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ENGAGING ARMED GROUPS & FORMER FIGHTERS IN CONTEMPORARY CONFLICT & COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM SETTINGS

The Stabilization Assistance Review

Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration & the 3D Approach

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An Initiative of Creative Associates International

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper is a joint RAND and Creative Associates International initiative to advance thinking on the utility of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) processes in stabilization efforts aligned with U.S. Government's (USG) Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) that states Defense and Development are in support of Diplomacy—the 3D Approach. This is accomplished by demonstrating how DDR historically served as a tool for defense, development and diplomacy; illustrating its similar functions in contemporary stabilization settings. Traditionally a post-conflict tool addressing security-governance, political transitions and stabilization following peace settlements, presently DDR is called upon during armed conflicts for groups and actors often associated with terrorism, violent extremist organizations (VEOs), and designated terrorist organizations (DTOs), and may include foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs). The SAR, a collaboration between the U.S. Department of State (DoS), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), offers recommendations for USG stabilization efforts in conflict-affected areas. **Stabilization, like DDR, is inherently political.**

DDR has undergone three definitive stages. In the 1980s, the USG and Soviet Union utilized DDR in Southern Africa and Central America to end the Cold War. By the 2000s, the link between security and development was codified in the Brahimi Report, adding a development dimension to DDR. The current need is exemplified as violent extremism (VE) spans the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, North Africa and the Sahel, including Nigeria and Libya, and includes countering violent extremism (CVE) where counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) elements supplant comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs). Colombia, and arguably Central Asia, the Balkans, and Southeast Asia require stabilization assistance with DDR components. Reinforcing these three stages, the paper outlines minimalist and maximalist DDR theory. The former correlates to stabilization security objectives, while the latter adopts a broader development approach to DDR. Taken together, these illustrate how DDR spans the conflict cycle and is "fit for purpose" for the SAR.

The link between "traditional" DDR and diplomacy is couched in the preconditions emanating from CPAs, largely absent in today's DDR. Even so, diplomatic issues continue to be impacted by international legal doctrine; international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights (HR) law with amnesties and transitional justice (TJ) translating into program responses. DDR and diplomacy in a VE setting cannot default to a CPA for several reasons; one of which is some groups make their way onto DTO lists. Notably, in Nigeria three actors affect security for DDR: Boko Haram, the military and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). In such cases, and consistent with the SAR, the USG should equitably calibrate engagement with a government's military and civilian entities by leveraging its good offices in the absence of national mandates. **Without a CPA, diplomatic efforts should aim to align legal dispositions by ensuring a nation's CT law is congruent with its civil law and its international partners to enable DDR in VE settings.**

In Cameroon, the Presidential Decree for Boko Haram and Nigerian identification of some Boko Haram "defectors" as Cameroon nationals - FTFs, is one such opportunity.

The defense pillar looks at the DDR-Security Sector Reform (SSR) nexus. Traditionally, DDR supported stabilization ensuring controlled release of ex-combatants (XCs) from armed forces and groups during demobilization and downsizing; advised the security sector on resource requirements when absorbing new recruits; provided options on the provision of security in communities with large numbers of returnees for reinsertion and reintegration; and developed special programs for potential spoilers and non-state actors. In DDR-VE settings SSR is a mixed bag. The preference of the Colombian and Kosovar governments to DDR the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia (FARC) and Civil Protection Corp (CPC) into non-armed security and public sector institutions is telling.

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Juxtapose this with the Nigerian CJTF integration into security forces while Boko Haram does not have the option, and we see hybrid models taking shape. The same is true of amnesties. Contingent upon individuals not being subject to prosecution for war crimes or crimes against humanity; where these conditions exist, the tactical utility amnesties offer to encourage "off-ramping" and "defections" will be offset by a dearth of political will for the USG to use these as a major tool in security transitions while "material support" issues loom large. Relative to the SAR, the USG could provide support to foreign militaries by sensitizing partners on the Leahy Law and vetting—the process by which the USG determines if foreign security forces can receive DoD assistance based on commitment to human rights.

Defining reintegration as part of a country's development process, coupled with the SAR call to layer, prioritize and sequence foreign assistance advancing stabilization, the plethora of development activities in DDR is measured against criticism that DDR was not achieving development aims. In part, an issue of poor expectation management, as donor expectations centered on XCs securing livelihoods at minimum and job creation at their most ambitious. Reintegration was measured in number of XCs trained and graduated from reinsertion programs. As a result, social and psychosocial reintegration was largely underdeveloped. By 2015, it was postulated that **DDR would benefit by placing communities at the center of the reintegration process through increased civic engagement and social reintegration prioritization, especially where the state had limited outreach and capacity.** Evolving theories situated DDR as a nexus between CVE and stabilization, with social reintegration a precondition for successful socio-economic reintegration. Moving forward requires application of lessons into current efforts whereby stabilization and DDR is a bridge to development. Initial USAID achievements in the pre-release phases of DDR should not be applied to post-release reinsertion and reintegration—these have not taken shape yet. Equally, the DoS approach that promotes disengagement and defection of fighters from armed groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and the Lord's Resistance Army may degrade a group's capacity to sustain attacks, though it does not address reinsertion or reintegration.

Findings and recommendations indicate that DDR is re-emergent and relevant—the 3D Approach is fit for purpose vis-à-vis the USG SAR policy, and while DDR is no longer solely governed by legal forces accompanying CPAs, legal issues remain of paramount importance and should frame diplomatic engagement. The emergence of hybrid models in SSR mandates increased attention to analytics with space for U.S. military engagement through technical support to foreign militaries based on Leahy Law compliance. Within a stabilization context, economic development is peripheral to a DDR agenda. The continued trajectory should be community-based with DDR-VE support to stabilization continuing through reinsertion. This, coupled with a taxonomy in DDR, could enhance a uniformity in approaches and understanding of the DDR-VE and the SAR space and diminish the propensity towards the "panacea" effect. A research and learning agenda is needed to advance DDR in alignment with USG stabilization policy. Evidence-based research and applied practices should inform policy. On one end, we need to establish efficacy and on the other, avoid detrimental practices by ensuring that DDR's contribution to stabilization forwards national security interests.

I. Overview

The following paper represents a joint effort by the RAND Corporation and Creative Associates International (Creative) and provides an overview and historical lessons on DDR's role in facilitating post-conflict processes. Its more targeted aim is to **advance thinking about the utility of DDR processes in stabilization efforts by enhancing technical knowledge in a manner that enables SAR implementation across this domain.** In effect, this paper retrofits and re-engineers DDR into the SAR's positioning of the USG's strategic stabilization objectives underpinning defense, diplomacy and development[1] —the 3D Approach. The retrofitting of DDR simply refers to the application of DDR approaches and principles across the 3D Approach. This is accomplished by firstly demonstrating how DDR historically served as a tool for defense, diplomacy and development, and secondly by illustrating how constituent approaches and components of DDR are relevant in contemporary stabilization settings.

Re-engineering requires an understanding of traditional DDR in the conflict-to-development continuum compared to contemporary DDR

positioning. The most widely accepted policy guidance on DDR is enshrined in the Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS) published by the United Nations (UN) in 2006. On the first page of the over 800-page volume, the IDDRS posits that "Since the late 1980s, the UN has increasingly been called upon to support the implementation of DDR programmes in countries emerging from conflict."[2] Concurrently, the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the Forward to the IDDRS notes, "The DDR of former combatants and those associated with armed groups is a prerequisite for post-conflict stability and recovery."[3] DDR was traditionally envisaged solely as a post-conflict tool, and as such it spans only from the immediate aftermath of conflict to development. To this end, DDR addressed security-governance, transitions and stabilization spaces following peace settlements. In contrast, DDR presently is being called upon during ongoing armed conflicts with armed groups and actors often associated with terrorism (Muggah and O'Donnell, 2015), or VEOs.

