossed into Gambian territory. With the discovery of offshore oil and gas reserves and increasing pressures on land throughout the region, there are concerns that cross-border and maritime disputes could escalate if they are not managed in a timely manner.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Despite these vulnerabilities and risks, there are a number of resilience factors identified by fieldwork

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[70] "Senegal deploys army to halt anti-government riots," Ba, D., Reuters, June 2011
[71] "Senegal: Security Forces Must Exercise Restraint at Protests," Amnesty International, October 2016

[72] "Understanding the Casamance Conflict: A Background," Fall, A., Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC), December 2010
[73] "Senegal: Ceasefire in Casamance," EIU, May 2014

participants in the area of security. As noted above, the history of ethnic and religious co-existence in Senegal, as well as the role of religious leaders and the Muslim *confréries* in promoting social cohesion and tolerance, was identified by many interviewees as a primary source of resilience. Fieldwork participants also highlighted the role of civil society groups and local and traditional leaders in dispute resolution. Particularly in the Casamance region, civil society coalitions such as the Coordination of Sub-Regional Organizations for Peace in Casamance (COSPAC) have been involved in mediation and peacebuilding. In southern Senegal, several respondents also described the creation of cross-border committees, involving Senegalese and Gambian communities, to address issues of deforestation and prevent illegal logging on both sides of the border.

Politics and Governance (Least Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Perceptions of corruption within the political system • Underrepresentation of women and youth in political decision-making • Limited or inadequate provision of health, education and social services • Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors
Risks	• Political protests • Electoral violence • Politicization of religious leaders

Vulnerabilities and Risks

During the fieldwork, participants identified perceptions of corruption and nepotism and a lack of transparency as key vulnerabilities in Senegal. Interviewees also reported incidents of bribery and vote-buying during elections. Additionally, fieldwork participants highlighted alleged incidents of nepotism, stating that jobs are often given based on personal relationships rather than skills or qualifications. In some regions, participants reported that politicians implicitly deferred to the *marabout*s and religious leaders on some key decisions.

> *"When it comes to transparency there are major challenges which need to be addressed, because the state has put in place mechanisms for checks, audit and accountability especially in contracting processes."*
>
> *- Representative from the Parti Socialiste (PS)*

Power transfers in Senegal have historically been largely peaceful, although anger toward the Wade administration contributed to violent protests in the leadup to the 2012 presidential elections.[74] In the 2012 presidential election, there was a voter turnout of 57.12 percent, down from 70.62 percent in 2007. Parliamentary voter turnout in 2012 was lower, at 36.67 percent.[75] Parliamentary elections were held in July 2017 and official sources reported that the turnout was 54 percent.[76] There were extensive delays and reports of voters being left off the voting rolls in the July 2017 legislative elections.[77] The next presidential election is expected to be held in 2019.[78] Fieldwork participants in several regions, including Dakar, noted past instances of politically-motivated violence among youth; however, these incidents were not viewed as being a serious threat to security or governance.

Fieldwork participants reported that women are still underrepresented in politics, although their influence has been growing. In 2010 Senegal adopted the Law on Equality of Men and Women in Electoral Lists, which has proven effective at the national level in elevating the representation of women in the National Assembly. Senegal's proportion of women in its legislature is one of the highest in the world at 43.4 percent. This is up from 22 percent prior to the 2012 legislative election.[79] During the fieldwork, interviewees reported that the law has been poorly implemented or not at all implemented in some regions of Senegal. For

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[74] "Senegal deploys army to halt anti-government riots," Ba, D., Reuters, June 2011
[75] "Senegal," IDEA, 2017
[76] "Senegal votes in tension election," DW, July 2017
[77] Ibid.

[78] "Senegal Consolidates Its Constitutional Democracy," Pham, J., Atlantic Council, March 2016
[79] "Gender Quotas and Representation Senegal," University of Florida, August 2017

example, the city of Touba (seat of the Mourides brotherhood) has not implemented the gender quota because the leader of the Mourides does not accept the law.[80]

While Senegal is officially a secular (*laïque*) country, religious leaders and organizations – particularly the Sufi brotherhoods (*confréries*), the largest of which are the Mourides and the Tijanniyyah – play a pivotal role in Senegalese politics.[81] In 2012, 92 percent of Senegalese interviewed by the Pew Research Center said that they belong to a brotherhood.[82] As noted above, brotherhood leadership can influence the implementation of laws and the presence of state authority, although in recent years they have refrained from openly endorsing political candidates.[83] Particularly in regions such as Diourbel, fieldwork participants reported that religious leaders exert extensive influence in politics, dispute resolution and other aspects of daily life.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Fieldwork participants cited civil society organizations as a resilience factor, citing the role they have played in implementing transparency initiatives in Senegal. Women were also reported to be a resilience factor in the area of politics and governance. Fieldwork participants noted that women have been engaged in advocacy and awareness-raising activities through CSOs.

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[80] "BTI 2016: Senegal Country Report," BTI, 2016
[81] Ibid.

[82] "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity," Pew Research Center, 2012
[83] "BTI 2016: Senegal Country Report," BTI, 2016

External Factors

Senegal is actively engaged with a number of regional organizations, including ECOWAS, the Commission of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and the AU, and also belongs to a number of international organizations such as the UN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization.

In the area of economics, Senegal is impacted by changes in global commodity prices and the activities of international financial institutions (IFIs). The World Bank has funded a number of projects in the country, such as an initiative to improve access to water and sanitation infrastructure, and a project supporting negotiations related to investment in the gas sector. In 2016, an underwater gas field located in Senegalese-Mauritanian waters was explored and found to have significant resources, which has the potential to increase foreign direct investment (FDI) in the future.

While incidents of terrorism and violent extremism remain low within the country's borders, Senegal is situated in a region that has seen multiple terrorist incidents in recent years, thus causing concern over the potential for spill-over effects. Cross-border and maritime disputes with Mauritania, The Gambia, and Guinea-Bissau also pose an ongoing security risk. Additionally, the discovery of offshore oil and gas has the potential to exacerbate cross border disputes in the future. Drug trafficking, human trafficking, and the small arms and light weapons (SALW) trade as part of wider regional networks are also security concerns in Senegal.

Furthermore, regional patterns of migration affect Senegal, as workers are drawn to Senegal from surrounding countries, such as Mauritania and Guinea. Conversely, some Senegalese, especially youth, have been migrating to Europe in search of better economic opportunities.

Finally, Senegal faces pressures from climate change and environmental degradation. Senegal is prone to natural disasters, primarily flooding and recurrent droughts.[84] Senegal is also vulnerable to the effects of climate change, including changes in rainfall patterns, cycles of drought and flooding, coastal erosion and sea level rise.[85]

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[84] "Senegal Disaster & Risk Profile," Prevention Web, 2014

[85] "Senegal," Africa Adaptation Programme, UNDP, 2017

Gender Considerations

Women and girls in Senegal continue to face challenges in the social, economic and political spheres, although, Senegal scores well in many gender-related indicators relative to other countries in the region.

Gender-based violence (GBV), female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and early marriage continue to affect women and girls in Senegal. Fieldwork participants reported that gender-based violence, including domestic violence, sexual assault and rape, is widespread, despite the fact that Senegalese law criminalizes rape and assault.[86] Interviewees noted that women are often unaware of their legal rights in these cases, and that social stigma prevents many women and girls from reporting GBV and seeking justice. Furthermore, the reliance on traditional or customary law throughout Senegal means that women may face discrimination under these systems, particularly around issues such as domestic violence. One respondent noted that families are often complicit in maintaining the culture of silence around GBV, including by encouraging early marriage in cases of assault. Nearly one-third (31.4 percent) of Senegalese women aged 18-22 were married before the age of 18, and the mean age for marriage was 16.4 years old in 2014.[87] Child marriage is more prevalent in rural areas, with the highest rates observed in Kédougou and Kaffrine regions, and among lower-income populations.[88]

In addition, female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) is practiced in Senegal. According to a 2015 report by the charity 28 Too Many, the estimated prevalence of FGM in Senegal is 25.7 percent for women aged 15 to 49 years old.[89] This is considered relatively low compared to other countries in the region such as Mauritania (69 percent), The Gambia (76 percent), Burkina Faso (76 percent), Sierra Leone (88 percent), Mali (89 percent), and Guinea (96 percent). The prevalence of FGM in Senegal is slightly higher in rural areas, and rates are highest in the regions of Matam (55 percent), Sédhiou (53 percent), Tambacounda (48 percent) and Kolda (44 percent).[90] One interviewee from Kolda reported that families who wish to have the procedure performed on their daughters will form caravans and travel to Guinea, where the practice of FGM is nearly universal. However, fieldwork participants noted that NGOs and the Senegalese government are active in carrying out sensitization campaigns to reduce the practice of FGM, and overall the practice is in decline.

Access to healthcare and family planning services was also raised during the fieldwork interviews. Maternal mortality in Senegal is at a rate of 315 deaths per 100,000 births, which is well below the average of 551 for Sub-Saharan Africa.[91] The total fertility rate has declined over time as well, from an average of 6.6 children per woman in 1990 to 5.2 children in 2015.[92] Family planning is slowly on the rise in Senegal; 21.2 percent of women reported using a modern contraceptive method in 2015.[93] However, there are considerable regional variations in fertility rates and in the acceptance of family planning.[94] In the Diourbel region, for example, interviewees reported that women who wish to take advantage of family planning services often must do so without their husbands' knowledge, due to socio-cultural and religious norms. In nearby Kaolack region, participants reported that family planning information is widely available in health clinics, although, again, social

[86] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016

[87] "Basic Profile of Child Marriage in Senegal," Malé, C., Wodon, Q., World Bank, March 2016

[88] Ibid.

[89] "Country Profile: FGM in Senegal," 28 Too Many, June 2015

[90] "Sénégal: Enquête Continue Quatrième Phase 2016," Demographic and Health Surveys, 2016

[91] "Human Development Report 2016," UNDP, 2016

[92] "Senegal," Bill & Melinda Gates Institute for Population and Reproductive Health, 2016

[93] Ibid.

[94] "Sénégal: Enquête Continue Quatrième Phase 2016," Demographic and Health Surveys, 2016

norms result in these services being underutilized. Members of the *Badiénou Gokh* initiative - older women volunteers who are chosen to counsel pregnant and lactating women in their communities with the aim of reducing maternal and neo-natal mortality - also carry out sensitization on family planning.

Fieldwork participants throughout the country emphasized the critical economic role played by women in Senegal. Women are frequently the breadwinners in their households and are most often engaged in agricultural production, domestic work and informal commerce. Although men and women have equal rights when applying for jobs, women perform 90 percent of domestic work and 85 percent of agricultural work in Senegal.[95] This disparity is partly due to the educational gap (women and girls have lower rates of literacy and school enrollment, particularly at the secondary and tertiary levels) as well as social and cultural norms that dictate gender roles.

Despite the fact that women form the backbone of the Senegalese economy, they face continued barriers to financing and land ownership that curtail their economic freedom. Under customary law, many women can only access land through their husbands, as traditional practices and the laws that enforce customary land tenure make it difficult for women to purchase property in these areas.[96] Furthermore, the National Domain Act is based on customary land tenure, in which rural councils are made up of customary landowners.[97] Because they are less likely to own land, women are not equally represented on these rural councils through which most land is allocated.[98] To promote women's economic empowerment, fieldwork participants reported that many women have turned to microfinance and *tontine* (a system in

which a group of women pay into a communal pot of money, with each woman receiving the entire pot of money on a set rotation in order to make larger, long-term investments) initiatives.

In 2010, Senegal adopted the Law on Equality of Men and Women in Electoral Lists, which has proven effective at the national level in elevating the representation of women in the National Assembly. Senegal's proportion of women in its legislature is one of the highest in the world at 43.4 percent. This is up from 22 percent prior to the 2012 legislative election.[99] In addition, Senegal has had two female prime ministers, most recently Aminata Touré from 2013-2014.[100] However, participants in the fieldwork reported that, although the gender parity law is beginning to improve women's representation, the law is poorly implemented or not at all implemented in some regions of Senegal.[101] For example, the city of Touba (seat of the Mourides brotherhood) has not implemented the gender quota because the leader of the Mourides does not accept the law.[102] Interviewees highlighted women's engagement in awareness-raising and mobilizing voters for political parties, but reported that a significant gender gap persists in elected positions at the local level. In addition, some respondents noted that gender parity in politics is hindered by women's lower levels of education and training, as well as social norms that deter women's political participation.

