

BEST PRACTICES FOR INVESTIGATING CRIMES OF ELECTORAL VIOLENCE

The Electoral Violence Investigation Framework

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© Copyright 2017, Creative Associates International, Washington, DC. All Rights Reserved. No part of this document may be reproduced in any form or fashion without written consent from Creative Associates International. ABSTRACT:

The Framework offers guidelines and best practices in the investigation of crimes of electoral violence. It is intended to provide police with tools to build stronger cases against perpetrators and reduce the culture of impunity which so often surround crimes of electoral violence.

Electoral Violence Investigative Framework: Best Practices for Investigating Crimes of Electoral Violence

I. Introduction:

In 2001 electoral violence or conflict occurred in 24.5% of elections held worldwide.¹ However when evaluating elections in Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990-2007, 19% of the respective 213 cases experienced repression and prolonged violence while 39% of the cases experienced harassment based crimes.² An alternative study of 110 elections suggest that election day is the most violent day during the election cycle, however 46% of deaths occurred in the phases before election day while 43% occurred after election day.³ Perpetrators of electoral violence vary with military forces deploying militia members to coerce voting populations in the 1999 Indonesian elections and 80% of crimes of electoral violence being committed by private armies in the Philippines.⁴ Determining the prevalence of electoral crime brings to attention the responding punitive figures. Sanctions against electoral violence perpetrators are commonly absent due to an often embedded culture of impunity. Accordingly, electoral violence continually stifles democratic governance by deterring voter turnout, polarizing communities, and discrediting democracy as an institution.⁵ Presently, investigating crimes of electoral violence (CEV) is an unguided process from the standpoint of international norms and best practices. Due to the complexity and political nature of electoral violence, sound investigations are often foregone, if they occur at all. Establishing a codified framework for investigative best practices provides a tool which can be effectively employed to diminish the culture of impunity often accompanying CEV. Embodying these best practices, the Electoral Violence Investigative Framework (EVIF) has the most utility when implemented in addition to each respective agencies protocols and procedures for standard criminal investigations. Tactics which are not physically violence, such as coercion, detention and harassment, compound crimes of electoral violence. Thus the

 ¹ Fischer, Jeffrey. *Electoral Conflict and Violence: A Strategy for Study and Prevention*, IFES White Paper, 2002, page 11.
 ² Straus, Scott and Charlie Taylor, *Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa – 1990- 2007*, University of Wisconsin, 2009, page 13.

³ Alston, Philip, *Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Addendum, Election-related violence and killings*, United Nations Human Rights Council, May 21, 2010, page 7.

⁴ Understanding Electoral Violence in Asia, United Nations Development Programme Asia-Pacific Regional Centre, 2011, page 10.

⁵ Thematic Workshop: Elections, Violence and Conflict Prevention, The European Commission Joint Task Force on Electoral Assistance, United Nations Development Programme, 2011, page 25.

investigative process necessitates special considerations - beginning with a determination of critical terminology. Only after electoral violence is defined can the discussion of how electoral violence is criminally employed begin.

Electoral violence definitions account for conceptual and scope of issues differences.

"At the broadest level, by violence or political violence we mean the deliberate use of physical harm or the threat of physical harm for a political purpose. Overt physical violence can take the form of beatings, torture, and murder, but violence is also evident by its threat – by coercive intimidation. 'Electoral violence' refers to physical violence and coercive intimidation directly tied to an impending electoral contest or to an announced electoral result."⁶

During the investigation process motive analysis is particularly important.

If "electoral violence is a particular type of political violence, and it occurs within the context of the overall process of democracy and democratization... electoral violence is a sub-type of political violence in which actors employ coercion in an instrumental way to advance their interests or achieve specific political ends..."⁷

To effectively construct and disseminate best practices, the Electoral Violence Investigative Framework (EVIF) utilizes an encompassing definition.

"Any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse an electoral stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence the electoral process" is a crime of electoral violence.⁸

Types of Crimes of Electoral Violence:

The aforementioned definitions are the first developed in the field of electoral integrity to directly describe the complexities of electoral crime. Expanding upon the parameters of the latter definition, it is necessary to further clarify what constitutes crimes of electoral violence. Employing violence to achieve a political objective is the underlying motive behind crimes of electoral violence. Due to the multitude of manifestations and variable manifestations by phase of the electoral cycle, CEV vary based on how sub-motives and means materialize. To facilitate

⁶ Straus, Scott and Charlie Taylor, *Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa – 1990- 2007*, University of Wisconsin, 2009, page 9.

⁷ Sisk, Timothy D., *Elections in Fragile States: Between Voice and Violence*, International Studies Association, 2008, pages 2 and 4.

⁸ Fischer, Jeff, *Electoral Conflict and Violence – A Strategy for Study and Prevention*, IFES, 2002, page 8.

analysis and categorization, this investigatory framework utilizes a bimodal construction of crime: physical or coercive. Physical electoral crimes are prosecutable via standard criminal law whereas coercive crimes may be additionally prosecutable under election law where political rights are violated. If such criminality exists in the statutory law of a given country, "hate crimes" directed against certain groups because of the gender, ethnicity, or other factors, may be prosecuted under those provisions as well. To ensure investigators can effectively build prosecutorial cases, physical and coercive electoral crimes are denoted below.

Physical Crimes		Coercive Crimes	
Tier One*	Tier Two	Tier Three	
Mass Shootings	Arson	Harassment	
Homicides	Theft of Election Material	Intimidation	
Bombings	Vandalism	Restriction of Movement	
Hostage Taking	Theft of Campaign Material Restriction of Assembly		
Sexual Assault	Restriction of Speech		
Assault		Restriction of Trade	
Kidnapping			
Riots			
Displacement			
Unlawful Detention			
Extortion			
*Rank ordered from highest to lowest intensity within each tier.			
Intensity determined by potential to harm and extent crime hinders political access.			
Tier One- Death or Injury to People			
Tier Two- Property Destruction			

Crimes of Electoral Violence Intensity Categorization Chart

Although not exhaustive, this list serves as a guideline for when it is appropriate to instate an investigation. While investigators should be well versed in the local and national laws governing

physical crimes as well as the electoral laws managing coercive crimes, the complexity of CEV requires investigators to distinguish between individual and group perpetrators prior to filing charges. The investigation process for physical and coercive crimes committed by an individual is presumably more direct and timely. Group sponsored crimes have additional tactical considerations to explore such as related crimes, network analyses, and access to leadership. When possible, investigators should enact a *conspiracy to commit* classification to charges given to influential leadership members who may not have physically committed the crime, but are proven to have ordered the offense to occur. By doing so, police are able to weaken the group's network structure while mitigating any exiting leadership impunity.

