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ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

GUATEMALA



Contract No: AID-DFD-I-00-05-00197
Task Order No: AID-OAA-TO-11-00055

April 2012

This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Creative Associates International,.

Table of Contents

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Guatemala Electoral Security Framework
Electoral Security Assessment of the 2011 Elections

Executive Summary

The Electoral Security Framework, employed by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), provides policy-makers, electoral assistance providers, and electoral and security practitioners with a toolkit to profile electoral conflict; to plan and program for preventing, managing or mediating these conflicts; and to measure the effectiveness of the strategy and its associated interventions. In January 2012, Creative Associates International used this Framework to conduct a post-election electoral security assessment in Guatemala that focused on the 2011 electoral cycle, including the September 11 municipal and first-round national elections, and the November 8 second-round national elections. The following problem statement and development hypothesis arose from this assessment.

Problem Statement: Guatemala lacks the capacity to sufficiently plan and deploy assets to provide electoral security as well as prosecute violent acts or sanction the flow of illicit funding into campaigns. Taking advantage of this environment of impunity and available resources, a range of perpetrators regularly use electoral violence, including elimination of rival candidates and intimidation of voters, to ensure victory by their preferred candidate.

Development Hypothesis: If Guatemala is better able to plan and deploy assets as well as prosecute crimes and control flow of illicit monies, then fewer incidents of electoral violence should occur.

Three major elements were studied during the course of the assessment: 1) Contextual Analysis; 2) Historical Conflict Factors; and 3) Stakeholder Analysis. Based on this analysis and key assessment findings and considerations of local planning restraints, programming recommendations are being provided.

Electoral Security Assessment Findings

1) Contextual Analysis

In Guatemala, electoral violence is a reflection of a general rise in the level of societal violence resulting from underlying social and economic factors, as well as a culture of criminal impunity. However, a weak political party system, opaque political finance, and a lack of enforcement of existing political finance regulations serve to exacerbate the

occurrence of electoral violence by creating hidden connections between elections and financial gain. Decentralization has also created monetary and territorial stakes that incentivize spoilers to employ violence, intimidation, and vote buying at the municipal-level to control local governance. These incentives, combined with the fact that the culprits of electoral violence are rarely arrested or prosecuted, has resulted in criminal interests, particularly Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs), emerging as forceful perpetrators of electoral violence as an effective and penalty-free method to achieve political and financial objectives.

2) Historical Conflict Factors

Electoral violence, including threats to candidates, party affiliates and their associates have been commonly experienced in every electoral cycle in Guatemala since 1999. However, the type and focus of the violence tend to differ depending on the phase of the country's electoral cycle; the majority of the electoral violence tends to occur in the Pre- and Post-Election phases, while Election Day is relatively peaceful.

The two principal forms of Pre-Election violence have been assassination of candidates and intimidation of candidates and voters. Since 2003, violence, particularly in the pre-election phase, has increasingly become a local phenomenon. This trend has been driven in part by increased activity by drug cartels which finance candidates, or intimidate their rivals, with the aim of controlling territory for use as trafficking routes. For example, the 2007 Pre-Election cycle witnessed a marked increase in violence from prior contests at the municipal level – mayoral and council seats – including assassination and intimidation of candidates and party affiliates as well as their families; In 2011, mayoral candidates were the predominant targets in the Pre-Election Phase. Additionally, while women were not the overt targets of violence, the paucity of female candidates and observations by those interviewed indicate that women were intimidated by the level of violence and opted out of contesting for office, believing that they were less able to protect themselves against violence than men.

In contrast to the Pre-Election Phase, Election Day 2011 in Guatemala was largely peaceful, with only a few confrontations at polling stations occurring where voters were transported from other municipalities to cast their ballots. Additionally, with electoral violence focusing at the municipal level, the level of violence during the Election Day Phase noticeably declined from the first round, which included local and national elections, to the second round held solely for national elections. While the level of violence again increased during the Post-Election Phase, neither the focus nor the intensity was equivalent to the Pre-Election Phase. Post-Election, the targets were poll workers, polling stations, sensitive electoral materials, and municipal offices. The conflicts involved the supporters of losing candidates forming mobs, assaulting poll workers, and burning electoral and municipal facilities.

3) Stakeholder Analysis

For programming purposes, the Stakeholder Analysis classifies actors into state or non-state categories. State stakeholders are regulatory, security, and judicial in nature and include Election Management Bodies (EMBs), security forces, and prosecutorial

authorities. The roles of these stakeholders are also determined so that potential perpetrators and targets can be identified, and the mitigating influences of other organizations and individuals can be leveraged for conflict reduction. The presence and role of the international community in electoral, transitional justice, policing, or military assistance is also described so that the any gaps or redundancies in electoral conflict prevention programming can be addressed.

Electoral Security Planning and Programming

In addition to improving the electoral process in Guatemala, electoral conflict reduction also supports other United States Government (USG) objectives including combating DTOs and supporting good governance in Guatemala. While USAID's electoral conflict prevention planning and programming for the September 2015 (first round) elections can anticipate financial resource constraints as well as varying levels of institutional capacity and political will among the domestic stakeholders, early intervention can be aimed at electoral conflict prevention measures with the objective of developing domestic capacity to carry the programming into the 2015 electoral cycle. Additionally, passage of some of the current proposed electoral reforms could reduce the vulnerabilities and triggers for electoral conflict. These include prohibitions or limitations on "floor crossing," or changing political parties by candidates; establishing reasonable municipal residency requirements for voter registration to reduce "carrying voters;" de-linking the voter registration card from receiving government assistance; enhancing political finance regulation; introducing term limits for mayors; and disaggregating the municipal elections from national ones.

The three strategic program objectives for the 2015 electoral cycle are as follows:

1) Strengthen the Capacity of State Stakeholders in Electoral Security Administration

- Establish an Office of Electoral Security Administration at the TSE
- Institutionalize the inter-agency electoral security task force
- Build TSE capacity in the enforcement of political finance regulations
- Facilitate TSE electoral conflict contingency planning for ballot counting and poll worker training
- Review and suggest revisions to National Civilian Police (PNC) deployment patterns during the electoral cycle
- Suspend some PNC Officer residential requirements during the electoral cycle
- Create programs for victims' services to assist with counseling, health care, or property loss resulting from electoral violence

2) Reduce Electoral Conflict among Non-State Stakeholders

- Strengthen political parties and their role in de-conflicting political dialogue
- Empower civil society organizations (CSOs) to monitor electoral conflict, media, political finance, and disputes
- Disseminate messages urging respect for the law and peaceful elections
- Establish a media Code of Conduct

3) Enhance the Performance and Accountability of Investigation and Judicial Institutions to Address Impunity for Electoral Violence

- Establish the Office of Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes within the Attorney General's Office
- Within the TSE, build electoral dispute adjudication capacity and clarify its mandate

Socio-economic factors will continue to create vulnerabilities for electoral violence. Although not unsusceptible to programming, reducing overall levels of criminality and poverty, for example, will require long-term efforts that leverage domestic and international support. Principal among these issues is the threat posed by DTOs as manifested through illicit capture of local governance in general, and weakening the integrity of municipal electoral contests in particular. Increasing capacity of security forces to combat these organizations is but one side of the solution, and should be coupled with efforts to address the means via which DTOs inject funding, and thus influence, into the electoral arena—in particular, making political finance regulations more stringent. Given the lack of political will to make these changes, such reforms, despite their urgency, are viewed realistically as long-term objectives. At the same time, in the short-and medium term, capacity building initiatives, reform, and further international assistance may help reduce vulnerabilities resulting from political and security factors.

Introduction

From January 8 through 28, 2012, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Guatemala. The post-election assessment focused on the 2011 electoral cycle, including the September 11 municipal and first-round national elections, and the November 8 second-round national elections. The Electoral Security Framework provides policy-makers, electoral assistance providers, and electoral and security practitioners with a toolkit to profile electoral conflict; plan and program to prevent, manage or mediate these conflicts; and measure the effectiveness of the strategies and associated interventions.

The team was composed of Jeff Fischer and Patrick Quirk from Creative, Vanessa Reilly from USAID's Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, and Carla Aguilar from USAID/Guatemala, Democracy and Governance. During the assessment, team members met with representatives of electoral authorities, police, civil society, political parties, media organizations, and the international community. Interviews were conducted in Guatemala City, Cuilapa, Magdalena Milpas Altas City, Escuintla City, and Tiquisate. A list of meetings held is shown in Annex I.

The assessment seeks to address the following Problem Statement and Development Hypothesis.

Problem Statement: Guatemala lacks the capacity to sufficiently plan and deploy assets to provide electoral security as well as prosecute violent acts or sanction the flow of illicit funding into campaigns. Taking advantage of this environment of impunity and available resources, a range of perpetrators regularly use electoral violence, including elimination of rival candidates and intimidation of voters, to ensure victory by their preferred candidate.

Development Hypothesis: If Guatemala is better able to plan and deploy assets as well as prosecute crimes and control flow of illicit monies, then fewer incidents of electoral violence should occur.

Fundamental Characteristics of Electoral Conflict in Guatemala

Electoral violence in Guatemala is a reflection of a rising level of societal violence in general. As such, in some cases it may be difficult to distinguish between violence perpetrated for electoral objectives and violence perpetrated for personal or economic reasons but occurring within the context of an electoral campaign.

Decentralization has created municipal-level electoral stakes in money and territory that incentivize spoilers to employ violence, intimidation, and vote buying to control local governance. As a result, municipal candidates are the predominant targets of electoral violence during the campaign phase; however, the targets, perpetrators, motives, tactics, locations, and intensity vary by phase of the electoral cycle – Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election.

A weak political party system, opaque political finance, and a lack of enforcement of existing finance regulations create hidden connections between money and electoral violence. There are no standard processes by which candidates become party nominees and the practice of "floor crossing," (whereby candidates can change parties at any time) is widely exercised. This practice destabilizes political dialogue and diminishes the traditional functions of political parties of interest articulation on behalf of citizens to government, and aggregation of opinions in coalitions of interest.

Criminal interests are emerging as forceful perpetrators of electoral violence and operate outside of the reach of conventional programming in reconciliation and peace-building. These criminal interests, particularly DTOs, bring a transnational dimension to the problem with implications for violence occurring in neighboring states. Criminal interests become involved in candidate selection, financing, and forced withdrawals, and employ violence, kidnapping, and intimidation to achieve their objectives. These interests may be motivated by the financial gains that flow from captured local governance, and the "safe haven" territories created by controlling local authorities.

Added to these factors is a culture of impunity for the commission of violent crimes. In the Guatemalan judicial system, it is rare to obtain a conviction for a violent crime. Electoral violence is no exception. Arrests and prosecutions for such crime are uncommon.

While these factors represent vulnerabilities that contribute to electoral conflict, there are mitigating factors in Guatemala that helped dampen violence in the 2011 contest and can be leveraged to diminish negative effects stemming from these vulnerabilities in future electoral cycles. First, the inter-agency planning and preparation for electoral security in 2011 surpassed that of previous elections and can be further supported and institutionalized. While still a nascent capacity, the organizational template, risk mapping, and data collection can be developed into a permanent institutional capacity. Second, the capacity of CSOs to perform incident monitoring and reporting can bring greater transparency and evidence about the perpetrators as well as services for victims of electoral violence. Third, the Attorney General's Office is taking steps to become more active in prosecution for acts of violence, reducing the level of impunity. Fourth, while youth gangs remain a problem in organized crime, youth do not appear to be widely exploited by political parties or candidates as agents of electoral violence. Fifth, while some Diasporas can also play a conflictive role in elections through rhetoric and financial support of violence, the Guatemalan Diaspora does not appear to play a conflictive role in elections.

Moreover, elements of current electoral reform proposals could help de-conflict the electoral process if passed. These reforms include establishing prohibitions or limitations on elected officials changing parties; establishing reasonable municipal residency requirements for voters; de-linking social benefits from voter registration cards; increasing sanctions on political finance violations; introducing mayoral term limits; and

disaggregating the municipal elections from national ones so that security forces can better protect them.

Electoral Security Report Methodology

The problem statement and development hypothesis were determined by applying the methodology found in the *Electoral Security Framework*.[1] The structure of this Guatemala Electoral Security Framework report is based upon this methodology:

1) **Assessment**: This step is divided into 3 major analytical pieces: a) Contextual Analysis; b) Historical Conflict Factors; and c) Stakeholder Analysis
2) **Planning:** Examine donor constraints, USG priorities, local capacity limitations, and other planning elements.
3) **Programming:** Determining specific areas of programming objectives and associated activities.
4) **Monitoring and Evaluation** (M&E) – Illustrative indicators.

