ELECTORAL SECURITY ASSESSMENT

HAITI

Task Order No: AID-521-O-15-00038

September 2015

Haiti Electoral Security Framework Electoral Security Assessment

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I. Executive Summary

Introduction and Assessment Organization

From July 13 to August 5, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Haiti, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The objective of the assessment was to identify and propose recommendations for the prevention and management of violence experienced in Haitian elections. The assessment was conducted in three stages. First, a one-day workshop was conducted for representatives of the Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP), CEP security, and the Citizens' Observatory for the Institutionalization of Democracy in Haiti (OCID). In the second stage, the assessment team divided into two groups. One group conducted meetings in northern Haiti in the cities of Saint-Marc, Hinche, Gonaïves, and Cap-Haïtien. The second group travelled south and conducted meetings in Les Cayes, Jacmel, Miragoâne, and Petit Goâve. In the third stage, on August 4, initial findings from the assessment were presented in briefings to USAID and other government representatives.

Security and Political Environment

This assessment was conducted in a dynamic security and political environment, with circumstances changing on a daily basis; both while the assessment team was in Haiti and after their departure during the subsequent report development. There were a series of violent incidents in late June and early July, which served to foster an initial environment of intimidation surrounding the elections. However, during the initial interviews of the teams in the North and South during the week of July 20, there were few incidents of electoral violence reported. Additionally, political campaign activities were minimal.

This early lack of incidents was attributed to several factors. First, while there were disqualifications of some presidential and legislative candidates, there was not a resulting set of "spoilers" in the process, that is, a political grouping or tendency that was completely shut out of the process. Second, in the early days of the assessment, as a result of the lack of public funding and money from other campaign finance sources, campaign activities were kept at a minimum, producing fewer targets in terms of incidents at campaign events, or public attacks on candidates while campaigning. And third, despite the recognition that the election would occur, doubts in the public mind persisted that the election would take place because of the CEP's delays in several important responsibilities including the distribution of the voter registry, the recruitment and training of Supervisors, Membres de Bureaux de Vote (MBVs), and Agents de Sécurité Électoral (ASEs). The distribution of the Carte d'Identification Nationale (CINs) was also cited as a concern; however, that distribution is the responsibility of the Office National d'Identification (ONI) and not the CEP.

For sub-national election staff of the CEP, there was a ten-month delay in providing payroll and funding at the BED and BEC offices. The lack of sub-national funding reflected a broader issue of the CEP's relationship and communications with BEDs and BECs as their implementing partners in electoral administration.

With the start of the week of July 27, the reports of incidents of electoral violence increased and continued to Election Day. In the pre-election phase, these incidents included homicides, physical assaults, disruption of political meetings, and property destruction/arson. Attacks on women candidates and their supporters were reported. PNH have also been the target of local attacks including several off-duty officers who were murdered.

From an international dynamics perspective, this electoral cycle is transitional, where MINUSTAH is further withdrawing its military and police assets, requiring a commensurate, yet thus far unachieved, enhancement of PNH capacities.

The PNH is generally viewed as having improved in its professionalization over the past two or three years. However, PNH pointed out that they did not have sufficient personnel (12,000 officers), vehicles, or communications equipment to fully secure voting on Election Day.

Impunity is also fostered by "immunity" for candidates and elected officials. There are supposed legal protections for candidates and elected officials that shield them from unwarranted arrest. However, in practice, immunity has lost this focus and serves now as a status for these political actors to behave as they wish. Its basis in law is elusive to identify.

While not without its societal impact, the situation regarding Haitian nationals and those of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic (DR) was not yet registering as a high concern during the period of the assessment. The only associated linkage identified on this assessment was an increase in demand for national identity documents because of a rumor that individuals without documents could be arrested and to assure that they would be distinguished from those coming in from the DR.

Finally, absent from the issues emerging in the interviews were reference to activities by the Haitian diaspora. However, while such connections should be monitored, there were no reports of such a direct diaspora role in the electoral violence.

Baseline Electoral Conflict Profile

August 9 – First Round Parliamentary Election

Pre-Election Phase

During late June and early July, before the commencement of the official campaign period there was a spate of deadly incidents in the Port-au-Prince area with political undertones. While direct correlations cannot be made between these events and the elections, the timing, targets, and severity of these incidents served to foster an early environment of intimidation. As the campaign period formally commenced, the political landscape was largely peaceful. As discussed above, the explanations for the paucity of incidents included an uncertainty about whether the election would occur, voter apathy, and the lack of campaign funds and activities. But, during the course of the late July/ early August campaign period, media and official reports showed an increase in the number of violent incidents related to the elections. The victims largely represented opposition candidates and their supporters while several

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cases of electoral violence against women have also been identified. The tactics employed included homicide, physical assaults, destruction of campaign materials, shooting at candidates' vehicles, and meeting disruptions. Weapons utilized included firearms, machetes, and rocks. The geographical locations largely conformed to the "red zone" coding system by MINUSTAH. Incident venues included rallies, campaign activity sites (such as putting up posters), and in candidates' homes.