II. The Investigatory Process

Time is a critical investigation factor. VEC investigations in particular are impacted by the electoral calendar in that the crime is intended to achieve some political objective during the electoral cycle to influence the outcomes which are certified on a given date. A systematic approach to the investigatory process is a proactive way to prevent time mismanagement that could potentially jeopardize the crime scene, facilitate suspect evasion, or even fail to prevent additional criminal activity. Adhering to codified investigation procedures promotes replicability of outcomes across a range of crimes of electoral violence while diminishing error through routinization. For organization and methodology considerations, consider an investigation as a 5 step function.⁹

First is the *initiation* of the investigation. The manner in which the crime is reported to police greatly influences the tone and pace of the investigation. It is inefficient for all reports to be given the same weight and in some cases reports can be fraudulently made. Accordingly, it is the call takers responsibility to evaluate the urgency and authenticity of each report to the best of their abilities and should do so using targeted questioning. Call takers or first responders should evaluate inquiries for the immediate needs for the investigation package - for example, homicides dictate coordination of forensic specialists; whereas the call taker can dispatch patrol

⁹ Derived from the Authorised Professional Practice College of Policing, *Investigation Process*, https://www.aap.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigation-process/

officers directly to the scene of voter intimidation and harassment incidents. Thorough initiation would include documenting the initial narrative received and what responding actions were taken. Successive investigation narratives build upon initial reports.

Second, a *preliminary investigation* provides initial contact with the crime scene(s), victims, and witnesses. Responders first secure the scene as preliminary investigations are a balance between risk management and quality control. Witness protection protocols should be instated until suspects are apprehended and/or investigative context allows slackened security measures. Many electoral violence crime scenes are vulnerable to environmental or human contamination. As some such crimes will be committed in election facilities, the redirection of the public to other locations is a step which should be anticipated. Erring on the side of caution, investigators should expect the first opportunity to collect crime scene evidence to be most viable. Similarly, promptly recorded victim and witness testimonies have greater authenticity and utility.

Third, investigators *analyze* the preliminary investigation findings and *determine responding investigatory needs*. At a minimum this entails a 'who, what, where, when, why, and how' depiction of the crime(s). An action plan should be constructed to ascertain missing or inconsistent information. Resource needs for the remainder of the investigation should be projected. Given the political dimension to these crimes, when and how to brief the public should be determined. Suspect profiles and related handling procedures are also important step three outputs. Once sufficient context of the crime is rendered investigation personnel should determine the charges being brought based on both the standard and electoral statutes.

Fourth, the *proceeding investigation* is case management and suspect management centric. Material should be source vetted and securely stored. Apprehended suspects undergo interviews, alibi vetting, and forensic material collection. Lead investigators should evaluate timing, victim safety, and environment concerns before ensuing pending suspect arrests. Documenting coordination agreements with all partner agencies and experts minimizes the risk of invalidating investigatory findings. Prosecutorial effectiveness depends on the credibility of material evidence and the legality of suspect management. And, fifth, *investigation closure* begins once investigators have achieved their objectives and necessary arrests are made. Completing the investigation narrative and verifying evidence storage facilitates the closure process. Long term welfare service needs for witnesses and victims should be coordinated as to maintain healthy police-community relations. Additionally, police should utilize media sources to relay case closure to the public. In contentious cases, police often prepare security and response plans to mitigate anticipated rioting, retaliation, or distress.

When employed with applicable statutes, these investigative principles promote sound conduct. The electoral violence investigative framework assists in managing and channeling investigative practices toward the successful prosecutorial case building.

Case Specific Components

In addition to the standard criminal investigation process, VEC investigations have four tailorable components: 1. Intra-agency communication, 2. Inter-community engagement, 3. Evidentiary Collection and Storage, and 4. Technological Capabilities. Components are given different priority and consideration depending on the respective investigation needs. Intra-agency communication fluctuates in relation to the degree and extent of the crime, what competencies are necessary, resource pathways, and many other coordination services. Investigators may need assistance from, inter alia, forensic pathologists, translators, material storage vendors, and health care providers to further investigation objectives and provide victim support services. Engagement between police and the community also varies based on case severity, victim and suspect whereabouts, and local partnership involvement. It must also be recognized that community relationships are being conducted in political environments. In poorer countries, many electoral events and locales are outside or in poor infrastructure, so evidence collection and storage can be daunting. Extensive documentation and procedural rigidity are necessary to preserve crime scene findings. Means of data collection and documentation can vary based on police force technology capabilities with those more advance entities using organizational software or police report indexes. And, by establishing these means of data collection and documentation, patterns of victimization, perpetration, tactics, and locations can be identified and factored into future electoral security planning.

Resources

Differing CEV and contexts will necessitate particular resource types and quantities. Having a universal and unmonitored resource pool is not sustainable, risking the inability to complete the five investigation phases. Categorizing investigative needs assists with monitoring and prioritizing resources. Resource categories and potential investigation needs are provided below.

Administrative Resources	Facility Resources	
 Training to identify and respond to CEV Social service partnerships [ex. experts such as Victim Advocates who assist families to avoid retaliatory crimes] Interpreters Spokesperson to manage press relations Financial records [ex. fund flow and the investigations projected budget] Narrative files and database to handle investigation findings 	 Police facilities for interviewing and detainment Storage locations for collected materials and paper documentation Means of transportation for investigators, protected witnesses, and suspects Central office, accessible to public respondents OIT office to support technical staff needs 	
Technological Resources	Forensic Resources	
 Computers with filing software to store and trace crimes, leads, or identifying items Communication devices such as mobile phones, short wave radios, microphones Surveillance equipment to monitor physical security Social media account monitoring 	 Scene processing tools [ex. cameras] Forensic tissue materials Sterile collection containers Documentation Log Preservation material such as tarps, road barricades, tents for outdoor crime scenes 	

The availability and sustainability of resources is affected by human capacity (administrative) and material capacity (facility, technological, and forensic). Resources and implementation capacity also influence personnel roles and responsibilities during the investigation process.

Personnel Structure, Roles, and Responsibilities

Police and community interactions during an investigation set the tone for long-term police and community relations. Respectful, professional, politically neutral police conduct can encourage

community partnerships and self-reporting that facilitate the investigative process. Alternatively, politicized police, those operating under the control or persuasion of a political entity, cannot practice neutrality. By failing to do so, politicized police cannot effectively investigate electoral crimes- the entities they are aligned to may be those under investigation or they may fail to consider suspects that are not associated with the opposition. Ensuring all personnel understand and enact their respective and apolitical investigative roles is a proactive means of stabilizing or improving police-community relations while using investigative best practices. While the contextual, resource, and legal constrains of individual police agencies influence personnel capabilities, the following serve as guidelines for staffing roles and responsibilities.