A History of Electoral Conflict in Guatemala (organized by electoral phase) is shown as Section I.B below. Detailed Summaries of TSE and PNC interviews conducted in Cuilapa, Magdalena Milpas Altas City, Escuintla City, and Tiquisate can be found in Annex II.

I. Electoral Security Assessment

A) Contextual Analysis

In order to establish a profile of the underlying causes of electoral violence in Guatemala, the security, political, social, and economic factors that create vulnerabilities for such violence must be examined. These contextual vulnerabilities are described below. The extent to which these vulnerabilities can be diminished varies with each factor. On the one hand, some vulnerabilities, such as Guatemala's contributing economic factors, will not significantly improve before the next election and only long term development and state consolidation will reduce its contribution to violence; on the other hand, some political vulnerabilities may be responsive to short- to medium-term electoral reform and assistance by the international community, helping to reduce electoral conflict in 2015.

1. Security Factors: Post-Conflict Environment

Guatemala experienced a 36-year civil war during which an estimated 250,000 individuals were killed as a direct result of the conflict. This legacy of open conflict remains a living memory for those in the generation who grew from childhood to maturity during its destructive course. This legacy also had an effect which "militarized"

[1] A Handbook describing the Framework can be found at the following link: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf

politics, whereby government proxies were engaged to silence the opposition through murder and forced disappearances. The conflict created illicit and parallel power structures of the state employing violence to achieve their military objectives. One example of such a parallel power structure was the Civilian Defense Patrols (PACs), which pressed indigenous people, particularly from the Northwest, to join and fight against the guerrillas. At one point, as many as two million Guatemalans (out of a then-total population of seven million) were involved with the PACs and received military training. While the PACs were eventually officially demobilized, their members remained active in comparable endeavors. Similarly, while the United Nations (UN) brokered 1996 peace accords ended the open conflict, the amnesty that it afforded to ex-combatants is viewed by some as fostering the culture of impunity for violence which persists in Guatemalan justice today, and carries over into electoral contexts.

2. Security Factors: Criminality

Criminal organizations, particularly DTOs, have increased their presence and operations in Guatemala over the past ten years and are said by governmental and non-governmental stakeholder to operate freely in many areas of the country, including a stronghold in the northern province of Petén. Specific to the electoral process, criminal organizations exert influence through money and violence to ensure victory by their preferred candidate in order to receive public contracts or protected territory for illicit operations. Gaining this power within the electoral process is made easier at the local level by the fact that mayoral candidates require substantial sums of money to finance their campaigns and to pay political parties in exchange for the use of their party's name. Criminal interests exploit this opportunity for influence by offering candidates funding and muscle. Should a candidate refuse such support, they and their families and supporters are threatened until the candidate agrees. These tactics of intimidation and coercion are also employed to force withdrawals of candidates from elections. (A further discussion of DTOs and electoral violence is included in Annex III.)

3. Political Factors: Political Party System

The political party system in Guatemala is fragile and fractured - its multiplicity of weaknesses inhibits political parties from serving the traditional roles of interest articulation and opinion aggregation which can de-conflict political dialogue. The four weaknesses of the political party system described below create vulnerabilities to electoral conflict in Guatemala manifested as inter-party and intra-party violence.

First, there is a brief life span for political parties - since 1986, for example, more than 30 parties have been founded and then disbanded. This high "infant mortality" rate requires the party organizers to focus only on the next election, which incentivizes a "winning at all cost" set of political behaviors.[2]

[2] Such characteristics have been terms "electoralist" by Thomas Carothers, that is, the parties are established to compete in the next election at the expense of ideology, principals, or visions for governance. Thomas Carothers, *Confronting the Weakest Link. Aiding Political Parties in New Democracies,* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006).

Second, the practice of "floor crossing" (changing party affiliation, referred to as *tránsfuga* or *transfuguismo*) is widespread, in particular surrounding electoral events. During the most recent session of Congress, for example, 114 of the 158 total deputies (*diputados*, or Congressmen), changed their party affiliation and in 2007 one in five deputies defected from the ticket on which they were elected to office. Due to this phenomenon, which shows no signs of abating, individuals generally cannot be certain that their chosen candidate will retain party affiliation and press for proposals associated with that party.

Third, although referred to as 'parties' these organizations tend to lack coherent party platforms, ideologies, or institutionalized structures. Instead, they tend to be clientelistic groups of friends or former colleagues with a specific set of personal interests (generally business-related) they hope to advance through assuming office. Presented ideologies and platforms differ little, if at all, between parties. Political parties become personal vehicles for enrichment and power which do not inspire voters with a national vision or ideals. In turn, voters regard their votes as goods in exchange for money or gifts. Parties without ideology, serving as personal vehicles for enrichment and power, do not inspire loyal voters; likewise, politicians lack particular loyalties to their constituencies.

Fourth, due to the lack of a statutory process for selection of candidates in the pre-campaign period, money and intimidation are the principal determinants for selection, particularly at the municipal level. As one source described it, there are four informal "filters" through which mayoral candidacies must pass to be successfully selected. First, the local political party filter generally involves a semi-random process through which parties look for local leaders and reflect on the popularity that a would-be candidate already possesses with the electorate. The second filter is money. Candidates are expected to fulfill a "quota" by bringing from 500,000 to 2,000,000 GTQs ($64,360 to $257,400 USD), used for financing their own candidacies and those for the district congressional candidates. With this level of funding required to compete, candidates often find themselves in debt and, if elected, seek financial relief through public treasuries or becoming captive to financial or criminal interests. Moreover, debt renders candidates beholden to their sponsors, which are often criminal in nature. The third filter is that of the congressional candidate, who must endorse the mayoral candidacy. And, the fourth filter is the DTOs. Some mayoral candidates are openly financed by DTOs, with approximately 12 to 15 cases reported where the connection was reportedly obvious in the 2011 election. In other cases the relationship is less evident but still present. DTOs may want a different mayoral or council candidate from the one selected through the previous filters and attack family and supporters of the rival candidate to force a withdrawal from the contest. In other cases, DTOs may force some individuals to be candidates against their will. All of these filters occur before the campaign period officially begins.

These factors combine to distort the traditional functions of political parties into the following types of entities, with associated implications for electoral conflict: 1) campaign instruments for its leadership to achieve office; 2) vehicles to receive and

expend licit and illicit funding; 3) organizations with sufficient strength to engage groups of armed enforcers; and 4) communication networks capable to incite supporters into the street.

4. Political Factors: Political Finance System

The political finance system is opaque and weakly enforced, which allows illicit funds to be employed in promoting electoral violence and voter coercion. As a regulatory body, the TSE is reported to lack the capacity to enforce political finance regulations.

There are three factors to consider in assessing the connections of money and electoral violence. First, the lack of compliance to donor disclosure regulations creates opportunities for illicit sources of funding to enter a political campaign, including funding from criminal interests. Second, most of the stakeholders asserted that the spending ceilings for presidential campaigns are too low and enable cheating by political parties in the actual expenditure of funds. A fine of around a $125 USD[3] for exceeding the spending limit is an inconsequential and ineffective deterrent and widely disregarded. And, third, the practice of vote buying implies that there is a coercive electoral environment whereby voters' selections are influenced by intimidation or reward. Vote buying can take many forms including raffling houses and other gifts, distributing bags of food or fertilizer as well as paying the costs of funerals, among other gifts. In 2011 there was also a perception that the government's social program initiatives by the then-First Lady Sandra Torres were used for vote seeking. Poorer families were eligible for goods and services, but reportedly forced to present a voter registration card to obtain these benefits. Election officials reported disturbances at registration sites that involved women who were turned away from those sites, un-registered, at the close of daily business.

5. Political Factors: Decentralization

Decentralization has created a system of localized electoral stakes involving municipal budgets and territory creating incentives to employ electoral violence to capture local governance. Guatemala's 1985 Constitution recognized a need for decentralization in the country in the delivery of public services. Ten years later, in 1995, Guatemala held its first municipal elections. Mayors in the country's 334 municipalities are elected by plurality vote, with no second round. In 2002 decentralization was carried a step further with passage of the Development Councils Law, the Municipal Code, and the Decentralization Law.

Today, local governments are a major source of public service provision in the country. Though this localization of governance has allowed for local resource management, in certain cases it has also created opportunities for criminal activity and associated electoral violence. The motive behind the violence is the capture of municipal government for both rents and patronage, and/or to accommodate or ignore DTOs whose transit routes are connected with the municipal boundaries. The re-election of unpopular mayors was cited

[3] The TSE is tasked with levying fines of between $100 and $125 throughout the campaign process, including infractions of spending limits but also other violations of electoral law.

by many as triggers for post-election violence, in part because of public frustration with the unfairness of an electoral process dominated by illicit and violent actors and its impact on the quality of local governance in an already resource-scarce environment.

6. Social Factors: Indigenous Populations

The indigenous populations of Guatemala make up approximately half of the nation's population (official government statistics report 40 percent while Indigenous spokespeople claim closer to 60 percent), yet are widely marginalized within the country's education, healthcare, economic and political systems. According to a report published by the Guatemalan government in 2010 on progress towards meeting their Millennium Development Goals, 80 percent of indigenous Guatemalans live in poverty, compared to 40 percent of the non-indigenous population. Despite political promises and government legislation for improved social inclusion over the years, including in the 1996 Peace Accords, economic marginalization and social discrimination have translated into political and electoral marginalization as well.

A major issue is effective denial of access to electoral processes. Indigenous populations tend to live mostly in rural areas of the country and traditionally work in agricultural jobs—services have been denied by holding past elections during harvest season or positioning polling stations long distances from indigenous population centers, without ensuring proper transportation was available. During the 2011 presidential elections, efforts were made to have a greater number of polling stations in rural locations. However, after violence broke out at some of these locations during the first round of voting, some polling stations in indigenous population centers were closed, forcing residents to again travel to cities to be able to vote in the second round of the presidential elections.

7. Social Factors: Women

Guatemala has the second highest rate of violence against women in Latin America, which creates a fearful environment for women in general and female candidates in particular. While not necessarily the direct targets of electoral conflict, this environment of Violence Against Women (VAW) translates into the self-marginalization of women, inhibiting their freedom of candidate selection for fear of domestic violence; and not standing as candidates for fear of public violence against themselves or their families.
Since 2000 there have been 5,000 cases of femicide in the country. In 2010, 786 cases of economic abuse[4] and 43,803 cases of sexual and other forms of physical violence against women were reported in the country. While the government has passed stronger sentencing laws for crimes committed against women, including passing a law in 2008 that formally recognizes femicide as a crime, these laws have not been effectively enforced. At the end of 2010, only 45 convictions resulted from 4,365 complaints of

[4] Economic abuse is understood as one partner holding control of or exploiting their partners' economic resources. Motives or such abuse vary, yet include desire to limit the abused partner's independence or use said individual's resources for purposes against their will.

sexual crimes. There is also a reported 98 percent impunity rate among criminals in femicide cases.

Police are not properly trained in investigating or assisting victims of sexual crimes. While the government maintains various entities focused on protection of women or related issues including the PNC Special Unit for Sex Crimes, the Office of Attention to Victims, the Office of the Special Prosecutor for Crimes against Women, and a special unit for trafficking in persons and illegal adoptions within the Special Prosecutor's Office for Organized Crime, women do not feel confident that the system can protect them.

B) Historical Conflict Factors

The historical electoral conflict profile changes with each Phase of the Electoral Cycle – Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election. These distinctions in Phases of the Electoral Cycle are important to note because the shift in the conflict profile from one Phase to another requires a commensurate shift in strategy, planning, and operations to prevent, manage, or mediate conflict during each Phase.

Moreover, in the 2011 Guatemalan context, the level of electoral violence differed between first and second rounds of voting; the higher level of violence during the first round was in part a result of all municipal elections being held only during the first round. Annex IV overlays the Pre-Election risk mapping with the locations where incidents were reported so that risk assessment methodologies can be refined through the new data from 2011.

During the Pre-Election Phase, the principal targets were municipal candidates as well as their families and supporters. In some cases, election officials were also targeted during voter registration activities. According to a report by IFES, during the pre-election phase 163 acts of violence were recorded—54 threats, 26 homicides and 22 assaults. Roughly 9 percent of these acts were raids on political parties' headquarters; 8 percent were confrontations among supporters and/or members of political parties; 6 percent were kidnappings; and 5 percent were extortions. By far, the Pre-Election Phase was the most violent and lethal. While most political parties were targets, the IFES analysis shows that the leading four political party targets, as a percentage of incidents reported, were LIDER (6 percent), VIVA/ENG (6 percent), UNE/GANA (10 percent), and PP (14 percent).