Even so, within this context, contemporary DDR remains a suitable response in settings where CVE activities are envisaged[4] and as a preventive measure to "off-ramp" armed group members or affiliates either on DTO lists[5] or making their way towards this end. In furtherance of this aim, DDR in contemporary conflict is suitable to addressing several "problem sets" in the conflict cycle[6] congruent with the 3D Approach specifically.

II. US Government Policy on Stabilization

On June 19, 2018, the DoS, USAID, and the DoD jointly released the Stabilization Assistance Review: A Framework to Maximize the Effectiveness of U.S. Government Efforts to Stabilize Conflict-Affected Areas. The interagency document lays out a shared definition of stabilization[7] to guide USG interventions in conflict stabilization activities, focusing on their political nature. The SAR aims to better direct resources through time-bound and strategic initiatives that help locally legitimate leaders govern inclusively, build peace, and prevent a return to violence.

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Political end states are now ostensibly the USG's guiding star for **smart, evidence-based and targeted interventions that build the resilience and capacity of locally legitimate authorities to peaceably manage conflict.** The SAR clearly states that Defense and Development are in support of Diplomacy, meaning that the DoS is in the lead for stabilization activities. In practice though, continued innovation and adaptation are needed to apply the SAR principles to ongoing efforts, including "upstream" conflict prevention[8] and in VE contexts[9]. Additionally, it is clear in the SAR and in USG publications leading into the SAR that USG interventions should focus on "greatest impact relative to the level of investment and effort" and relatively early and easy success to garner "political support for a transition via a 'demonstration effect,' crucial to winning over the undecided 'fence-sitters'."[10]

In the 1980s, after successful DDR interventions in Southern Africa and Central America—its geo-strategic interests met—the USG handed DDR to the World Bank and United Nations. DDR has remained under the purview of multilaterals since, although the USG is now re-engaging in its national interest in preventing and de-escalating "terrorist" issues. With the SAR now being the USG framework for engagement, DDR should be nimble enough to act as scaffolding for the SAR approach across the stabilization-fragility-conflict spectrum. This is especially true when considering greatest impact for level of investment and effort, and the importance of early "wins" to sway public perception, as well-managed DDR is cost effective and highly visible to the general population.

> In parallel to the evolution in thinking around stabilization, theory and practice of DDR underwent an evolution of its own.

III. Why DDR? Why Now?

Understanding DDR is best achieved by moving beyond nomenclature D-D-R[11] . In the end, **DDR is about optics, actors and an environment.** That environment now includes "asymmetric" conflict, kinetic CT and CVE initiatives[12]. Not exhaustively, COIN operations, gangs, anti-crime measures and stability operations are composite elements of DDR (Muggah and O'Donnell, 2015; Ozerdem and Jacoby, 2008). As such, countries and settings at risk of violent extremism[13] become the parameters we use to develop a working DDR definition for this paper:

Again, we turn to the SAR. Notably, the opening paragraph states, "The United States has strong national security and economic interests in reducing levels of violence and promoting stability in areas affected by armed conflict, especially to consolidate security gains against the ISIS and other non-state armed groups."[15] A US Institute of Peace (USIP) report on the Task Force on Extremism in Fragile States released September 2018 is demonstrative; **VE is presently spanning an arc from the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel.** Presently, 77% of conflicts in the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, and the Sahel have a VE element, compared with 22% in 2001, including Nigeria and Libya. **DTOs are present in 19 out of 45 countries in these regions and have governed territory in over 25% of them.** The USG response has included combat operations in five of the forty-five countries and security assistance to upwards of 90% of them.[16] Al-Qaeda has expanded in recent years into Syria, Iraq, Yemen and the Sahel[17] and ISIS has established a presence in a dozen countries[18] and remains present in Iraq and Syria[19] . The DoS call for DDR in Yemen and Libya, efforts in the last three years in West Africa,[20] the USG regional expansion into the Lake Chad Basin (LCB), victim assistance support in Mali from armed groups, and International Crisis Group call for defections to demobilize and reintegrate some "vigilantes" in Cameroon[21] is not coincidental. Despite the USG displacement of terrorism as the primary national security concern, unstable political conditions, weak economic structures and ideologically driven groups persist as a threat.[22]

The operative question becomes: **if not DDR, then what?** If peace breaks out across the LCB, Sahel, and the Middle East and North Africa there will be hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of former fighters and affiliates that require support in rehabilitation and reintegration[23] congruent to traditional post-conflict DDR. If peace doesn't break out, the same problem set and dilemma exists, namely the call for DDR during armed conflict through encouraging defections and off-ramping of fighters and affiliates from armed groups. One option is for the USG and international community to ignore the issue; however, this doesn't seem palatable. Only one day after President Trump announced a unilateral withdrawal from Syria, the Kurds publicly considered releasing upwards of 3,200 ISIS detained fighters.[24] Simply stated, outside DDR, there is no other proximate policy instrument easily reconfigured to address armed actors and groups in stabilization contexts. To understand this, three issues need unpacking. First, we lay out a DDR framework, then theory, and lastly we illustrate how DDR historically and presently fits the SAR 3D Approach

Outside DDR, there is no other proximate policy instrument easily reconfigured to address armed actors and groups in stabilization contexts.

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IV. A Theoretical Framework for DDR

DDR of former fighters after conflict dates from the third century BC and has featured in some form in virtually every conflict since with upwards of 60 DDRs taking place from the late 1980s to 2015.[25] While most were launched in the wake of international or civil wars as part of an internationally mandated peace support operation following a CPA, shifting conflict dynamics and emergent caseloads over the last decade continue to alter the landscape in which DDR operations are implemented. **Presently, DDR targets persons in combatant and non-combatant roles from statutory armies and non-state armed groups.**

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To understand DDR's role in contemporary conflict, a generational framework is often utilized depicting DDR through a policy, operational and program lens from the late 1980s to the present.

The first iteration occurred in the wake of the Cold War between the US and Soviet Union who were locked in proxy wars across Central America and Southern Africa. Caseloads largely consisted of men, many of whom wore insignia. These early caseloads were under unified command and control, making eligibility and verification a relatively straightforward affair. While efforts in Central America focused on "demilitarization", those in Southern Africa were akin to a statebuilding agenda.[26] In no small part, DDR facilitating state formation of Mozambique, Namibia and Angola required transforming the "terrorist" rebel fighters into persons who fought "Liberation Struggles." Little attention was given to reintegration; former fighters received humanitarian benefits.[27] "Operations" were governed by military support with an emphasis on SSR. An intended end state was the stabilization of regions through the creation of new, strong central states.[28]

By the mid-2000s, an emergent policy approach responded to the international community claim that reintegration of XCs was not achieving sustainable peacebuilding aims. This led to a broad range of initiatives designed to facilitate enabling conditions for DDR.[29] These were enshrined in the 2010 publication by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 'Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations'. This phase can be characterized as the development generation of DDR and was distinguished by increased attention to social cohesion, addressing other armed groups like gangs with an aim to serve as a "stabilizing bridge between crisis response and long-term development."[30] Building on the findings of the Brahimi Report that inextricably linked DDR, security and development, noting, "Demobilized fighters (who almost never fully disarm) will tend to return to a life of violence if they find no legitimate livelihood, that is, if they are not "reintegrated" into the local economy,"[31] DDR aimed to "secure peacebuilding dividends as measured in development gains."[32]

Identified in 2012, **DDR is undergoing a third shift whereby fighters that travel across contiguous and non-contiguous international borders to join armed groups for ideological (and other) reasons find themselves members of groups categorized as DTOs.** DDR initiatives are considered in areas with limited state and governance capacity and outreach where conflict is ongoing—often asymmetric in nature. The notable absence of state governance and rule of law provides fertile ground for insurgent groups associated with "terrorist" organizations.