Investigative Personnel Guidelines


Role	Responsibilities		
	Police Staff		
Call Taker	Determine severity of crime reported, collect contextual information and relay to responding officer		
Responding Officer	Communicate with victims/witnesses, assess and secure scene, determine and enact immediate response or support services, compile documentation, pursue suspect inquiries ¹⁰		
Forensic Investigators	Collect, analyze, and store crime scene for evidential material regarding the crime, suspects, or ongoing risks		
Lead Investigator	Provide consistency towards objectives and oversees ongoing efforts- operational decisions, conducts interviews, verify investigative outcomes, etc.		
Intelligence Officers	Responsible for vetting community partners, suspect alibis, and monitoring media platforms for critical information and potential leads		
Patrol Officers	Observe for unfolding events, pursue suspect(s), and carryout proper arrest procedures		
Human Security Officers	Witness protection services for high risk victims and witnesses.		

¹⁰ Investigation of Volume Crime Manual, ACPO, 2002, page 16.

Public Relations Officers	When appropriate- provide media/press with investigation updates and engage community stakeholders to promote positive perceptions of police/investigative efforts	
Technology/ Data Managers	Populate and maintain investigation records and resolve technological issues	
Commun	ity Partners and External Agency Support Staff	
Social/Emotional Support Counselors	Assist with victims/witnesses recovering from traumatic events	
Community Liaisons	Conduct outreach efforts to facilitate community-police communication, self-reporting, and community watch initiatives	
Interpreters	If police personnel cannot effectively communicate with witnesses, victims, or suspects external interpreters should be employed throughout the investigation	
Victim Advocates	Assist victims and their families to recovery and pursue normalcy in their lives. Also notifies support staff if further trauma recover services are required	

Knowing the overall structure allows personnel and partners to navigate the investigation process. Varying positions are not active during the entirety of the investigation while others serve as the driving mechanism. Visuals can improve investigation functionality. Figure 1 depicts one method for personnel relations. Note that each successive row denotes the investigation phase in which the respective actor is likely to be most involved.

Figure 1: Example, Investigation Role Structure



III. Best Practices

Best practices are the research and experience derived, enterprise specific, procedures or guidelines that yield objective outcomes.¹¹ Based on the context and intended audience the development and implementation process behind best practices vary drastically.¹² Effective and actionable best practices are tailorable for each implementing institution and serve as a sound foundation from which mitigating common shortfalls or lapses in judgment becomes possible. The Electoral Violence Investigative Framework (EVIF) best practices were identified from a

¹¹ Merriam-Webster Dictionary, *Best Practice*, accessed June 28, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/best%20practice

¹² Holtzclaw, Eric. *Forget Your Industry's Best Practices*, Inc.com, April 3, 2013. http://www.inc.com/eric-v-holtzclaw/forget-your-industrys-best-practices.html

review of investigation manuals including those of the Association of Chief Police Officers of England¹³, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)¹⁴, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI)¹⁵, and United Nations (UN Women)¹⁶. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Best Practices in Electoral Security Guide¹⁷ and various academic studies provide contextual considerations to mitigate within violent electoral crime best practices. Varying investigation objectives and agency capabilities alter the relevancy and means to implement best practices. Contextual considerations also assist investigators in tailoring best practices to resolve cases differing from standard electoral violence profiles. When implementing best practices investigators should maintain objectivity and compatibility to needs of the case.¹⁸ The remainder of the EVIF is structured based on the investigation process. In the section below Best practice (BP) thematic areas serve as subsection headers within the applicable investigation stage followed by narratives which describe of the best practices themselves.

IV. Readiness Training and Protocol Clarification

Readiness training should be conducted before implementing the Electoral Violence Investigation Framework. The framework become more effective as electoral violence becomes a matter of importance yet also one that is manageable. During subsequent re-election phases and electoral cycles training should reflect the lessons learned from proceeding investigative efforts. This process can include a review of CEV investigations from previous election cycles with forecasted applicability to the current socio-political climate. Given each respective police entities capabilities and community contexts crafting a more tailored implementation policy will yield more consistent results as investigation units gain electoral violence competencies and stronger case-building practices. To ensure the initial EVIF implementation phase is credibly administered, the following best practices should guide primary readiness training efforts.

BP: Train investigators and support staff of investigation conduct and expectations.

¹³ Investigation of Volume Crime Manual, ACPO, 2002

 ¹⁴ Inspector General's Office, *Guidelines on Conducting Investigations and Preparing Investigation Reports*, UNHCR, Sept 2012
 ¹⁵ Keel, Timothy, "Homicide Investigations: Identifying Best Practices," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Feb 2008
 Keel, Timothy, "Homicide Investigations: Identifying Best Practices," FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, Feb 2008

t Practices in Electoral Security?: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Programs," USAID, Jan 2013

¹⁸ Myatt, Mike, *Best Practices-Aren't*, Forbes Magazine, 2012.

Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS), a division within the United States Department of Justice, developed contemporary policing practices that utilize problem solving and community policing based models.¹⁹ Under the COPS model, community members serve as partners and resources, allowing police to more closely manage the investigatory process. The EVIF capitalizes on the benefit of engaging the community while addressing election related violence. During the election cycle, police experience expanded roles. Problem solving based learning prepares trainees to build upon transferable knowledge of standard crime investigations with electoral law and VEC considerations. The purpose of the Protocol Clarification Training is to prepare trainees to develop action plans for the various VEC investigations they may encounter. The learning outcomes within the training template provide transferable guidelines that investigators can reference when evaluating the progress of their investigation efforts.

Core Competency	Possible Content ²⁰	Learning Outcomes ²¹
Local Procedures, Policies, Laws	 Electoral Law parameters What are CEV Legal code enforcement, varying offenses Effective use of investigative strategies (forensics, interviews, public relations) 	 Familiarity with electoral law parameters and access to supporting documents Ability to implement investigative strategies and self-monitor effective use
Legal Authority	 Legal jurisdiction and evidentiary rules Lawful search requirements (ex. Warrants) Liability considerations Procedures for scene processing, taking witness/victim/suspect statements, and proper evidence handling What services liaisons, consultants, external sources can legally provide (consent to service forms recommended) 	 Working understanding of applicable legal, electoral and institutional, that govern criminal investigations procedures Ability to conduct thorough, sterile, and documented crime scene assessments Knowledge of community and expert partnership roles/responsibilities

Protocol Clarification Training Template

¹⁹ A Problems Based Learning Manual for Training and Evaluating Police Trainees, Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS)- U.S. Department of Justice, acknowledgement page.