TSE officials were also targeted in this Phase. In response to threats of violence the TSE Magistrates were forced to retain private Personal Security Details. Departmental and Sub-Departmental Delegates have also been the targets of intimidation campaigns to seek their resignation and abuse by citizens disgruntled by the slowness of the voter registration process. The IFES analysis shows that 11 percent of the incidents documented were against TSE personnel.

While women were not the overt targets of violence (although a female mayoral candidate was assassinated during this period), the paucity of female candidates and observations by those interviewed indicate that women were intimidated by the level of

violence. Believing that they are less able to protect themselves against violence than men, they in turn opt out of contesting for office.

On Election Day, some incidents of violence were reported, but, in large part, the voting was peaceful. The victims of Election Day violence tended to be election officials and voters. Minor altercations were reported between party representatives at the local level. The practice of "carrying voters" (or *acarreo*) also provoked confrontation among voters at polling stations, and rock throwing attacks on domestic election monitors were reported. Otherwise, the violence took a less obvious form of coercion through vote buying or intimidation.

Election "Day," however, must be distinguished from Election "Night;" the daytime environment contrasted with the evening of Election Day when ballots were counted and violence broke out and continued through the Post-Election Phase. These distinct periods experienced different forms of violence. Analytically, Election "Night" should be considered in the context of the Post-Election Phase so that the ballot counting, announcement of results, and dispute resolution can be viewed as a process. Post-Election Phase targets have been human as well as sensitive electoral materials and election or municipal facilities. Human targets included election officials, political rivals, and police. Additionally, two PNC officers were hit and wounded by rocks. Polling stations and municipal offices were also attacked and burned. And, one day before the new congress was to be inaugurated, a congressman was assassinated.

Spoilers are the perpetrators of electoral violence. In this case, perpetrators can be classified into three categories: 1) political rivals; 2) criminal interests; and 3) voters. Political rivals include candidates and their supporters, particularly the candidates for mayoral contests. Criminal interests in Guatemala can be divided into, on the one hand, the local organized crime groups engaged in various illicit activities; and, on the other, the Mexico-based DTO, the Zetas, operating in various regions of the country. These criminal interests employ violence in distinct fashions. For many local organized crime groups, violence is used as a last resort with initial attempts to co-opt candidates through intimidation or through financial incentives to support their election. By contrast, the Zetas employ a "take no prisoners" operational approach that is more violent and lethal.

Voters are also spoilers. During the Pre-Election Phase, the principal setting for voter-initiated violence was during voter registration activities. Election officials reported unruly queues of voters verbally abusing registrars for slowness or delays in the registration process or at the closure of daily registration activities if they remain in line and un-serviced at the close of the day. Women seeking their voter registration cards, presumably to participate in the associated Social Cohesion benefits programs, were reported as some of the leaders of the disturbances. The principal perpetrators of Post-Election violence are mobs of losing candidate supporters engaging in candidate/leader incited violence, although some outbursts may also have been spontaneous in nature.

The motives for political rivals or criminal interests to target candidates, their families, and supporters is to remove them from the contest by either a forced withdrawal or

assassination. Election officials are targeted by these same perpetrators to force their resignation from office so that they can be replaced by officials who are more amenable to their candidates or criminal interests. The motive of voters disrupting voter registration activities has been linked to the government's Social Cohesion program, whereby program applicants, generally females, were required to show their voter registration cards to receive the Solidarity Bag of goods and the stipend for their families. The principal motive of the Post-Election perpetrators was to force an annulment and reversal of election results in a mayoral election.

Political rivals and criminal interests have used high caliber firearms for candidate assassinations and assaults. Political party offices have been attacked. The kidnapping of candidate's families and staff has also been a tactic to force the candidate to withdraw from a contest. Death threats and extortions against candidates were widely reported. Intimidation campaigns against election officials, the so-called "black campaigning" tactics, are illustrated by a case where a flyer, purportedly signed by the Zetas (though probably placed by local politicians), was distributed throughout the community putting forward a public threat against the sub-departmental TSE delegate.

In the Post-Election Phase, street actions and confrontations between political rivals and election officials followed the first round of balloting in 2011, where the announcement of results (delayed or not) triggered incidents on the municipal level by disgruntled candidates and supporters. These mobs of losing candidate supporters assaulted poll workers, burned ballots, and destroyed polling stations and municipal offices. Rocks, clubs, and machetes were their weapons of choice. The IFES report noted above indicates that 63 percent of the Post-Election Phase incidents could be labeled as public disorder, the burning of infrastructure and/or ballots occurred in 29 percent of the cases, and general violence in 6 percent.

The locations for violence can be defined by geography and specific conflict points. In assessing the at-risk municipalities, the TSE, PNC, and other agencies in the working group constructed threat profiling from four basic sources: 1) incidents reported by local TSE officials; 2) municipalities where elections had to be re-conducted because of violence; 3) PNC records on pre-election conflicts; and 4) Civil Intelligence Agency monitoring dissatisfaction with local governance by the population. Employing these criteria, six municipalities were rated as high risk, 24 municipalities at medium risk and 149 municipalities at low risk. Geographically, the departments and municipalities where violence occurred reflect departments where organized crime flourishes, such as Gualan and Zacapa, and where there are drug transit routes. In the Pre-Election Phase, these at-risk locations included Alta Verapaz, Huehuetenango and San Marcos. Locations also included municipalities where unpopular mayors were contesting for re-election or contests for mayors were perceived to be close. According to one source, prior to the 2011 contest, there were death threats against candidates reported in approximately 200 of Guatemala's 334 municipalities.

Specific conflict points during the Pre-Election Phase were random locations, such as restaurants or in vehicles, where assassinations or assaults were carried out against candidates by unknown gunmen. Election offices where voter registration occurs were

locations where voter "mob" actions took place. And, political party offices and candidates' homes became the scene of assaults and kidnappings.

In the Post-Election Phase, ballot burning was reported in Xejip, Nahula, Sololá, San Jose Punicha, and Tiquisate, causing elections to be re-conducted in those municipalities in November. There were also incidents reported in Pueblo Nuevo Vinas, Santa Rosa (armed men breaking into election centers and burning them with several injuries to poll workers) and other incidents reported in Magdalena Milpas Altas, Sacatepequez; San Jose; Petén, and Tiquisate, and Escuintla. Overall, public disturbances were reported in 31 municipalities in 16 departments. Burning of infrastructure and/or ballots was reported in 14 municipalities in 12 departments. The specific points of conflict were polling stations and municipal offices.

C) Stakeholder Analysis

1. *State Stakeholders*

i. Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)

There are three TSE actions and responsibilities to consider that are relevant to the issue of electoral conflict: 1) electoral security administration; 2) political finance administration; and 3) electoral dispute resolution.

a) Electoral Security Administration

The TSE was not directly charged with providing electoral security but coordinated the planning process for provision of electoral security with the PNC and other government ministries. Within the TSE, the office responsible for electoral security planning is the Inspector General. With the assistance of IFES, the TSE developed electoral conflict vulnerability mapping that included information gathered from municipal and departmental TSE staff. Inter-agency coordination began in May 2011.

A security plan was developed by the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and military along with the TSE and IFES experts. Civil and army intelligence were involved in gathering information on threats and risks. Actions for the Pre-Election, Election Day and Post-Election Phases were included in the Plan. A high level coordination mechanism was established in which the TSE's magistrates, Vice Ministers from Interior, Army, Communications, Energy, Foreign Affairs and CONRED (National Coordinator for the Reduction of Disasters) participated. A working group command center was established on Election Day along with the command center of the TSE. These forms of TSE-security force cooperation were also emulated on the departmental level where possible.

b) Political Finance Administration

The TSE is responsible for monitoring campaign spending and enforcing violations of political finance regulations, including limitations on expenditures and requirements that parties reveal sources of financing (parties are required to disclose sources of financing and expenditure totals). The auditor's office has authority to investigate party campaign spending. Should the TSE identify a violation, it is required to levy fines ($125 USD

maximum) onto political parties associated with exceeding specified spending ceilings or not providing sufficient documentation on finance sources. While more strict penalties exist (as of 2010) in the penal code for receipt of illicit financing by parties (four to 12 years in jail and a maximum fine of $33,000), the enforcement of these penalties is outside of the TSE's legal mandate. The TSE also monitors prohibitions against use of state resources during the electoral cycle. Although legally empowered as an enforcement mechanism as of 2007, the TSE reportedly lacks the administrative capacity to consistently identify infractions and levy associated financial penalties.

c) Electoral Dispute Resolution

The TSE hears and receives complaints as well as adjudicates electoral disputes stemming from complaints filed by voters and parties. In serving this administrative and judicial role, the TSE is structurally divided into two sectors that handle complaints and appeals during specific periods of the electoral cycle. The Inspector-General receives and handles complaints in the pre-electoral phase and the General Secretariat receives and handles complaints during the electoral process. Reforms in 2007 devolved Election Day dispute resolution authority to electoral boards at the municipal and departmental levels. It is unclear what institution has absolute authority to make decisions regarding electoral disputes, as decisions made by the TSE have been challenged and overturned in other courts.

ii. Guatemala Human Rights Ombudsman

The Human Rights Ombudsman conducted a long term election observation program in 2011, in particular, monitoring of human rights abuses during the campaign. The Ombudsman is a member of the G-4 coalition[5] and, through its Security and Justice Convention, endeavors to make political parties play less of a clientelistic role and more of a role in proposing public programs and governance solutions.

The Ombudsman established an incident database where human right violations during the elections are registered. Information on these incidents and crimes are then forwarded to the Attorney General for review and then prosecution, as appropriate. Incident maps were also sent to the MOI for their electoral security planning activities. Based upon previous experience, the Ombudsman projected that 132 municipalities were at some kind of risk for electoral violence in 2011; however, according to the Ombudsman, serious violence was only experienced in 10 to 15 municipalities. Nevertheless, the theme of impunity from arrest and prosecution by perpetrators of electoral violence was again expressed. The Ombudsman operates 46 auxiliary offices which issue human rights "alerts" if local sources begin to report that violence is possible.

iii. National Civil Police (PNC)

In coordination with staff from the MOI, intelligence services, military, and TSE, a strategic and operational electoral security planning initiative was started in 2010. The

[5] The Guarantor-4 or 'G-4' initiative is a peace-building effort involving a coalition of Roman Catholic church, evangelical church, university, and Human Rights Commission stakeholders organized to promote peaceful campaigning among political parties. Its role as a mitigating factor is discussed below.

resulting planning documents divided the Electoral Cycle into four Phases for each round – Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election, with a fourth Phase reserved for the events surrounding the inaugurations of mayors, congress people, and the executive. The plan included a methodology for developing diagnostic scenarios for planning operations and risk mapping. Based upon these examinations, a risk rating of high, medium, or low was assigned to each municipality. Risk maps showing "alerts" for each Phase were developed. Security forces were deployed according to the level of projected risk. A lessons-learned session was conducted between the first and second rounds (and before the inaugurations) to see how the strategy and operations should shift to manage new threats. Some of the training provided to police in electoral security planning was provided through an agreement with the government of Russia.

Coordination with local police units was strongest on Election Day with a joint inter-institutional operations center as the hub of monitoring, communications, and response management. Official communications with local police chiefs were conducted via mobile telephones and e-mail. The PNC also coordinated with the Army through the technical working groups and retained the ability to ask the Army for assistance and to intervene if the level of violence required such a response to restore public order.

iv. Military

Guatemala's National Army has played a positive role in election security, in particular during the 2011 elections. In preparation for this contest the Army collaborated closely with the PNC and TSE to develop an electoral security plan. Meetings related to development of the plan between the army and PNC began in April 2011, followed by meetings between all three entities beginning in July 2011. The plan outlined roles and responsibilities for the PNC and Army as well as priority areas and commensurate plans for deployments, which were based on analysis of violence and conflict in past electoral cycles. Corresponding with their institutional mandates the PNC maintained leadership in security planning and oversight and the Army played a support role, deploying in line with the security plan and in compliance with Guatemalan law. In order to provide support to the PNC, during the electoral process the Army deployed all members of the Special Forces, which assisted the PNC with, among other tasks, capturing perpetrators of violent acts.

v. Judicial System

While the assessment team did not meet with representatives of the Office of Attorney General, the activities and integrity of the new appointee, Gloria Paz, received praise from numerous and diverse sources. The reform of establishing a Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes modeled after the office in Mexico was also widely endorsed and the Attorney General was in general viewed as the office where this new position should be placed. In terms of existing legal structures, clarifying roles in judicial and prosecutorial division of labors among the TSE, Attorney General, Supreme Court, and Constitutional Court on matters of electoral crimes and justice may help to reduce impunity.