Finally, fieldwork participants in the Casamance region discussed the importance of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. For example, one interviewee reported that women's groups played a key role in calming cross-border tensions during a land conflict between the Senegalese town of Touba Tranquille and the Gambian town of

[95] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016
[96] Ibid.
[97] "Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Convention," OHCHR, July 2013
[98] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016

[99] "Gender Quotas and Representation Senegal," University of Florida, August 2017
[100] "Senegalese human rights campaigner appointed as justice minister," Reuters, September 2013
[101] "Senegal 2016 Human Rights Report," United States Department of State, 2016
[102] "BTI 2016: Senegal Country Report," BTI, 2016

Dar Salame. Youth in Ziguinchor also highlighted the formal and informal engagement of women in the mediation of the Casamance conflict. One interviewee credited a former minister counsellor, Amsatou Sow Sidibé, with the creation of a dialogue forum which succeeded in bringing multiple MFDC factions to the negotiating table. Women's groups in the region have also formed a coalition group called the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance (PFPC) which conducts dialogue, carries out advocacy activities and provides services to victims of the conflict.[103] As one youth participant described, "They call themselves mothers and say they have no right to remain silent. They go up to the frontier areas to meet the actors of the crisis. And today, if you no longer hear gunfire it is thanks to women. We are now witnessing a lull since 2012. They have helped to change the configuration in the dynamics of conflict, how to perceive the conflict."

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[103] "Women in Casamance unite for peace," OHCHR, December 2012

Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region

Dakar Region

The Dakar region is both the smallest and the most populous region in Senegal. The region consists of the capital city of Dakar and its suburbs on the Cape Verde peninsula. The National Agency of Statistics and Demography estimates the 2017 population of Dakar to be 3,529,300, or approximately 23 percent of the country's total population.[104] Because the region includes the country's capital, Dakar hosts most of the country's government, industry, commerce and financial services jobs and generates 55 percent of Senegal's GDP.[105] Due to significant internal migration to the region, Dakar is home to a mixture of all the country's ethnic and religious groups.

Structural Vulnerabilities	• Perceptions of corruption and impunity in the justice system • Inadequate and limited access to the judicial system • Lack of popular knowledge of legal system • Limited provision of public services, especially healthcare • Unemployment, especially for youth • Inflation • Price volatility • Poor infrastructure • Inadequate enforcement of child protection mechanisms • Pressures from internal migration • Illicit economic activity, especially drug trafficking • Under-staffed and under-resourced security forces • Perceptions of corruption and nepotism among government officials
Event-Driven Risks	• Land-based conflicts • Politically motivated riots/protests

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[104] "Senegal," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2017
[105] "Perspectives Urbaines: Villes Émergentes pour un Sénégal Émergent," World Bank, 2015

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Religious and traditional leaders • Alternative conflict resolution systems • Civil Society, NGOs, Development Partners • Cohesion between ethnic and religious groups

Rule of Law

According to participants in the fieldwork, perceptions of corruption, nepotism and ineffectiveness within the formal judicial system are key vulnerabilities. Limited access to the judicial system and delayed case deliberation were also highlighted as key concerns, while the cost of filing cases (such as hiring a lawyer) has been prohibitive for vulnerable populations. Additionally, interviewees stated that court decisions are not uniform, which has undermined trust in the formal judicial system. Interviewees also highlighted a lack of judicial independence, stating that the executive branch has the power to influence court decisions.

Due to these vulnerabilities, populations in the Dakar region often prefer to utilize alternative and traditional conflict resolution systems before turning to the formal justice system. However, a participant in the men's Focus Group Discussion (FGD) stated that women are often treated unfairly and that rape cases have been ignored in these traditional systems. Other interviewees stated that protection of women's rights has increased over time, especially as women have become more active in the justice system.

Population and Demographics

During the fieldwork, inadequate access to basic social services, especially in rural areas, and increasing emigration from Senegal were cited as key vulnerabilities. Interviewees particularly emphasized the limited access to healthcare, citing the high cost of health coverage and medicine.

Fieldwork participants expressed mixed opinions on the effects of migration in Senegal. One participant stated that while the Senegalese diaspora does send money back into the country, this money is rarely targeted at development. Interviewees also reported that migration into Senegal from Guinea and Mali has had some negative effects, such as rising cost of living and higher housing prices.

Youth were identified as a vulnerable segment of the population during the fieldwork. Youth are reportedly vulnerable to manipulation and exploitation by politicians. Additionally, participants in the women's FGD stated that youth have been illegally migrating out of Senegal in search of better economic opportunities. Several fieldwork respondents expressed concern over the potential radicalization of youth. Additionally, interviewees stated that child protection laws are insufficient and that incidents of child abuse persist in the region. During the women's FGD, one participant noted that *enfant talibé* continue to suffer in Senegal and are not adequately protected. During a Key Informant Interview (KII), a civil society representative stated that because of the religious

> *"There are people who use children to get money. This is a problem. Over time, these children are gathering scrap metal and stealing. Groups of four or five children. They look for metal for example and go sell it."*
>
> *- Youth focus group discussion, Dakar City*

aspect of *enfant talibé*, there is little political will to address the problem.

Fieldwork participants reported that family planning is often considered to be culturally and religiously taboo in Senegal. However, some participants noted that there is an effort to increase education about family planning through sensitization and awareness raising campaigns.

Finally, interviewees discussed concerns over the negative effects of climate change, citing shorter rainy seasons, rising temperatures, and food insecurity. During a KII, a civil society representative stated that flooding has become an increasing concern in Dakar. Additionally, climate change has led to increased rural to urban migration, which places greater pressure on urban infrastructure and services. Fieldwork participants highlighted several issues created by internal migration, such as rising housing costs, increasing criminality in cities, and negative environmental effects.

Economics and Resources

Price volatility, food access, exploitation of natural resources, and inequality between rural and urban areas were cited as key economic vulnerabilities during the fieldwork in Dakar. Interviewees noted that the cost of living is especially high in the city of Dakar. The divide between urban and rural areas was highlighted during the fieldwork, including the limited access to basic social services and poor infrastructure in rural areas. Food insecurity was a key concern discussed during the fieldwork as well, and interviewees noted that many products are imported. Vulnerable groups lack access to healthy foods and even basic necessities are expensive.

Land access and resource management were also key issues for fieldwork participants. Participants in the women's FGD stated that women do not have access to land, as customary land is said to belong to men. Interviewees also cited land-grabbing by wealthier citizens as a concern, especially in areas where oil has been discovered. Additionally, a lack of transparency and mismanagement of natural resources was

discussed throughout the fieldwork, particularly in the oil sector. Border issues related to fishing were also cited as a key concern during the fieldwork. For example, one participant discussed conflicts between Mauritanian and Senegalese fishermen. Mauritania has stricter fishing regulations and observes periods where fishing is forbidden, while Senegal does not, resulting in overfishing. There have reportedly been incidents of Senegalese fishermen being imprisoned in Mauritania for disobeying regulations and fishing in Mauritanian waters.

Unemployment, especially youth unemployment, was also cited as a key economic vulnerability in the region. According to fieldwork participants, there are opportunities for employment in the construction and agricultural sectors, but local populations often lack adequate functional skills to fill these openings. Interviewees noted that women are active in the local economy through informal trading. According to a participant in the men's FGD, women have created and are part of local micro-credit structures.

Security

Land-based conflicts, illicit economic activity, and inadequate training of security forces were key vulnerabilities identified during the fieldwork. Several participants stated that police forces are inadequately staffed to serve the population in Dakar. Additionally, interviewees reported that security forces are poorly managed and lack the knowledge to defuse situations peacefully. Concerns about the use of excessive force by security forces during protests was also a key concern highlighted during fieldwork.

Illicit economic activity, especially the prevalence of drug trafficking, was discussed by fieldwork participants. During the women's FGD, one participant reported that drug trafficking has caused an increase in assault and murder in Dakar. In addition to drug trafficking, interviewees stated that illicit flows of Small Arms and Light

Weapons (SALW) and human trafficking are prevalent and challenge security in the region.

Conflicts over access to land were discussed as a vulnerability in Dakar. Fieldwork participants noted cases in which the government has relocated local populations so that the land could be used for commercial purposes, contributing to grievances. During the women's FGD, one participant stated that there have been incidents in which landowners have sold land to more than one person, resulting in conflict.

> *"There is a problem with the transparent management of natural resources. We've discovered oil in Senegal but we fear that the problems that have risen in other countries will now happen here."*
>
> *- Youth focus group discussion, Dakar City*

Unlike in other regions in Senegal, interviewees in Dakar emphasized concern over the potential for radicalization, stating that youth are particularly vulnerable. During the youth FGD, participants described perceptions that there are increasing divisions between Muslims and Christians in the region.

Politics and Governance

During the fieldwork, participants identified perceptions of corruption, nepotism and a lack of transparency as key political vulnerabilities in the region. Interviewees also discussed concerns about bribery during elections. For example, during the men's FGD, one participant stated that religious leaders reportedly receive large sums of money to vote for a particular candidate. During the youth FGD, one participant stated that religion has become politicized. Religious leaders have reportedly forged close ties with party leaders and use their positions to forward their personal interests. Mismanagement of public funds was also cited as a key concern during the fieldwork.

The lack of civic education and awareness was also cited as a vulnerability by fieldwork participants. During a KII, one participant discussed the need for further education and awareness-raising campaigns, especially for youth. Additionally, interviewees reported that rural communities are more disconnected from political activity than urban areas in the Dakar region.

Finally, interviewees stated that while women are still underrepresented in politics, their influence has been growing. During the youth FGD, participants stated that women need capacity building to enhance their skills in order to play prominent roles in politics.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Despite the vulnerabilities and risks listed above, the Dakar region has a number of social and institutional resilience factors that help to mitigate these risks. Fieldwork participants discussed the role of traditional leaders, religious leaders, the *chefs de quartier* (neighborhood heads), and *Badiénou Gokhs* (aunts of districts) in alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. Interviewees also noted that civil society organizations, such as the Association of Women Lawyers, have played a role in protecting women within the judicial system. *Confréries* (religious brotherhoods) were also cited as a resilience factor contributing to peace and security in the region.

Diourbel Region

The Diourbel region is located in the central western part of Senegal. The region is bordered by Thiès to the west, Fatick to the south and Louga to the northeast. Diourbel is the third most populous region, with an estimated 2017 population of 1,692,967 according to the National Agency of Statistics and Demography.[106] Diourbel is mostly rural, with an urban population of only 16.1 percent.[107] Diourbel's main economic activities are agriculture, livestock and trade. The main ethnic groups in Diourbel are Wolof and Serer, with smaller populations of Poular, Mandingo and Djola.[108] Diourbel is also home to the city of Touba, the seat of the Mouride Brotherhood (*"confrérie"*).

Structural Vulnerabilities	- Lack of popular knowledge of legal rights - Influence of religious leaders in judicial processes - Perceptions of corruption and bias within the judicial system - Poverty - Poor or insufficient infrastructure, including education and healthcare services - High levels of youth unemployment - Lack of vocational training - Barriers to credit and land access for women - Lack of natural resources - Prevalence of the *enfant talibé* phenomenon and weak enforcement of child protection mechanisms - Gender-based violence - Crime, including armed banditry and drug trafficking - Perception of corruption in security forces - Influence of religious leaders in elections - Perceptions of corruption, nepotism and political bias in politics
Event-Driven Risks	- Political demonstrations - Cases of banditry and criminality - Flooding

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[106] "Senegal," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2017
[107] "Urbanization Rate in Senegal," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie
[108] "Populations," Conseil Regional de Diourbel, 2012

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Traditional and religious leaders • Youth associations • Co-existence between different religions and inter-religious dialogue frameworks

Rule of Law

Fieldwork participants reported that there is generally a lack of popular knowledge of legal rights in the Diourbel region, and that the justice system is largely controlled by the *marabouts* and religious authorities. Interviewees reported that small disputes are often resolved through mediation by traditional leaders or the Mouride Brotherhood, in lieu of going through the court system. Respondents also noted that the influence of the *marabouts* in the Diourbel region extends to the political sphere, as politicians frequently seek advice and follow the instructions of the *marabouts.* One participant noted that the population is aware of the unspoken associations between particular *marabouts* and politicians. While the religious authorities were largely viewed positively as a source of social cohesion and resilience, their influence in politics and the justice

"The marabouts are the symbols of resilience in Senegal. They regulate social life and help strengthen social cohesion. On the other hand, the marabouts are the greatest threat to upholding the rule of law."

- Men's focus group discussion, Touba

system does challenge the independence of rule of law institutions.

In addition, many fieldwork participants highlighted perceived corruption and bias within the justice system as a concern. Interviewees reported that prisoners are often released early if they have connections to an influential *marabout*, and that *marabouts* themselves are not prosecuted if they have committed a crime. Extended detention times

are also an issue, as one participant noted that detainees may spend more than a year in prison without a trial.

Population and Demographics

Fieldwork participants in the Diourbel region highlighted poverty, poor infrastructure, a lack of education and training for women and youth, and a high youth unemployment rate as key issues facing the population. Interviewees reported that communities face limited access to drinking water, particularly in the peripheral neighborhoods of Touba, and that the cost of food and healthcare is prohibitive. Participants also noted the inadequate number of healthcare facilities and physicians in the region. As there is no hospital in Mbacké, patients must travel to one of the hospitals in Touba, which is often too expensive.

Participants noted an insufficient number of schools in the region, mentioning that children in Touba are often sent to Mbacké to attend school since there is no French or Western school in Touba. Early marriage is also common in the Diourbel region, which (along with poverty and economic pressures) contributes to a higher school drop-out rate among girls. One woman leader said, "Several girls have dropped out of school because her parents gave her in marriage with a man. Whether she likes it or not, she will be obliged to join her household. What is disappointing are fifty-

"Religious authorities in Touba rejected the idea of installing a school in Touba that teaches French, claiming at the only instruction given is the Qur'an."

