

SYMPOSIUM FOR STABILITY OPERATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT IN A NEW ERA: MAKING THE WHOLE OF GOVERNMENT APPROACH WORK

ABSTRACT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

On February 12, 2009, Creative Associates International, Inc. and Lockheed Martin held a symposium on readiness, stability operations, and development that drew the participation of senior U.S. government officials, former senior officials, senior Congressional staff, subject matter experts, and industry leaders, as well as programmatic professionals. The discussion hinged on two overarching themes—Getting it Right: Defining the Challenges and Context, and Everything is Local: The Importance of Culture, History and Language.

The discussion highlighted challenges and opportunities in the area of stabilization and development. Integrating the U.S. response to weak and failed states and nations in transition was the central theme. Speakers noted that populations – often children and youth – suffer from conditions of hunger, illiteracy, lack of rule of law or elections, education, or basic human rights. These conditions harbor circumstances that engender growing challenges to the security of the United States and the international community. It was noted that a fundamental problem is poverty. In Latin America and the Caribbean, forty percent of the populations still live on less than two dollars a day.

On a philosophical level, participants noted that our ideas of democracy, free trade, human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and liberty are part of a marketplace of competing ideas. Our approach needs to be one of respect, equality, and minority to let our ideas compete successfully. Those who challenge our ideas, including criminal elements or those sowing political instability, are smart and innovative. We must respect their capabilities, and we must be innovative ourselves in order to challenge them. This is the brain-on-brain struggle. We will not win at the point of a gun or by signing a check. It's about what we bring: our ideas of freedom, progress, and human rights.



DISCUSSION TOPICS:

The Importance of Culture

We Are Adapting, But Need to Do More

Hiring and Empowering the Right People

Working with Congress

The Role of Contractors and Other NGOs

The International Context

Battle Space

Stability Operations:
The capacity to deliver results in non-permissive settings

Humanitarian Space

TM

CREATIVE CENTER FOR STABILIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a central point of reference. A parallel was drawn to the U.S. response to the devastation in New Orleans in 2005. Two years prior to Katrina, FEMA had over one hundred response exercises of which only two were for hurricanes. All the rest were about counterterrorism. A speaker noted, “How often do we have a terrorist incident and how often do we have a hurricane?” Looking forward, what is the probability of another Iraq or Afghanistan versus another Eastern Congo, Somalia, or Sudan?

The point was made that the choice between nation-building or stabilization and development is a false dichotomy because collapsed states will be with us for the foreseeable future. People entering national security service today are going to face this challenge for their entire career. The number of countries that have either collapsed or are collapsing ranges from 25 to 40 according to public institutes that study failing states. U.S. national security depends on our ability to hire and train people to grapple with this new reality.

The road we travelled after the Cold War was another key point of reference. The Clinton Administration undertook the PRD-20 process, chaired by the National Security Council, to look at 84 U.S. government entities that have a direct or indirect foreign affairs role in such areas as foreign aid, defense, and trade. Rather than stuff policy priorities into boxes on an existing organizational diagram, it was proposed that the government look at the challenges in the post-Cold War era and then determine the appropriate instruments to use, including eliminating, restructuring or creating new institutions. Unfortunately, the effort collapsed because the interagency team could not reconcile its current organization with the new challenges.

The need for clarity in defining the challenges we face, and the need to integrate strategic responses to them ran throughout the discussion. The United States is not clearly defining the emerging challenges to international stability. While we have some idea of what they are, we lack integrated strategic planning across the government to determine the roles and responsibilities of each instrument we need to effectively address these challenges. It was also emphasized that for Congress to be able to act, those recommending reform need a clear vision that explains to taxpayers not just what changes are needed but why the United States should engage in stability operations, development and other overseas engagement. This is a fundamental responsibility of the Executive Branch.