Law enforcement and the judicial system are weak and enable a general culture of impunity for criminal actors through rarity of arrests and prosecutions. Estimates vary, though stakeholders indicate that between 98 and 99 percent of violent crime go unpunished.[6] Facing low probability of capture or punishment, perpetrators view electoral violence as an easy, inexpensive, and penalty-free way to pursue political or financial objectives. Representatives of the PNC indicated they are under-resourced to effectively conduct investigations or collect evidence to support cases of ordinary crime much less electoral crimes.

The Constitution of Guatemala provides for a system of *amparos*, which in the electoral context are rights of "appeal" and "shelter" for individuals whose candidacies have been temporarily suspended by the Comptroller's Office or the TSE. In order to be certified as a candidate by the TSE, individuals must provide a *finiquito*, a certification of their suitability to run for office, without unpaid fines, criminal charges, litigation, or other such offenses committed while a public servant. Candidates whom the TSE has not allowed to contest for office may file an *amparo* (often with a lower level court) to appeal the decision, which freezes the TSE process and forces the TSE to allow the would-be candidate in question to run. This allows the courts to effectively overrule the TSE and compromise the candidate registration process.

Finally, Guatemala lacks a special court with a legal mandate to hear electoral cases. The TSE adjudicates electoral disputes, yet sources interviewed raised questions about capacity of the TSE to manage both its judicial and administrative mandates simultaneously. Clarity is required on which institution makes the final decision on electoral justice matters – the TSE, Supreme Court, or Constitutional Court.

Combined, these factors create a vulnerability to electoral violence because the likelihood of arrest and prosecution, including for violent acts, remains below the risk threshold for many potential perpetrators. Moreover, the uneven application of the *ampero* process means that even candidates known to employ violence may be able to remain in the contest, and, presumably, continue to use violence.

2. Non-State Stakeholders

i. Political Parties

Political parties have been spoilers and targets of electoral violence at the municipal and national levels. In the Pre-Election Phase, political parties allegedly employ assassination or intimidation of rival candidates. Though these actions are purportedly motivated by desire to condense the field of viable rivals in a particular contest, the precise motivation for such actions is not always clear due to overlap of personal vendettas and rivalries with political party allegiance. On Election Day, political parties and candidates are responsible for "carrying voters" schemes, which have been a conflict trigger at some

[6] Human Rights Watch – World Report 2011 – Guatemala. Available here: http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/guatemala

polling stations. And, in the Post-Election Phase, losing political parties and candidates may agitate their supporters to attack polling stations and municipal offices.

ii. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

The CSO community has historically played a constructive role in promoting increased transparency in the electoral process. Principal contributions of CSOs related to elections include conflict analysis and mapping prior to the 2011 election as well as domestic election monitoring.

In the 2011 pre-election phase, *Acción Cuidadana* (Citizen Action), a Guatemala City-based CSO, performed a conflict mapping exercise that examined factors related to violence in general and the electoral process in particular to project probability of violence in each of Guatemala's 333 municipalities. Electoral process factors included atypical levels of turnout, void votes, blank votes, and atypical votes per group, with samples taken from elections in 1999, 2003, and 2007. Using data provided by the PNC, factors related to violence included history of electoral violence, political violence, and deaths by hand-gun per 1,000 people. Factors were cross-referenced and through statistical analysis municipalities were given a risk level of "extreme," "high," or "low." Maps were created using Ushahidi and then provided to electoral stakeholders coordinating security deployments, so resources could be allocated accordingly. On Election Day, *Acción* managed an incidents reporting system whereby individuals submitting reports of electoral malpractice and violence via SMS, e-mail, telephone, and web site entry. *Acción* was also involved in implementing Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) on Election Day.

In the Pre-Election and Election Day Phases, *Mirador Electoral,* a coalition of five Guatemalan CSOs, coordinated domestic observation of the electoral process. This coalition also provided domestic monitoring prior to the 2007 elections. Though the coalition's focus was on electoral process more generally, incidents of violence were also recorded. *Organismo Naleb,* a CSO that focuses on advancing rights of Guatemala's indigenous peoples, developed a manual for domestic observers to protect against discrimination against indigenous voters on Election Day.

CSOs have and continue to advocate for increased transparency in a range of areas related to elections as well as governance and human rights. *Movimiento pro Justicia*, for example, monitors abuses of and aims to reform the *amparo* process. For the media, DOSES employs monitoring of on-line media to determine whether coverage is biased for or against a given candidate and, if so, how. Within the human rights sphere, the Myrna Mack Foundation has among other programs implemented training and workshops for indigenous people, predominantly in the western highlands, in legal education. The goal of these programs is to educate participants regarding their human rights and legal mechanisms for defending those rights, as enshrined in the Guatemalan constitution. Faith-based organizations such as the *Oficina de los Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado de Guatemala* (Office of Human Rights of the Archbishop of Guatemala - ODHAG) have also played a profound role in documenting and pressing for prosecution of human rights abuses from the civil war to present. ODHAG also served as a member of the G-4.

iii. Media Organizations

Coverage of the 2011 presidential contest in mainstream Guatemalan media (television, print, and radio) was generally objective and unbiased toward a specific candidate and seems unlikely to have spurred electoral violence. According to media monitoring performed by DOSES,[7] two specific incidents of bias against specific presidential candidates did occur. First, the media issued articles and analysis biased against Sandra Torres, wife of then-President Alvaro Colom, who in March 2011 was named UNE's presidential candidate but in August 2011 was disqualified from running per Article 186(c) of the Guatemala Constitution, which holds that relatives of the sitting president cannot participate in the Presidential election.[8] Second, yet to a lesser degree, mainstream media, starting in October 2011, began publishing articles biased against Manuel Antonio Baldizón, LIDER's candidate.

The national media's performance can be termed as an "over-reporting/under-reporting" syndrome regarding coverage of electoral violence. The over-reporting dimension involves concerns expressed that the national media exaggerated or sensationalized the violence in order to sell newspapers and increase viewership. On the other hand, many incidents of localized violence tended to go unreported in the national media with victims and perpetrators remaining largely anonymous to the general public.

The use of SMS texts to both issue electoral threats and report incidents of conflict were the two principal applications of new media in an electoral violence context. Forms of new media are gaining traction as a means of obtaining news, yet continue to lag behind traditional forms. In a recent survey, individual access to information via the Internet and Twitter are the fifth and sixth most used means, respectively. In part, this is due to low Internet penetration rates, with approximately 16.5 percent of the population having access; 12.6 percent of the population uses the social networking site, Facebook, with 42 percent of individuals accessing their account on a daily basis.

3. International Community

A range of international actors have provided assistance to Guatemalan state- and non-state stakeholders with regard to enhancing election management and electoral security preparations as well as targeting impunity and youth crime prevention.

i. Inter-Governmental Organizations

[7] DOSES employed a seven-person team to monitor media coverage from July 2011 through November 2011 in order to track media coverage allocated to each candidate and determine whether media was biased in favor of a given candidate. Each member was assigned a particular set of media outlets to monitor for a seven-day period and for each story published in that outlet record various indicators of bias including but not limited to placement of the story (headline versus later sections) and whether the story contained quotes for and against the candidate or consisted mainly of facts.

[8] Referred to as "Sandraphobia," the media's rather visceral opposition to Torres is said to have been motivated by class bias, given that Torres did not for example attend schools generally frequented by the traditional elite class, and her handling of various social programs.

UNDP is working in cooperation with USAID to provide technical assistance to strengthen the administrative capacity of the TSE, and to promote electoral participation in Guatemala. In the past, UNDP coordinated a small grants program involving several civil society organizations and coordinated with *Acción Cuidadana* in identifying where electoral violence incidents occurred and in developing a security manual for observers. In 2007, the EU conducted an electoral observation mission for Guatemala's Presidential elections, recommending in its report the establishment of an investigative unit within the office of the Attorney General that would be charged with investigating electoral crimes, but the Government of Guatemala did not act on this recommendation. The EU will shortly begin implementing a €20million 'SEJUST' (Security Justice) project aimed to reform and strengthen the judicial system in Guatemala. The SEJUST aims to, among other objectives, improve quality of criminal investigation units within the government as well as enhance the organization and effectiveness of the judiciary. The project will also support CSOs, including media, which are active in the security and justice spheres.

ii. Non-Governmental Organizations

In the Pre-Election Phase, the National Democratic Institute (NDI) supported an audit of the voter registry in specific geographic areas that provided information to the TSE and National Civil Registry (RENAP). NDI also supported domestic observation by *Mirador Electoral* to perform Pre-Election and Election Day monitoring, with some focus on electoral violence. During the elections, NDI supported *Acción Ciudadana* to implement parallel vote tabulation. IFES facilitated a meeting of key state stakeholders in electoral security including the TSE, Ministries of Interior, Education, Health and the security services. As a result, a technical committee was formed with the TSE playing a coordinating role in electoral security planning and management. The following program activities in electoral security administration were also conducted: capacity training for 200 inspectors in conflict resolution and working with the security services; development of a "crisis guide" with a directory of contacts in electoral security; conflict mapping and the deployment of security forces; and facilitation of "peace pacts" among presidential and mayoral candidates.

iii. Transitional Justice

The principal international actor involved in addressing the issue of impunity is the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), which has provided technical assistance to the special investigations unit within the Attorney General's office to improve its investigative methods. CICIG has also worked with the MOI and the police to strengthen the justice system.

II. Electoral Security Planning: Program Objectives and Planning

A) Primary Program Objectives

Based on the problem statement and development hypothesis, proposed programming aims to address three primary objectives: 1) strengthen the capacity of state stakeholders in electoral security administration; 2) reduce acts of violence by non-state stakeholders; and 3) enhance the performance and accountability of investigative and judicial institutions to address impunity for electoral violence.

B) Mitigating Factors

In proposing program responses, mitigating factors must also be considered. Mitigating factors are influences that could be leveraged to prevent, manage, or mediate electoral violence. Existing mitigating factors and how they might be further leveraged or enhanced by assistance programming are as follows.

1. Electoral Security Administration Experience

Based on the IFES assessment and the TSE's subsequent vulnerability mapping, a Security Plan was developed by the MOI, PNC, military, and other ministries along with the TSE and IFES experts. This approach to planning has provided a template and relevant experience for electoral security stakeholders that can be replicated and expanded in future elections.

2. The Guarantor-4 (G-4)

The G-4 initiative is a peacebuilding effort that involves a coalition of Roman Catholic Church, evangelical church, university, and Human Rights Commission stakeholders organized to promote peaceful campaigning among political parties. Through this initiative, in January 2011 parties signed an Ethical Pact (*Pacto Etico*) to avoid mudslinging and incendiary language during the campaign. The G-4 is a positive and morally persuasive force, yet lacks and will continue to lack any means or mandate aside from moral suasion to ensure compliance by signatories. Adding some form of enforcement mechanism would perhaps enable the G-4 to more effectively achieve its objectives and thereby reduce electoral violence.

3. CICIG

CICIG's existing investigative capacities and efforts associated with its mandate have helped address the issue of impunity for electoral violence in Guatemala through investigative assistance, as CICIG provided technical assistance in the investigation of the mayoral candidate murders in San Jose Pinula, making that case one of the few where an arrest was made. While CICIG's mandate expires in 2013, the model of investigative assistance in the San Jose Pinula case may be reflected in future assistance initiatives.

4. Attorney General

The new Attorney General, Gloria Paz, has received praise and further positive remarks for her integrity and performance, bringing increased legitimacy and respect for that office. The capacities of this office can be expanded to focus on the prosecution of perpetrators of electoral violence. Interviewees across state- and non-state sectors indicated they support establishment of a Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes, as is the case in Mexico.

5. Role of Youth

Maras, or youth gangs, remain a problem in Guatemala and are exploited by organized crime; however, this cooptation generally does not transfer to the political sphere, as youth are generally not targeted by political parties to serve as street enforcers or agents of violence during elections as they are elsewhere. Although this has not yet occurred, at least at a noticeable level, individuals across sectors feel that rural youth remain at risk to be used as agents of violence by political parties. Perhaps to preempt the negative use of youth by political parties and other rivals, the TSE could enhance efforts to recruit young people to serve as poll workers and other electoral administration positions.

6. Guatemalans Abroad

Although in some other countries Diasporas play an enabling role in electoral conflict, either through rhetoric or financing, by all reports Guatemalans abroad play no direct role in the elections and must return to Guatemala to cast ballots. This dynamic may change, though, should Guatemalans be granted the right to vote abroad, which would make the diaspora community a target of votes and finances for candidates and political parties.