- Professor, Touba

year old's who marry minors who had ambitions of a career as a lawyer or a doctor."

Youth in the region face high rates of unemployment, and some participants mentioned that poverty and the lack of economic opportunity is driving migration to Dakar, to neighboring countries, or to Europe. Of the youth who remain in the region, many work as cart drivers, Jakarta motorcycle drivers in urban areas, or in trade. One participant also noted that there is a lack of extracurricular activities for youth in Touba. One woman leader said that "Young people in Touba lack socio-economic infrastructure. Football is banned and young people do not have a playground."

Fieldwork respondents also reported that the *enfant talibé* phenomenon is present in the Diourbel region. Some noted that poverty has worsened the issue, as more children are being sent to *marabouts* with insufficient means to support them.

Finally, respondents noted that while knowledge of family planning methods is widespread, women in the Diourbel region continue to face socio-cultural and religious barriers to family planning. One participant reported that women who wish to take advantage of family planning services often must do so without their husbands' knowledge. Participants also reported that domestic violence and prostitution affect women in the region.

Economics and Resources

In the area of economics, interviewees highlighted the region's lack of natural resources, and the low levels of employment opportunities for women and youth. Much of the economy in the Diourbel region is based on market trade and commerce, as well as agriculture and livestock herding. One participant also noted the presence of SONACOS, a Moroccan-based agricultural company, in the region, but reported that the company primarily employs foreign workers rather than employing locals.

Participants also highlighted a general lack of employment opportunities for women and youth, which has contributed to migration outflows from the region. As noted above, many youth work as motorcycle taxi drivers, cart drivers, or in trade, while women are often engaged in commerce or agricultural production. The region's lack of education and vocational training infrastructure was also raised as a vulnerability. Women's economic empowerment is also curtailed by barriers to accessing credit and land.

Security

The key security issues highlighted by participants in the Diourbel region were crime and armed banditry, a rise in drug trafficking, and tensions during political demonstrations. Participants attributed the rise in crime and banditry to multiple factors, including the prevalence of the *enfant talibés* and child homelessness, youth unemployment, and population growth in the region. However, participants in the Men's FGD noted that the passage of a law criminalizing cattle theft has decreased the prevalence of these incidents in the region.

Interviewees also reported that prostitution, as well as crimes related to drugs and alcohol, are on the rise in Diourbel region. Some participants noted that Jakarta motorcycle drivers are often seen as contributing to the insecurity, and one participant reported that these drivers are often involved in drug trafficking and prostitution rings. While security forces reportedly carry out patrols in urban areas, some participants held the opinion that members of the police and gendarmerie are bribed to overlook these activities. Several interviewees also expressed that the region's religious authorities, including the Caliph, have not adequately responded to the threats of drug trafficking, prostitution and criminality.

Participants also noted cases of violence in the course of political demonstrations. One participant cited the example of an opposition party demonstration in September 2017 that was repressed by insufficiently trained security forces. However, one woman leader in Touba noted that the use of social media platforms has allowed youth to form associations and promote communication between supporters of different political parties, which can deter political violence.

Religious radicalization and extremism was not a concern among fieldwork participants. Many interviewees cited the role of religious authorities in promoting social cohesion and religious tolerance. As one youth leader said, "I am not afraid of the arrival of terrorism in Touba because, knowing the religious character of the holy city of Touba, it would be unthinkable for someone to come and commit terrorist acts there. In addition to this, people are inclined to report any suspicious behavior."

Politics and Governance

Fieldwork participants reported that politics in the Diourbel region is largely controlled by the *marabout*s and religious authorities, who one participant described as the "invisible hand" in the region. One interviewee noted that in local elections in Touba, the religious authorities publish two candidate lists – one of which is approved by the advisors of the Caliph and does not respect the national gender parity law. Residents are largely expected to vote for the approved candidate list and the party in power. Participants also noted that *marabout*s are involved in granting land titles in the region.

"Before election day, the community of Touba already knows who will be the mayor because the choice is made by advisors of the Caliph and validated by the religious leaders."

- Professor, Touba

Participants also raised concerns around the prevalence of nepotism, corruption and political bias among politicians and administrators in the region. Interviewees in one focus group expressed frustration that jobs are often granted based on personal relationships rather than by skills or qualifications. Others reported that the government distributes funds along political lines, saying that the President is not sending funds to Mbacké because they do not vote for him. Several participants expressed that politicians are concerned with their own self-interests rather than serving the population, as evidenced by unfulfilled campaign promises. During a KII, one woman leader from Touba reported that once local officials are elected, they disappear and do not address pressing issues such as insecurity, the lack of electricity, poor sanitation, and flooding.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

During the key informant interviews (KIIs) and FGDs, participants mentioned many resilience factors amongst the population in the Diourbel region. One focus group noted that although the actions of the *marabout*s are sometimes seen as contrary to the rule of law, these religious leaders also strengthen social cohesion. Many participants mentioned the peaceful coexistence between religions in the region as a resilience factor, noting that there is an ongoing Christian-Islamic dialogue and that people from different religions often interact and inter-marry.

Various types of youth associations and youth-focused programs were also highlighted as social resilience factors in the Diourbel region. Participants credited existing youth networks with a decrease in conflict between youth political groups. Local youth have also created a program called "One House One Lamp" to combat the lack of lighting and increase security. There are also youth associations who focus on raising awareness on early marriage and the necessity of education for girls.

Kaolack Region

The Kaolack region is located in the central western part of Senegal. The region is bordered by the Fatick region to the north and west and the Kaffrine region to the east. To the south, the region shares an international border with The Gambia, and is a nexus for trade between Dakar and the Gambian capital of Banjul as well as the southern region of Casamance and Mali, Guinea and Guinea Bissau. Kaolack has an estimated 2017 population of 1,086,464 according to the National Agency of Statistics and Demography.[109] Apart from trade, the region's main industry is agriculture, which employs 65 percent of the population.[110] The largest ethnic group in the Kaolack region is Wolof, followed by Halpulaar and Serer.[111]

Structural Vulnerabilities	- Perceptions of corruption, impunity and bias within the judicial and political systems - Poverty - High rates of youth unemployment - Rural-urban migration and youth emigration to Europe - Disparities between rural and urban areas in terms of social services and infrastructure (access to water/electricity, distance of schools, etc.) *Enfant talibé* phenomenon and weak enforcement of child protection measures - Volatility in staple food prices - Food insecurity - Deforestation - Barriers to women's land ownership and financing - Land-based conflicts - Criminality and armed banditry - Networks of drug trafficking, smuggling and prostitution - Lack of resources and training for security forces - Perceptions of corruption among security forces - Under-representation of youth and women in decision-making processes
Event-Driven Risks	Land-based conflicts

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[109] "Senegal," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2017
[110] "Rapport Regional Definitif: Région de Kaolack," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, April 2017
[111] Ibid.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Local, traditional and religious leaders • Religious & ethnic cohesion • Civil society organizations and NGOs • El Hadji Ibrahima Niass University and vocational training programs • Women's groups promoting economic empowerment

Rule of Law

Levels of trust in the justice system are reportedly low in the Kaolack region, due to perceptions of corruption, impunity and bias towards wealthy and politically connected citizens. Fieldwork participants expressed that the judiciary is not independent of the state and is often influenced by the dictates of the *marabouts.* In addition, the judicial system is reportedly hampered by extended detention times, weak enforcement of sentences, and a lack of popular knowledge around the role of the justice system. As a result, many communities in the Kaolack region turn to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as mediation by imams, local leaders or family members, rather than pursuing justice through formal frameworks.

"I do not trust Senegalese justice. …Since Macky Sall took over as President of Senegal, only political opponents are stopped, when several of [the administration's] departments that are involved in an embezzlement case are in no way affected."

- Teacher, Kaolack

This reliance on alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution and on customary or traditional laws particularly affects women's rights and access to justice in the Kaolack region. One group of fieldwork participants reported that in the Toucouleur or Serere ethnic groups, the decisions of the head of the family takes precedent over local laws. In addition to this, women do not have land ownership rights under customary law and many are unaware of their legal rights.

Population and Demographics

The region of Kaolack has a population of over 1 million people, comprised of multiple ethnic groups including Balanta, Bambara, Fula, Fulani, Djola, Mandinka, Moor, Serer, Wolof and others.[112] The largest ethnic group in the Kaolack region is the Wolof.[113] Fieldwork participants reported peaceful cohabitation among ethnic and religious groups in the Kaolack region. In addition, the Kaolack region is home to a number of mining and salt companies, and a majority of the employees of these companies come from outside the region.

"In villages, the immigration of young people has an impact on the economy. The fields are abandoned, there are only the old ones who do not have enough strength to cultivate the land. Thus the city and some villages are stripped of their human resources, accentuating poverty."

- Men's focus group discussion, Kaolack

Primary concerns expressed by the fieldwork participants included unemployment, poverty and poor infrastructure and social services. Participants reported high levels of youth unemployment and a lack of vocational training in the region. Several interviewees noted that youth are increasingly leaving school to work as Jakarta

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[112] "Country: Senegal," Joshua Project
[113] "Two studies on ethnic group relations in Africa: Senegal, the United Republic of Tanzania," UNESCO, 1974

motorcycle drivers, or to emigrate to Europe. Some respondents also saw unemployment as contributing to insecurity in the region, including cases of petty crime, violent crime and illegal trade.

Access to infrastructure and inadequate social services, including health care and education, were also raised by participants as a concern. Interviewees reported poor sanitation, a lack of access to electricity and drinking water in rural areas, and inadequate resources for hospitals and health clinics. Some participants also expressed that the delivery of social services in influenced by political connections. As one interviewee said, "In the villages there is discrimination in the distribution of electricity. A village can be crossed by posts, but electric power is installed in a nearby town where a politician lives."

Fieldwork participants reported that family planning services are available but often underutilized in the Kaolack region. Some interviewees reported that many women and girls have an interest in family planning methods, while others noted that they face cultural and religious barriers to accessing services. Participants in the Women's FGD particularly noted that sensitization on family planning is carried out in health clinics and by members of the *Badiénou Gokh* initiative. The *Badiénous Gokh* are women volunteers who are chosen to counsel pregnant and lactating women in their communities with the aim of reducing maternal and neo-natal mortality.

Finally, fieldwork participants reported that the issue of *enfant talibé* persists in the Kaolack region, and that child protection measures are poorly implemented or weakly enforced. Several interviewees noted that the *enfant talibé* phenomenon is often driven by poverty, as parents do not have the means to educate their children. Others noted that the issue of child protection goes beyond the *enfant talibés* in the *daaras* but is a larger issue of poverty and the abuse of street children.

Economics and Resources

The primary economic activity in the Kaolack region is agriculture (including farming, herding and fishing).[114],[115] The Kaolack region is a major producer of peanuts and is known as the "peanut basin" in the country. The region is also home to several salt and mining companies. While only one interviewee reported tensions with these companies, some interviewees noted that these companies do not hire many locals, while others expressed that these groups do not pay well and provide little investment in local communities. One participant also reported that salt extraction is leading to deforestation and the destruction of crop areas.

Key economic concerns raised by fieldwork participants included volatile food prices and, as noted above, youth unemployment. Interviewees reported that there is no control over the price of staple products such as sugar, rice or onions, and that prices of staple goods rise during festival seasons such as *tabaski* (Eid al-Adha). Some participants noted that this price volatility has a particularly negative impact on poor and vulnerable populations and threatens their food security.

> *"I am not a farmer and I depend on my meager wages. And if food prices are not accessible, my family and I will not survive."*
>
> *- Teacher, Kaolack*

Land-based conflicts are also a concern in the Kaolack region. Fieldwork participants reported that tensions over land emerge due to

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[114] "SOS Children's Village Kaolack," SOS Children's Villages

[115] "Local Development, Institutions, and Climate Change in Senegal: Situation Analysis and Operational Recommendations," World Bank, January 2010

expropriation by local leaders, sales or leases of the same plot to multiple people, and conflicts between herders and farmers. One interviewee reported that local farmers sometimes place poison in their fields to deter livestock from entering their fields.

Women in the Kaolack region face limited opportunities for training and employment, and are most often engaged in agricultural production, commerce and domestic work. Women also face barriers to land access and ownership, as customary law privileges male inheritance rights. Interviewees reported that women also lack access to financing and credit. As a result, many women reportedly self-organize into groups such as *Groupements d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE) and *tontines* to expand their economic activities.

Finally, fieldwork participants reported that drug trafficking, smuggling and prostitution is prevalent in the Kaolack region. One interviewee attributed these trends to Kaolack's geographic position as a crossroads of trade alongside an international border. Other participants expressed that the authorities are complacent in combatting these issues due to corruption.

Security

Armed robbery, crime, cattle theft, land-based conflicts and drug trafficking are the primary security concerns in the Kaolack region. Youth, particularly Jakarta motorcycle drivers, are often involved in cases of crime and drug trafficking, which fieldwork participants attributed to the high rates of youth unemployment and poverty in the region.