Election Day Phase

Election Day incidents involved dissatisfied and angry voters, rivaling mandataires, and attacks on polls. In several locations, large crowds pressed into polling stations effectively capturing the locations and halting the balloting. Mandataires were cited in international and domestic observation reports as persistent sources of conflict and intimidation within polling stations and their environs. Sensitive election materials continued to be targets even after the close of polls.

Post-Election Phase

The post-election incidents have involved protests and clashes between candidates, their supporters and election officials over the vote tabulations and anticipated outcomes. There have also been arrests of candidates on firearms and assaults charges.

Electoral Violence Intensity

Based upon the criteria in the Electoral Security Framework to measure the intensity of the violence, the August 9 electoral cycle would be rated as a 2, with 0 representing no violence and 3 representing severe violence. The rationale for selecting Code Level 2 is based upon the metric that this level is the threshold for incidents of violence involving homicides, which is consistent with the conflict profile revealed in the assessment.

Upcoming Presidential, Parliamentary, and Local Elections

Implications for October 25 and December 27 Electoral Cycles

While this conflict dynamic will be occurring on the national level, a different dynamic will be occurring on the local level. In local government contests, the political competition is often familial, personal, or the result of other local economic or social rivalries. As a result, the conflict could occur between candidates (there are probably not many active supporters on this level) with known grudges or grievances. Political parties will not be the influence that they are on the national level. Because of the large number of ballots and candidates, the local elections are more complex logistically than a national election alone. As such, the quality of electoral administration can also be a factor in whether Election Day and the post-election phase are peaceful or not; just as was seen in August.

Mitigating Factors

Mitigating factors that served to dampen the potential for violence in this electoral cycle include a reduction in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) population, lack of hate speech, lack of boycotts, and presence of national observers. While there was no boycott for the August 9 election, as cited above, Vérité and potentially INITE are boycotting the October 25 election.

Structural Drivers of Electoral Violence

The programmatic response to counter electoral violence can be constructed on three levels: 1) strategic objectives; 2) programming sectors; and 3) chronology. There are four strategic objectives associated with these program recommendations: 1) improve electoral administration; 2) reduce the culture of impunity; 3) de-conflict political relationships; and 4) foster a public intolerance for electoral violence. Second, given the complexity of the electoral conflict profile, the programmatic approach should be multi-sectoral in scope and involve state, non-state, and international stakeholders engaging in the following activities: electoral administration; political parties; civil society; rule of law; women; youth; security sector reform; and livelihoods. And, third, the programming should be organized into four chronological stages: 1) Post-August 9 review; 2) October 25 preparations; 3) December 27 preparations; and 4) Re-structuring drivers of electoral violence.

Stage 1 – Post-Election-August 9

The following are program recommendations for the immediate follow-up to the August 9 elections:

1) Conduct a detailed diagnostic of the electoral violence experience in the August 9 electoral cycle, creating a searchable database to house the profile data, and a mapping platform;
2) Review the call-in archives from the voter information call center, observer emergency call center, and women's emergency call center;
3) Review the experience of the new selection process for MBVs;
4) MINUSTAH, CEP, and PNH should conduct an After Action Review (AAR) to assess the performance of their electoral security planning;
5) Extract insights and profiles on the use of state resources for campaign purposes by OCID monitors;
6) Obtain the arrest records for the 147 people detained on Election Day and profile their political affiliations and follow their cases for follow-up prosecution; and
7) Review the record of formal electoral complaints filed and adjudicated with the national, departmental, and communal complaints boards.

Stage 2 – Pre-Election - October 25

The following are program recommendations in preparation for the October 25 elections:

8) A point person in the international community should be identified to manage the issue of electoral violence among international and national stakeholders for the balance of the electoral cycle;

9) Introduce electoral violence and fraud monitoring methodology for international observer groups to employ in their monitoring activities;
10) Establish a project to monitor and mine social media for potential threats of violence against particular candidates or to organize mass protest actions; and
11) Encourage the CEP to establish a permanent political party consultative mechanism (PPCM).

Stage 3 – Pre-Election – December 27

Ascertain which of the program actions 1 through 7 are relevant to be conducted again and updated into the December electoral context.

Stage 4 - Restructuring Drivers of Electoral Violence

Restructuring Internal Drivers of Electoral Violence

Lack of Permanent Electoral Institutions **-** With the local elections conducted, a permanent electoral management council should be established.

Electoral Management Body (EMB) Model – The current sectoral model can be reformed to a mixed model with one representative of the five political parties holding the largest number of seats in the parliament (combined Deputy and Senate) and four members from civil society-at-large..

Electoral System **-** While the prospects for reforming the electoral system are low, if such reform is under consideration, the following model can be evaluated. The majoritarian system for the Chamber of Deputies can be changed to that of a List Proportional Representation (PR) system. The Senate can remain departmentally-based so that constituency service is not ignored.