²⁰ Derived from Chapter 7 Criminal Investigations within the COPS Trainee Manual, pgs. 108-112

²¹ Derived from Chapter 8 Final Evaluation Learning Outcomes within the COPS Trainee Manual, pgs. 128-131

Officer Safety/Use of Force Stressors/Self- Awareness/ Restraint	 Witness protection SOPs and officer risk Safe handling weapons, body fluids, etc. Protocol for clearing crime scene areas when suspect is unknown and risk is higher Use-of-force SOPs, reporting, ramifications Self-assess neutrality, competency, and fairness during investigations Effective case load management Knowledge of resources/services available to all involved in investigation process 	 Analyze and administer safety SOPs in low and high risk environments Follow evidence handling guidelines Competency in use of force protocol and misconduct reporting requirements Iterate means to address stress, trauma, and self-care needs in changing scenarios Identify the available resources available for investigators and police staff Understand protocol for
	 Awareness of post-traumatic stress disorder 	addressing conflicting interests within investigations
Ethics	 Sensitivity training and 'do no harm' policies towards victims/witnesses Equitable discretion during investigation Internal corruption, abuse of power, excessive use of force reporting standards 	 Competency of professionalism, code of conduct, and sensitivity guidelines Demonstrate an understanding of SOPs and the ability to document and report misconduct
Individual Rights	 Investigation considerations from constitutional law Mitigating conflicts with rights protected for all parties, not only dominant group(s) 	• Understanding of individual rights as afforded from constitutions, SOPs, and electoral laws and ability to address rights disputes corresponding with investigations
Cultural Diversity/ Minority / Special Group Needs	 Awareness of varying cultural relationships and perceptions of police, investigations, credibility, socioeconomic status, etc. Social diversity considerations such as poor mental health, non-gender binary, displaced persons, survivors of sexual violence, etc. 	 Ability to identify and mitigate biases, prejudices, and group-think tendencies perpetuating targeted CEV Ensure resources are in place to address cultural, minority, and special group needs Witness safety protocol
Community- Specific Problems	• Addressing community perceptions and influences on local crime and quality-of-life	• Foster community-police relations to determine extent of local crime and risks

Leadership	 issues (ex. targeting minority groups) Utilizing community members as crime reporting and investigation resources 	 Utilize partners to further investigations Devise crime reporting and victim support services to engage community
Leadership	 Promote leadership development through "agent of change" self- help model Crisis control, large crowd, vulnerability management training (ex. Public electoral event as an active crime scene) 	 Apply leadership strategies to a multitude of investigation scenarios Identify and utilize leadership structures and agency chain of command practices
Communication Skills	 Importance of communication skills during all stages of investigation Active listening (intra-agency and external) Professional demeanor to partnerships Interview and statement training Narrative control when communicating with media sources (concise, optimistic) 	 Effectively navigate communication requirements for full investigation cycle Conduct effective and documented victim, witness, and suspect interviews Properly manage and disseminate investigation updates and public relations statements to appropriate media outlets
Conflict Resolution	 SOPs during active/ongoing crime scenes Managing combative witnesses/citizens Mitigating inter and intra-agency issues 	• Ability to implement conflict resolution strategies, electoral violence SOPs, and locate external resources as needed
Problem Solving Skills	 Prioritize extensive and holistic initial investigation information from call takers Assess electoral crimes using innovative and traditional investigatory resources 	 Strategize investigation action steps by using best practices, situational awareness, and community partnerships Effectively prepare prosecutorial cases
Report Writing	 Agency SOPs regarding investigation and case building documentation Taking statements and preparing transcripts Investigation narratives and VEC maps 	 Ability to locate and complete report files to meet effective case building objectives Produce credible and valid transcripts Generate replicable action plans

Investigation Process	 Initiation of Investigation Preliminary Investigation Analyzing and determining responding investigative needs 	 Ability to identify electoral violent crimes Organize, conduct, and monitor effective
	 Proceeding Investigation Investigation closure 	 investigations with proper documentation Ensure replicability of findings by adhering to SOPs and electoral laws

Administrators should reference the local and electoral laws then tailor their training protocol accordingly. To ensure personnel are prepared to follow investigation best practices the resulting readiness training should, at minimum, address positive and effective character traits, bias awareness, and sociocultural sensitivity. Training should also cover the competencies and skill sets which personnel are responsible for possessing during the investigation process.

BP: Determine punitive measures for improper investigation conduct and inform staff.

Prosecutorial case building relies on the credibility, authenticity, and replicability of investigation findings. Deviation from any of these standards can jeopardize the lawfulness of the investigation and consequently invalidate findings. Investigation personnel should be aware of the ramifications of intentional misconduct or investigation negligence. Police administrators may consider providing personnel with protocols for reporting misconduct or similar concerns.

BP: Evaluate training program to assess short and long term impact.

As training concludes, facilitators should determine and record the reaction of participants and determine their level of individual learning.²² These short term gauges can be cultivated through pre and post-tests and/or self-reporting methods. Trainee retention is observed further into the investigation process when individual job performance and organizational performance are reviewed.²³ Training facilitators should partake in the investigation planning process to identify and obtain resources and protocols for maintaining trainee contact and evaluating conduct.

V. **Investigation Planning Process**

Pre-Election Phase:

²² Kirkpatrick, Donald. "Techniques for Evaluating Training Programmes," *Training and Development Journal*, 1979, pages 78-92. ²³ Ibid.

BP: Conduct an election security diagnostic.

Based upon previous local experience with electoral violence police are able to profile violence likely to occur during the current election. A PESTEL analysis, which identifies political (P), economic (E), social (S), technological (T), environmental (E), and legal (L) factors which are creating vulnerabilities for electoral violence to occur. Using the data collected and documented through previous investigation, a history of electoral violence can be analyzed inconsideration of such crimes occurring again. The historical context should also identify previous cases of impunity as this outcome may be recurring. Security diagnostic findings should be compiled into electoral security planning and account for the rapid response protocols necessary for CEVs.

BP: Conduct a material collection and evidence handling capability assessment.

Police agencies should determine whether the manpower and resource capabilities they have during non-election or standard operations are sufficient and flexible enough to accommodate the more complex and laborious election cycle. This assessment should highlight what partnerships may be necessary to ensure that investigations are sustainable, both financially and administratively. Resulting partnerships or protocol changes should enable investigators to conduct a thorough scene analysis on the first visit as many electoral scenes cannot be secured or closed indefinitely until the investigation concludes due to their active use in the election process. The assessment should consider the quantity and quality of equipment necessary to collect evidence for various CEV including information security technology. Storage facilities are vital to bolstering evidence handling capacity.

BP: Devise communication and outreach strategy.

Because the culture of impunity affects the public's trust and support of the police, press relations should go beyond information security measures. In addition to containing sensitive material the communication strategy should recognize the political dimension of CEV by identifying how best to engage their respective public populace. In doing so the objective should be to maintain investigation credibility. Initial communication and outreach planning should also establish the internal agency communication pathways and how to effectively convey those protocols with investigation personnel.

BP: Standardize documentation and report forms to establish case building methodology.

External experts and partners should collect and record data using the same documentation standards and forms as police personnel to ensure consistency. Documentation ranges from crime scene access logs, witness identification forms, and interview narrative documents to support services attendance sheets and victim health reports. For information to be comparable

and for intelligence to be constructed all contributing personnel and partners must have similar data collection practices.

VI. Mobilizing the Investigation

Once an electoral violence event (EVE) is reported the investigation process begins.