7. Electoral Conflict Statistics

Prior to this election, data on electoral violence was virtually non-existent. This paucity of data made it difficult if not impossible for electoral security stakeholders to create risk mapping or perform predictive planning. This gap was addressed prior to the 2011 elections—incident data was collected from multiple sources including *Acción Cuidadana*, PNC, military, and the Human Rights Ombudsman. Moving forward, the capacity of these organizations to collect data can be enhanced and the multiple sources of data can be combined, harmonized, and employed as standardized baseline data for future election security planning and operations. Coordinating sources would allow stakeholders to cross-reference and triangulate data points and in turn better validate risk levels of particular municipalities.

C) Planning for Elections

Planning related to electoral conflict prevention perspective for the September 2015 (first round) election should anticipate the need for early interventions beginning in the fourth calendar quarter of 2014. In order to enable USAID to have maximum impact on the

programming objectives, planning should be organized by objective and targeted by state and non-state domestic counterpart. Within USAID, programming initiatives to address these three objectives can be found within and funded by associated budgets of Elections and Political Processes (EPP), Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), and anti-corruption programs with potential reach into political finance programming. Intra-USAID coordination across these relevant programs can ensure the program response package is sufficiently diversified to address Guatemala's complex conflict dynamics.

An electoral conflict prevention dimension can be introduced into existing programs of the USG outside of those directly administered by USAID, specifically with the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Justice, related to building the capacity of the military and PNC to counter DTOs. Such an approach would encourage the organization of a set of programs stretching across USAID and other departments with a disciplined focus on electoral conflict prevention and security.

Similarly, coordination with other international stakeholders in electoral assistance and conflict prevention, such as UNDP, EU, and the OAS could also expand the reach of prevention programs and offer the opportunity for USAID leadership in electoral conflict prevention.

III. Electoral Security Programming

A) Programming Approaches

The programming approaches are first divided by objective: 1) strengthen the capacity of state stakeholders in electoral security administration; 2) reduce violence committed by non-state stakeholders; and 3) enhance the performance and accountability of investigative and judicial institutions to address impunity for electoral violence.

1. Electoral Security Administration Capacity Building

i. TSE

The TSE is the central focus of state stakeholder programming. With regard to leveraging and expanding existing IFES activities, general programs to build the TSE's administrative capacity at the central, departmental, and municipal levels should be continued.

a) Office of Electoral Security Administration

Adding to these existing activities, assistance should be provided to the TSE to create an Office of Electoral Security Administration, whose responsibility is to coordinate the TSE's planning and coordination in electoral security with departmental TSE delegates and other government stakeholders.

One component of electoral security administration is in the maintenance of a database on electoral incidents. A centralized database maintained by the Office should be developed which integrates and harmonizes incident reporting (organized by electoral phase) by the TSE, *Acción Cuidadana*, PNC, military, and the Human Rights Ombudsman. Data should be collected and organized in a consistent manner across partners providing information into the database. To do so, partners should employ a consistent incident reporting framework that profiles violence by type of spoiler, target, incident type/tactic, and location. The database can include a function whereby national, departmental, and municipal risk maps are created for use by relevant stakeholders to pinpoint potential hot spots and, in turn, deploy appropriate security resources to those areas—for conflict prevention and management.

For victimized election officials and poll workers, the Office could also be mandated to oversee a program of victim's services for election officials who have suffered from electoral violence. The Office could offer services such as psychological counseling, health care for physical injury, and compensation for loss of property.

b) Political Finance Administration

In addition to the capacity in electoral security administration, further assistance can be provided to enhance the TSE's capacity to administer political finance regulations. Such assistance can be provided in tandem with reforming the political finance legislation to reflect strong sanctions for violations and renewed emphasis on disclosure of receipt and expenditures, source and expenditure prohibitions, and expanded access to banking and other financial records. Training programs, such as IFES' Training in Detection and Enforcement (TIDE) program, can offer staff instruction on audit and financial investigation techniques and evidence collection among others. A link to the TIDE handbook is shown below.

http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/Books/2005/~/media/Files/Publications/ManualHandbook/2005/TIDE_Handbook_Enforcing_Political_Finance_Laws.pdf

The political finance data collected by the TSE should be made publicly available through its web site. Data should be available to be sorted by contributor, recipient, amount, date, and type of transaction.

c) Conflict Contingency Administration

As ballots are Post-Election Phase targets and their burning requires another election to be called, the TSE may consider instituting a system of "Contingency Counting Centers." These Centers would be strategically located in each department and secured by military and PNC. If a polling station is under attack and the ballots are at risk, the materials could be taken to a secure counting center for processing. This approach would also remove the ballots, as primary targets of the mobs, from the municipality. Ballot integrity would need to be assured during transport. Such a practice of moving ballots to safe haven counting locations was reported by election official Cuilapa and Milpas Altas City as a form of forced tabulation option.

Finally, poll workers could receive training in conflict mediation for use inside the polling station. If minor disputes emerge between voters or the supporters of different candidates, having a "first-responder" mediation capacity inside the polling station could help prevent the escalation of minor incidents into more intense events.

ii. National Civilian Police (PNC)

Two areas of assistance and reform can be considered to increase the PNC's capacity to prevent and manage electoral violence.

a) Electoral Deployment Patterns

Assistance can be provided in appropriate resource allocation among fixed, mobile, and rapid response forces during an election. While the PNC has apparently made significant strides in electoral security planning and organizing operations, the focus on public order management distracts their resources from performing other functions such as investigation of acts of violence or reserving some assets as Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs). Linked to this area, a review of effective police strategies and tactics currently employed on the local level (including resource allocation and deployment schemes) can be conducted to help migrate these best practices across municipalities and departments. While the PNC has conducted "lessons learned" sessions with its inter-agency working group partners, such a review has not yet occurred.

b) Officers' Residencies during Elections

The PNC could consider reconfiguring existing officer allocations to designate a handful of officers to serve in their municipalities of residence. Currently, PNC officers are assigned to municipalities on a rotating basis and do not operate in their town of residence. This practice at times creates a gap in understanding by PNC officers of local power dynamics in their assigned town. Ensuring that some police are deployed to their town of residence could help address this gap. Altering this structure could assist the PNC in forecasting potential conflict and violence (in particular by ensuring electoral security planning is performed by individuals with knowledge of the community) as well as yield benefits in other areas of local policing.

2. Reducing Electoral Violence by Non-State Stakeholders

i. Political Parties

Existing NDI programs to strengthen political party capacity and engender party values based upon ideology and visions of governance are important engagements. Building greater stability in the political party system can reduce electoral conflict as legitimate avenues of competition and communication are open to stakeholders. Current initiatives in electoral reforms address some of these issues, including floor crossing, voter registration, and political finance, but parties remain weak and this exposure remains a constant threat for conflict among political rivals. The TSE and G-4 can organize joint Political Party Forums where the TSE provides election updates and the G-4 presses political parties on campaign ethics and non-violence. A series of such Forums can be

held throughout the electoral cycle in an effort to encourage constructive political dialogue and accountability among political rivals.

ii. Civil Society Organizations

Assistance can be provided to CSOs to play four roles with respect to electoral violence. First, programs such as those with *Acción Cuidadana* for domestic monitoring should be continued. However, the methodology used by CSOs to monitor electoral violence should be consistent with the framework for the incident database established by the TSE (as described above). Second, CSOs can provide related "niche" monitoring of political finance and electoral disputes. The role of new media in electoral violence should also be monitored as usage expands. These two monitoring functions are intended to reduce the incentives for violence through increased transparency and accountability. The third program is that of victim's services offered through international charity and relief organizations for those individuals who are not election workers but still have been targets of violence. Domestically, CSOs, faith-based organizations, and the G-4 can be partners in organizing counseling, health care, and legal services for victims of electoral violence. And, the fourth role is message dissemination—educating the public with messages on respect for rule of law and peaceful elections.

iii. Media Organizations

Media organizations can be requested to adopt a Code of Ethics in their reporting of violence. Guidelines and journalist training on standard reporting policies concerning electoral violence and electoral dispute resolution can be developed for media organizations. Special protections should be considered for journalists who are threatened by perpetrators for covering stories of electoral violence.

During the electoral cycle, the use of SMS texting and social networking sites in reporting incidents of violence can be fostered through public education programs in cooperating with participating CSOs which receive, organize, and publish the reports.

3. Investigation and Judicial Capacity Building

i. Attorney General

The capacity of the Attorney General's office to prosecute electoral violence can be directed through the establishment of an office of Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes. This Special Prosecutor can be focused on pursuing justice against the perpetrators of electoral violence as well as serve as the judicial counterpart to the TSE in the prosecution of political finance regulations. The Special Prosecutor should also have the mandate to investigate and prosecute electoral crimes associated with acts of deception, coercion, destruction, and denials of service.

ii. TSE

Those Magistrates and staff involved with electoral dispute resolution can receive training on international standards in electoral dispute resolution, case load management, system administration, and weighing evidence among other topics.

B) Leveraging Current Electoral Reform Initiatives

Some of the current proposed electoral reforms could be leveraged to reduce the vulnerabilities and triggers for electoral conflict. The potentially de-conflictive reforms are described below.

1. Prohibit "Floor-Crossing"

Prohibit the practice of "floor-crossing," through which candidates change parties, for a specific period of time, perhaps one year, after election to office.

2. Reform Voter Registration Deadlines

Reform voter registration rules to establish a deadline of one year before the election for a voter to change residences. This may reduce the ability for candidates to manipulate registration through "carrying voters." Any Election Day conflict emerging from this practice would be reduced.

The possession of a voter registration card should also be de-linked from the Social Cohesion program and other means of identification should be required. Such a reform would help to de-conflict some voter registration exercises.

3. Issue Strong Sanctions on Political Finance Violations

Issue strong sanctions, such as significant financial penalties and the disqualification of candidacies, for the violation of political finance regulations including the buying and selling of votes. Individual voters may also be prosecuted for receiving such compensation. Proof of the acceptance of illicit funding should be defined as a criminal act with penalties of incarceration for violation. Such legislation is intended to obstruct the relationship of money and electoral violence through transparency and penalties.

4. Introduce Mayoral Term Limits

Introduce term limits of one consecutive term for mayors. Doing so may reduce the financial incentives associated with multiple terms in office and the connections of these incentives to electoral violence. It may also reduce the triggers for Post-Election Phase violence among losing candidate supporters as a result of poorly performing mayors continuously winning re-election.

5. Disaggregate Municipal Electoral Cycle from National Elections

Disaggregate the sequencing of elections and conduct municipal elections on a separate electoral cycle. Within the cycle of municipal elections, conduct these elections over a period of four weeks, dividing the county's department into four sections with elections held separately in each region. Such a cycling of elections will allow the PNC and

military to concentrate forces in areas conducting elections and thereby make enforcement more effective.

C) Electoral Security Framework for Guatemala

The matrix below summarizes the Electoral Security Framework described in sections A and B above.

Program Matrix
Electoral Security Framework for Guatemala

State Stakeholder	Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)	Management (Election Day Phase)	Mediation (Post-Election Phase)
TSE	Electoral Security Administration Capacity Building and Victim's Services Political Finance Regulation Reform and Capacity Building Establish and Maintain an Electoral Incident Database and Mapping Establish Network of Contingency Counting Centers Conflict Mediation Training for Poll Workers	Electoral Security Administration Capacity Building and Victim's Services Political Finance Investigation and Sanctions	Electoral Dispute Resolutions Reform and Re-Structuring Electoral Disputes Resolution Capacity Building
Human Rights Commission	Harmonize Human Rights Monitoring and Data Collection with Other Stakeholders		Document Cases of Electoral Violence as Distinct Types of Human Rights violations
Guatemalan Congress – Electoral Reform Pertinent to Electoral Conflict	Prohibit "Floor-Crossing" Prohibit "carrying voters" De-linking voter registration cards and social benefits Enhance sanctions on political finance		

	violations, including criminalizing acceptance of illicit funds and enhance public funding Introduce term limits for mayors Disaggregate municipal elections from other elections		
PNC	Lessons learned among local police departments Reform of rotation assignment system	QRFs/anti-riot	QRFs/anti-riot
Attorney General	Establishment of Office of Special Prosecutor	Special Prosecutor Capacity Building	Special Prosecutor Caseload Assistance
Non-State Stakeholder	**Prevention (Pre-Election Phase)**	**Management (Election Day Phase)**	**Mediation (Post-Election Phase)**
Political Parties	Political Party System Strengthening Political Finance Accountability and Compliance Ethical Campaigning Pacts	Acceptance of Results Pacts	
Civil Society Organizations	Monitoring Electoral Conflict Monitoring Political Finance Monitoring Electoral Dispute resolution Monitor Media and New Media and Elections/Crime Victim's Services	Monitoring Electoral Conflict Monitoring Political Finance Victim's Services	Monitoring Electoral Conflict Monitoring Political Finance Victim's Services

Faith Based Organizations and Initiatives	Victim's Services	Victim's Services	Victim's Services
Media Organizations	Code of Ethics in Reporting Training on Reporting on Electoral Violence	Training on Reporting on Electoral Violence	Training on Reporting on Electoral Dispute resolution

IV. Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E)

A) Evaluation Framework for USAID Program

The development of an M & E framework for the evaluation of electoral conflict prevention programs can consist of three basic components: 1) baseline data: 2) program targets; and 3) custom indicators.