Fieldwork participants also expressed that security forces in the region are largely ineffective in dealing with these security threats, due to a lack of equipment and training. One participant remarked that police stations are not close to the communities they serve, while another reported that the toll-free emergency number is rarely used

because the police who respond ask callers to purchase gasoline for them. Several interviewees also reported that local police and border agents are corrupt, which further undermines public trust in the security forces. As a result of this lack of trust, fieldwork participants reported that local communities frequently engage in mob justice.

Interviewees did not report any threat of radicalization or fear of terrorist activity in the Kaolack region. On the contrary, participants pointed to the region's peaceful inter-religious coexistence and the role of religious leaders as important resilience factors in deterring radicalization.

Politics and Governance

Fieldwork participants in the Kaolack region highlighted pervasive corruption, nepotism and a lack of transparency as primary issues in the area of politics and governance. Participants recounted instances of petty corruption, such as citizens paying a fee to process documents at the town hall and people paying bribes to the police to drive without car insurance. Some interviewees also noted that service provision is dependent on the presence of local politicians, with participants in the Women's FGD stating that "some localities inhabited by influential political leaders usually have infrastructure, unlike other areas that are often neglected."

"If you look at the Kaolack region, it has several ministers and MPs on the national scene. However, their impact is not felt in the development of the region. We really have doubts about the transparency in the management of political affairs of the city of Kaolack and the region as a whole."

- Women's focus group discussion, Kaolack

In addition, youth remain underrepresented in political decision-making in the region. Youth are reportedly engaged in the political process, but are often manipulated or mobilized by politicians ahead of elections to garner votes. While departmental youth councils do exist, interviewees noted that decision-making power continues to rest with the elders.

Similarly, respondents expressed that women face limited access to political power within the region. One participant noted that women are often used by politicians "to gain power, to strengthen their electorate," but there are few women in elected positions. Despite the existence of the gender parity law at the national level, it remains poorly implemented at the local level.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

During the KIIs and FGDs, several resilience factors were identified in the Kaolack region. Religious leaders were widely viewed as having a positive influence in conflict resolution and the de-escalation of social tensions. Participants in the Men's FGD also noted that members of the Niassene family of the Tijaniyya *confrérie* are involved in awareness-raising campaigns. As noted above, local leaders and family members are also frequently involved in dispute resolution.

In addition, multiple interviewees cited Senegal's history of religious tolerance and inter-religious coexistence as a key resilience factor, particularly in deterring radicalization in the region.

Civil society organizations were viewed positively by participants in Kaolack, particularly those working in the areas of human rights, economic empowerment, food security and elections. Interviewees cited the examples of an organization which coordinated an awareness-raising campaign on voter cards, while another promoted land reform. Participants in the Men's FGD also identified a project by Environmental Action and Development in the Third World (ENDA) which provides school supplies for students. However, the effectiveness of civil society is often undermined by a lack of funding. As a result, as one participant noted "civil society is present, but it is not well heard and has no means."

Women's role in trade and commerce is also viewed as a resilience, as women's economic empowerment allows them to support their families. While women in the Kaolack region continue to face barriers to financing, interviewees reported that women self-organize into groups such as *Groupements d'Intérêt Economique* (GIE) and *tontines* to expand their economic activities.

Finally, participants in the Men's FGD identified the presence of the El Hadji Ibrahima Niass University as a resilience in the Kaolack region. Interviewees expressed the hope that the vocational training provided by the University would increase resilience by positioning youth to better compete in the job market.

Kolda, Sédhiou, Kédougu and Tambacounda Regions

The Kédougou, Kolda, Sédhiou and Tambacounda regions are located in southern and south-eastern Senegal. These four regions share borders with The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Mauritania. According to 2017 predictions by the Senegalese National Agency of Statistics and Demography, Tambacounda is the most populous of the regions, with a population of 783,777, followed by Kolda with 748,451, then Sédhiou with 514,016 and Kédougou with 172,482.[116] The regions are home to multiple ethnic groups, including the Fulani, Mandingo, Wolof, Sarakole, Djola, Serer, Balantes and Baynounck.[117] Agriculture, including livestock herding, fishing, and the production of cotton, rice and peanuts, comprises the majority of economic activity in the area.[118] The Kédougou and Tambacounda regions also possess significant mining potential, including gold and phosphate reserves.[119]

Structural Vulnerabilities	- Perceptions of corruption and bias in the judicial system - Limited infrastructure and social services, including healthcare and education - Gender-based violence - Prevalence of early marriage - Weak enforcement of child protection mechanism, particularly around child labor and the *enfant talibés* - Volatility of food prices and food insecurity - High rates of youth unemployment and limited employment opportunities leading to youth emigration - Environmental degradation and climate change pressures - Networks of illicit economic activity, including timber smuggling - Increasing competition for land - Barriers to financing and land for women - Criminality and banditry - Lack of staff, resources and training for security forces - Porous borders - Perceptions of corruption, bias and lack of transparency in politics - Underrepresentation of women in politics

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116 "Regions," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2018
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 "Service Régional de la Statistique et de la Démographie de Kédougou: Situation Economique et Sociale Regionale 2014,"
Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, 2014

Event-Driven Risks	• Land- and resource-based disputes
	• Political demonstrations
	• Return to conflict by MFDC
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Civil Society Organizations, including NGOs, women's and youth groups
	• Local, traditional and religious leaders
	• Ethnic and religious coexistence
	• Community initiatives to combat deforestation
	• Microfinancing and *tontine* initiatives

Rule of Law

Fieldwork participants in these regions generally expressed a positive view of the judiciary and court systems. However, interviewees reported perceptions of corruption within the judicial system, including short jail sentences and the intervention of politicians and religious leaders in judicial decisions and sentencing.

"Overall justice is fair except for a few elements. In the area of cattle thefts, if the gendarmes arrest a thief and he is taken into custody, a few days later he is found in the street. Thieves being released without justice is due to corruption."

- Men's focus group discussion, Sédhiou

As a result, the population of these regions primarily rely on mediation by local leaders or other alternative mechanisms of dispute resolution in lieu of the court system. One interviewee noted, however, that these traditional mechanisms are frequently discriminatory toward women and girls, particularly in cases of inheritance, as customary law privileges male inheritance.

Population and Demographics

Participants in the Kolda, Sédhiou, Kédougou and Tambacounda regions highlighted the lack of infrastructure and social services, child labor, and gender issues such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and early marriage as key concerns in these regions. Multiple participants reported that the regions lack adequate healthcare facilities, requiring patients to travel long distances to access care. Other interviewees noted that rural areas face poor infrastructure, including roads, electricity and telephone networks.

Fieldwork participants also identified child labor, particularly in gold mining, and begging, including by *enfant talibés*, as important issues. Participants in the Women's FGD noted that many of the *enfant talibés* are not Senegalese but are rather from neighboring countries such as Guinea. While interviewees acknowledged that the Senegalese government has taken steps to end the practice of child begging, child protection measures are weakly enforced, and one respondent asserted that there is a lack of political will to eradicate the problem. NGOs and CSOs are also involved in providing services for the *enfant talibés* and child laborers; participants in the Men's FGD identified an NGO in Tambacounda, La Lumière, which has created a reception and reintegration center for children working in gold mines.

The practice of female genital mutilation (FGM) is still prevalent, particularly in the Kolda and Sédhiou regions, although NGOs and the Senegalese government have been carrying out awareness-raising activities on the issue. The Kolda, Sédhiou and Tambacounda regions have some of the highest rates of FGM among girls under the age of 15 (45 percent, 53 percent and

48 percent, respectively)[120], and fieldwork participants from Kolda reported that families will form caravans and travel to Guinea to have the procedure performed. In addition to FGM, women and girls in these regions reportedly face high rates of early marriage and domestic and sexual violence. Early marriage has contributed to higher rates of school drop-outs among girls. Fieldwork participants reported that CSOs such as Amnesty International and Action Educative en Milieu Ouvert (AEMO) have been working to mainstream gender issues in schools because of the prevalence of rape in the region. Interviewees in the Youth FGD also identified the work of the GONE Association and the Ado Center in Kolda in successfully reducing rates of early marriage in Sédhiou and Kédougou, while a participant from Sédhiou particularly highlighted the Violence Alert Cells (CAVE) in denouncing early marriages, abuse, and violence towards children. CAVE has worked both in the school system and in the wider community to spread their message.

Finally, the Kolda, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Kédougou regions are ethnically and religiously diverse, and fieldwork participants reported high levels of social cohesion. However, one interviewee in Kolda reported an ongoing dispute between members of the Ibadou and Tidjane brotherhoods ("*confréries*") over the construction of a mosque in the Velingara department. The case was referred to the court system, and to date a verdict has yet to be issued.

Economics and Resources

The Kolda, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Kédougou regions are largely dependent on agricultural production of cotton, rice and cashews, as well as logging and gold mining. Fieldwork participants identified rising food prices and food insecurity as pressing issues in these regions. Particularly in Kolda and Sédhiou, the price of goods is often higher due to the cost of transporting items from

Dakar. Recent trends in favoring cash crops over food crops in order to increase profits has led to food shortages and increased food insecurity. As a result, regions including Tambacounda have needed to import food from neighboring regions. In addition, interviewees noted the lack of government regulations to control food prices during festival periods, when rising prices further decrease the ability of vulnerable populations to purchase goods.

"In Sédhiou there is always a difference in prices with Dakar and the traders talk distance. Prices are not accessible, compared to the north of the country, and this is abnormal. Even the prices of vegetables are higher in Sédhiou."

- Women's focus group discussion, Sédhiou

Youth unemployment is also a concern, and fieldwork participants reported that the lack of economic opportunity has contributed to a trend of youth emigration to Europe. Formal employment opportunities remain limited outside of the agricultural sector, and as a result many youth turn to driving Jakarta motorcycles or migrate to mining areas to work in the gold mines. Some interviewees also highlighted a lack of formal employment qualifications among youth and the need for vocational training in the regions.

The gold mining industry in the Tambacounda and Kédougou regions has become one of the largest economic drivers in these areas. Many youth and children are reportedly engaged in the informal mining sector. Participants in the Youth FGD reported that the governor of the Kédougou region recently instituted a policy requiring permits to conduct informal mining and gold panning, which created tensions. In the Women's FGD in Sédhiou, respondents also highlighted an increase in

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[120] "Sénégal: Enquête Continue Quatrième Phase 2016," Demographic and Health Surveys, 2016

prostitution around mining sites and the injuries and fatalities caused by artisanal mining operations. One interviewee said that "People who work in oil and mines often have health problems. They cough and vomit when breathing gas in the wells. Sometimes they have respiratory problems."

The Kolda region has also seen widespread logging and timber smuggling into The Gambia, where the timber is then exported. The issue has led to cross-border and diplomatic tensions between Senegal and The Gambia in the past. Participants cited the example of a case in which Senegalese forest rangers who were patrolling to deter smuggling crossed into The Gambia, were arrested, and were held until the Senegalese government intervened on their behalf. One interviewee noted that rosewood, one of the most commonly smuggled types of timber, is now becoming rare or on the verge of extinction in the region.

These regions have also seen increasing environmental degradation and are vulnerable to the pressures of climate change, including changes in rainfall patterns. One interviewee reported that the Kolda region has been experiencing decreasing rainfall which, due to the region's reliance on agriculture, has affected crop production and decreased food security. Logging has also contributed to deforestation and in Kédougou and Tambacounda, formal and informal gold mining operations are using mercury to extract gold, which risks contaminating the ground water and could lead to related health problems. Participants also reported increasing salinization of land. The decrease in available land for farming, whether due to environmental degradation or a desire to use the land for more lucrative purposes such as mining, could have negative impacts on livelihoods and food security, particularly for vulnerable populations.

Due in part to increasing pressure on land and resources, land conflicts are a concern in the Kolda, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Kédougou regions. Fieldwork participants reported that intra-

communal land conflicts often occur over issues of inheritance, and conflicts also occur between farmers and herders. In addition, one interviewee warned that the ownership of rice fields by foreigners could be a source of tension or conflict in the future. Another expressed concern that the increase in cashew production could result in expropriation or greater competition for land.

Finally, women play a key economic role in these regions, often acting as the economic breadwinner and head of household. However, as women frequently face barriers to accessing credit and financing, many women reportedly turn to microfinancing and *tontines*, a system in which a set number of women pay into a communal pot of money, with each woman receiving the entire pot of money on a set rotation in order to make larger, long-term investments. In addition, many women in Senegal are unable to inherit land under customary law. One interviewee noted that the African Network for Integral Development is fighting for women's access to land.

"In Kédougou it is the woman who nourishes the family. The men say that when they married, they paid a lot. So the women have to work a lot once at the conjugal home."