The consideration of these groups for DDR has complicated the political landscape and legal environment. DDR efforts mandated for states continue to have regional dimensions, with conflict dynamics and emergent caseloads of FTFs shaped by radical agendas, at times associated with Islam, representing an entirely new caseload in DDR. The operating environment includes CT and COIN and is often characterized as a "CVE" setting.[33] **DDR has reified from a state building agenda, to efforts at treating the failed state, to attempts to weaken groups that contest the Westphalia model writ large.**

> DDR is undergoing a shift whereby fighters that travel across borders to join armed groups find themselves members of DTOs.

As illustrated, DDR commonly serves as a tool for SSR aimed at downsizing and legitimizing armed forces under civilian control. As an SSR tool, DDR falls squarely into the SAR's defense posturing, while the inclusion in CPAs positions DDR as an instrument of policy and diplomacy. The Brahimi years that ushered in the primacy of reintegration placed DDR as a development issue.

V. DDR Theory

Formal promulgation of DDR theory occurred relatively recently. Practitioners and policymakers since the 1980s hobbled together elements of theory, although the policy guidelines on DDR were not published until 2006. It would be more than a decade before a consolidated work of DDR theory and practice went to press in the seminal work by Desmond Molloy, Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Theory and Practice.[34] The IDDRS guidelines are more akin to a "best practice meets doctrine" volume. In contrast, Molloy lays out the two major schools of thought around DDR theory classified as *minimalist* and *maximalist*. The former positions DDR squarely within a short-term "stabilization" setting. There is a preponderance on politically stabilizing the central state through achieving a level of security necessary to pivot towards peacebuilding and eventual development aims. Conversely, maximalist theory tends towards development, placing a premium on reintegration, where DDR is a bridge to development. [35]

Not surprisingly, **DDR theory spans the security-development continuum; in its most extreme interpretations, DDR reaches the polar ends of both.** On the development side, theory posits that war is egregious. By virtue of its very nature all persons are victims, and deserving of support necessary to restore livelihoods, psychosocial wellbeing, a sense of security and dignity. Development theory is in effect humanitarian. In DDR terms, this would be a reintegration goal. The security side is quite the opposite, implying the only reason we engage in DDR for XCs is to remove them from the security equation. If removal could have been achieved militarily, that would have been done, and there would be no need for DDR in the first place. In the extreme, XCs are viewed as inherent spoilers. The disproportionate resources allocated to former fighters through DDR impedes development outcomes. Removing them from the security equation is a prime mover; not restoring their dignity, livelihoods or well-being. If DDR results in him or her sitting under a tree for eternity, so be it.

VI. 'Traditional' DDR and the 3D Approach

In fitting DDR into the SAR 3D paradigm for "traditional" DDR, the **diplomacy** element centers on peace settlements and CPAs. Almost by definition, as a post-conflict stabilization and peacebuilding tool, the diplomatic arm of DDR is demonstrated by the fact it is written into peace settlements. The defense pillar is best suited for efforts where DDR interfaces with SSR. To this end, DDR has been utilized as a tool to accomplish SSR goals. A look at the UN, USAID and The Organisation of Economic Development (OECD) will illustrate these security elements.

Within a DDR-SSR rubric, Afghanistan and Sudan's use of interim stabilization measures (ISMs) as a tool balancing security and development is important to highlight.[36] For the **development** pillar, a brief overview of the IDDRS, Second-Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations, and Brahimi Report are forwarded.

VI.I On Diplomacy

The link between DDR and diplomacy is couched in the preconditions subsumed in policy guidance and doctrine in the 2006 IDDRS. These links to diplomacy include (i) the signing of a negotiated peace settlement, (ii) the provision of a legal framework for DDR usually emanating from a CPA, (iii) trust in the peace process, (iv) willingness of the parties to the conflict to engage in DDR as a voluntary process, and (v) a minimum guarantee of security for parties undergoing DDR.[37] These are largely absent in today's DDRs. Even so, diplomatic issues impacting the status and treatment of XCs are enshrined in legal doctrine. The bodies of law in traditional DDRs are IHL[38] and HR law.[39] The thematic areas where these translated into programmatic responses included domains of amnesties and TJ. The IDDRS suggests that mediators of DDR processes consider "truth, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence in peace agreements. . . [and] reject amnesties for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and gross violations of human rights."[40]

The inference is amnesties are a diplomatic recourse when not transgressing international law[41] and TJ issues walk a fine line between peace, justice and security.

It is a bit of a misnomer to categorically state that DDR processes, writ large, emanate from a peace agreement. Why? Well, in part, signing an agreement and acceding to its terms are very different issues. Even so, the variety of peace agreements demonstrates that the cessation of hostilities often provides the space needed for the political transition process to take shape through a DDR initiative. This may or may not involve power-sharing and security arrangements. There are instances where internationally brokered agreements address national reconciliation efforts and sharing of political power. Of the twenty conflicts in the escola de cultural de pau assessment of DDR programs, 90% were negotiated settlements.

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The exceptions were Chad and Haiti[42]. The Hudayah process and National Dialogue for Yemen are examples of agreements brokered by the international community where diplomatic measures are implicitly pointing towards DDR in the stabilization-to-political transition process. The immediate security gain: forestalling a coalition military response.

VI.II On Defense

As noted, the defense pillar of the SAR 3D may be optimally served by understanding the DDR-SSR nexus. The OECD, an exemplary leader in SSR, positions these two areas so closely as to advise that DDR and SSR efforts be considered in tandem as part of a comprehensive and integrated effort addressing security and justice development programming.[43] While many examples exist, among the most ambitious DDR efforts in the 2000s were the efforts in Afghanistan and Sudan. In the decade following 9/11 there were at least four DDR initiatives in Afghanistan where SSR played a significant role—The Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP);[44] the Commander Incentive Programme (CIP);[45] the Disbandment of Illegally Armed Groups (DIAG);[46] and Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Programme (APRP).[47] In Sudan there were an additional four DDR efforts nested within a larger SSR rubric—The Interim DDR Programme (IDDRP) affecting South(ern) Sudan and Sudan; an effort planned for the Darfur region, and a DDR in the north governed under the East Sudan Peace Agreement

(ESPA).[48] There are specific areas where DDR can support the SAR ensuring a "controlled release" of XCs from armed forces and groups during demobilization and downsizing: advising the security sector on resource requirements when absorbing new recruits; providing options on the provision of security in communities with large numbers of expected returnees; and developing special programs for potential spoilers. These were relevant for Afghanistan and Sudan and inform OECD-DAC guidance[49].

> DDR and SSR efforts should be considered in tandem as part of a comprehensive and integrated effort addressing security and justice development

It is helpful to articulate the security link in DDR through SSR by underpinning what actors comprise the security sector. USAID describes SSR as "an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of: defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police and law enforcement; corrections; intelligence and national security; border management; DDR; and/or reduction of armed violence."[50]

Again, Afghanistan[52] and Sudan[53] are illustrative. As well, both employed interim stabilization measures (ISMs) establishing "holding patterns" for various armed groups. In Sudan a "strategic" ISM was adopted where special needs groups of women, the elderly, persons with disabilities and children were removed from the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) ahead of regular forces. Doing so distilled the caseload so that hardcore fighters considered an acute security risk could be treated separately.