To ensure a rapid and effective response,

BP: Call takers should report crimes of electoral violence to "SCALE".

A thorough and succinct report would provide the **status** of the EVE, the **crimes** claimed to embody an EVE, the **audience** involved, the **location**, and the **extent** of the response needed. Call takers should ensure they address the following guidelines to ensure sufficient contextual information is documented and relayed to the responding investigation personnel.

	Reporting to SCALE Guidelines for Call Takers			
S	Status of the Violent Electoral Crime	Is event active and ongoing, resolved, unknown?		
С	Crimes or Electoral Violence Claims	What behavior was observed/experienced?		
Α	Audience	Who is reporting the crime(s)? Are they a victim and/or witness?Is the suspect known/ identifiable? How many?		
		Are the identities of other victims/witnesses known by the respondent?		
L	Location	What is the estimated population at the scene? Where did the crime(s) occur?		
		Is the crime scene at an ongoing electoral event? Could physical barriers hinder scene access?		
E	Extent of Response	Is there known loss of life or physical injury? Are emergency medical responders needed? Is there rioting or uncontrolled masses present? Does the respondent fear for their safety?		

In addition to ensuring personnel can rapidly begin the investigation process, reporting to SCALE also improves quality assurance as all incoming electoral violence claims are documenting similar information points. Although police agencies may have a more formal call response script, utilizing a lengthy script may be too time consuming for more urgent cases. The SCALE method collects vital information police need in order to organize investigation logistics, including when partners and experts should be present for the initial investigation.

Securing the Scene

Upon arriving on the scene, police personnel should preserve life and crime scene integrity, secure material evidence, and identify victims and suspects.²⁴ This prioritization ranking can be synthesized as the P (preserve) S (secure) I (identify) protocol. PSI protocol implementation requires investigation personnel to limit physical interference and evidence contamination. Securing may also be complicated if the scene of that of an election facilities, where the public is conducting election business. Given the time sensitivity of elections, quickly identifying alternative locations is an added political complexity to securing the scene.

BP: Control scene accessibility by establishing a security perimeter.

Effective prosecutorial case building begins with quality control and evidential credibility. The more regulated the crime scene is the more difficult crime scene obstruction becomes. Limiting scene accessibility reduces the risk of human contamination while restructuring unauthorized flow of persons. In most initial site visits the suspect(s) is unidentified or unknown. Accordingly all present parties must be identified and interviewed as every person present could be a valuable asset to the investigation or a potential suspect.

BP: Crowd management efforts should focus on preventing retaliation crimes.

Electoral violence intends to coerce the target thus electoral crimes are inherently political. In group-based crimes, the targeted group and sympathizers may instinctually retaliate because their experience with the justice system is one of habitual impunity. Accordingly police personnel and partnership staff should prioritize allocating separate waiting places for victims and any alleged

²⁴ Authorised Professional Practice College of Policing, *Investigation Process*, page 4. https://www.aap.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigation-process/

perpetrators. Doing so will lessen the likelihood of additional altercations while police carryout out initial investigation efforts including interviews.

BP: An estimated crime timeline can be constructed by cross referencing statements.

To prevent group-think or false reporting, all interviews should be conducted separately and within a designated safe space. Due to the political nature of electoral violence, the current case may not be an isolated event but instead a segment of larger electoral crime efforts. Thus an attention to detail, including a reliable timeline of the crime, can be vital to later intelligence and investigative efforts. If observers cannot overhear what others are reporting they are less likely to alter their narrative to conform to that of the majority opinion. Any arising timeline or narrative inconsistencies will signal to personnel where investigative efforts should be shifted.

BP: Utilize multi-gendered and sensitivity-trained staff to ensure victim/witness security.

The effects of electoral violence are often experienced differently for victims of sexual based violence as it is a commonly used weapon during the election cycle. As policing is a traditionally male profession, sexual violence traumas may be unintentionally exacerbated by insensitive investigative efforts.²⁵ Gestures of security and support can take a multitude of forms, beginning with a gender-diverse staff, thus allowing victims the option to request same-gender confidants.

BP: Identify high profile witnesses, victims, and suspects to determine related or pending events.

The political motives behind CEV increase the likelihood that victims and targets are not chosen at random. Determining politically aligned targets or suspects can broaden the understanding of the event. To fully achieve the political motive or to hinder the electoral process it is possible that suspects plan to conduct multiple CEV. Knowing high profile actors or targets can strengthen forecasting capabilities as investigation action steps become more tailored as additional information is accumulated. Alternatively an ongoing investigation may be related to prior CEV from either the concurrent or a previous election cycle. Generally, a high profile actor

²⁵ "Identifying and Preventing Gender Bias in Law Enforcement Response to Sexual Assault and Domestic Violence", COPS and the Police Executive Research Forum, 2016, pages 15-16.

would be an individual or a group with a political modus operandi or alliance, authoritative status, or decision making capabilities within the local or national political system.

BP: Victim advocates provide short to long term stability, security, and health services.

Each phase in the investigation process presents challenges for victims, witnesses, and their families. From completing paperwork to identifying available services the formality of an investigation often exceeds common experience and knowledge. Although diverse, the role of victim advocates can include raising awareness to CEV, providing grief counseling, coordinate safety protocol, and ensure victims are aware of their legal protections and rights, inter alia.²⁶ At a minimum victim advocate services should be made available until an investigation is closed. When possible, advocacy services should be sustainable for the duration of the election cycle.

Analyzing the Scene

BP: Assume that investigators can only access a preserved crime scene once.

In non-electoral contexts a crime scene can often remain under control of investigation personnel indefinitely. However, investigation efforts cannot further suppress the electoral process. This means that once a crime scene is processed there is a near-immediate need for the location or structure to be used again for further electoral events or functions. Accordingly, investigators should begin their investigation with the mindset that they only have one chance to thoroughly and ethically examine the scene of the crime. Investigation personnel should arrive on scene with all documentation and evidence collection materials necessary to complete the examination. During the preliminary steps of scene processing the lead investigator should determine if outside resources including but not limited to experts and interpreters and make the necessary arrangements for such support personnel to arrive before the crime scene is released.

BP: Utilize a crime scene access and inventory log for quality-assured evidence handling.

Prosecutorial case building requires error-control. Using a "gloves off, hands off" method of scene processing, meaning that if personnel do not have sterile gloves they should not be tasked with physical evidence collection, should be the most stressed scene analysis protocol. Quality

²⁶ "What is a Victim Advocate?" The National Center for Victims of Crime, 2008. <u>https://victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crime-victims/what-is-a-victim-advocate-</u>

assurance also entails that the origin and current whereabouts of material evidence. To prevent contamination and reduce the potential for allegations of misconduct investigation personnel should document and monitor all physical contact with the crime scene and evidence. A crime scene access directory should include the name and role of personnel, date and duration of scene access, purpose and outcome of visit, area of scene contacted, and a brief narrative of actions taken while on site. Comparably, the inventory log should track all evidence movement per investigation personnel, date, resulting location of material evidence, and purpose of inventory relocation. The intention of utilizing such documentation procedures and templates should be to strengthen prosecutorial case building by reducing the prevalence of tampered or missing evidential material so sufficient and unaltered evidence is presented for suspect identification and resulting legal proceedings.