- Youth focus group discussion, Sédhiou

Security

Fieldwork participants reported that the security landscape in the Kolda, Sédhiou, Tambacounda and Kédougou regions is generally stable, particularly since the establishment of the ceasefire with the MFDC in 2014. However, interviewees expressed concerns around the incomplete peace process and the potential for a return to conflict by the MFDC, with one participant saying that "for four years we have noted a situation of neither peace nor war." The factionalization of the MFDC, and the fact that not

all factions are included in negotiations with the government, hinders the peace process. One interviewee also noted that certain factions of the MFDC are benefitting from timber smuggling and other illicit activities, which may decrease their willingness to negotiate an end the conflict.

Ongoing security issues across the four regions include criminality and armed banditry, as well as land conflicts. Cattle theft has reportedly declined in the Kolda region due to the implementation of a cattle identification and stamping system. As one interviewee explained, "cattle theft is less common, thanks to a program launched by the government and which allows animals' movements to be traced. This program encourages buyers' registration and animals' identification through a stamp. It has helped to curb theft and reduce insecurity. It is an element of resilience that needs to be replicated in all regions."

While security forces are reportedly present in the regions, several respondents noted that they are often understaffed or lack equipment and resources to adequately respond to security threats. Women in the Women's FGD also expressed that security forces have been unable to contain violence during political demonstrations in the past, giving the example of a local mayor and his bodyguard who were attacked by opponents during a meeting. The threat of violent extremism was generally viewed by participants as being low, but one interviewee did voice concern around inadequate control of the shared border with Mali.

Fieldwork participants highlighted the key role of civil society organizations (CSOs) in calming tensions and promoting peace. One interviewee cited the example of a clash between Jakarta motorcycle taxi drivers and security forces in March 2017 which led to the destruction of the police station and the local treasury building. Following the violence, CSOs and religious and traditional leaders facilitated dialogue to resolve tensions. In addition, the Coordination of Sub-regional Organizations for Peace in Casamance (COSPAC),

a group of more than 150 CSOs from Senegal, The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau, has played an important role in peacebuilding and serves as an intermediary between the various factions of the MFDC and the Senegalese state.

Politics and Governance

Despite the history of independence movements in the Kolda and Sédhiou regions, fieldwork participants reported that the political landscape has been relatively calm since the 2014 ceasefire agreement with the MFDC. However, corruption and the lack of transparency in government remain central challenges for these regions. Fieldwork participants reported that politicians often resort to cronyism and help their own ethnic group or members of their political party before others. This partisanship has not led to a resurgence of violence, nor the use of ethnicity-based rhetoric to achieve political gains, according to interviewees. Participants generally viewed partisanship in politics as an expected component of the political landscape and not necessarily as detrimental, but noted that ethnic or political party affiliation does affect employment opportunities.

"Political leaders do not represent the people seriously. Most of the time they do not even stay in the area and do not understand the dynamics. Rand Gold Resources Ltd, which operates the Massawa Gold Mine in Tinkoto (Kédougou department), has provided $30 million in financial support to build a hospital ward, but if you go there what you will see is not worth this amount. The mining revenues benefit practically only the mayor and his relatives. The only road that exists in Kédougou is the one built by ECOWAS. … Corruption gangrenes the management of public affairs."

- Youth focus group discussion, Sédhiou

CSOs have also focused on promoting transparency within natural resource management, including carrying out advocacy on government reporting to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the creation of the "Publish What You Pay - Senegal" campaign. The "Publish What You Pay" coalition of CSOs advocates for the extractive industry to increase investment in mining towns to share benefits, and settles disputes between the community and the industry.[121] Overall, Senegal has steadily improved in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index every year (placing 64th this year), but it still has room to improve, especially at the local level and near borders.[122]

While women remain under-represented in political decision-making positions in the Kolda, Sédhiou, Kédougou and Tambacounda regions, fieldwork participants noted that women are actively engaged in advocacy and awareness-raising activities in CSOs. Women have reportedly played a particularly important role in peacebuilding activities and mobilizing others for action. Interviewees noted that women serve on local government councils in some communities (including the town of Kolda), but many continue to face persistent socio-cultural expectations and norms that deter political participation.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

The KIIs and FGDs revealed several resilience factors in the Kédougou, Kolda, Sédhiou and Tambacounda regions. One of the greatest resilience factors in these regions is the work of CSOs and NGOs, who have organized forums and advocacy campaigns on issues such as women's health and family planning, FGM, conflict resolution, environmental degradation, and good governance. They have also joined forces to create large coalitions like the Coordination of Sub-

regional Organizations for Peace in Casamance (COSPAC) to mediate conflict across borders and develop a culture of resolving conflict at the local level.

In addition, relations between ethnic and religious groups are generally peaceful, which interviewees attributed to community leaders, religious groups, CSOs, and local governments working to ensure solidarity between communities.

> *"People get along very well. You can hardly distinguish Christians from Muslims or differentiate ethnic groups. This is an achievement we are proud of. Although various ethnic groups live in this region, they coexist peacefully. There is a great sense of solidarity. Our local administration, religious, and traditional leaders, have succeeded in forging an amazing sense of solidarity and cohabitation between communities."*
>
> *- Journalist, Kolda*

Local and traditional leaders, religious leaders, and CSOs all play an important role in dispute resolution and mediation with these groups often preferred over the formal court system.

Several interviewees also identified community-based efforts to reduce deforestation, including the creation of forest monitoring committees.

Finally, efforts to increase women's economic empowerment, including microfinance, *tontine* initiatives and land tenure reform, are a key resilience due to women's critical role in the economy. One interviewee noted that the African Network for Integrated Development (ANID) is fighting for women's access to land.

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[121] "Senegal," Publish What You Pay

[122] "Senegal," Transparency International

Saint-Louis Region

Saint-Louis is the northern-most region in Senegal, bordering the regions of Louga and Matam to the south and the country of Mauritania to the north. Saint-Louis's population is approximately 1,009,170 according to the 2017 report by the Senegalese National Agency of Statistics and Demography.[123] The Saint-Louis region is primarily home to the Fulani, Toucouleur, and Wolof ethnic groups.[124] The region of Saint-Louis has a diverse economy, with agriculture, livestock and fishing comprising a significant part of the local economy. The Saint-Louis region also has one of the largest tourism sectors in Senegal.[125]

Structural Vulnerabilities	• Perceptions of executive interference, corruption and bias in the judicial system • High rates of youth unemployment • Youth unemployment and lack of employment opportunities • Weak enforcement of child protection measures • Price volatility • Climate pressures, including drought and the effects of climate change • Loss of fishery resources • Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors • Cross-border and maritime tensions with Mauritania • Porous borders • Under-staffed and under-resourced security forces • Poor communication between security forces and local communities • Under-representation of women in politics • Perceptions of clientelism, nepotism, corruption and bias among political and governmental officials • Poor provision of public services • Urban-rural disparities in infrastructure and services • Lack of transparency in the management of state affairs
Event-Driven Risks	• Land disputes • Cross-border and maritime disputes • Farmer-herder clashes

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[123] "Region: Saint-Louis," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie
[124] "Population Dynamics of Senegal," The National Academies Press, 1995
[125] "Service Régional de la Statistique et de la Démographie de Saint-Louis: Situation Economique et Sociale Regionale 2014," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, August 2015

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms: "palaver tents", religious leaders, traditional and customary leaders • Islamic brotherhoods (*"confréries"*) • Civil society groups, including NGOs, women's and youth groups • AEMO (Action Educative en Milieu Ouvert) and government agencies working on social services and infrastructure development • Microfinance and *tontine* credit programs

Rule of Law

Feelings of mistrust in the judicial system were prevalent during interviews with participants in the Saint-Louis region, primarily stemming from the perceived lack of judicial independence due to executive interference and the presidential power to appoint judges. Fieldwork respondents also highlighted a climate of impunity, political corruption and bias toward the wealthy and politically-connected as undermining the rule of law. Some interviewees noted that the justice system is further hindered by slow processing times, costly legal fees, and a lack of popular knowledge about the judicial process. In general, however, respondents reported that judicial institutions are present in the region, and that the state has recently built additional court facilities.

The low level of confidence in the justice system in the Saint-Louis region has contributed to a greater reliance on alternative and traditional mechanisms of dispute resolution, with the formal judicial system often viewed as a last recourse. Interviewees particularly identified conflict resolution mechanisms such as the "palaver tents" in Saint-Louis, along with religious leaders, local leaders and chiefs, as resiliency factors. One interviewee noted, however, that these alternative

"When there is a conflict, if you know the justice system will favor you, you'll go to the justice system."

- Youth focus group discussion, Saint Louis, Podor, Richard Toll

mechanisms sometimes lack the means to enforce their decisions.

Population and Demographics

Fieldwork participants reported that Saint-Louis has experienced significant trends of migration in recent years, both the emigration of youth to Europe and, to a lesser extent, the immigration of foreign workers to the region from Mauritania, Guinea, and other countries. In addition, the presence of foreign companies has brought foreign nationals from countries such as India to the region. Particularly regarding immigrants from Mauritania, interviewees reported that these groups are actively involved in trade and commerce in the region but that their presence also increases competition for available jobs.

Respondents identified youth unemployment and poor employment prospects as the primary drivers behind the trend of youth emigration to Europe. While some interviewees expressed that Senegalese diaspora communities can positively impact the region by sending remittances, others noted that the trend of emigration has contributed to "brain drain", a loss of able-bodied workers, a lower fertility rate, and the breakdown of family structures. Some interviewees noted that civil society organizations are leading campaigns against migration to Europe, but that these efforts are undermined by the lack of government action against human traffickers.

While youth in Saint-Louis often lack economic opportunities, fieldwork respondents reported that youth are increasingly engaged in politics. For

instance, according to participants in the Youth focus group discussion (FGD), youth in the region now enjoy increased representation in the *conseils de gestion* (neighborhood-level councils), where they are can work to address the challenges facing the region.

Citing their various income-generating activities and their role in carrying out awareness-raising activities, participants identified women as playing an integral role in the socio-economic climate of the Saint-Louis region. However, women are reportedly underrepresented in decision-making positions. In addition, early marriage and a lack of family planning were highlighted by interviewees as issues facing women. While some participants expressed that women have interest in family planning methods due to economic pressures, they are discouraged by their husbands due to religious considerations. Information about family planning is available at local hospitals but resources are often underutilized as the topic is largely considered to be taboo.

Participants reported that the Saint-Louis region has relatively good access to social services, including healthcare and education, although access decreased in rural areas due to a lack of infrastructure. Respondents in the Women's FGD particularly noted that Senegal's universal health care program has had a positive effect on the health of children under the age of five.

Finally, fieldwork participants reported that the phenomenon of *enfant talibé*[126] is very visible in the Saint-Louis region, often driven by economic pressures on parents. While interviewees acknowledged that the state has taken positive steps to focus on child protection, some noted weak or incomplete implementation of these measures. *Action Educative en Milieu Ouvert* (AEMO), an initiative of the Ministry of Justice, was identified by one FGD participant as a resiliency

factor in this area. The interviewee reported a case in which an *enfant talibé* in a local community tried to flee from an abusive *marabout* (a teacher from a Koranic school). AEMO intervened and led an investigation that saw to the detention of the *marabout*.

"You see enfants talibés in markets in the evening. They are used by people to find money. Some enfants talibés are in religious school but others are street kids. There are some enfants talibés who are not in school at all and their only activity is begging."

- Youth focus group discussion, Saint-Louis, Podor, Richard Toll

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Economics and Resources

The economy of Saint-Louis is largely agricultural, and key economic concerns identified by fieldwork participants included price volatility and a lack of employment opportunities. Price volatility, which participants attributed to the state's inability to control prices, has reportedly resulted in a reliance on cheap, sub-standard products imported from Mauritania. Some interviewees also reported that the northern parts of the Saint-Louis region are affected by illicit smuggling routes, which contributes to a reliance on low-quality products.

A key sentiment expressed by all participants centered on the potential of the extractive industries to reinvigorate the economy. The discovery of gas off the coast of the region was, by and large, viewed as a potential stimulant for future infrastructure development and economic growth.[127] However, some participants warned that oil, mining and gas extraction pose risks in the region, including land expropriation, environmental degradation, and tensions between companies

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[126] *Enfant talibé* are children studying at traditional Koranic schools, *"daaras"*. Some *enfant talibé* are forced to beg on the streets.

[127] "BP, Kosmos make major gas find off coast of Senegal," Reuters, May 2017

and local communities. As fishing is an essential income-generating activity in the Saint-Louis economy, some interviewees also expressed concerns about the potential for offshore gas fields to decrease the supply of fish in Senegalese waters. Finally, the location of the newly-discovered oil fields (on the coast of Senegal and Mauritania) was highlighted by some interviewees as a potential vulnerability that could lead to the renewal of tensions between the two countries.

Citing their various income-generating activities and role in trade, participants identified women as playing an integral role in the socio-economic climate of the Saint-Louis region. Microfinance and *tontine* credit schemes were highlighted as playing an important role in promoting the economic empowerment of women. A financing scheme by the Ministry of Women, Family and Children Affairs was particularly identified as a resiliency factor for women.

Finally, the Saint-Louis region is also vulnerable to cycles of drought and climate pressures. Fieldwork participants in particular identified changes in rainfall, sea level rise, and decreasing fishery resources as contributing to food insecurity in the region. For the fieldwork participants, the government's efforts to address such issues have largely been inadequate and ineffective. There are also concerns that increased pressures on land or the local economy stemming from the effects of climate change could spur further migration.