> There are five main groups affecting the security sector of interest to the SAR-DDR intersect. Not exhaustively, these include non-state actors such as militias, rebels and other armed groups; armed and public security forces including the military, police, paramilitary and intelligence community; civil management and oversight bodies from executive, judicial and legislative entities, line ministries and sub-national government bodies; civil society including think tanks, academia and civic groups; and other actors such as financial institutions and regional organizations.[51]

In Afghanistan a "structural" ISM cobbled together armed groups that fought the Taliban in support of Coalition forces following 9/11 into a single command and control structure—the Afghan Military Forces, slated for a comprehensive DDR. [54]

The maximalist school of thought on DDR corresponds with the emergence of a second-generation approach to DDR. The emphasis is on reintegration.[55] The transition was congruous to the paradigm shift ushered in with the Brahimi Report. This shift was based on the contention that **peace support operations could not remain dependent on top-down approaches emanating from a Security Council mandate.** The nature of conflict had shifted. Success was contingent upon ensuring that "programmes are linked to broader peacebuilding/early recovery strategic frameworks, exit strategies of missions, and development frameworks."[56] It was the inclusion of development frameworks that was demonstrative of a policy shift, though its intent to operationalize was promulgated by the UN Policy Committee calling for a well-planned and coherent funding strategy spanning DDR, aligning funds and programs with countries' peace processes, recovery efforts and development planning.[57] This directly corresponds to the widely accepted definition of reintegration as part of a country's development process and a national responsibility[58] and the SAR call to layer, prioritize and sequence foreign assistance advancing stabilization.[59] This led to a spate of development activities nested within DDR efforts including veteran's schemes, economic aspects to community violence reduction, and weapons for development initiatives[60] amongst others.

> A well-planned and coherent funding strategy spanning DDR, aligning funds and programs with countries' peace processes, recovery efforts, and development planning directly corresponds to the SAR call to layer, prioritize and sequence foreign assistance advancing stabilization.

Notably, mainstreaming development objectives into DDR through reintegration was seemingly necessary, though had unintended consequences. Considerable weight was placed on socio-economic reintegration.[61] DDR was criticized for not achieving peacebuilding and development aims, in part because expectations around DDR were not properly managed. Efforts were expected to lead to identifiable livelihood options and jobs for XCs—which was never a stated aim of DDR. Simultaneously, social and psychosocial reintegration was largely underdeveloped. Donor expectations for reintegration were measured in number of XCs trained and graduated from reinsertion programs. This "panacea" effect led to a reinsertion to reintegration dilemma. It became common, if not a de facto practice, for DDR results to be reported as the number of XCs trained and graduating from "reintegration" programs – usually vocational training, small business development and educational opportunities. The frequent donor question on how many XCs were reintegrated was reported in these terms. In fact, this is merely a determinant of how many XCs have been reinserted.[62] Arguably, these dynamics remain for current operations. A potential pitfall is that successful pilots setting precedent run the risk of history repeating itself. They would be well-served to consider if, and under what conditions, an overemphasis on a minimalist approach may be detrimental to goals consistent with its manageable interests and the maximalist paradigm.

VII. A Changing DDR Landscape and the 3D Approach

For a second time, recognition of the changing landscape came about due to criticism of DDR efficacy; this time within the UN Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery (BCPR). To address this, an Issues Paper was commissioned in 2013. Ironically, the paper predates CVE nomenclature; depicting caseloads that "have adopted an 'ideological' shift closely associated with radical and terrorist groups [that] bring challenges related to legal status, human rights, and transitional justice into the reintegration process."[66]

Consistent with environments prone to asymmetric conflict, kinetic CT operations and the risk of VE, what is absent is political reintegration.[67] Notably, efforts exist in their nascency. Colombia's FARC, a DTO, forming a political party[68] is illustrative; however, similar to Mats Berdal's and David Ucko's assertions, limiting efforts to political party formation is not optimal. This is in part due to the complexity of the task,[69] though in VE settings the scope of the problem set is expanding:

Examples include Mozambique where a current call for retroactive DDR benefits for veterans from the Liberation Struggle were noticed as early as 2009 in Namibia;[63] the Brussels Agreement tying European Union accession to DDR of the Serbian CPC into Kosovo's security institutions;[64] the Ukraine, where fighters seeking Soviet style support could become mercenaries for VEOs; and the Philippines, where the government and Moro Islamic Liberation Front refer to DDR as the "normalization of relations" and "decommissioning"[65]. **This indicates DDR is larger than the VE space or CVE context it currently occupies.**

VII.I On Diplomacy in a CVE Setting

Issues of DDR and diplomacy in a VE setting cannot default to a CPA for several reasons, one of which is some groups make their way onto DTO lists—Al-Shabaab in Somalia,[70] Boko Haram in West Africa, and ISIS come to mind.[71] **Rapprochement accompanies restrictions; legal, reputational, political and otherwise.** Relevant for SAR, the USG interest in these issues took shape in 2015. An assessment in Nigeria identified three actors affecting the security environment for DDR; Boko Haram, the military and the CJTF, a self-mobilized community defense force that aided the Nigerian military to rout Boko Haram. A mission report concluded the USG should equitably distribute support with the Nigerian military, the Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA), and the Vice President's Office. . Leveraging its good offices diplomatically in the absence of a national mandate meant negotiating these relationships. This could be achieved through military engagement by DoD providing a mentoring role to Nigerian security forces on the rules of engagement and lawful detention, and USAID and the DoS assisting the government to compile and consolidate existing ONSA and Presidential Initiative in the Northeast (PINE) strategies into a comprehensive national DDR policy.[72]

In previous efforts emanating from a CPA, practitioners, policy makers and implementer engagement followed peace accords. This was known as the pre-planning phase, and while it made provisions for aspects of the mediation such as DDR technical advice to special envoys and emissaries in the context of peace negotiations,[73] these seldom materialized. As a political process, DDR in VE settings without a CPA requires calibrated support to a multitude of actors whose DDR interest and optics is not uniform. While predating the SAR, the USG diplomatic entreaties in Nigeria reflect this reality.

Under a CPA, the legal framework for DDR was often mandated through a national commission that developed policy through a Steering Committee. Policy translated into strategies, usually at an administrative sub-national level. Implementation plans followed with technical and program teams carrying out DDR. Without a CPA, diplomatic efforts should increasingly aim to align legal dispositions for DDR. Ensuring a

> **Without a CPA, diplomatic efforts should increasingly aim to align legal dispositions for DDR. Ensuring a nation's CT law is aligned with its civil law, as well as with its primary international partners, would enable DDR in VE settings.**

nation's CT law is aligned with its civil law, as well as with its primary international partners, would enable DDR in VE settings. Advances made in Nigeria are offset by the situation in Colombia, in part because Nigeria is engaged in manageable "bitesize" pilots,[74] and Colombia has a full-blown DDR underway. Support by USAID to Colombia's peace process is stymied because of legal incongruencies.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces (FARC) in Colombia has transformed from a "terrorist" organization into a political party while remaining a DTO for the USG. This means neither the USG nor any private US entity may assist any of the 12,451 demobilized FARC.[75]

The issue is further complicated by former FARC being free to leave DDR encampment centers to self-reintegrate. In these "communities" of return, the USG material support clauses remain applicable; hampering the effectiveness of US foreign assistance.[76]

Commingling technical and legal support into diplomatic alacrity, the USG can undertake regional efforts where political will is demonstrative. In Cameroon, the

government-issued Presidential Decree on DDR for Boko Haram[77] coupled with the Nigerian identification of some "defectors" as Cameroon nationals - FTFs, provides one such opportunity.