EVERYTHING IS LOCAL: THE IMPORTANCE OF CULTURE, HISTORY AND LANGUAGE

This facet evoked a number of comments, thoughts and critiques. The entire international community has consistently tried to impose responses and solutions that are divorced from local realities. Past attempts at state-building have been seriously undermined by failing to understand the local context for state-building efforts. The international community must reach out to local communities and informal political actors, to consult and involve them in decisions about the future of their countries while also managing their expectations for international interventions. There is a need for institutional coherence within a society, particularly at the local level, in order to lay the foundations for sustainable institutions.

Language and culture are key. If you do not have a particular expertise in the local culture, you need to learn it. You need learn who Mutanabi is so you can understand why al-Qaeda blew up the Street of the Booksellers, Mutanabi Avenue, in Baghdad. It was because the Shi'a claimed this great Arabic-language poet as one of their own. If, like

When we founded Creative Associates, we wanted to be sure that we were involved throughout the world serving those that needed the most, particularly children in the developing world who were left without education and without opportunities. Today it is extraordinarily special for us to be able to discuss diplomacy, security, and development together in one forum. For us to be effective and efficient, and for the United States to really be able to succeed, we need to have a unity of effort focused on stability and development.

M. Charito Krivant
President & CEO



There is a need for institutional coherence within a society, particularly at the local level, in order to lay the foundations for sustainable institutions.

the Provincial Reconstruction Teams, you do not speak the local language and understand the local customs and culture, bilingual and bicultural advisors are a necessity. David Petraeus added enormous value in Iraq because he had Sadi Othman as his alter ego in those cultural aspects.

Another commentator noted similarly that with regard to Latin America and the Caribbean, our challenge is to approach the region in a spirit that respects sovereignty and culture, and that is mindful of the depth and complexity of our relationship and past history, both positive and negative. The United States must strive to overcome negative history through positive, productive engagement.

The U.S. Government is incorporating lessons learned from current operations. It was noted that the counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan are battles for the allegiance of local populations. Both U.S. civilians and military need to undertake the task of understanding other cultures, including bureaucratic cultures. For example, the U.S. Southern Command is committed to having its personnel speak the languages of the region and engage and understand the region's literature, culture and perspectives. USAID, in hiring new Foreign Service Officers, is targeting the various ethnic Diasporas in the United States to bring in people with experience and understanding of different cultures and languages. Congress is mindful of this need. For example, the House Armed Services Committee prepared a report on building long-term cultural capability in the Department of Defense.

WE ARE ADAPTING, BUT NEED TO DO MORE

The United States Department of State. The Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) created and has tested the Interagency Management System (IMS). The IMS is led by the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) to ensure command and control up and down the chain as policy is formulated and implemented. The IMS deploys Advanced Civilian Group teams to a country. A second element is a Civilian Response Corps drawn from eight agencies: State, USAID, Justice, Treasury, Commerce, DHS, HHS, and USDA. The Civilian Response Corps being created will have 100 active component members and 500 standby members. S/CRS's Advanced Civilian Group in Afghanistan helped American PRTs develop plans for civilian engagement. S/CRS also has a planning staff that has worked on assistance and recovery for Haiti, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Kosovo. S/CRS is in touch with about a dozen similar offices around the world, especially in Britain and Canada, and is encouraging other countries to develop this capacity, including China, India and Brazil.

The United States Agency for International Development. USAID is working to double the Foreign Service in a four year period, from about one thousand to over two thousand officers. USAID is hiring people with tremendous experience and expertise. The largest single group is for democracy, governance, and stabilization, and many of those individuals have worked on or with Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). USAID is bringing in as many agricultural officers as it can and hiring many new contracts officers. USAID hired 157 people in calendar year 2008, by far the largest number since the mid 1970s, and will surpass that goal in 2009.

The United States Department of Defense. Army doctrine recognizes that we now live in an era of persistent, irregular conflict. The military is adapting to meet the demands of that kind of war, and combat training centers are working on counterinsurgency. The Department of Defense recognizes that the nature of the conflict goes considerably beyond the capabilities of our military. Civilian agencies of the U.S. government need to similarly steel themselves for a long struggle. Stability operations are development and

On a philosophical level, participants noted that our ideas of democracy, free trade, human rights, freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and liberty are part of a marketplace of competing ideas.