"A big issue here is the encroachment of the sea on our land. Saint-Louis is small and the sea is gradually encroaching, and we have nowhere to go. We asked the Government to relocate us but instead of doing that, they sent us rice, oil and things we do not need."

- Women's focus group discussion, Saint-Louis, Podor, Richard Toll

Security

Land conflicts, political tensions, protests, and an increase in drug use were identified as key security concerns in the Saint-Louis region. Due to Saint-Louis's proximity to the Mauritanian border, cross-border and maritime conflicts – particularly over land and fishing rights – were highlighted as a salient threat. Participants in the Women's FGD reported that tensions over fishing rights routinely increase in December and January of each year, when the Mauritanian government bans fishing to regenerate fishery stocks and Senegalese fishermen clandestinely fish in Mauritanian waters. As noted above, there are concerns that these maritime disputes could increase with the discovery of offshore oil fields. Fieldwork participants also reported incidents of conflicts between herders and farmers.

"There is friction between Senegalese fishermen and Mauritanian fishermen. Because we no longer have enough fish, especially the big ones on the Senegalese side of the sea, our men are forced to go fishing in Mauritanian waters to get a good catch, especially of a big size. And this is causing a lot of tension."

- Women's focus group discussion, Saint-Louis, Podor, Richard Toll

Interviewees did not identify terrorism and radicalization as a concern in the Saint-Louis region, thanks in large part to the presence of the Islamic brotherhoods ("*confréries*"). As one interviewee in Saint-Louis said, "There is no room for people with nothing to belong to, due to the *confréries*. Any new radical movement would be challenged and marginalized." Security forces and anti-terrorist units were identified as further sources of resilience in this area.

The security forces were viewed as being generally effective in securing the region, although fieldwork participants noted that local police are routinely under-resourced and under-staffed. A youth participant from Richard Toll also expressed that tensions exist between security forces and local communities due to a lack of communication between the two.

Politics and Governance

Fieldwork participants reported that the Senegalese state is generally present and visible in the Saint-Louis region, although several interviewees expressed the sentiment that the government should do more in the areas of infrastructure development and service provision. Participants in the Women's FGD reported that the city of Saint-Louis "is very congested and dirty. The waste disposal lorries/trucks do not come often enough. Though each household pays 1,000 CFA a month to the municipality for this, the money does not translate to good service. The Government administration are not doing what they ought to in this regard."

Widespread perceptions of corruption, nepotism, and a lack of transparency were highlighted by fieldwork participants as primary vulnerabilities within the political sphere. One participant in Saint-Louis recounted the story of a government minister who reportedly thanked the first lady for his position, saying "if one is a minister, it is thanks to her." Other participants noted a lack of transparency in government procurement and petty corruption by administrative officials.

Perceptions of corruption also extended to views of elections in the region. Several participants reported that there have been instances of vote-buying in past elections. Others noted that politicians often fail to fulfill their campaign promises, leading to disillusionment among the general population.

Many interviewees reported that women's representation in politics remains low, despite the existence of gender parity laws. As one interviewee in Saint-Louis said, "Women in the political arena are there to applaud the men." Women are reportedly more active in awareness-raising and voter mobilization than in decision-making roles, which some participants attributed to religious and cultural dictates, as well as a lack of education.

> *"During the last elections, my sister-in-law, who is a member of the ruling party, gave my son a 2,000 CFA note when he visited her. My son informed me that his aunt gave him the money from a large bag full of 2,000 CFA notes. Later we learnt that politicians gave out 2,000 notes to voters to support the President."*
>
> *- Teacher, Saint-Louis*

Non-state actors, including civil society groups, religious leaders and social movements, were identified as playing an important watchdog role and as being involved in dispute resolution. Some interviewees, however, reported that certain civil society groups have been coopted by elite interests and thus are less effective in working for the betterment of society.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Despite the vulnerabilities and risks listed above, the Saint-Louis region has a number of social and institutional resilience factors that help mitigate these risks. Fieldwork participants particularly identified the role of religious leaders, elders, local leaders and the practice of the "palaver tent" in dispute resolution. The Islamic brotherhoods (*"confréries"*) were also identified as being adept at mediating social tensions and deterring the threat of radicalization.

Civil society groups and NGOs, especially those involved in development activities, were also

viewed as positive resilience factors. One interviewee highlighted the work of Counterpart International, who built classrooms in the region. Government agencies and initiatives working in infrastructure development and social services were also viewed as resilience factors - in particular, respondents named AEMO, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Health and Social Action, the country's universal healthcare program, and the national anti-trafficking network.

Microfinance and *tontine* credit schemes were also identified as an economic resilience factor, particularly for women who lack access to bank loans or traditional credit. One interviewee particularly highlighted a financing program implemented by the Ministry of Women, Family and Children Affairs.

Finally, the participation of women's groups in awareness-raising activities around social issues and government policies was viewed as a source of resilience.

Ziguinchor Region

The Ziguinchor region is located in the southwestern portion of Senegal and borders the Sédhiou region to the east, The Gambia to the north, and Guinea-Bissau to the south. Ziguinchor's population is 621,168 as of 2017 predictions and is the third least populous region in Senegal.[128] The Ziguinchor region's primary economic activity is agriculture (including the production of rice), but fishing also composes a significant portion of the economy.[129] Ziguinchor is part of the region broadly known as Casamance, which has been the site of a secessionist movement led by the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC) since the 1980s.

Structural Vulnerabilities	
	• Perceptions of corruption, bias and a lack of independence within the judicial system
	• Lack of popular knowledge of legal system
	• Limited or inadequate provision of infrastructure, health, education and social services
	• Youth unemployment
	• Rural-urban migration and illegal emigration to Europe
	• Gender-based violence
	• Phenomenon of *talibé* children and weak enforcement of child protection mechanisms
	• Lack of transportation and processing infrastructure
	• Price volatility for staple foods
	• Economic impacts of Casamance conflict (including decline in tourism and agriculture, closure of businesses)
	• Illicit economic activities, including timber and drug trafficking
	• Environmental degradation (sea level rise, salinization of land, deforestation, destruction of mangroves)
	• Lack of financing and land access for women
	• Criminality
	• Poor relationships between security forces and local populations
	• History of grievances and perceptions of marginalization among local communities
	• Perceptions of corruption, bias and lack of transparency in politics and elections

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[128] "Region: Ziguinchor," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie
[129] "Service Régional de la Statistique et de la Démographie de Ziguinchor: Situation Economique et Sociale Regionale 2014," Agence Nationale de la Statistique et de la Démographie, July 2017

	• Underrepresentation of women and youth in political decision-making
Event-Driven Risks	• Failure of mediation or withdrawal of Sadio-led MFDC faction from negotiations • Renewal of conflict by MFDC • Start of ASTRON zircon extraction operations • Land-based conflicts
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Local leaders and neighborhood councils, particularly in dispute resolution • Development initiatives supported by expatriate communities, family members or local communities • NGOs and civil society groups • Infrastructure development and microfinance projects • Religious and ethnic cohesion

Rule of Law

While fieldwork participants in Ziguinchor generally reported that the judicial system was present in the region, widespread perceptions of bias, corruption, and a lack of judicial independence undermine trust in rule of law institutions. Interviewees expressed that the judiciary is subject to interference by the executive branch, and that judicial rulings are biased toward the wealthy and supporters of the ruling party. In addition, the rule of law is reportedly hindered by reports of processing delays, arbitrary arrests, and a lack of popular knowledge of the law.

> *"People steal livestock, they are condemned and are released after very little time. So the population or the herders beat the thief to death instead of delivering him to the justice system as they have lost confidence."*
>
> *- Lecturer, Ziguinchor*

This lack of trust in the judicial system has contributed to incidents of mob justice and a reliance on alternative or traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. While land-related conflicts or serious cases may be referred to the police or the court system, participants reported that most disputes (such as divorces or neighborhood quarrels) are often settled by local leaders or neighborhood councils. One participant from Kataba reported that the community had created an Association of Support for Peace and Development Initiatives to resolve conflicts. Similarly, interviewees in the Women's Focus Group Discussion (FGD) noted that community members in Sindian created an intervention committee to resolve any problems arising from the Navétanes football tournaments. While the involvement of local leaders in dispute resolution was often viewed positively, it was noted that reliance on non-state actors can put women at a disadvantage, particularly in domestic violence cases.

Domestic and sexual violence was raised as a key concern facing women and girls in the Ziguinchor region, yet interviewees reported that many women lack knowledge of legal protections and services around rape, assault and domestic violence. This lack of knowledge, as well as persistent social stigma, has contributed to consistently low levels of reporting on these issues.

Population and Demographics

A key concern for participants in the fieldwork was the lack of infrastructure and social services in the Ziguinchor region, particularly in rural areas. Interviewees noted that rural communities, and even some parts of urban areas such as Ziguinchor city, lack access to drinking water, electricity, education infrastructure, and healthcare. One participant from Karabane reported that the community has rehabilitated old barns to make classrooms, while other participants noted that the lack of rural schools often drives students to move to urban areas or even to other countries such as The Gambia to study, making them more vulnerable to exploitation. In the case of health services, respondents reported that patients must travel long distances to access care, and that hospitals and health clinics often lack equipment, resources, and staff training. Participants in the Women's FGD noted that the need to travel long distances dissuades many pregnant women from seeking care, thereby increasing cases of maternal and child mortality. In the absence of state infrastructure and services in the region, respondents reported that expatriates, family members in other parts of the country, and even communities themselves often join together to collect funds and build schools, wells, and other services.

"In the case of Bignona, services are not accessible. In this department, the ill are evacuated to Ziguinchor. There is no hospital that can receive all cases of patients for such a large city. There is an ambulance deficit. We find it hard to feel the presence of the State at our side, especially its services."

- Men's focus group discussion, Ziguinchor

Another concern raised by fieldwork participants was youth unemployment and migration. The decades of conflict in the Casamance region have resulted in a decline in agriculture and tourism, which traditionally provided employment for many youth, particularly along the coast. The lack of economic opportunities for youth has reportedly contributed to a strong trend of rural-urban migration and has increasingly driven illegal emigration to Europe.

"In the Tilène district, a man raped two sisters, which caused pregnancy for one of them. The CLVF (Committee for the Fight against Violence against Women) fought for his condemnation. But thanks to the intervention of the politicians who seek the recognition of marabouts (the culprit is the son of a prominent marabout) he was released after only a few months of detention."

- Women's focus group discussion, Ziguinchor

As noted above, women and girls in the Ziguinchor region face high levels of gender-based violence, including rape and domestic violence. Participants in the Women's FGD reported that women are particularly vulnerable to assault while working in the fields or traveling between communities. The cultural stigma around these issues remains high, and one interviewee reported that families will often force early marriage to cover up cases of pregnancy or abuse. Other concerns facing women and girls in the Ziguinchor region include early pregnancy and prostitution. Some interviewees noted that many of the prostitutes in Ziguinchor are not Senegalese, but instead are girls from Guinea-Bissau.

Finally, fieldwork participants reported that the phenomenon of *enfant talibé* persists in the Ziguinchor region, despite the existence of child protection measures intended to fight against it. Interviewees noted that many of the *enfant talibés* in the region are not Senegalese, but rather come from neighboring countries such as Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, and The Gambia. Several organizations working on child protection are reportedly active in the Ziguinchor region; participants highlighted the

work of Action Educative en Milieu Ouvert (AEMO), Futur Au Présent (FAP), and Environment and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA).

Economics and Resources

The economy of the Ziguinchor region is largely dependent on agriculture, including the production of cashew nuts, rice and mangoes, and fishing. While the region has significant economic potential, the region remains poor and economic productivity is hindered by a lack of transportation and processing infrastructure, as well as the cooling and storage facilities required to transport produce and other fresh goods. The region's isolation from the rest of Senegal makes it difficult for farmers and fishermen to reach markets, and fieldwork participants expressed frustration about delays in the construction of roads such as the RN6 that would connect Ziguinchor with other regions. The region's poor infrastructure is also compounded by low shipping and port capacity along the Ziguinchor coast.

"The Casamance region lacks transformative infrastructure. The Rani juice that people drink in Senegal is based on mangos coming from Morocco, while this area is a quintessential mango production area with rare varieties. But because of the lack of processing infrastructure, much of the production rots here."

- Women's focus group discussion, Ziguinchor

A key concern raised by fieldwork participants was the rising price of staple foods and price volatility. Food prices reportedly rise during festival seasons such as *tabaski* (Eid al-Adha). In addition, the region's location and poor infrastructure results in higher prices for food and other goods sold in Casamance, as traders must pay higher transportation costs or taxes to move goods through The Gambia to reach Ziguinchor. The rise in prices has impacted food security for vulnerable populations, particularly in rural areas. As participants in the Women's FGD reported, "people no longer have vegetables in their diet since they all sell their vegetables and fruits to buy oil and rice."