VII.II On Defense in a CVE Setting

On the security dimensions we can start with amnesties. As alluded to earlier, amnesties are contingent upon individuals not being subject to prosecution for crimes that include war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and gross violations of human rights.[78] These may continue to have limited utility. In Somalia, a hybrid evolved whereby influential members of society, including religious leaders, encourage defection from VEOs through appeals for non-violence and incentives based on various forms of amnesties. This is premised on a

Al-Shabaab, which is governed by the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) to determine that former fighters, and their communities of return, are not considered "high" risk.[79] Conversely, amnesties in northern Nigeria for Boko Haram are not looked upon favorably, in large part due to the negative perceptions from the Nigeria Delta DDR that amnesties didn't translate into long-term peace dividends through DDR. Amnesties offered in the Delta region were aimed at groups not listed as DTOs.

The resistance to amnesties in a DDR for Boko Haram came out of interviews during several DDR assessment missions undertaken by Creative Associates International between 2016–2018, where Nigerians made less of a distinction between Boko Haram as a DTO and the Delta non-state armed groups (NSAGs); taking issue with the failure of amnesties to achieve stated ends.

In DDR-VE settings, SSR is a mixed bag. Kosovo helps frame the issue. While not a VE issue strictly speaking, the fact that the Kosovars perceive Serbian CPC as "hardliners" loyal to Belgrade and under the command and control of its Ministry of Defense is telling. The Kosovo integration of the CPC did not include the Police, an armed security force. Non-armed integration was preferred. It was in Kosovo's interest to dismantle the CPC as they represented a security threat to the government.[80] The case was similar in Colombia where the UN advanced non-armed integration options into the public sector for the Havana Talks.[81] Again, there was little appetite for an SSR, this time for FARC—a DTO. The CJTF in Nigeria is faring better as SSR is underway for "trained" CJTF members through the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES).[82] **Kosovo and Colombia demonstrate how an NSAG and a DTO**

> While amnesties have tactical utility to encourage off-ramping and defections, the political appetite for the USG to employ amnesties as a major tool in security-transitions for DDR may be limited while material support clauses loom large.

with different legal dispositions represent similar security threats. They also highlight how a DDR for a two-state solution, and a traditional peace settlement impact DDR in a VE setting. Nigeria is an illustration of statutory and non-statutory actors, as well as a DTO's interface in a single conflict setting where DDR is considered. Relative to the SAR, the USG could impact each of these theatres by conveying conditions of support to foreign militaries as promulgated by Leahy Law. Where credible evidence suggests individuals or units are human rights violators, assistance is withheld.[83] This corresponds to the 2016 USAID Mission recommendation referenced earlier. Information on Leahy could assist foreign governments seeking DDR assistance from the USG. Illustratively, the Nigerian decision charging the 7th Division with oversight functions of DDR could have been mitigated with this information.[84]

> Leahy vetting is a process by which the USG determines if a foreign security force can receive DoD assistance based on its commitment to human rights.

VII.III On Development in a CVE Setting

The development aspects of DDR in VE settings is yielding lessons, some of which include the changing landscape for DDR providing opportunities to engage differently. With the onset of CVE, the notion of 'pull' and 'push' factors became prominent. Ballast was established between the once predominant socio-economic issues and marginalization, discrimination, poor governance, the rule of law and human rights violations. This remains consistent with USG policy promulgated by the DoS and USAID in May 2016 to: "Employ foreign assistance tools and approaches, including development, to reduce specific political or social and economic factors that contribute to community support for violent extremism in identifiable areas."[85]

This is not to say that socio-economic issues are not paramount; they are! In Yemen, a country where over a million persons are fighters in need of reintegration,[86] USAID's response to the popular youth uprising of 2011 focused on mitigating VE by addressing a deteriorating socio-economic situation[87]. **What this shift achieved was the space to re-position socio-economic issues as an enabling driver within a VE context,** a concept forwarded by The Royal United Services Institute in 2015;[88] the very context in which DDRs are increasingly mandated.

In the same year, it was postulated that DDR would benefit by placing communities at the center of the reintegration process through increased civic engagement.

By prioritizing social reintegration through a community-based reintegration (CBR) approach, national and regional (sub-national) security and governance mechanisms would be strengthened, especially in areas where the state had limited outreach and capacity.[89] The application of the shift from the primacy of socio-economic issues required experimentation. The first case was Somalia—the country where the DDR-CVE connect was identified.[90] A theory of change situated DDR as a nexus between CVE and stabilization with social reintegration that includes links to family and community as a precondition for successful socio-economic reintegration. The CBR and social reintegration model was supported by statistical evidence. During an evaluation of The National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants in 2018, interviewees were asked to rate the importance of reintegration skill-sets. Vocational skills (99%), literacy/numeracy (93%), life-skills (88%) and psychosocial support (86%)[91] demonstrate an extraordinary degree of equity. **What is needed moving forward is the integration of lessons into current efforts whereby stabilization and DDR is a bridge to development, while managing expectations to avoid a "panacea" effect.** Current USAID efforts

DDR benefits by placing communities at the center of the reintegration process through increased civic engagement.

In 2018, interviewees were asked to rate the importance of reintegration skill-sets. Vocational skills (99%), literacy/numeracy (93%), life-skills (88%) and psychosocial support (86%) demonstrate an extraordinary degree of equity.

in Nigeria run the risk of missing lessons and successes are in the pre-release phases of DDR.[92] There is no evidence to suggest reinsertion is efficacious. Equally, while the DoS approach promoting disengagement and defection of fighters from groups like al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS, and the Lord's Resistance Army may diminish internal cohesion and degrade their ability to conduct attacks,[93] it does not address reinsertion, "absorption capacity" or reintegration.

VIII. Findings

While not exhaustive, the below is a handful of findings that can be addressed through engagement of DDR in VE settings under the SAR 3D rubric.

Finding 1: _DDR is re-emergent and relevant—the 3D Approach is fit for purpose vis-à-vis the USG SAR policy._ DDR theory, policy frameworks, history, global and emergent cases illustrate the utility of DDR. The capacity for DDR to span the conflict cycle, its role in stabilization and its capacity to be adapted to contemporary conditions and caseload make it an optimal tool to address armed groups and actors.

Finding 2: _DDR is no longer solely governed by legal forces associated with CPAs and political settlements; however, legal issues remain of paramount importance and should frame diplomatic engagement._ Where DTOs and FTFs are concerned, DDR must align with international HR and IHL and CT laws for stakeholders contributing, processing and/or receiving former fighters and affiliates.

Finding 3: _SSR issues for DDR-VE settings remains relevant with hybrid models emerging. The USG has a role to play._ The USG could support foreign militaries by sensitizing partners on the Leahy Law. Additional analysis regarding political reintegration v. the dismantling and disbandment of armed groups is needed prior to offering SSR options.

Finding 4: _Amnesties may offer limited utility for DTOs and FTFs; the political will to employ these as a stabilization tool remains unknown._ At best, past and current results are mixed. One interviewee in Nigeria noted that offering forgiveness to one that doesn't ask may be insulting. While a significant "off-ramping" incentive, other TJ tools akin to older DDRs remain relevant.

Finding 5: _Within a stabilization context, economic development is peripheral to a DDR agenda. The continued trajectory should be on CBR._ DDR-VE should continue through reinsertion, balancing between socio-economic, social and psychosocial needs. Cogent "transition" (exit) strategies for reintegration should aim to avoid a "panacea" effect.

Finding 6: _A research and learning agenda is needed to advance DDR in alignment with USG Stabilization policy._ Legal prohibitions are met with precedent, though capacities to go-to-scale are not there. USG advances are impressive. Even so, evidence-based research and applied practices should inform policy. We need to establish efficacy and avoid detrimental practices.

IX. Actionable Recommendations

Recommendation 1: _Technical support should inform upstream diplomatic engagement and downstream programs and operational support_. The USG should partner in DC and field locations with entities possessing DDR acumen. Experts should provide domestic and foreign entities advice on legal dispositions for DDR in VE settings leading to national and regional frameworks.