“Our enemies... our competitors... our opponents...they are innovators. They wake up each and every day trying to figure out how to defeat us. They have created flat organizations: networked, technologically savvy and quick to adapt – all great lessons for us. We cannot afford to stagnate. We must also change and adapt.”

Admiral James Stavridis

development is hard. From the start, we need joint, combined, interagency and international planning, coordination and collaboration. The American people must support those in civilian agencies who engage in conflict by using words, ideas, and development aid.

Plan Colombia: Lessons of a success. Six million Colombians marching against the FARC illustrated how the Colombian people are making great progress with U.S. support. Plan Colombia was a relatively modest program: \$5 billion over ten years. Throughout Plan Colombia's implementation, no more than 800 U.S. troops were on the ground. This small number shows how a small but expert cadre can help a country address an insurgency. The speaker noted that the next tranche of effort in Colombia must be devoted to development with USAID in the lead.

We must further sharpen our response. National Security Council (NSC) subcommittees can hopefully ensure that the stove pipe problem among agencies is addressed. An expanded, better-coordinated interagency effort should recreate a U.S. Information Agency to make the American case. We need tools to facilitate collaboration and knowledge management across the government and with NGOs. S/CRS is a good concept and belongs at State, but are we developing the civilian institutional capability to respond rapidly to failing states and to international crises quickly enough? Since professionals—not just volunteers—with technical skills are needed, will the Civilian Response Corps recreate some of the problems of the Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority?

Issues with planning, implementing, and monitoring & evaluating U.S. assistance. When USAID had ten-year plans it did what the Department of Defense now does. For thirty years the U.S. had the most decentralized foreign assistance system and dominated the development community. We are courting disaster by centralizing control of development in Washington and moving away from institution building, towards service delivery. Institution and capacity building with democratizing countries takes 10 to 15 years, but OMB and Congress demand quarterly quantifiable indicators to show performance. The federal government's business systems are not functional. The Federal Acquisition Regulation is 1,982 pages long. We also need a baseline against which to measure the capacity of the society we are trying to help and the capacity we leave behind—we need to go back five years later and see what capacity remains. After the embassy bombings of 1998, Congress passed a law minimizing the American footprint abroad. A participant observed that a light U.S. footprint is counterproductive as the goal of al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations is to eliminate the face and the presence of the U.S. globally.

Lessons learned in the field also came out. From a field perspective, defining success means not confusing performance with capacity. Capacity takes a long time to build. Another perspective emphasized that even when there is planning at the strategic level for peacekeeping or disaster relief, when you get down to the working level within a country, every operation is ad hoc. Objectives determined by headquarters may or may not match the needs and objectives of people and organizations in the country.

Should there be a civilian quadrennial review for stabilization and development?

Yes, but for the whole federal government not just State and USAID. It should be framed as a Quadrennial National Security Review to get buy-in from the American people. The process may start with twenty colonels and two Foreign Service Officers but it should end with Foreign Service Officers having expertise in long-term planning. Contractors need to write more papers, seek to testify, and help reconstitute expertise back in the agencies. Others cautioned that in reframing the issue of development as a national security priority, care is needed to avoid making development a wholly-owned subsidiary of our national security policy. The military's Quadrennial Defense Review framework was designed to build up our own capabilities; in development, we're building other people's capabilities.

The choice between nation-building or stabilization and development is a false dichotomy because collapsed states will be with us for the foreseeable future.



HIRING AND EMPOWERING THE RIGHT PEOPLE

There was significant focus on increasing the capacity of State and USAID with the right kind of personnel to undertake stabilization and reconstruction. The people who work on conflict mitigation and post-conflict recovery and stabilization on the civilian side are not very different from the people in the Special Forces on the military side. You cannot simply plug anyone into those kinds of situations and expect them to perform well. State and USAID need to hire risk takers.