In addition, the decades of conflict in the Casamance region has negatively impacted the economy in Ziguinchor. The decline in tourism and the closure of hotels in Cap Skirring has contributed to rising unemployment for youth, who traditionally worked as tour guides. The conflict also prompted the closure of seafood processing plants and other businesses which provided employment for many women in the area. Agricultural production has also been hampered by the presence of landmines, as farmers can no longer access their fields.

The insecurity in Casamance and the lack of controls in rural areas has also contributed to a rise in contraband smuggling and illicit economic activities in the Ziguinchor region, particularly along the Gambian and Bissau-Guinean borders. Fieldwork participants reported cases of illegal logging and timber trafficking, drug trafficking (as Ziguinchor acts as a transport route to and from Guinea-Bissau) and the production of cannabis. One interviewee reported that Senegalese timber is often smuggled into The Gambia before export, noting that The Gambia was declared to be the fourth-largest exporter of rosewood to China despite having few forests.[130] Fieldwork respondents also noted that this illicit economy is driven by high rates of poverty and youth unemployment, as well as corruption among forest rangers and security forces who benefit from illegal trade. Several factions of the MFDC are also involved in illegal logging and cannabis cultivation, although the Sadio-led wing has banned these activities. The involvement of rebel groups in these

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[130] "Analysis of the demand-driven trade in Hongmu timber species: Impacts of unsustainability and illegality in source

regions," Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), 2016

activities has raised concerns around the potential for the MFDC to fund a return to conflict, or for the creation of a "war economy" to decrease political will to negotiate or end the conflict.

As noted above, the lack of employment opportunities for youth is a concern in the Ziguinchor region, and has contributed to youth involvement in drug trafficking as well as trends in rural-urban migration and illegal emigration to Europe. Fieldwork participants reported that there are few jobs in the private sector, and that youth lack adequate vocational training. As one interviewee said, "Youth are all involved in driving Jakarta motorcycles when some of them even have a DEA (Diploma of Advanced Studies)."

Land and resource-based conflicts are also a primary issue in the Ziguinchor region. Fieldwork participants reported cases of land grabbing and expropriation by the MFDC or local authorities, as well as inter-communal and cross-border conflicts around border demarcation. Several interviewees cited the example of a cross-border conflict between the Senegalese town of Touba Tranquille and the Gambian village of Dar Salam over the ownership of farmland. Participants in the Women's FGD also noted a rise in violent confrontations due to illegal logging as landowners try to protect their land.

A major resource-related concern raised by fieldwork participants was the establishment of a zircon and mineral sands mining operation by the Australian company Astron in the town of Niafarang. Interviewees reported that local communities are opposed to the operation, which they claim will cause population displacement, environmental degradation and destroy the sand bar which currently acts as a natural dike to prevent the sea from flooding rice fields and houses. Local groups have also criticized Astron's rehabilitation and social benefit plans as being inadequate. The operation has caused tensions and protests, including demonstrations in Niafarang, Ziguinchor and among diaspora populations in Spain, France and Canada.[131] Concerns have also been raised around the potential for the zircon operations to spark wider conflict, as the MFDC recently issued a statement condemning the project.[132] The Astron project is currently scheduled to commence operations in October 2017.

In addition to land pressures and tensions over mining, fieldwork participants highlighted a number of environmental issues which threaten livelihoods in the Ziguinchor region. Interviewees reported sea level rise and increasing salinization of land in coastal areas (which affects groundwater and agriculture) as well as deforestation and the destruction of mangroves. Many women cultivate oysters in the mangroves, and participants in the Women's FGD noted that "there are no longer oysters due to the disappearance of the mangrove, and less rice can be cultivated because of salinization." An interviewee from Karabane also reported decreasing fishery stocks. As a source of resilience, however, one civil society leader from Kataba highlighted the work of environmental activists in combatting deforestation. Communities have created cross-border committees and forest monitoring committees to increase awareness of deforestation, and local groups have created a forest festival with both Senegalese and Gambian communities to raise awareness and promote the use of alternative forms of charcoal (created from leaves and waste).

"The population of Niafarang lives on the exploitation of rice, and mangroves where they grow mussels. Landowners want to keep their land."

- Women's focus group discussion, Ziguinchor

[131] "Actions contre le Zircon en images…Paris, Ziguinchor, Catalogne, Québec," Casavvance, September 2017

[132] "Senegal rebels issue warning over Astron's mineral sands mine," Farge, E., Reuters, September 2017

Finally, interviewees reported that women play a primary economic role in the Ziguinchor region, including in the production of agricultural goods, as market vendors and workers in industrial plants, and in running households. However, participants noted that women face difficult access to financing and land, as land access is often governed by traditions and customary law. To improve women's access to financing, one interviewee highlighted the role played by microcredit initiatives, including the Coopérative Autonome pour le Renforcement des Initiatives Economiques par la Microfinance (CAURIE-MF) and Association Villageoise d'Epargne et de Crédit (AVEC).

Security

Fieldwork participants reported that overall security in the Ziguinchor region has improved since the declaration of the ceasefire with the MFDC in 2014. However, interviewees expressed that this relative calm remains tenuous, and that there are a number of issues that could prompt a return to conflict. While one faction of the MFDC (led by Salif Sadio) has been in talks mediated by the Community of Sant'Egidio since 2012, the other factions of the MFDC are excluded from negotiations, which several participants identified as a threat to security. In addition, participants expressed that the main triggers of the Casamance conflict, including the demand for Casamance independence and historic grievances around perceptions of marginalization, are either

"I think that to speak of peace would mean that there are agreements between two parties in conflict, yet the only agreement is a ceasefire. So this is a situation of neither peace nor war that I would call a situation of armed peace. There is no war but certainly both the military and the rebels remain armed."

- Lecturer, Ziguinchor

inadequately addressed or are excluded from the negotiation agenda. One interviewee also noted that the Sadio faction of the MFDC was historically supported by the former Gambian President Yahya Jammeh, and that the ECOWAS deployment of troops and Jammeh's departure could potentially prompt Sadio to pull out from negotiations. Overall, interviewees called for a more inclusive approach to the ongoing peace negotiations to prevent a return to conflict.

As noted above, tensions have recently emerged in the Ziguinchor region around the proposed Astron zircon mining operations. Interviewees expressed concerns that this project could spark violence in the region, as the MFDC factions recently issued a united statement opposing the operations, calling it a "declaration of war."[133] One interviewee noted that the deployment of government troops to protect mining sites could be viewed as a further provocation.

In addition to the threat of renewed conflict by the MFDC, participants highlighted armed banditry (particularly in border areas), crime, cattle theft, rape, and trafficking in drugs and small arms as key security concerns in the Ziguinchor region. Interviewees noted that incidents of cattle theft are particularly prevalent along the border between Senegal and Guinea-Bissau, and that communities have self-organized to protect against this issue. Participants in the Women's FGD also reported that armed bandits, drug addicts and MFDC combatants are implicated in cases of rape, and that Jakarta motorcycle drivers are involved in facilitating prostitution and carrying out kidnapping.

While security forces are present in many parts of the region (predominantly in urban areas), fieldwork participants characterized the relationship between security forces and local populations as being generally poor. Several interviewees expressed the opinion that security

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[133] "Senegal rebels issue warning over Astron's mineral sands mine," Farge, E., Reuters, September 2017

forces are there to protect government or mining properties rather than local populations. Others reported that security forces respond to demonstrations, which are often led by students, with disproportionate force. Participants in the Women's FGD said that the security forces "call for reinforcements from Dakar with military aircraft or the Bignona brigade" in response to demonstrations. These women also noted that security forces and police are involved in impregnating young girls in the region. Security force abuses and tensions with local populations further contribute to historic grievances toward the Senegalese state in the Casamance region.

Finally, fieldwork respondents did not identify religious radicalization as a concern in the Ziguinchor region, citing a shared cultural and religious background and the peaceful nature of Sufi Islam.

Politics and Governance

Interviewees in Ziguinchor reported widespread perceptions of corruption, bias and a lack of transparency in the area of politics. Participants cited instances of petty corruption among local administrators and security forces – such as bribery along roadways and in processing documents – as well as alleged cases of buying votes or implementing projects with state funds to sway votes ahead of elections. Participants in the Men's FGD also criticized the lack of transparency in state budget allocation, stating that "the consistency between the declared budget and the achievements [of this money] is always out of sync." Several participants also reported that personal and political connections with the ruling party can impact employment opportunities and influence the outcomes of court cases.

These negative experiences exacerbate existing grievances in Ziguinchor that stem from the historic and ongoing isolation and perceived marginalization of the Casamance region. One interviewee reported a feeling of disconnect between administrators from the north of the

country and local civil servants, while participants in the Youth FGD stated that "politics is the business of people in the North. This area does not count on the political spectrum." Several participants also expressed frustration at the perceived lack of government investment in infrastructure to connect the Casamance with the rest of the country.

Interviewees also reported that women and youth remain underrepresented in political decision-making, although several noted that the national gender parity law is making strides in increasing women's participation. One interviewee called the parity law "a lever that overcomes the culture," as many women face social norms, low levels of education and cultural barriers to political participation. Participants cited several examples of women's increasing representation, including involvement in the Casamance peace process through the Platform of Women for Peace in Casamance and growing acceptance of the involvement of leaders' wives in political management. In addition, one interviewee noted that in some areas (such as Lower Casamance, where animism or indigenous religion is more widely practiced) women may also take on religious leadership roles. Young people are reportedly engaged in politics as political party supporters (and have sometimes been involved in political violence in recent local elections) but lack representation in formal decision-making.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

During the key informant interviews (KIIs) and FGDs, fieldwork participants identified several social and institutional resilience factors in the Ziguinchor region. A primary source of resilience was projects carried out by NGOs and other local, national and international civil society organizations. Interviewees identified projects in the areas of women's rights, health, food security, environmental issues, mediation and dispute resolution, and child protection, carried out by a variety of groups including the Platform of Women

for Peace in Casamance, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, SOS Casamance, Environmental and Development Action in the Third World (ENDA), Ditoukarabane, Construire La Paix (COPI), Action Educative en Milieu Ouvert (AEMO), and Futur Au Présent (FAP). In addition, several interviewees discussed the positive role of locally-organized community and cross-border initiatives, particularly in the areas of environmental protection and dispute resolution. One participant from Kataba reported that communities created the Association of Support for Peace and Development Initiatives to resolve inter-communal conflicts. A civil society leader also noted the creation of cross-border committees and a forest festival that is jointly held with Gambian communities to fight against deforestation.

Programs of infrastructure development and economic development were also identified as positive resilience factors. One interviewee named an infrastructure project (*Programme d'Urgence de Modernisation des Axes et Territoires Frontaliers -* PUMA) as benefitting border towns and the Casamance region as a whole. Another interviewee praised the role of microfinance initiatives such as Coopérative Autonome pour le Renforcement des Initiatives Economiques par la Microfinance (CAURIE-MF) and Association Villageoise d'Epargne et de Crédit (AVEC) in helping women to access financing.

Particularly in the area of security, fieldwork participants cited the region's shared cultural background, inter-religious coexistence and the peaceful nature of Sufi Islam as resiliencies in deterring radicalization or conflict. One interviewee noted that shared cultural, linguistic and religious ties with neighboring countries such as The Gambia and Guinea-Bissau can also help reduce the risk of large-scale cross-border conflicts.

Finally, as noted above, neighborhood councils and local leaders play an important role in dispute resolution. Inter-marriage between ethnic groups was cited as a resilience factor that contributed to cohesion and peace.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Senegal has a diverse topography of forests, desert, lakes, and coastland. Relative to its neighbors, it is also peaceful and well-developed, which contributes to a thriving tourism industry. Research findings suggest that it is structurally resilient compared to its neighbors, especially in the Politics/Governance and Security pillars.

However, there are some lingering vulnerabilities at the sub-national level, notably in regard to the long-running separatist movement in the Casamance region, as well as some cross-border tensions and smuggling networks, including timber. In an effort to address the root drivers of these vulnerabilities, the Senegalese government has been investing in the development of the administrative regions that make up Casamance (Ziguinchor, Sédhiou, and Kolda) but the 2017 transfer of power in Gambia presents some uncertainty as to how the negotiations may proceed, given former President Yahya Jammeh's support of the MFDC. Also, there are concerns about the possibility of spillover of extremist violence from neighboring countries, although to date this has not been a significant challenge. For example, unlike Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, Senegal has not experienced deadly terrorist attacks emanating from Mali. The issue of *enfant talibé* who live in *daaras* and are forced to beg by their teachers is one that could present social or security risks down the line.[134] At 2.9 percent population growth, Senegal will have increased demographic pressures that will need to be managed.

Senegal is relatively poor in terms of GDP per capita compared to the wealthier ECOWAS countries of Nigeria, Ghana, and Cape Verde, but recent oil discoveries could change that profile quite rapidly in the next several years. How Senegal manages this oil boom will determine its trajectory in terms of diversification, inequality, and possible communal tensions that could be sparked by competition for resources if not handled well.

Community engagement and consultation will be key to addressing all the risks and vulnerabilities detailed in this report. Fortunately, Senegal has a long history of ethnic and religious coexistence. Civil society, community, and religious leaders play an important role in building platforms for collaboration and problem solving. These platforms should be facilitated and leveraged by government and private sector for conflict sensitive development and to avoid unintended consequences going forward.