Recommendation 2: _The USG should increase Civil Military engagement where SAR and DDR interface through the US military._ Trainings to domestic and foreign militaries with the DoD a primary stakeholder should be provided by a US based company. Offering should be mission specific and include Leahy vetting sensitization, rules of engagement, and IHL and HR law and detention issues.

Recommendation 3: _USG policy and approaches to DDR as conceived by DoS and USAID should be informed by a uniform understanding of terms, approaches and "problem sets."_ A typology and taxonomy of DDR should be industry-wide and led by the USG. It should directly inform risk assessment and mitigation plans, due diligence, and M&E and reporting frameworks.

**Recommendation 4:** _A DC-based group of experts should shape a research and policy agenda based on the explicit recognition that DDR is dispositive to meeting USG stabilization objectives._ Working on dedicated DDR problem sets directly relevant to the SAR 3D approach, select policy institutes, think thanks, contractors and USG agencies should proactively advance "thought leadership" in this area.

X. SUMMARY CONCLUSION

This paper is not exhaustive—major issues are left out or addressed in a cursory manner. This is true for "traditional" DDR, as well as DDR in VE settings. The treatment of these subjects, or lack thereof, is in no way a reflection of their importance, rather a matter of discretion. One set of issues is fighter detainment in contemporary stabilization and DDR versus encampment and cantonment. These are closely aligned to notions of rehabilitation and "de-radicalization" which are taking place in open and closed centers; in the former XCs may leave, or be furloughed on weekends, and in the latter "exit" from a center occurs upon graduation. Lessons are being harvested in Somalia by the International Organization of Migration and Nigeria by Creative Associates. Another area deserving of attention is cross-border movement and regional approaches. Once a staple of DDR efforts, the dynamics of the FTF issue from non-contiguous countries is complicating the landscape—legally, operationally and programmatically. The World Bank, USG, IOM and Creative are prominent in this space.

Political reintegration is an area where more research is required. Notions of disbandment v. transformation are touched upon while issues of two-state solutions are not. Kosovo, Timor-Leste and South Sudan are relevant. Perhaps the Kurdish and Palestinian question will be in the future. How these affect commander incentives and SSR is not yet clear. Cases are divergent to say the least. Colombia has undergone a transformation process for the FARC not legally recognized in DDR terms by the USG, hampering support. In Burkina, a case can be made to address "preventative DDR", as a means to avoid a de-Baathification effect. This could be a political form of DDR that seeks accommodations with armed groups and power brokers before they end up on a DTO list. As well, emergent cases as issues outside the scope of this paper will come to the fore. In Venezuela various modalities tying political reintegration, SSR, disarmament and options for demobilization are likely. Veterans issues in Mozambique and Soviet-style pensions in Ukraine where there is a threat of political de-stabilization and mercenary issues require treatment. References to the intelligence sector, a prevailing actor, is passing at best. All said, what we don't know is as important as what we do. There is no clear delineation between the 3Ds in the SAR and DDR—they bleed into each other. Fortunately, this is not a necessary condition to move forward. **What we can fairly ascertain is that DDR is fit for purpose in the SAR, and that DDR is re-emergent in DC and global circles. The operative question remains – if not DDR, then what?**

1 SAR, i.

2 IDDRS, "1.10 Introduction to the IDDRS," 1.

3 Ibid, ii.

4 The most notable examples of DDRs being planned and undertaken in contexts where armed actors are DTO members is for Al-Shabaab in Somalia through the 'National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaging Combatants' and in Nigeria where efforts are underway to address threats emanating from Boko Haram through a Demobilization, Disassociation, Reintegration, and Reconciliation effort.

5 The notion of preventative DDR was developed by Creative Associates during a January 2018 assessment on DDR needs in Burkina Faso where it was determined that some violent extremist attacks in the Sahel attributed to groups from Mali started crossing the border into Burkina Faso beginning in April 2014. As attacks grew in frequency and severity, the need for CVE programming that includes DDR became clear. Particularly salient were attacks ostensibly perpetrated by the former Regiment du la Sécurité Presidentielle (RSP) unilateral disbandment. The notion was to provide DDR support to the RSP before they became listed as a DTO, which would render them a proscribed group unable to access support. Preventive DDR was a means to avoid the impact of the wholesale de-Baathification that contributed to the rise of ISIS in Iraq.

6 Lund, Michael, United States Institute for Peace (USIP), 2004. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/preventing_violent_conflict.pdf

7 "We define stabilization as a political endeavor involving an integrated civilian-military process to create conditions where locally legitimate authorities and systems can peaceably manage conflict and prevent a resurgence of violence. Transitional in nature, stabilization may include efforts to establish civil security, provide access to dispute resolution, and deliver targeted basic services, and establish a foundation for the return of displaced people and longer-term development."

8 Creative Learning, "Stabilization Symposium Executive Report," 2018, 3.

9 Summary of the US National Defense Strategy, page 3, posits that "States are the principal actors on the global stage, but non-state actors also threaten the security environment with increasingly sophisticated capabilities."

10 USAID Office of Transitional Initiatives. "Perspectives on Security Transitions," June 2017, 4.

11 "A process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding civilian livelihoods." IDDRS, "1.20 – Glossary: Terms and Definitions," 6.

12 Piedmont, 2015. 2-4.

11 UNDP categorizes 3 VE country types: epicentre countries such as Mali, Nigeria and Somalia where extremist groups are active; spill-over countries where the ramifications of extremist group operations are felt on many levels, and at-risk countries which exhibit some of the same underlying and root causes of VE as both epicentre and spill-over countries. United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP), "Preventing and Responding to Violent Extremism in Africa: A Development Approach," 6.

14 14 SAR, 1.

15 15 Ibid, 1.

16 16 USIP, "Beyond the Homeland, Protecting America from Extremism in Fragile States," September 2018.

17 Hoffman, Bruce, "Al-Qaeda's Resurrection," Council on Foreign Relations, New York, March 2018.

18 US Department of State, Fact Sheet, "Designated ISIS Branches and Individuals," Washington, D.C., February 2018."

19 Michelle Knights and Alexander Mello, "Losing Mosul, Regenerating in Diyala: How the Islamic State Could Exploit Iraq's Sectarian Tinderbox," CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point), Volume 9: Issue 10, October 2016.

20 In late 2015, the USG began assessments to determine the viability of undertaking DDR in Nigeria where the national government through the ONSA has put in place and considered plans to address both Boko Haram and the CJTF.

21 International Crisis Group (ICG), "Cameroon's Far North: A New Chapter in the Fight Against Boko Haram," August 2018.

22 USA National Defense Strategy, "Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the USA: Sharpening the American Military's Competitive Edge," page 3. The strategy notes that these issues remain an exigent threat despite the defeat of ISIS's physical caliphate.

23 Offers for Yemen's 'The Preventing Recruitment through Ex-Combatant Reintegration (PRE-R)' solicitation put out by USG in 2018 was based on estimates of more than a million fighters in need of reintegration in the case of a successful political settlement and/or peace process.

24 The New York Times, "Kurdish Fighters Discuss Releasing Almost 3,200 ISIS Prisoners," December 2018.

25 Muggah, R. and O'Donnell, C., "Next Generation Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration," Stability: International Journal of Security and Development,

4(1), DOI, p.Art. 30, 2015.

26 Piedmont, 2015, 2-4.

27 The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) provided packages of assistance alongside returning refugees; however, there was some skills training. In modern DDR programs, these "packages" are framed as Transitional Support Allowance; usually allotted along with training during "reinsertion." This occurs during the demobilization phase of DDR.