1. Baseline Data

The multi-sourced incident documentation activities by the TSE, *Acción Cuidadana*, PNC, military, and the Human Rights Commission can serve as a source of baseline data for incidents of electoral violence. This data must be harmonized into a common structure. In doing so, the following entry fields can be considered:

- Date of Incident (Electoral Cycle Phase);
- Time of Day of Incident;
- Targets or Victims – political candidates, their family members and supporters, election official, police, journalists, voters, or others;
- Number of Victims Involved by each Tactic/Gender;
- Spoilers or Perpetrators – political candidates, family members or supporters, criminals, police, voters, or others;
- Type of Incidents/Tactics – multiple homicides, individual homicide, physical assault, sexual assaults, kidnapping, destruction of physical property, destruction of sensitive electoral materials, riots and street actions; and
- Location – Department, Municipality, Point of Conflict.

An analysis of these indicators can provide a conflict profile and how this profile is reduced over subsequent electoral cycles. However, baseline capacity assessments of key institutional state and non-state stakeholders should be conducted so that capacity building can be measured. Within the Democracy and Governance context, the state stakeholders include the TSE and Office of the Attorney General. For non-state stakeholders, the partners include political parties, CSOs which monitor elections, and media organizations.

2. Program Indicators

Guided by USAID's handbook on *Governing Justly and Democratically – Indicators and Definitions*, the program areas for these activities include Rule of Law and Human Rights, Good Governance, Political Competition and Consensus Building, and Civil Society.

i. Rule of Law and Human Rights

GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights
Indicator Title: Number of Retributive and Restorative Justice Institutions Created or Supported with USG Assistance
Custom Indicators
Establish an Office of Special Prosecutor for Electoral Crimes in the Office of Attorney General for the purposes of investigation and prosecution of electoral crimes.
Promote victim's compensation as elements of judgments concerning electoral crimes from Guatemalan ordinary courts
GJD – 1.1 Constitutions, Laws and Human Rights
Indicator Title: Number of Campaigns Supported by USG to Foster Public Awareness and Respect for Rule of Law
Custom Indicator
Engage CSO partners in developing civic education campaigns to promote the rule of law by fair and peaceful elections
GJD 1.3 – Justice System
Indicator Title: Number of Communities Supported in Crime Prevention by USG
Custom Indicator
Employing the conflict profile baseline data, map the impact of electoral violence prevention programs by type of victim or target
GJD 1.3 – Justice System
Indicator Title: Number of Individuals/Groups Who Receive Legal Aid or Victim's Assistance with USG Support
Custom Indicator
The number and compensation that victims of electoral receive from the courts through state or non-state assisted legal services
GJD 1.4 – Human Rights
Indicator Title: Number of USG Supported National Human Rights Commissions and Other Independent State Institutions Charged by Law with Protecting and Promoting Human Rights that Actively Pursued Allegations of Human Rights Abuses Annually

Custom Indicators
Number of human rights monitors deployed during the electoral cycle to monitor incident of conflict and violence
Harmonizing and aggregating the incident reporting with other stakeholders collecting similar data.

ii. Good Governance

GJD 2.6 – Governance and the Security Sector
Indicator Title: Number of Government Officials Undergoing USG Assisted Security Sector Governance Training
Custom Indicator
Number of TSE, PNC, and Ministry participants in electoral security training programs

iii. Political Competition and Consensus Building

GJD 3.1 – Consensus Building Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Groups Trained in Conflict Mediation/Resolution Skills with USG Assistance
Custom Indicator
Number of election workers trained by the TSE in conflict mediation/resolution in voter registration sites and polling stations
GJD 2.3 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Domestic Election Observers Trained with USG Assistance
Custom Indicators
Number of domestic observers trained in electoral conflict incident monitoring and reporting
Number of domestic observers trained in media monitoring
Number of domestic observers trained in political finance monitoring
Number of domestic observers trained in electoral dispute resolution monitoring
GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of People Reached by USG Assisted Voter Education
Custom Indicators
Number of voters reached by media type with messages to discourage vote buying and other political malpractices as sponsored by the TSE
Number of voters reached by media type with messages to discourage vote selling and voter complicity in electoral crimes

GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Laws or Amendments to Ensure Credible Elections Drafted with USG Technical Assistance
Custom Indicators
Prohibitions or statutory limitations placed on the practice of "floor-crossing" or changing political parties by elected officials
Legal framework for political finance is strengthened and sanctions increased for violations
Reform of residency requirements for voter registration to reduce the practice of "carrying voters" from one municipality to another
De-link the voter registration card from receiving social benefits
Introduce term limits for mayors
Establish a statutory process of candidate selection or nomination by political parties
Disaggregate municipal elections from national elections and conduct municipal elections in four stages over the course of one month around the country
GJD 3.2 – Elections and Political Processes
Indicator Title: Number of Electoral Administrative Procedures and Systems Strengthened with USG Assistance
Custom Indicators
Establishment of an Office of Electoral Security Administration at the TSE
Collect and harmonized the multi-sourced incident reporting data from the 2011 elections and establish an incident database and mapping system
Institutionalize the inter-agency task force involving the TSE, security, and intelligence forces
Conduct training for political finance system administration and regulation enforcement including vote buying
GJD 3.3 – Political Parties
Indicator Title: Number of Political Parties and Political Groupings Receiving USG Assistance to Articulate Platform and Policy Agenda Effectively
Custom Indicator
Number of platforms published in an all party platform compendium available in both hard copy and on the TSE web site.
GJD 3.4 – Political Parties
Indicator Title: Number of USG-Assisted Political Parties Implementing Program to Increase the Number of Candidates and Members Who are Women, Youth and from Marginalized Groups
Custom Indicators

Number of women candidates for national and municipal offices and political party leadership
Number of indigenous people candidates for national and municipal offices and political party leadership
Number of men and women under the age of 30 who are candidates for national and municipal offices and political party leadership
GJD 3.5 – Political Parties
Indicator Title: Number of Organizations Receiving USG Support to Promote Development of and Compliance with Political Finance Regulations and Legislation
Custom Indicator
Number of participants in USG-funded workshops on compliance to political party regulations and political finance reforms
GJD 4.1 – Strengthening Democratic Civic Participation
Indicator Title: Number of Participants in USG-Funded Programs Supporting Participation and Inclusion of Traditionally Marginalized Ethnic Minority and/or Religious Minority Groups
Custom Indicator
Number of participants in workshops to recruit indigenous people as candidates and political party leadership
GJD 4.1 – Strengthen Democratic Civic Participation
Indicator Title: Number of USG Assisted Civil Society Organizations that Engage in Advocacy and Watchdog Functions
Custom Indicators
Number of CSOs monitoring and advocating on electoral crimes and conflict
Number of CSOs monitoring and advocating on media fairness
Number of CSOs monitoring and disclosing political finance data
Number of CSOs monitoring electoral crimes and disputes and advocating against impunity
GJD 4.2 – Media Freedom and Freedom of Information
Indicator Title: Number of Journalists Trained with USG Assistance
Custom Indicator
Number of journalists trained in workshop on standards for coverage of electoral violence

V. Conclusion

As a result of Guatemala's history, socio-economic factors will continue to create vulnerabilities for electoral violence. Although not unsusceptible to programming, reducing overall levels of criminality and poverty, for example, will require long-term

efforts that leverage domestic and international support. Principal among these issues is the threat posed by DTOs as manifested in illicit capture of local governance in general and weakening the integrity of municipal electoral contests in particular. Increasing capacity of security forces to combat these organizations is but one side of the solution, and should be coupled with efforts to address the means via which DTOs inject funding, and thus influence, into the electoral arena—in particular, making political finance regulations more stringent. Given the lack of political will to make these changes, such reforms, despite their urgency, are viewed realistically as long-term objectives.

At the same time, in the short- and medium-term, capacity building initiatives, reform, and further international assistance may help reduce vulnerabilities resulting from political and security factors.

Further strengthening capacity of Guatemalan stakeholders involved in provision of electoral security will be crucial to safeguard future elections. These efforts should begin with the TSE yet also extend to security stakeholders. Establishing an office within the TSE for electoral security administration could be a useful first step to build the TSE headquarters and departmental capacities in electoral conflict management. Providing assistance to strengthen communication and coordination between national, departmental and sub-departmental election officials is another tangible issue that could enhance provision of electoral security for future contests. And finally, the inter-agency working group could be made permanent in order to ensure continuity between electoral cycles and avoid re-establishment prior to each contest.

Within the security sphere, an evaluation of PNC capacity could be performed and support provided accordingly. At the same time, reforms to the electoral system may make increases in PNC capacity unnecessary. In particular, disaggregating municipal and national elections would help address issues associated with PNC capacity, in particular inadequate number of forces to simultaneously provide security for all polling stations. Holding municipal elections in stages (perhaps four or five clusters of municipalities) would enable the PNC to focus on and deploy assets to one specific set of municipalities at a time. Such a reform would allow the PNC to diversify the deployments of its officers into fixed, mobile, and rapid response enforcement postures.

Various electoral reforms could help de-conflict Guatemala's elections; however, to ensure gains as soon as possible priority should be given to advocating a specific set of changes. Priority areas include the following: establishing term limits for mayors; prohibiting the practice of "carrying voters"; reforming the political finance system to increase fines and enhance authority of the TSE to enforce penalties; criminalizing vote selling and buying; restricting "floor-crossing" by newly elected congresspersons; establishing a statutory candidate "primary" system; and disaggregating municipal elections as cited above.

Despite these vulnerabilities, mitigating influences exist that can be better leveraged to prevent and manage electoral conflict. The G-4 mandate could be expanded into a more robust monitoring and enforcement role for the ethical pacts signed by parties. Given that

youth do not appear to be exploited by political parties as agents of violence, programs involving youth in elections and campaigns should be expanded to reduce the incentives for their recruitment. Finally, many of the issues up for debate in Congress are cited in this assessment as factors in electoral conflict. By establishing a consensus agenda (and counting the votes in Congress for such an agenda), electoral reform can have the added impact of helping to de-conflict the electoral process—as citizens see lawmakers making progress, they may be de-incentivized from resorting to violence to advance political grievances.

Annex I - Program of Meetings

Guatemala Electoral Assessment
January 8-27, 2012

Week 1: January 8-14, 2012 (Guatemala City)

January 8, 2012 – Assessment Team arrives in Guatemala.