BP: Collect both affirming and dissuading evidence to account for all possible scenarios.

Human tendency can lead investigators to look for evidence that reaffirms any inclinations or perceptions they have regarding a crime. Rather than trying to draw conclusions during crime scene analysis, investigators should strive to neutrally collect evidence thus reserving the evaluation process for the successive investigation phase. By collecting evidence that can both affirm and dissuade speculations investigators are increasing the odds that all possible suspects are considered and that potential connections to other ongoing investigations or CEV can be identified diligently.²⁷ Lastly, a consistent and neutral approach to evidence collection minimizes internal corruption or misconduct from occurring.

BP: Engage all witness and victim narratives to prevent ongoing impunity-based silencing.

The culture of impunity stifles community based reporting as potential informants may be deterred by previous or ongoing electoral violence injustice. With a broader perspective of CEV and better equipped personnel, investigators can mitigate impunity-based silencing by systematically interviewing and considering all present witnesses and victims as potentially credible sources. It should be noted that not all evidence or testimonies will be of equal value or

²⁷ "Investigation Process", Authorised Professional Practice College of Policing, page 5. https://www.aap.college.police.uk/app-content/investigations/investigation-process/

influence. Considering and effectively documenting all relevant narratives challenges the culture of impunity but also reduces the existence of missing or unknown information.

BP: Trauma counselors should inform sexual violence and coercive crime victims of means to preserve material evidence for collection.

Due to the personal and emotionally degrading nature of sexual violence most victims may instinctively want to cleanse themselves in an attempt to reduce the impact of the offense. Unfortunately all cleansing actions destroy vital evidence. Accordingly, first respondents and trauma counselors should be trained on how to sensitively but firmly inform those affected of the importance and procedure for material evidence preservation. Complying with physical evidence requirements can provide victims with a sense of control and justice as perpetrators are more likely to be held accountable when material evidence can be presented during the prosecution.

Documenting the Scene

BP: Maintain an investigation narrative of all action steps.

An investigation narrative should be compiled from the point of initiation through the closing of the investigation. All decisions regarding scene processing, suspect management, victim/witness engagement, any the various other components that drive an investigation forward should be chronicled. By doing so investigation personnel will strengthen the credibility of their case building efforts and also be able to later identify lessons learned regarding their respective electoral violence investigation capabilities. Said lessons learned will be influential in later election cycle investigation planning phases.

BP: Create an evidence map to reconstruct the crime scene.

Each successive action taken during an investigation reveals additional information or misinformation. While evaluating unfolding elements of the CEV personnel may benefit from revisiting the crime scene. However, most investigators will not enjoy the luxury of revisiting a pristine and secured crime scene after their initial inspection. Accordingly, constructing an evidence map that accounts for the physical layout of the crime scene as well as the respective locations of all material evidence allows investigators to repeatedly reexamine a simulated and untampered crime scene.

BP: Utilize social media activity to document and explore electoral violence incidents.

Mobile device applications allow real-time posting capabilities. As technology capabilities become more advance investigators should anticipate both positive and negative implications. While community members may receive lifesaving information from social media posts made during a large scale CEV members from an opposition group may be moved to retaliate against the perceived aggressors of a crime following social media posts. To stay informed and prepared police should routinely monitor social media to map CEV and later forecast crime hotspots. Police agencies can proactively engage the community by utilizing social media accounts for raising electoral awareness and community policing efforts.

VII. Evaluate the Preliminary Investigation

BP: Confirming crimes and charges are addressed by electoral law ensures jurisdiction.

Standard legal codes remain in effect throughout an electoral cycle however the political sensitivity and severity of CEV may influence policy makers to assign alternative jurisdiction while drafting electoral laws. Effective prosecutorial case-building requires investigators to confirm that the crimes being investigated are in fact CEV, the charges being pursued are authorized by electoral law, and that their respective law enforcement entities hold jurisdiction. Otherwise, the case may be dismissed from the judicial system based on false jurisdiction or an incorrect conceptualization of the crime as an act of electoral violence.

BP: Consider the current election phase to determine possible motives and means.

Since the average election cycle is 18 months community and political tensions can ebb and flow. When attempting to determine potential CEV means and motives investigators should consider the moment during the cycle which the crime is committed. For example, if a CEV occurs one day before the respective election investigators should inquire whether any election or ballot material was targeted during the offense. Likewise, if CEV occur following election result announcements, investigators should explore retaliation as a motive. During this process the previously explained PESTLE analysis can be a valuable resource and reflection point.

BP: The status of the suspect(s) should drive the preliminary investigation review.

Cases with unknown suspects have a heightened degree of urgency compared to those with identified suspects. For obvious reasons, unknown suspects can put the public at risk of further criminal targeting. When suspects are known investigators should focus on resource allocation and preparing for trial. Alternatively investigators should prioritize locating and apprehending suspects when orchestrating investigation action plans following crime scene analysis.

Structuring Uncertainties

BP: Review the evidence map and event timeline to determine evidentiary unknowns.

Visual depictions and a detailed chronology of the transpiring crime provide investigators with a template of what evidence should be expected. The evidence map and timeline narrative can also serve as a guideline from which personnel can verify the authenticity of material and documentary evidence. Inconsistencies in the timeline and material evidence gaps should be addressed via investigation action plans. Being aware of investigatory unknowns can prepare personnel for alternative findings, suspects, or unfolding threats.

BP: Conduct a CEV trend analysis to compare findings to existing or ongoing cases.

Investigators should document the location, crime(s) conducted, suspect profile, and impact for all CEV investigations they conduct. From this information a map reconstruction allows for trend analysis to occur and the timely identification of serial offenders or related political objectives. In the long run such analysis allows for investigators to develop CEV forecasting competencies and expertise in deconstructing electoral violence.

BP: Compiling a perpetrator profile should incorporate logistical components of the crime.

Unintended personal biases can influence investigation personnel to conclude someone from a designated opposition group is responsible for a crime. To avoid making wrongful accusations investigators should strategically devise a perpetrator profile. An often overlooked component of strategic analysis is a capabilities assessment. Such should address who could feasibly or realistically commit CEVs considering access to the resources or weaponry used, geographic proximity to the crime scene, soundness of their alibi, and lastly presumed political associations.

BP: Maintain real-time perpetrator profile and arrest-status data to track investigation.