People in uniform can and are helping to make a compelling case for additional diplomatic and economic development resources. The State Department is also seeking to increase the Foreign Service by 15%, or 1,100 officers. Increasing the number of Foreign Service Officers may get State back to the traditional role stakeholders have always appreciated: having regional and area expertise, including in culture, language, and history. Another proposal was to create a career interagency professional international affairs service in the U.S. government with career development and education like the military provides for its officers.

Views from the field. To be effective, you have to be fast, you have to be flexible, you have to be politically relevant, and you have to continually reassess and retarget because the environment will continue to change. What kind of people do you need to be effective in these environments? First, they have to be willing to go. These places are dangerous. All are extremely politically charged and people have to continually perform at a high level every day, seven days a week. Individuals in this role need political acumen. There is no experience like experience and this kind of field operative must have the power to make decisions. Headquarters needs to empower them to take risks and be entrepreneurial because there are no simple answers in these environments.

THE OTHER PART OF GETTING IT RIGHT: WORKING WITH CONGRESS

Congress needs to be engaged from the beginning, from take-off to landing. Engaging all stakeholders in Congress is essential. A whole of government approach is usually understood as a whole of the Executive Branch approach. The 'Whole of Government' approach needs to include the Legislative Branch as an equal partner to set the agenda, identify problems, and enact solutions. The Executive Branch delivers plans to Congress with a request for urgent action. Members of Congress have many responsibilities and do not normally have a command of the same level of detail as the Executive Branch. Many members were surprised that the Executive Branch did not have stabilization and reconstruction capacity. The previous administration created new entities to bypass more difficult reforms. The "F" process was supposed to overcome stove piping and provide strategic resource management, but came to be regarded as a slush fund in Congress. Executive outreach to Congress is itself stove piped to committees of jurisdiction. State, USAID and DoD should have a unified approach to Congress and brief mixed groups of members from appropriations and authorizing committees. Building greater transparency between the two branches is essential for getting budget flexibility and the decentralized instruments we need to succeed. In the coming years, more collaborative planning and budgeting can help restore underlying trust between Congress and the Executive.

Stakeholders are beginning to take action to develop and coordinate interagency capabilities for stabilization and development operations. Chairmen Skelton, Berman and Lowey authored an amendment to create an interagency policy board. The S/CRS authorization bill was included in the National Defense Authorization Act. Last year, six months of hearings on Provincial Reconstruction Teams produced a detailed House Armed Services Committee report. Military officers can now get (Goldwater-Nichols)



The nature of the conflict goes considerably beyond the capabilities of our military. Civilian agencies of the U.S. government need to similarly steel themselves for a long struggle.

joint credits for interagency work with State or USAID, or for working on a PRT or military transition team.

The prospects for Congressional action on national security reform. Constituent views and how much weight the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense put behind national security reform will be decisive. Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton are calling for action. Senators and Representatives from the authorizing and appropriations committees have shown interest, and outside groups are focusing on this topic. Beyond that top line, there is less momentum. There is a lot on the agenda and there are huge expectations of President Obama. The Congress is very focused on domestic issues for good reason. Even legislation with broad support such as the global HIV/AIDS reauthorization bill were delayed and took Senators getting personally involved to get the legislation passed. Congress's approach in the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process is one example of how to accomplish difficult reforms. Some indicators of Congressional engagement: What budget numbers will the Administration put forward? Are members introducing pieces of legislation? Are questions being raised at nomination hearings?

THE ROLE OF CONTRACTORS AND OTHER NGOS

Contractors have experienced the evolution first hand. As they have sought to serve those most in need, particularly children who were left without education and without opportunities, international development contractors have repeatedly found themselves in the midst of conflict. In order to be effective and efficient as contractors of the United States, and to really be able to succeed, they need unity of effort with those in military uniform. In turn, the complex work of the U.S. military can significantly benefit from contractors' knowledge of local communities. One sign of the changes taking place due to the challenges faced by governments is the evolution of partnerships between different sectors of the contracting industry. The increasingly critical role of stability operations requires a mix of hard power and soft power.