Monday, January 9th	
Time	**Contact**
10:00am – 1:00pm	Entry Briefing with USAID
2:15 – 4:00pm	Carmen Aída Ibarra Morán, Movimiento pro Justicia

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Tuesday, January 10th	
Time	**Contact**
8:00 – 9:30 am	Maximo Zaldivar, IFES Country Representative Director
10:00am – 12:00pm	Edgar Ajcip, LIDER
12:30 – 2:30pm	Gustavo Berganza, Asociación DOSES
3:00 – 5:00pm	Eduardo Núñez, Resident Director NDI Guatemala

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Wednesday, January 11th	
Time	**Contact**
8:00 – 9:30 am	Hugo Rivera, TSE'S General Inspector
10:00am – 12:00pm	Sydney Shaw, UCN (Deputy Secretary General)
12:00 – 1:00pm	Gonzalo Marroquin, Siglio XXI
2:00 – 4:00pm	Ana Glenda Tager, Interpeace, Director Latin America

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Thursday, January 12th	
Time	**Contact**
10:00am – 12:00pm	Julio Solórzano, Director Electoral TSE
1:00 – 3:00pm	Manfredo Marroquin and Rashid Arcashar, Acción Ciudadana
3:30 – 5:00 pm	Abelardo Quezada / Jorge Solorzano, UNDP

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Friday, January 13th	
Time	**Contact**
9:00 – 10:30am	Mario Polanco, GAM
10:30 – 11:30am	FOSS
12:00 – 2:00pm	Antonio Dal Borgo, EU Delegation in Guatemala
2:00 – 4:00pm	Mr. Fernando Girón, Myrna Mack Foundation
4:00 – 5:00 pm	Jorge Escoto, USAID Local Governance Project

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Week 2: January 15-21, 2012

Monday, January 16th: Day Trip - Cuilapa, Santa Rosa Department	
Time	**Contact**
9:00 – 10:30am	Alvaro Conrado Nájera and Jorge Luis Barrera, Department TSE Departamental Delegate and Assistant
11:00 am – 12:00pm	Vivian Ávila Marroquin, National Electoral Network
12:00 – 1:00pm	Commissary Luis González/Departmental Chief Police
3:00 – 4:00pm	Roberto Trigueros/Chairman and members of the Departmental Election Board

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Tuesday, January 17th: Guatemala City	
Time	**Contact**
8:00 – 9:00 am	Alvaro Pop, Organismo Naleb
10:00 – 11:30am	Roberto González, CREO
3:00 – 5:00pm	U.S. Embassy – Political Counselor and analysts

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Wednesday, January 18th: Day Trip - Magdalena Milpas Altas City	
Time	**Contact**
9:00 – 10:00am	Rudy Fernando Navas Rivera/TSE Departmental
10:00am – 12:00pm	Carlos López Bautista/ Electoral Board and Mr. Chinchilla, Police Officer
12:00 – 01:00pm	Return to Guatemala City

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Thursday, January 19th: Guatemala City	
Time	**Contact**
12:00 – 1:30pm	Juan Luis Font, El Periódico
2:00 – 3:00pm	Pastor Jorge Morales, Alianza Evangélica de Guatemala

Friday, January 20th: Day Trip Escuintla City and Tiquisate, Escuintla Department	
Time	**Contact**
09:00 – 10:00am	Edgar Rodolfo Reyes/ TSE Departmental Delegate, Miguel Angel Torres, Governor, and 1 police and army representative
10:00 – 11:30am	Transport to Tiquisate
12:00 – 02:00pm	Carlos Francisco Betancourt and Elder Morales new and former Sub Departmental Delegates, 1 representative of the municipality and 1 representative of the Police.

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Week 3: January 22-28, 2012 (Guatemala City)

Monday, January 23rd	
Time	**Contact**
10:30 - 11:30 am	Manuel Barquin/GANA
12:00 – 1:00 pm	Mario Antonio Sandoval/ Prensa Libre, Guatevision
2:00 pm– 3:00pm	Victor Manuel Chocoj Tiul, Police Commissioner
04:00 - 5:00 pm	Colonel Gustavo Fisher, National Army

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Tuesday, January 24th	
Time	**Contact**
8:00 – 9:00am	Jhalmar Calderón, PNUD
9:00 - 10:00am	Nery Rodenas, ODHAG
11:00am – 12:30pm	Anibal Guitiérrez, CICIG, Consejero Político
2:00 – 3:00pm	Rodolfo Nuetze, Guatemala City Council and CREO
3:00 – 4:00 pm	Dr. Sergio Morales, PDH

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Wednesday, January 25th	
Time	**Contact**
3:30 – 4:00pm	Roberto Alejos, Former President of Congress
4:30 – 5:30pm	Jorge Herrera, Patriotic Party (PP)
5:30pm	Carlos Barreda, UNE

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Thursday, January 26th	
Time	**Contact**
10:00am -12:00pm	Edgar Gutierrez/ Fundación DESC, Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of Civil Intelligence
2:30 – 4:00pm	Out Brief with Ambassador and USAID

Annex II – Interviews with Sub-National Election Officials and Police Officials

Cuilapa, TSE Delegate and Municipal Board

Electoral risks plans are maintained on the departmental level by the TSE Delegate, including actions to be taken if earthquakes occur on Election Day. Preventative measures include surveying the local populations for rumors and identifying municipalities where mayors are contesting for re-election. The TSE coordinated its activities with the PNC and military to prepare for deployments which would confront these risks. However, there was little coordination with the central TSE offices, and the means of communication were limited to telephone contacts. Voter education campaigns included "vote in peace" messages. The re-election issue is pertinent because it is viewed as a trigger for electoral conflict. Term limits or only allowing mayors to compete for office alternatively were viewed as one approach to dampen the post-election violence which occurs as a result of the re-election of unpopular mayors.

In general, the underlying causes of the violence were considered to be the mayoral re-elections, the "carrying" of outside voters to vote elsewhere, and weaknesses in the electoral law. Social causes were traced to the lack of quality of public services and abuse of municipal resources by mayors. The municipal board members reported that when poll workers from a neighboring village heard about unrest at a polling station in another village, they collected the voting materials and fled to safety. In the second round, poll workers had to be recruited from other areas because of the intimidation experienced during the first round in some locations.

In this department, there was not any significant Pre-Election Phase violence. However, violence did occur on the night of Election Day and the Post-Election Phase where disgruntled voters reacting to the re-election of mayors attacked polling stations setting them on fire and causing injuries, such as broken bones, to poll workers. In one case, gasoline was thrown onto poll workers. Two people were arrested for this incident, but then released. Local youth are not visibly involved with the violence.

Magdalena, Milpas Altas City, TSE Delegate and Municipal Board Member

The TSE Delegate observed that electoral violence was increasing in this department. However, the violence was confined to the first round of voting. In the Pre-Election Phase, the violence took the form of voter/perpetrators and election official/victims during the voter registration process. Women were informed that they had to show their voter registration card in order to obtain benefits from the government's Social Cohesion program. As a result, women in this municipality crowded the registration office each day and became unruly when the office was closing at the end of the day and they remained in line, unregistered. However, this was the only form of violence reported in the Pre-Election Phase and "peace pacts" were signed by political parties to refrain from incendiary or violent campaign tactics.

On Election Day, the practice of "carrying voters" caused minor disturbances at the polling stations where voters bused from other municipalities were confronted by the *bona fide* residents.

In Post-Election Phase violence, officials asserted that the root causes were found in the political system and that municipal administrations can be re-elected even though they are corrupt. In 2007, the ballots had to be taken to Antigua to be counted because of the threats of violence. Ballot counting on election night served as a trigger to violence when the announcements of results were made with street actions, rock throwing, and burning of ballots and property. In one instance, partial results were leaked from inside the polling station sparking disturbances outside. The police were under-resourced and ill-prepared to confront the size of the crowd. In fact, two police were injured by rocks thrown from the crowd. Special riot police were called as reinforcements to restore public order; however, it took the force one and a half hours to arrive on the scene. The coordination was centralized between the TSE and Ministry of Interior (MOI) but not strongly coordinated on the municipal level. No one has been arrested or prosecuted for these acts of violence.

The Delegate expressed the view that training and education could go far to de-conflict election in Guatemala. For example, better training on lawful electoral procedure for TSE delegates and political parties would encourage better administration and compliance to electoral rules. Similarly, the TSE should ramp up its civic education program to reach rural and indigenous areas so that voters are better informed and less vulnerable to vote buying and intimidation. Organized crime was not viewed as a factor of concern.

Escuintla City, Sub-Department Delegate

The Delegate supported several electoral reforms which could mitigate vulnerabilities to electoral violence. These reforms include term limits for mayors, prohibiting the practice of "carrying voters," and stronger sanctions should be levied on political parties for violation of the law. "Black campaigns" against candidates and election officials, anonymous intimidating messages delivered by paper leaflets or, increasing, SMS texts were used. Vote buying was reported, but takes on an institutional dimension in that the compensation for the vote is patronage at the municipality, that is, vote right and get a job. Local youth were not identified with electoral violence.

In the Pre-Election Phase, the Delegate undertook the identification of potential "hot spots" within his jurisdiction. These insights allowed him to coordinate with the PNC on measures to protect vulnerable locations and individuals. Aside from a few fistfights among candidates and supporters, the Pre-Election Phase was largely incident free. Related in part to the deployment of military in the area, Election Day was largely incident free. In the Post-Election Phase, there were some reports of ballot burning and rioting outside of a municipal building. But the level of Post-Election Phase violence by losing candidate supporters appeared to be less intense here than in other locations surveyed. Organized crime was not reported as an influence in electoral violence.

Tiquisate City, Sub-Department Delegate and Former Delegate

The former Sub-Department Delegate became the target of an intimidation campaign to drive him from office. After over two decades of service, he resigned his position for fear of harm to himself or his family. The principle threats came in the form of leaflets

distributed in the Pre-Election, Election Day, and Post-Election Phases. The leaflets were signed by the DTO, the Zetas, and put forward a smear campaign against the Sub-Department Delegate, threatening to burn down his house, urging the citizens to demand his resignation, and threatening mass murder to prove that they are serious. While the Zetas' name was on the leaflet, the Delegate did not believe that it was from the group because the Zetas do not typically engage in smear campaigns but resort to violence as their first option.

The Delegate pointed to one reason for such vulnerability to threats is that the TSE does not understand the challenges on the local level. The decision-making is too centralized in Guatemala City and there is little coordination with man sub-nation authorities. In his option, elections are becoming more and more dangerous for local officials. A similar Pre-Election issue was reported here as in Magdalena of over-crowding at voter registration centers, and unruly voters left in line, un-serviced, at the close of daily business.

As reforms measures, the Delegate proposed term limits for mayors and members of congress, strengthen the political finance enforcement capacity of the TSE, prohibit the practice of "carrying voters, and provide security for sub-national election officials. Property, injury, and life insurance for sub-nation election officials should also be considered. Additional staffing during voter registration would also ameliorate the source of friction at the registration center where voter frustration boils over because the process is so slow.

The Ombudsman expressed concern about the TSE's election observer accreditation policy. The TSE requires applicant observers to provide a photocopy of the national identity card as verified by an attorney. The introduction of this verification step costs the applicant at least 50 GTQ ($6.50 USD) and the Ombudsman considers it to be a kind of "tax" to be an election observer. Also regarding the TSE, the Ombudsman expressed concern about inadequate enforcement of political finance regulations and the overall need to reform the electoral law.

PNC – Cuilapa

The police deployed 397 officers with 39 patrols cars, 40 special officers, and 100 academy officers on and surrounding Election Day. The officers were deployed for a continuous, single shift of 26 hours. Their responsibilities included protection of ballot counting and taking custody of counted ballots if required. Local officials held two meetings with election authorities in election security preparations and through these developed a risk map for the 14 municipalities under their jurisdiction. The map was then used as a guide for asset deployments.

Incidents that the police had to confront included the blocking of highways and the burning of one city hall. In the municipality of Taxco, there were an insufficient number of police to confront a mob, members of which eventually disarmed present police forces. Weaponry observed included high caliber weapons in the Pre-Election Phase and machetes and sticks in the Post-Election Phase. The PNC views the violence in these

elections as increasing over previous elections, marked also by an increased in impunity for perpetrators of electoral violence. The police note that they are under-resourced in terms of people and assets including weapons, vehicles, and communications equipment. Their lessons learned from this experience have not been shared with police from other departments in any formal fashion.

PNC - Magdalena Milpas Altas City

The numbers of people participating in Post-Election violence overwhelmed the capacity of the local police to manage public order. Two police were hurt by rocks thrown from the crowd. The police expressed a perceived disadvantage in forecasting electoral violence given that they are on a rotation system that frequently precludes them from working in the same cities in which they maintain residents. The implication is that PNC lack sensitivities to local issues, personalities, and threats. This effect was to some extent offset by holding meetings with municipal board members to perform some planning, yet even this degree of coordination was insufficient to properly plan for the level of security required.

PNC - Escuintla City

Similar to other subnational locations, local officers in Escuintla city also raised their lack of capacity to properly handle riots. The practice of "carrying voters" was cited as a difficult issue for police to manage. On the one hand, the practice is provocative and has reportedly triggered incidents at polling stations on Election Day. At the same time and due to the legality of the practice itself, police ability to make arrests is limited to disturbances spurred by individuals agitated by the practice.

PNC - Tiquisate City

The police were reported to be ineffective at investigating the threat against election officials and providing measures of protection for those officials who were directly and publicly threatened. In their defense, the police are also targets of violence from the same pool of perpetrators and must also manage "force protection" measures. While the PNC did conduct some electoral security planning before the elections, it was regarded as a superficial effort. Echoing statements of PNC in all other areas, the PNC in this department also expressed concerns about being under-resourced in people and assets

Contingencies related to perpetrators and motives also apply to political party representatives as perpetrators of threats and intimidation, which occur regularly in the Pre-Election Phase, onto candidates as well as their affiliates and family members. Due to the unstable nature of Guatemala's political parties (no political party has been re-elected to the presidency since 1980, for example) no single party represents the most frequently targeted organization across various electoral cycles—targets have varied according to the parties created prior to and running in a given election.