Continuing to strengthen the political system will also be important. Findings suggest that Senegal is quite strong in terms of the perceived legitimacy and representativeness of its political leadership, though there have been some instances of election violence, including during the 2017 legislative elections. Notwithstanding those instances, the strength of Senegal's political system will be an important source of resilience in the years ahead.

Rule of Law

- Encourage and expand the use of alternative dispute resolution and mediation mechanisms
- Raise awareness around gender-based violence (GBV) crimes within the traditional justice systems
- Support programs to raise awareness and support victims of GBV
- Strengthen and improve access to justice for vulnerable populations

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[134] "'I still See the Talibés Begging,'" Human Rights Watch, July 2017

- Strengthen transparency and accountability in the justice system
- Strengthen the independence of the justice system

Population and Demographics

- Support culturally sensitive programming to address female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) and family planning
- Support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage the youth population
- Encourage assessment of educational curricula to ensure adherence to the needs of the country
- Increase coordination between ministries and actors charged with child protection
- Strengthen current anti-*enfant talibé* initiatives and the anti-trafficking national plan
- Strengthen the implementation of child protection instruments
- Modernize Islamic education *daaras* and integration to the mainstream education

Economics and Resources

- Support and expand microfinancing and training programs, particularly in support of women- and youth-led initiatives
- Support small and medium enterprises (SMEs)
- Strengthen the implementation environmentally sustainable policies to address climate change
- Develop programmes to diversify the economy

- Ensure that large-scale mining companies are adhering to international best practices on business and human rights, with mechanisms in place for affected communities to seek redress
- Promote collaboration between government and the private sector to encourage investment

Security

- Support bi- and multi-lateral training assistance programs to enhance the institutional and organizational capacity of the security forces
- Encourage partnership between CSOs, security forces and local communities to enhance security
- Work with regional and international partners to address larger regional trends of insecurity and violent extremism
- Establish cross border dialogue platforms between Senegalese and Mauritanian communities to address underlying tensions due to transhumance, fishery and potentially the newly discovered gas fields

Politics and Governance

- Monitor upcoming elections to promote transparency
- Promote initiatives to strengthen good governance and transparency
- Promote implementation and enforcement of the Gender Parity Law
- Support programs to train and engage women in political decision-making

Appendix A: Data Sample

Phase	Dimension	Source	Metric	Sample
Phase 1: Desktop	Resilience	SNA	Survey	23 Peace/Security Actors
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	ECOWARN	SitReps	940 reports
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections is/are protected from political interference	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	EIU Democracy Index	Electoral process and pluralism	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	EIU Democracy Index	Political Participation	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	EIU Democracy Index	Functioning of Government	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	IDEA	Average Voter Turnout Parliamentary	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Transparency International	Corruption Perception	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	BTI	Political and Social Integration	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Freedom House	Political Rights	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Mo Ibrahim Index	Personal Safety	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UN, ECOWAS, AU	Peace Operations	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	ACLED	Conflict Fatalities per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)

Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UPPSALA	Presence/Conflict with Non-State Armed Groups	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	PTS	Political Terror Scale – Amnesty	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	PTS	Political Terror Scale – State	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	PTS	Political Terror Scale – HRW	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	Refugees by country of origin per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	Refugees by country of origin (difference 2015-2014) per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	IDPs by Country of Asylum per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	IDPs by country of asylum (difference 2015-2014) per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, national-level judges give reasons for their decisions/judgments.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	WB Human Rights and Law Report	% of Women on Constitutional Court	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)

Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Does the law mandate equal remuneration for work of equal value?	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Does the law mandate nondiscrimination based on gender in hiring?	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited?	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Gini coefficient	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Gini WYD	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Income Share Held by Highest 10%	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Population with Improved Sanitation (Urban-Rural Difference)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Population with Improved Water Source (Urban-Rural Difference)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Children under 5 moderately or severely underweight, percentage	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Depth of the food deficit (kilocalories per person per day)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Prevalence of Underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Literacy, 15-24, Women	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	School enrollment, primary and secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, female (%) (modeled ILO estimate)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)

Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Median Age	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Population Growth	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Prevalence of underweight, weight for age, female (% of children under 5)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Contraceptive prevalence, any methods (% of women ages 15-49)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Life expectancy at birth, female (years)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Percentage of women aged 20-24 years old who were married or in a union before age 18	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1: Desktop	Risk	ECOWARN	IncReps	849 (after reducing for duplicates and relevance)
Phase 1: Desktop	Risk	ACLED	Incidents	613
Phase 2: Field Research	Risk and Vulnerability	Focus Group Discussions	Broken out by Men, Women, and Youth	21
Phase 2: Field Research	Risk and Vulnerability	Key Informant Interviews	Prominent individuals and local experts, including government officials	37

Appendix B: Vulnerability Index

Index Data Sources

Based on the five human security pillars, a series of indicators were identified based on relevance and measurability. Data sources were then identified from recognized institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations, as well as universities, research institutions, and think tanks. A full list of data sources is attached in *Appendix A.* During selection and testing of the index, the availability of data was assessed to ensure an even distribution of scores.

Process: Calculating the Scores

The index is scored on a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability, and 10 the lowest level of vulnerability. Each raw data set is normalized and scaled, before being integrated into the indicator and pillar scores.

1. Normalization

An index, by definition, integrates and compares data sets with very different curves and distribution. As a first step, therefore, it is necessary to normalize the data so that it can be properly compared. Without framing the data within the context of the wider group of numbers, its meaning can become skewed. Therefore, the process of finding the mean and calculating the Standard Deviation (SD) of the data set, then using those elements to approximate a normal distribution, can be used to provide this meaning. The Gaussian normalization formula is outlined below.

Where μ is the mean

σ^2 is the variance

$$f(x, \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\,\sigma}\, e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}$$

SD is the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for a group of numbers as a whole. Normal distribution is then used to find how the variables are approximately normally distributed. In the context of this tool, it will help to understand where countries sit in relation to each other within the group distribution of a particular data set.

For raw data sets that have gaps (e.g. data is unavailable for some countries but not others), country data points are left blank. This ensures countries are not provided with an artificial score, where data does not exist.

2. Scaling

To create an index where countries are scored within a defined range, the data sets must be scaled so the scores can be integrated. This process of scaling transforms the normalized data into a number between 1 and 10, with 10 representing the lowest level of vulnerability. The below formula was applied to standardize the distribution values from [min, max] to [MIN, MAX], matching the new scale of values both for the highest and lowest edges of the distribution.

$$X = MIN + \frac{(MAX - MIN)}{(max - min)} \times (x - min)$$

3. Aggregation

Each indicator may be made up of either one or multiple data sources. In cases where multiple data sets were used to make up the one indicator, the data sets were each scaled to preliminary index scores (1-10), as outlined in the above steps. The average was then taken of these scores to reach a final index score for that indicator. This process was repeated at the pillar level, first averaging, then scaling the indicator scores.

Appendix C: Additional References

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Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar

	VULNERABILITIES	RISKS	RESILIENCES	RECOMMENDATIONS
Rule of Law	➢ Alleged corruption and impunity in the justice system ➢ Ignorance of existing legal instruments ➢ Alleged lack of independence of the justice system ➢ Cultural barriers to access to justice by women ➢ Latency in the judicial case processing	➢ Violent protests against the justice system ➢ Politicization of high profile cases ➢ Under reported gender-based violence crimes	➢ Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms ➢ Religious, traditional, and customary leaders ➢ Free legal counsel "Maisons de Justice" ➢ Existence of the "Médiateur de la République" ➢ National Office for the Fight against Fraud and corruption (OFNAC/CENTIF)	➢ Encourage and expand the use of alternative dispute resolution and mediation mechanisms ➢ Raise awareness around gender-based violence (GBV) crimes within the traditional justice systems ➢ Support programs to raise awareness and support victims of GBV ➢ Strengthen and improve access to justice ➢ Strengthen transparency and accountability in the justice system ➢ Strengthen the independence of the justice system
Population & Demographics	➢ Unemployment, especially for youth ➢ Low rate of family planning ➢ Disparities between rural and urban areas in terms of social services and infrastructure ➢ Illegal emigration of youth to Europe ➢ Immigration into Senegal from surrounding countries ➢ *Enfant talibé* phenomenon and weak enforcement of child protection measures	➢ Increased criminality ➢ Malnutrition and Food Insecurity ➢ Natural resources-based tensions ➢ Coastal erosion ➢ Floods and drought	➢ Cohesion among ethnic and religious groups ➢ Contribution of immigrants and diaspora to the local economy (remittances) ➢ Existence of social safety net and social security measures such as free health care for the elderly and infants ➢ The roles of the "Badienou	➢ Support culturally-sensitive programming to address female genital mutilation and cutting (FGM/C) and family planning ➢ Support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage the youth population ➢ Assessment of educational curricula to ensure adherence to the needs of the country

	➢ Environmental degradation; ➢ Land competition ➢ Climate change;		Gokh" in supporting pregnant women ➢ Campaign to reduce FGM and child marriage	➢ Increase coordination between ministries and actors charged with child protection ➢ Strengthen current anti-enfant *talibé* initiatives and the anti-trafficking national plan ➢ Strengthen the implementation of child protection instruments ➢ Modernization of Islamic education "Daara" and integration to the mainstream education
Economics & Resources	➢ Food insecurity ➢ Price volatility including fuel, staple foods; ➢ Poverty ➢ Youth unemployment ➢ Limited opportunities for vocational training ➢ Rural-urban disparities ➢ Illicit economic activities ➢ Environmental degradation (land and water resources/ salinization of land and aquifer) ➢ Barriers to credit and land access for women ➢ Overfishing and illegal fishing ➢ Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors ➢ Economic impacts of Casamance conflict (including decline in tourism and agriculture, closure of businesses)	➢ Start of Astron zircon extraction operations ➢ Drug trafficking ➢ Illegal logging ➢ Increasing competition for land ➢ Decline in fishery resources ➢ Land grabbing ➢ Money laundering	➢ Establishment of community development programme (Programme *d'Urgence de Développement Communautaire* PUDC) ➢ Ongoing construction of feeder roads to ease access to markets ➢ Implementation of the EITI ➢ Presence of GIABA Regional Office to fight organized crime and financing of terrorism	➢ Support and expand microfinancing and training programs, particularly in support of women- and youth-led initiatives ➢ Support small and medium enterprises (SMEs) ➢ Strengthen the implementation environmentally sustainable policies to address climate change ➢ Develop programmes to diversify the economy ➢ Ensure that large-scale mining companies are adhering to international best practices on business and human rights, with mechanisms in place for affected communities to seek redress ➢ Promote collaboration

	➢ Inadequate transportation infrastructure			between government and the private sector to encourage investment
Security	➢ Under-staffed and under-resourced security forces ➢ Perception of corruption in security forces ➢ Networks of drug trafficking, smuggling and prostitution ➢ Porous borders ➢ History of grievances and perceptions of marginalization among local communities in the Casamance region ➢ Rebellion in the Casamance region	➢ Land and resource-based conflicts ➢ Crime, including armed banditry ➢ Cattle rustling ➢ Cross-border and maritime tensions between fishing communities ➢ Smuggling of small arms and light weapons ➢ Terrorism and radicalizatio n ➢ Drug cultivation (Marijuana) and trafficking	➢ Professionalism of security forces and defense forces ➢ Proximity policing ➢ Community policing ➢ Existence of non-violent religious ideology (*confrerie de mouride et de tidianiyya*) ➢ Legacy as of the West African countries that did not experience military coup ➢ Participation of the security and defense forces in peacekeeping operations in neighbouring countries ➢ Existence of women platforms intervening in the Casamance ➢ Reconstruction programmes through government agencies and international stakeholders	➢ Support bi- and multi-lateral training assistance programs to enhance the institutional and organizational capacity of the security forces ➢ Encourage partnership between CSOs, security forces and local communities to enhance security ➢ Work with regional and international partners to address larger regional trends of insecurity and violent extremism ➢ Establish cross border dialogue platforms between Senegalese-and Mauritanian communities to address underlying tensions due to transhumance, fishery and potentially to the newly-discovered gas fields
Politics & Governance	➢ Perceived lack of transparency in the mining and extractive sectors ➢ Perceptions of corruption within the political system ➢ Underrepresentatio n of women and youth in political decision-making	➢ Political protests ➢ Electoral violence ➢ Politicization of religious leaders	➢ Vibrant civil society groups, including NGOs, women, and youth groups ➢ Existence of the 2010 Parity Law making the country the most progressive in	➢ Monitor upcoming elections to promote transparency ➢ Promote initiatives to strengthen good governance and transparency ➢ Promote implementation and enforcement

			terms of Gender in the region ➢ Vibrant media ➢ Highly influential religious leaders in maintaining social cohesion ➢ Long-standing inter-religious dialogue/toleranc e ➢ Availability of Gender progressive laws including equal parental authority	of the |Gender Parity Law ➢ Support programs to train and engage women in political decision-making