Among the complexities of electoral violence are the multitudes of characteristics that can be used to classify, identify and monitor CEV perpetrators. A perpetrator profile will address the differences between independently acting individuals or unaffiliated perpetrators and their organized crime or group affiliated counterparts. Depending on the number and affiliation of pending suspects the investigators will have to construct proportionate arrest strategies. Correspondingly, arrest data that provides an account of the success or failure of arrest strategies can streamline police agency's respective best practices and investigation success rates.

Press Release Protocol

BP: Release community impact statement to address tone, direction, and public perception of investigation.

To maintain community partnerships and trust for police the press release personnel need to demonstrate that an ongoing investigation means the crime(s) is taken seriously. Investigators should conduct a community impact assessment when more elaborate CEV occur. Such assessment would determine the level of risk to the public, any costs incurred to the community, and identify the local officials responsible for addressing questions of community rebuilding as necessary. Releasing assessment findings as a community impact statement can quell fear, show police intent to proceed with the investigation, and in turn improve public perception of electoral violence resolutions.

BP: Invoke public participation when deemed necessary and community safety permits.

Transparency encourages community cooperation. When beneficial or necessary press releases could call upon community members to assist in investigatory efforts. The public may be useful by identifying unknown victims or suspects, reporting suspected crime scenes, or avoiding use of high-risk public spaces thus alleviating the degree of monitoring required by police. Also in serial CEV cases community crime watch initiatives may increase intelligence collection as local observers serve as informants. Safeguards should be taken to ensure community members can participate anonymously or with a minimal risk associated. Community engagement should be used as a measure of last resort if a case is not progressing or when there is reason to believe that unidentified witnesses or victims exist.

Monitor/Manage the Investigation

Corrective Actions: How to Mitigate Insufficient Preliminary Findings

BP: Personnel performance monitoring should be ongoing to uphold quality assurance.

Although investigation personnel should receive monitoring once they complete readiness training there actual compliance with investigation efforts also requires monitoring. Often personnel will think the complexities of electoral violence puts related investigations beyond their capabilities-organization and cohesion can mitigate such. Establishing investigation goals and objectives may assist with avoiding mission drift as ongoing performance monitoring can negatively impact personnel morale. Also making expectations known may encourage personnel to adhere to neutral and professional investigation practices that reduce the likelihood of intentional misconduct.

Resource Considerations

BP: Prepare an investigation sustainability plan to identify financial and facility longevity.

Lead investigators should note that the complexities of CEV often translate into complex investigation costs. Throughout each investigation the leadership should take note of any sudden changes in expense or depleting resources, particularly those related to material evidence handling, processing, and storage. Lapses in evidentiary quality assurance efforts can jeopardize the credibility of investigation findings. Following each additional CEV investigation the sustainability plan should be updated to reflect police budgetary means and suspected shortfalls.

BP: Leverage expert and community partnerships to maximize effect but minimize efforts.

During the investigation planning phase personnel should have identified the available community partners. Once the initial investigation and scene analysis are completed investigators should review the capabilities of the identified local experts, community service providers, and media outlets to determine whether resource engagement is sufficiently occurring. Since it is not possible to know how many CEV will occur during an election cycle police entities can reserve their resources by increasing expert and partner participation while reducing agency effort and cost. An additional benefit of utilizing community resources comes following the election cycle when experts and partnering organizations have favorable and working relations with police.

Suspect Management

BP: Diversify lines of inquiry using the TIE (trace, interview, evaluate) method.

After preliminary interviews are conducted additional information still needs located. Investigators should pursue suspect identification by tracing likely suspect characteristics and parameters, interview individuals within the potential parameters to cross reference existing interview narratives, then evaluate significant inconsistencies or promising leads. Personnel constructing suspect parameters should consider things like access to the crime scene, living proximity to affiliated suspects, criminal record for similar electoral offenses, and what resources and means would be required to employ the CEV under investigation.²⁸

BP: Generate an arrest strategy that incorporates crisis aversion (risk reduction) methods.

Due to the sensitive and political nature of CEV investigators should prioritize quality arrest strategies rather than prioritizing a speedy conclusion to the investigation. Of utmost importance is ensuring that suspect detainment is conducted professionally to avoid retaliatory crimes or diminished community-police relations. This includes ensuring adequate detainment facilities are utilized. At a minimum, investigators should consider the timing of the planned arrest, the risk posed to the community if the suspect is not immediately apprehended, the vulnerability of potential evidence with or on the suspect, the size and force capabilities of arresting police units, and whether additional suspect surveillance could provide more suitable conditions for arrest.

BP: Utilize multiple evidencing means during suspect interviews to lessen mistrial risks.

Once apprehended police interaction with suspects should be well documented not only for material evidence but also to prevent misconduct or accusations of police misconduct. Simple procedural policies, such as requiring two officers to attend each interview or the use of video/audio monitoring during interviews can not only strengthen the prosecutorial case but also discredit claims targeting the investigation at large. Credible trials require professional and ethical investigation efforts. As such, suspect handling is a critical element to mitigating impunity.

Public Welfare Management

BP: Coordinating support services for witnesses and victims should be ongoing to reflect their current stability and wellness status.

²⁸ "Working with Suspects", Authorised Police Practices, http://www.app.college.police.uk/appcontent/investigations/working-with-suspects/

Those harmed or affected by CEV may be facing a lengthy recovery. Investigation personnel and community partners should continue to coordinate victim and witness wellness services throughout the investigation cycle. Psychosocial and emotional support services are most effective after long term exposure since the underlying and often latent traumas take several counseling sessions to divulge and remedy. Investigators should provide victims/witnesses with post-investigation resource contacts as a gesture of best practice and interest in community health and wellness. Physical CEV will necessitate health services for those affected. Especially when victims and witnesses are needed for in-court testimony their health and wellness are critical components to their perceived credibility as an informant thus service provision should ensure they ability to assist in both the prosecutorial case building effort as well as the judicial system process.

BP: Witness and victim protection should mitigate the risk of harmful retaliation.

The need for long term protection services for victims and witnesses beyond efforts to undo the damage or harm done during the actual CEV. Even when suspects are apprehended and in custody the victim/witness may still be at risk of retaliation from the suspects' peers or similarly motivated individuals. Thus security services may be needed in higher profile cases. When elicited, protection efforts should balance providing a sense of normalcy for the victim/witness with preventing further victimization. In extreme circumstances protection includes victim relocation.

Situation awareness training/services

BP: Revise security plans for upcoming electoral events when public CEV are occurring.

When a series of public and mass-target CEV are occurring the investigation personnel need to work within their police agencies to strengthen the security efforts for upcoming large-scale electoral events. For some cases simply scheduling more police officers to be on duty during large public events may alleviate stressors that could otherwise remove investigators from their case management role. It should be noted that voters are often weary of police within voting spaces so revised security plans need to be realistic in their scope while not further hindering the electoral cycle. Establishing security parameters or utilizing video/audio monitoring are potential ways to observe the flow of persons outside of electoral events without politicizing the police.