28 Piedmont, 2015, 3-4.

29 Ibid., 4.

30 "DDR/RR," Unmissions.org, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, January 2018. monusco.unmissions.org/en/ddrrr

31 The Brahimi Report, 7-8. https://undocs.org/A/55/305

32 Piedmont, 2015, 4.

33 Ibid., 4.

34 Molloy, 2017.

35 Von Dyck, Christopher, "DDR and SSR in War-to-Peace Transition SSR - Paper 14," Centre for Security Development and Rule of Law (DCAF), 2016, 10.

36 The concept of an ISM includes the introduction of measures that may be incorporated into DDR-like efforts that keep (former) fighter cohesiveness intact within a civilian and/or military structure with the intent of creating space for political dialogue and social and economic reintegration to take hold. See: Colletta, N., Samuelsson Schjorlien, J. & Berts, H., "Interim Stabilisation: Balancing Security and Development in Post-conflict Peacebuilding," Stockholm: Folke Bernadotte Academy. 2008.

37 IDDRS, "2.10 - The UN Approach to DDR," 1.

38 Maslen, Stuart-Casey, "Disengaged Combatants in Somalia: A Review of the Normative Framework," (UN Internal), Commissioned by the Bureau of Conflict Prevention and Recovery, UNDP, New York, September 2013, 8. Known as the international law of armed conflict or the law of war and generally applicable to armed conflict with the express aim to reduce duress and suffering of both civilians and XCs, it is also applicable to persons actively engaged in conflict, though this is a peripheral aim of IHL.

39 Ibid., 9-10. Human rights law exists to ensure the states respect individuals, promote his or her well-being, and protect their rights. To this end, it is unlawful to abuse a person in custody and where detained; persons (as detainees) must be treated humanely. A right to a fair trial is guaranteed. It is applicable at all times, though in times of "emergency" observance of certain aspects of these rights does not come into full compliance.

40 IDDRS, "6.20 - DDR and Transitional Justice," 18.

41 The use of amnesties in DDR efforts should be carefully considered. Even within a legal framework, intended effects should be measured with unintended consequences. The amnesty offered to XCs in the Niger Delta DDR was not well received. Many citizens perceive this as rewarding predatory actors—peace at the expense of justice. It is not helpful when amnesties offered as part of a DDR incentive package end up part and parcel to a sub-par DDR effort, also widely perceived as the case in Nigeria. Notably, in today's efforts the nature of the caseload and the fact that DDR is occurring during armed conflict greatly diminishes the use of amnesties as a tool for DDR.

42 Escola de Cultura de Pau, 7-8.

43 The OECD-DAC refers to SSR as Security System Reform. For the purposes of this paper Security Sector and Security System Reform are used interchangeably.

44 ANBP was akin to a traditional DDR seeking to "DDR" approximately 63,000 members of the Afghanistan Military Forces—discounting "ghost soldiers" that were discovered during the screening process and removed from the government payroll. The CIP provided "special incentive" packages to roughly 600 mid- and senior-level commanders as a means to ensure they would not act as "spoilers" to the peace process; the DIAG responded to criticism post-DDR that Afghanistan remained awash with illegally armed groups, cataloging upwards of 1,200; while APRP called for reconciliation of Anti-Government Elements with the central government through a DDR.

45 UNDP, "Report of the Evaluation of DDR and CIP in Afghanistan." The CIP sought to demobilize non-state actors by providing former jihad commanders with "secure sustainable employment" (4), strengthen armed security forces by integrating militants into Afghanistan National Army (7), utilize the Ministry of Defense (MoD) to spread news of the program, and tap the Afghan Institute of Training and Management to train commanders transitioning from military to civilian life (15-16).

46 Poulton, Robin-Edward. "DIAG Evaluation: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan." The Disarmament and Reintegration Commission was tapped to oversee DIAG programs (9); the MoD responsible for destruction of seized arms (11). New Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan unit was created within MoI's CT Department (13). The DIAG helped provincial governors negotiate surrender/license of weapons, using District Development Assembly projects as a "carrot" (15). Responsibility for weapon management/collection transferred from military to police under DIAG, in order to better share weapon management responsibilities (16).

47 47 Islamic Republic of Afghanistan National Security Council D&R-Commission, "Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program (APRP)," April 2010, 3. APRP's goal is peace promotion through a political approach that encourages Taliban fighters and leaders aligned with armed opposition and extremist groups to renounce violence and join a constructive process of reintegration.

48 48 "Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Sudan." Stemming from the 2005 CPA, the IDDRP aimed to separate the armed forces of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) and the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) in the run up to the 2011 referendum where Sudan and South Sudan emerged as two separate states. The DDR in Darfur was an example of the government of Sudan negotiating several binary peace agreements with armed groups, a clear deviation from the principles and preconditions laid out in the IDDRS, while DDR under the ESPA ranks as one of the most successful to be undertaken.

49 49 OECD, page 105.

50 50 USAID, "Inventory of USAID Security Sector Governance and Institution Building Programs," 1.

51 51 Ibid., 1.

52 52 Poulton, Robin-Edward, "DIAG Evaluation: Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups in Afghanistan." The DIAG plan relies upon state and non-state actors simultaneously: gun permits are only issued when a tribal elder, along with a police officer and the district governor, sees the weapon and vouches for the prospective gun owner's character (45). The police were the public security force chosen to be in charge of weapon registration, collection, and destruction, whereas previously the military held sole responsibility (15). Provincial Reconstruction Teams, which essentially utilize soldiers as development agents, have been created by the International

Security Assistance Force to improve security in advance of DIAG implementation, but with limited effects (19). District Development Assemblies (DDA) and Community Development Committees (CDC) engage with civil society to implement development projects in local regions. They are used as the "carrot" under DIAG: if all illegal armed groups in a district surrender their arms and give a "good behavior promise," the DDA or CDC is given a USD 300,000 grant (15). The Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, led by Vice President Karim Khalili and Minister of Information Mohammed Stanekzai, coordinated governmental DDR efforts and collaboration with the UNDP and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (12). The Ministry of Interior gave disarmament a special focus by establishing a dedicated DIAG unit within its Counter-Terrorism Department (13), which established four databases tracking weapon licenses, weapon identification, illegal armed groups, and private security companies (18).

53 "Interim Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Programme for Sudan." The CPA originally sought to provide XCs with cash payments over time, vocational and emotional counselling within communities (30), and mental health services at Khartoum military hospital (55), mostly through civilian line ministries and civil society. Notably, the CPA that made provisions for a referendum in 2011 that would result in unity for Sudan or a two-state solution legitimized as formal security forces the SPLA and SAF. As small arms and light weapons would be the property of the sovereign government irrespective of referendum outcomes, disarmament was not part of CPA. The SAF and SPLA were responsible for their own disarmament without verification processes; weapons were often re-deployed after being "surrendered" (Stockholm Policy Group 19). CSOs took the lead on women integration (Ibid. 46). The two also self-reported fighters' eligibility for demobilization benefits, again without verification mechanisms (Ibid. 23). Notably, 15,000 former SPLA integrated into police (Ibid. 21). XCs chose from four reintegration options (agriculture, small business, vocational training, adult education), facilitated by local NGOs and private sector organizations (38).

54 Piedmont, 2012, 101-102.

55 Von Dyck, Christopher, 10.

56 DPKO, 5.

57 UN Secretary General Policy Committee,

"Decision No. 20110/28 – Review of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Arrangements," November 2010, 1. Corresponding to the Brahimi Report outcomes, the policy decision called for the establishment of multi-year funding modalities to ensure "windows of opportunity" are not missed to support reintegration.

58 UN General Assembly—Report of the Secretary General, A/60/705, "Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration," March 2006, 8.