Views from the field. Contractors and other NGOs are more cost effective and are here to stay. We cannot turn the clock back to the 1960s when USAID had 15,000 officers, 5,000 in Vietnam alone. However, more USAID officers are critically needed to provide management and oversight.


THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Developments in the international environment will also have an impact. European governments are directing official development assistance through the World Bank and the U.N. and are eliminating their emergency response capabilities. The World Bank has trust funds worth \$24 billion, and the UNDP's official budget is \$1.2 billion, with a "real" budget of \$5 billion. However, these trust funds all have strings attached.

Lessons from Iraq, decreasing resources, and issues of performance will argue more strongly for U.N. missions in the future. Mandates can come under a U.N. Security Council Resolution or an international agreement. A mandate from a U.S. law that sets, for example, the rules of engagement results in a very complex situation. Invariably, countries' politics and laws will have a role, no matter what the mandate says.

CLOSING THOUGHTS

In conclusion, speakers repeatedly underscored that development matters. Addressing basic human needs is a fundamental tool of our national security strategy. One speaker noted that while the eight Millennium Development Goals approved in 2000 were to have been met by 2010, none will be met in any of the African countries by the



The challenges of the 21st Century demand that we be innovative, disciplined, agile and able to form creative partnerships in order to anticipate and respond to emerging threats to local and regional stability.

deadline. While the United States has been fully engaged in the post conflict requirements of both Iraq and Afghanistan, instability has continued to simmer throughout portions of Africa, and hinders the attainment of the development goals.

We were also reminded that those who are behind the challenges we face—drug cartels, criminals, and others who sow political instability—are innovators who will use all and any means to reach their goals. The challenges of the 21st Century demand that we be innovative, disciplined, agile and able to form creative partnerships in order to anticipate and respond to emerging threats. We're not going to win at the point of a gun or with a signed check. It's about synchronizing the intellectual capital and capabilities of those in government and those who work with government, together with local populations in the Americas, in Sub-Saharan Africa, in East Asia, in the periphery of the Indian Ocean, in Central Asia, and around the world.

SPEAKERS

M. Charito Krivant
President and CEO
Creative Associates International, Inc.

Mike Dignam
President
Lockheed Martin, Readiness and Stability Operations

Opening Address: Partnership in the Americas
Admiral James Stavridis
United States Southern Command

Panel 1: Cross-Cultural Collaboration: Improving the Integrated Response
Jeb Nadaner
Lockheed Martin, Readiness and Stability Operations
Patrick Garvey
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Staff
Dr. John Nagl
Center for a New American Security
Hon. Andrew Natsios
Georgetown University
Dr. Margaret Daly Hayes
Evidence Based Research, Inc.
Beth Tritter
The Glover Park Group

Reinvigorating and Strengthening USAID's Foreign Service Profile: Modernizing the "Third D" (Development) to meet Critical Needs
Dr. Janet Ballantyne
USAID

Panel 2: From Policy to Practice: Some Lessons from the Field
Spike Stephenson
Creative Associates International, Inc.
Robert Jenkins
USAID OTI
Amb. Tim Carney
Ambassador of the United States, ret.
COL Christopher Mayer
Chief of Staff, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Security Affairs
Jessica Lewis
Office of Sen. Harry Reid
Daniel Madden
Office of Rep. Vic Snyder

Introduction of Keynote Address Speaker
James Schmitt
Creative Associates International, Inc.

The Whole of Government Approach to Interagency Cooperation
Amb. John Herbst
U.S. Department of State S/CRS

Concluding Remarks
Dick McCall
Creative Associates International, Inc.



In order to be effective and efficient in stability and development missions, we need unity of effort between civilian agencies and military personnel. The operations must be rooted in local knowledge and cultural understanding.

FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE SYMPOSIUM AND THE CREATIVE CENTER FOR STABILIZATION & DEVELOPMENT PLEASE CONTACT JESSICA KRIVANT AT JESSICAK@CAII.COM.