BP: Press release narratives should be objective, non-politicized, and avoid fear baiting.

During the election cycle police agencies should practice more confidentiality with what they share

to media sources. When possible having a press relations unit within the police agency allows more thorough vetting of material and press release narratives before they reach the public or external media sources. Investigation updates should be objective, avoid negatively labeling a subpopulation or minority group, refrain from advocating for any political entity or politician, and aim to reassure the public that investigation personnel are taking CEV seriously. If an internal press relations office is not available the lead investigator should similarly structure their release statements and only utilize credible media outlets to disseminate information publicly.

Documentation Efforts BP: Supporting evidence should be comprise private and public sources for authenticity.

Physical and material evidence collected at the scene of the crime and during suspect interviews are the most effectively means to build a prosecutorial case. However, even when adhering to sound and professional investigation protocols the investigation is unlikely to run as smoothly. Alternative supporting evidence is a practical way to address any investigation weaknesses while also ensuring the investigation is prepared to proceed to trial. Investigators should also use internal police databases, official records, social media chronologies, and expert testimony to justify the rationale behind investigation decisions. Keeping in mind that there will be more material evidence collected than likely used in court investigators should neutrally collect and properly store all material so that the prosecutors can later determine what is of strongest value to the judicial case.

VIII. Ending the Investigation

Case Transfer Considerations BP: Compile Lessons Learned into a document for future CEV investigation training.

Most election cycles are several years apart. Logistically this implies that investigation personnel may change from one election cycle to the next. Without technical notes or a lessons learned narrative of previous electoral crime investigations it is likely that the insight gained and professional development acquired would leave the police agencies with each respective investigator. As good practice investigators should conclude each investigation by not only completing the investigation narrative but also by constructing a narrative of lessons learned-what approaches did (not) work well, how was the community most engaged, what service providers/experts/vendors were superior partners, etc. After several electoral cycles the

accumulated lessons learned will constitute agency-specific best practices that guide future investigation planning and conduct that reflect contextual factors and considerations.

BP: Confirm an investigation should end by reviewing an Investigation Integrity Plan.

After reviewing standard local statutes and relevant electoral laws investigation personnel should create a matrix of all legal and procedural requirements. As the investigation is underway personnel can verify the matrix components have been completed by providing a date and authorizing signature. Essentially the matrix should have at least one column or row for each phase in the investigation function. If updated at the end of each phase investigators can simply review the matrix for completion and confirm that the investigation is prepared for closure. One variation of such is demonstrated below.

Case Resolution Chart				
Scene Suspect Victim Evidence Support				
 Secured 	 Identified 	 Identified 	 Collected 	 Partners Identified
 Cleared 	 Detained 	 Secured 	 Documented 	 Service Delivery
 Released 	 Interviewed 	 Interviewed 	 Examined 	 Progress Evaluation
 Monitored 	 Charged 	 Assisted 	 Authorized 	 Debriefing
 Catalogued 	 Tried 	 Monitored 	 Stored 	 Media Closure

*Professional Relationship Out-processing***BP: Resolve public concern by issuing an investigation closure statement.**

Failure to update the public of a closed investigation may negatively impact their perception of the police agency's ability to handle the matter. A brief and succinct statement should provide enough information to stress the importance of an unhindered electoral cycle yet relieve any lingering questions the public may have. Try recapping why the incident was a CEV, reiterating why CEV are investigated with special considerations, provide what local resources the public has throughout the election cycle, and provide the investigation outcome to the extent logical.

BP: Provide community and expert partners with an exit plan.

During an extensive election cycle investigators are likely to form trusting relationships with the community and expert partners. Beyond the election cycle these partnerships are a valuable resource to the police department and the community more broadly. Investigators should provide an exit survey to partnering entities to determine the quality of their experience, primarily

whether they felt adequately employed or whether they would like to terminate their working agreement. Additionally, police should determine if continued partnerships with any service providers should be pursued or whether election-conditional partnerships are sufficient. The main objective of out-processing professional relationships is to ensure that the option of future engagement and service partnership remains.

IX. Technology Applications (Value Added Components)
 Implementing new protocols and best practices may overwhelm more loosely organized police agencies however productive use of technology can assist with investigation efficiency.

Real-Time Methods

Where technological resources are available investigation personnel can strengthen their routinization by utilizing a real-time investigation application. Any mobile device that is application compatible can serve as a soft copy record, evidence, and documentation locker. With cloud storage capability preliminary investigators can record, preserve, and share evidentiary material in real time. Although security measures are required having the means to automatically duplicate documentation of the crime scene can drastically nullify the risk of evidence tampering since photographic accounts of crime scene processing can serve as backup.

Additionally, videography of the crime scene can similarly produce a means to further explore a crime scene. Preserving crime scenes within electoral settings can be difficult and having evidence reels can strengthen the authenticity of the case as *seeing* the crime scene unfold can mitigate any risk of contamination or tampering. Preemptively, investigators can also pursue suspects of serial electoral crimes by installing video monitoring devices at profiled or possible crime scenes such as large rallies. It should be noted that monitoring should be used neutrally implemented as it can enhance efforts to pursue a lead but should not metastasize into civilian observation.

Social Media

Because of its growing popularity and accessibility, social media has become a multifaceted tool for a variety of users. Service partners can use social media to promote community engagement events and provide information about available resources. While community engagement and electoral awareness efforts can be stimulated via social media, investigation personnel can also

benefit from social platforms. Incident mapping and forecasting can be facilitated through the use of social media as citizen users can tweet, post, blog, among other things, their observations and experiences. This can streamline the extent of the intelligence analysis work required from police. Alternatively, investigation personnel can also improve security conditions by establishing event chick-ins using social media or mobile device applications. For instance, if large electoral gatherings are scheduled patrons can check-in to the event once they arrive and check-out once they safely return home. As a byproduct citizens may feel more secure in that law enforcement personnel would be notified more urgently if they were to go missing or also know their last whereabouts in case they were kidnapped or taken hostage during a larger scale electoral crime. It should be further reiterated that any use of data mining or monitoring comes with the risk of abuse of power and violation of privacy. To mitigate these risks investigation planning process. The greater and more authentic community engagement and awareness campaigns can be the more objectively personnel can utilize technology and do so with support from the public.

Community Engagement and the Media

The support services provided by community partners can have a lasting impact with the potential to prevent CEV. As community forums and safe spaces are frequented, a narrative of community engagement and awareness is developed. Utilizing print media forms, such as word clouds, can be instrumental in distributing the message throughout the broader population. For example, if a community partner holds an electoral violence prevention event during which local leaders give speeches on community healing the narrative dialogue can be processed through a word cloud generator to create an image displaying the most frequently used words- in essence *showing* what was said and giving a lasting impression of the transpiring event. These images can then be used as awareness tools and dialogue points to engage less involved populations.