59 SAR, 8.

60 DPKO, 9, 22, 28-29.

61 Von Dyck, Christopher, 9.

62 IDDRS, "1.20 – Glossary: Terms and Definitions," 19. The IDDRS defines reinsertion as: assistance offered to ex-combatants during demobilization but prior to the longer-term process of reintegration. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance to help cover the basic needs of ex-combatants and their families and can include transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment and tools. While reintegration is a long-term, continuous social and economic process of development, reinsertion is short-term material and/or financial assistance to meet immediate needs, and can last up to one year. (Secretary-General, note to the General Assembly, A/C.5/59/31, May 2005).

63 In a response to the Namibian Ministry of Veteran's Affairs to assess the viability and costing for a program to assist veterans of the Liberation Struggle, the assessment required attending to children of veterans who were demanding "reintegration" entitlements. The British Commissioner commented that the upcoming election would be the first time that "born free-ers" would be voting who were not bound ideologically to SWAPO. One youth interviewed noted he and his colleagues were 'born into SWAPO...they didn't join and may be the first generation not to die in SWAPO,' underpinning the considerable political sway and sensitivity related to the upcoming national elections, and long-term impact on veteran's issues in DDR. See: Piedmont, Dean, "BCPR Mission to Namibia: Scoping Mission for the Ministry of Veteran's Affairs in Namibia Residual Reintegration of War Veterans from the Liberation Struggle," (UN Internal), June 2009.

64 The CPC DDR is a requirement under the 2014 Brussels Agreement as per Article 8. Accession to Article 8 for Serbia and Kosovo would advance their aims of

joining the EU. See: Piedmont, Dean, "Kosovo Strategic Note for DDR for Civilian Protection Corps," (UN Internal), February 2014, 2.

65 Piedmont, 2015, 4.

66 Colletta, Nat and Piedmont, Dean (co-author), "The UN Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Issues Paper," (UN Internal), July 2013, 3.

67 Berdal, Mats and Ucko David H. (2009, 6) make the point that a restrictive understanding of political reintegration confined to the formation of political parties that take part in democratic processes in a post-conflict setting may not be optimal; one reason is the limited chances for success relative to the complexity of the task.

68 Colletta, Nat and Piedmont, Dean (co-author), 3.

69 The attempt to transform the RUF into a political entity was not viable for these reasons. It would have been easier, and perhaps more politically palpable, to dismantle the group from the onset. See: Berdal, Mats and Ucko David H., 2009, 6

70 The DDR effort in Somalia is called 'The National Programme for the Treatment and Handling of Disengaged Combatants.'

71 Efforts at DDR of ISIS may have first taken shape with a UNDP Government of Sudan's Sudan National Commission for Countering Terrorism effort called "Partnering Against Violent Extremism." Analyzing data sets from "disengaged" ISIS members, their families and long-term Guantanamo detainees, PAVE sought to understand the link between CVE, reintegration and VE. While not a typical DDR effort, the initiative was born of successful efforts between the UN and Sudan's DDR Commission from the CPA era. Other efforts are taking shape in West Africa where ISIS-West Africa may be supplanting Boko Haram as a primary VE group.

72 The PINE is a nationally driven stabilization and development effort coordinated by ONSA. At the time of this mission the government of Nigeria entities were discussing who had the mandates for initiatives and efforts such as PINE and DDR. See: USAID, "Draft Discussion Paper on Defections", January 2016, 3-4.

73 "During the pre-planning phase of the UN's involvement in a post-conflict peacekeeping or peace-building context, the identification of an appropriate role for the UN in supporting DDR efforts should be based on timely assessments and ements."

21

analyses of the situation and its requirements." IDDRS, "3.10 Integrated DDR Planning: Processes and Structures," 5.

74 In March 2018, IOM attend the first Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) graduation ceremony for 95 XCs with an additional 159 expected to graduate. Interview, International Organization of Migration (IOM) Representative in Nigeria, August 2018.

75 USAID, "Evaluation Report Colombia Transforma Program Mid-Term Performance Evaluation," May 2018, 12.

76 Ibid., 12.

77 A quick examination of the Cameroon Presidential Decree reveals that it does provide a national legal framework under a specified governing authority to undertake DDR; however, it is not determined whether the decree runs afoul of national CT law. The mandate provided National Disarmament Committee, Demobilization and Reintegration (CNDDR) directly corresponds with 'traditional' DDR. Even so, corresponding with 'traditional' DDR, the decree and CNDDR does not account for the special circumstance of Boko Haram as a DTO except with reference to 'de-radicalization' during reintegration. Reintegration support runs a risk of running afoul of USG 'material support' clauses similar to the case of Colombia. See: Republique du Cameroun, Le President de la Republique, "Cre'ation du Comite' National de De'sarmement, de De'mobilisation et de Re'integration," November 2018.

78 The right to a remedy for victims of violations of human rights is found in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 8), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child (Art. 39), the 1984 Convention against Torture (Art. 14), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 2), among other instruments.

79 IOM, January 2018; 2, 12, 16, 18-19.

80 Piedmont, Dean, "Kosovo Strategic Note for DDR for Civilian Protection Corps," (UN Internal), February 2014, 2, 4.

80 Options included Mine Action, notably effective as an economic livelihood opportunity and psychosocial transition from military towards a civilian identity; the education sector as teachers—an option employed in Afghanistan for over 800 women in communities receiving back XCs; public works projects similar to efforts in Kosovo, South Sudan and Afghanistan; and commander incentive options that would integrate mid- and senior-level commanders into government posts. UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR), "The Reintegration of former FARC-EP into Public Institutions," (Internal), September 2015, 1-2.

82 In Borno State, several security sector and related public service sector entities are already planning to accept BOYES/CJTF members: Fire Brigades, Department of State Services, State Security Service, the army, police, National Drug Law Enforcement Agency, the Nigerian Road Safety Corps, the Nigerian Prison Service, and the Nigerian Civil Defense Corps. Creative Associates International, "An Operational Strategic Plan for Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration," November 2017, 7.

83 Department of State, "Fact Sheet - Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights, And Labor," March 2018.

84 Nigeria 2017 Human Rights Report. https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/277277.pdf

85 Department of State & USAID. "Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism," May 2016, 6.

86 Responding to a USAID solicitation for a DDR in Yemen, "Preventing Recruitment through Ex-combatant Reintegration," Creative Associates International cited over 1 million fighters potentially in need of reintegration assistance should a peace settlement come to fruition. Funding Opportunity Number SFOOPOOO4338, June 2018, 3.

87 USAID/OTI, "Yemen Stabilization Initiative Final Performance Evaluation – Evaluation of Program Assisting the Yemeni Government to Address Destabilizing Factors in Insecure Regions," December 2015, 10.

88 Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), "Drivers of Violent Extremism: Hypotheses and Literature Review," October 2015; 4-8, 11.

89 Piedmont, 2015, 7.

90 In 2013, DDR continued as the recommended policy instrument to support a government-led CT strategy and military offense. In these early efforts, twelve fighter classifications were used interchangeably. These included defectors, XCs, disengaged XCs, disengaged fighters, escapees, returnees, captured, surrounded, fighters, disengaged combatant and voluntarily disengaged. In the end they all came under a rubric of "disengaged fighters." Colletta, Nat and Piedmont, Dean (co-author), 3.

91 Percentages are based on a Likert scale from 1-5 with higher percentages correlating to the degree of importance respondents attach to a given 'reintegration' domain. IOM, January 2018; 2-4, 11.

92 Proceeding from an August evaluation of its programs in northeast Nigeria specific to the DDR Cluster, Creative Associates is charting intervention efficacy taking note that the process has not advanced far enough to determine how former fighters and affiliates will fare after release from custodial authorities; in other words, upon reinsertion and reintegration.

93 Department of State Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations, "Defections & Disengaged Fighters."

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