Annex III – The Influence of Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) on Guatemala's Elections

Countries throughout Central America have been used by various Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) in order to transport narcotics (including by not limited to cocaine, marijuana and heroine) from their source (mainly the Andean region) to markets in the U.S. According to U.S. government estimates, more than 90 percent of narcotics bound for the United States are shipped via Central America or Mexico.[9] In addition to El Salvador and Honduras, Guatemala has also and in particular since the late 1990s been used by DTOs as a transshipment point for illicit drugs—in 2009 alone, for example, approximately 250 tons of narcotics were shipped through Guatemala.[10]

DTOs in Guatemala can be divided into two groups—major crime 'families' of Guatemalan origin and Major cartels that originated in Mexico—with varied levels of involvement in drug-production and trafficking. The major DTO families in Guatemala are the Mendozas, Lorenzanas and Leones. Involved in other criminal enterprises as well, including human trafficking, the role of these families in the drug-trade is principally transporting contraband through Guatemala and into Mexico. The Mendozas generally operate along the border with Honduras, the Leones in Zacapa to the east, and the Mendozas in Petén province.

Two large Mexican DTOs with distinct origins[11] are known to operate in Guatemala—the *Sinaloa* cartel and the *Los Zetas* (*Zetas*) cartel. Their principal interest in Guatemala is control over territory that can in turn be used as transshipment points for narcotics. Narcotics are generally flown (though at times transported via water) into Guatemala and then broken into smaller shipments for movement through Mexico and then into the U.S. Control over territory in general and Guatemala in particular is vital to ensuring these DTOs' ability to transfer narcotics – increases in control over territory translate into higher revenues for the cartel, as they are able to move more drugs as well as rely less on other criminal organizations to operate or secure transport corridors. Mexican DTO operations and interests in Guatemala (and in particular the Zetas) extend beyond control of territory to move drugs, however, and into executing various other criminal enterprises that include kidnapping and extortion as well as prostitution rings. Influence in key areas is vital to preserving these operations as well.

The Sinaloa cartel, one of the largest and most powerful in the world, is reportedly strongest along the border with Mexico and focused on transporting narcotics that are brought in via the Pacific coast. Since 2005 the Zetas have been operating in the northern Guatemalan provinces of Coban, Alta Verapaz and Petén. The Zetas' move into northern Guatemala (the Sinaloa cartel was operational in Guatemala long before) was mainly a

[9] "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control March 2010," (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), 7.
[10] "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I, Drug and Chemical Control March 2010," (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of State, 2010), 7.
[11] The Sinaloa cartel essentially was founded by Pedro Avilés Pérez in the Mexican state of Sinaloa in the 1960s and is currently operational in 17 Mexican states. The Zetas cartel is comprised of former members of the armed wing of the Gulf Cartel, another prominent and influential Mexican drug cartel.

response to increased pressure from government of Mexico to interdict drug trafficking and capture of kill drug cartel members throughout that country. In order to escape Mexican president Felipe Calderon's "war on drugs," the Zetas shifted some of their operations into Guatemala. Estimates indicate the Zetas have at least 400 operational members in this region, with more flowing in as pressure from the Mexican government increases.[12] The cartels fight between each other for control of territory and aim to gain influence over local politics, yet employ distinct tactics, with the Zetas employing more violent means.

The Mexican DTOs use three core tactics to gain and then maintain control over territory. First, they employ *direct and indirect violence to challenge rival drug traffickers* or Guatemala's various criminal syndicates. On direct violence, they assassinate criminal rivals or enter areas and engage in gun fights. Rivals are forcibly pushed out of territory, which is then controlled by the competing DTO. Concerning indirect means, the Mexican DTOs in general yet principally the Zetas use violence to intimidate rival cartels or criminal organizations. Citizens are targeted directly to "send a message" to rival cartels. As one example, in May 2011 the Zetas killed and then be-headed 27 peasants in Petén province, reportedly to send a message to a local drug dealer associated with the Leon crime family. Murder rates have increased in what were already violent areas.

Second, the Mexican DTOs *attempt to gain control over elected officials (mayors or governors, for example) or non-elected government staff (police or military)* to increase their influence and therefore control in key areas. The DTOs employs a range of tactics to secure these gains. On one end of the spectrum, they use bribes and extortion—politicians reportedly receive money in exchange for turning a blind eye to DTO operations. Taking advantage of the weak or non-existent campaign finance regulations, the Zetas have reportedly since 2008 become increasingly involved in financing electoral campaigns of political parties, mainly by funneling money to candidates through established family-run criminal organizations. Direct contributions to politicians are reportedly less prevalent yet still occur. According to *El Periodico's* editor, Jose Ruben Zamora, Guatemalan General Mauro Jacinto informed Zamora that then President Colom's re-election campaign received approximately Q20 million ($2.5million USD) from the Zetas, in addition to financing from other trafficking groups. Jacinto was murdered soon after the report emerged. With regard to non-elected government staff, reports indicate that both major Mexican DTOs have infiltrated the police. Interviewees indicate that low- and mid-level police comprise a 'cartel of the shield'—officers help the DTOs transport their narcotics through police checkpoints by flashing their 'shield' (badge), after which the car is allowed to pass. Infiltration extends to higher levels as well. In February 2010 then Police Chief Baltazar Gómez along with Nelly Bonilla, Guatemala's highest anti-narcotics officer, were arrested due to alleged connections with

[12] Cartels had reportedly used remote airstrips in areas of northern Guatemala while smuggling narcotics, yet it was not until 2007 that the notoriously violent cartel substantially increased operational presence these areas.

deaths by the Zetas of five police officers attempting to confiscate 900 kilos of cocaine from the cartel.[13]

The Zetas use a range of violent tactics in order to gain influence in territories they deem crucial to drug running operations. They have assassinated politicians who targeted Zeta operations in order to remove this non-pliant individual from power as well as send a message to their successor that they should not challenge the cartel. The Judiciary has also emerged as a target. Judicial officials have also been targeted by Zeta assassinations in order to intimidate judges or lawyers and prevent them from prosecuting Zeta members. For example, the prosecutor assigned to the aforementioned incidents where 27 individuals were beheaded was himself gunned down, his body cut into five pieces and placed in the same number of bags, with a note from the Zetas reading: "This is for those who keep on making mistakes; one by one we will keep on killing."[14]

Aside from yet intimately linked to their increased influence in politics, the DTOs in general but Zetas in particular have through the aforementioned and other means contributed to a marked increase in violence in Guatemala. This includes fighting between the Zetas and rival cartels as referenced above as well as violence between the cartel and the government. In response to increased Zetas presence, in November 2010 then President Alvaro Colom declared a "state of siege" in Coban, which included army patrols throughout the city's streets. Moreover, the Zetas have exacerbated the already weak state of Guatemala's rule of law. Prior to Zeta presence the Government of Guatemala already faced challenges from gangs and drug traffickers and lacked control over large swaths of territory. Increased Zetas operations and killing has stretched security force resources even thinner. The weak Guatemalan state has not only passively enabled (through weak control of territory) the Zetas' rise, but also directly contributed to its increase in strength – rogue members of Guatemala's Special Forces have reportedly trained (for a fee of $5,000 a month) members of the Zetas as well as helped the cartel secure weapons and ammunition originally purchased by the state. As with DTOs in the region in particular but also insurgent groups across the globe, in the Guatemalan context low state capacity and low government willingness (as represented by the aforementioned corruption) has created a dynamic in which the DTOs can establish operations in a given territory, retain control over this space, and then use revenues gained to expand into other regions as necessary.[15]

[13] Elisabeth Malkin, "2 Top Guatemalan Police Officials Are Arrested on Drug Charges," *New York Times*, March 2, 2010.
[14] "Hallan cadáver descuartizado de un fiscal en Cobán", *Siglo21*, 24 May 2011.
[15] The interrelationship between low state capacity and low government willingness (corruption) and why this facilitates DTO and insurgent group expansion is outlined in Patrick W. Quirk, *Arms, Aid and Internal War: U.S. Intervention and Illicit Financing in Colombia and Afghanistan*, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, Department of Political Science – Doctoral Dissertation Manuscript, 2012).

Annex IV – List of At Risk Municipalities and Incidents – 2011

Rating	Department	Municipality	Pre-Election	Post-Election
High	Santa Rosa	Pueblo Nuevo Vinas	17-10	X
High	Retalhuleu	San Andres Villa Seca		X
High	Quiche	Chinique		
High	Quiche	Zacaualpa		
High	Peten	San José	1-1	X
High	Izabal	El Estor		
Medium	Sacatepquez	Santo Domingo Xenacoj	5-3	X
Medium	Chimaltenango	Pochutz	8-5	
Medium	Chimaltenango	San Andres Iztapa		
Medium	Chimaltenango	El Tejar		
Medium	Santa Rosa	Cuilapa		
Medium	Solola	San Lucas Toliman	2-1	X
Medium	Solola	Nahuala		X
Medium	Quetzaltenango	Quetzaltenango	7-4	
Medium	San Marcos	Ocos		
Medium	Huehuetenango	San Mateo Ixtatn 5-3		X
Medium	Huehuetenango	San Pedro Soloma		X
Medium	Huehuetenango	Tectitan		
Medium	Quiche	Chichicastenango	11-7	
Medium	Quiche	San Gaspar Chajuf		
Medium	Quiche	San Pedro Jocopilas		X
Medium	Quiche	Sacapulas		X
Medium	Zacapa	Zacapa	8-5	X
Medium	Chiquimula	Quezaltepeque		
Medium	Jalapa	San Carlos Alzatate	3-2	X
Medium	Jalapa	Mataquescuintla		X
Medium	Jutiapa	Jutiapa	22-13	
Medium	Jutiapa	Santa Catarina Mita		
Medium	Jutiapa	El Adelanto		
Medium	Jutiapa	Agua Blanco[16]		

Post-Election Incident Locations	
Department	**Municipalities**
Huehuetengo	Nenton, Coloenango, San Mateo Ixtatan, San Pedro Soloma, Santa Eulalia, Santiago Chimaltenango
Sacatepequez	Santo Domingo Xeacoj, Patores, Magdalena Milpas Altas, Santa Lucia, Cuidad Vieja
Quiche	San Pedro Jocopilas, Patzite, Chinique, Zacualpa, Sacapulas
Solola	Concepción, Santa Cruz La Laguna, San Antonio Palopo, San Lucas Tollman, Hahua

[16] Herrera Marizza, Electoral Violence Analysis: Second Rounds of Elections in Guatemala, IFES, November 2011

Alta Verapaz	San Juan Chamelco, Panzos, Senahum Coban
San Marcos	El Tumbador, Tajumlco, Ocos
Guatemala	Villa Canales, San Raymundo, San Jose del Golfo
Santa Rosa Casillas	Pueblo Nuevo Vinas, Nueva Santa Rosa
Jalapa	San Carlos Alzatate, San Miguel Chaparrón, Mataquescuintla
Chiquimula	Olopa, Ipala
Escuintla	La Democracia, Tiquisate
Suchitepquez	San Lorenzo, Pueblo Nuevo
Chimaltenango	San Miguel Pochuta
Izabel	El Estor
Jutiapa	El Adelanto
Peten	San Jose
Retalhuleu	San Andres Villa Seca
Totonicapan	San Cartolo[17], Aguas Calientes

[17] Herrera, Marizza and Mauricio Romero Vidal, Quick Assessment, Monitoring and Analysis Report of the 2011 Guatemalan General Elections, IFES, October 2011

Annex V - Acronyms

ANN	Alianza Nueva Nación
CREO	Partido Compromiso, Renovación y Orden
DIA	Partido Desarrollo Integral Autentico
DCG	Partido Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca
FLASCO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales
FRG	Partido Frente Republicana Guatemala
GANA	Partido Gran Alianza Nacional
ICG	International Crisis Group
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
INGEP	Instituto de Investigación de Gerencia Política de la Universidad Rafael Landivar
INTRAPAZ	Instituto de Transformación de Conflictos para la Paz en Guatemala de la Universidad Rafael Landivar
JRV	Junta Receptoras de Votos
LIDER	Partido Libertad Democrática Renovada
MÁS	Partido Movimiento de Acción Solidaria
MOE – UE	Misión de Observación de la Unión Europea
PAN	Partido de Avanzada Nacional
PDH	Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos
PNC	Policía Nacional Civil
PP	Partido Patriota
PU	Partido Unionista
ONGs	Organizaciones no Gubernamentales
RENAP	Registro Nacional de law Personas
TSE	Tribunal Supremo Electoral
US	Partido Unión Democrática
UNE	Partido Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza
URNG/MAIZ	Partido Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca/Movimiento Amplio de Izquierda
VIVA	Partido Visión con Valores