Political Party System **-** Strengthening the political party system is linked to several other program actions - the establishment of a PPCM by the CEP, political party representation on the CEP, the political finance issue is relevant and discussed below.

Electoral Stakes **-** Modifying the benefits of holding of public office would be difficult through conventional internal reform initiatives. These benefits are well guarded by elected officials.

Reform advocates should await an opportunity for a triggering event and seize on such a trigger to provoke reform.

Political Finance/Use of State Resources **-** The CEP should be engaged to provide more rigorous enforcement of the current political finance regulations, potentially engaging the PPCM in an enforcement role as well.

Restructuring External Drivers of Electoral Violence

<u>Culture of Impunity</u> **-** After the conduct of this three-round electoral cycle, an examination the electoral violence should be conducted with a perspective on evaluating the role of the leadership behind the violence. If the scale and orchestration warrants it, an ad hoc transitional justice mechanism can be established.

<u>PNH Capacity</u> **-** The trajectory for capacity building and professionalism of the PNH seems to be an appropriate one.

<u>Availability of Illicit Firearms</u> **-** Just as the distinction was made about the weapons being pre-existing or new, the strategy for the reduction in illicit firearms should be bifurcated to address these two firearms dynamics through seizures and "buy back" programs.

<u>Economic Issues</u> **-** Economic solutions are protracted at best and are the least responsive to short and medium term programming. Election-related economic programming will not eliminate poverty but must be configured to mitigate the impact of economic drivers on fostering electoral violence, for example youth at-risk and women's economic empowerment programs.

Conclusions

The assessment revealed the new profile of electoral conflict dynamics in Haiti. With years of election postponement and rule by decree, new political rivalries have developed and this election was the first opportunity for these rivalries to be played out in a violent context. While the violence has an immediate impact on the conduct of the election, affecting turnout, campaigning, and outcomes; its long-term impact is deleterious to public perceptions about the efficacy of elections to decide questions of governance. However, specific programming has been proven effective at countering electoral violence. The program recommendations put forward in this assessment provide a strategic, multi-sectoral, and phased response to the patterns of violence experienced in August. In so doing, the level of violence can be reduced in 2015 and the structural drivers addressed for long-term solutions to the persistence of violence in Haiti's elections.

II.   Introduction and Assessment Organization

From July 13 to August 5, Creative Associates International (Creative) conducted an electoral security assessment in Haiti, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The objective of the assessment was to identify and propose recommendations for the prevention and management of violence experienced in Haitian elections. This objective was fulfilled through three levels of assessment:

1) To identify the baseline vulnerabilities for violence to occur on the August 9 first round parliamentary electoral cycle and propose countermeasures;

2) To forecast the potential baseline threats of violence to occur during the October 25 and December 27 cycle of presidential, local, and parliamentary second round elections and propose countermeasures; and

3) To analyze the structural drivers underpinning the persistence of violence as a characteristic of Haitian elections conducted since 1987 and propose restructuring measures.

The year 1987 is benchmarked for two reasons. First, it was the first general election conducted after the collapse of the Duvalier family regime, thus signaling an opening of the political environment; a goal continuing to this day. Second, those elections were marred by pre-election violence in attacks on Duvalier opponents; and the Election Day massacre at the Argentine School. This event led to the cancelling of the elections and the next elections did not take place until December 1990.

Creative conducted an electoral security assessment in Haiti in the Autumn of 2012, in anticipation of elections being conducted in 2013. For this current initiative, that assessment was employed as a historical reference for examining issues that remain pertinent to this day. Recommendations from the 2012 assessment that remain relevant include the following:

- Training for CEP members and staff on the principles of electoral security administration;

- Assure that the paper procès-verbal is posted in a secure location at the polling station and require the polling station supervisor to take a photograph of it;

- Establish a permanent political party consultative mechanism; and

- Conduct special outreach programs and engagement for youth during the electoral cycle.

The assessment methodology employed in the electoral conflict dynamic analysis is that of USAID, as developed by Creative, and found in two publications: 1) *Electoral Security Framework: Technical Guidance Handbook for Democracy and Governance Officers*[1]; and 2) *Best Practices in Electoral Security: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance Programming*.[2]

A list of acronyms is shown in Annex I.

The assessment was conducted in three stages. First, a one-day workshop was conducted for representatives of the Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP), CEP security, and the Citizens' Observatory for the Institutionalization of Democracy in Haiti (OCID). OCID is a recently-formed consortium of Haitian civil society organizations (CSOs) with previous election observation experience including the Civil Society Initiative (ISC), the Ecumenical Center for Human Rights (CEDH) and JURIMEDIA. The workshop provided an overview of the Electoral Security Framework methodology and principles of electoral security administration.

The Links to these publications are below:
[1]https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/1-Electoral-Security-Framework.pdf
[2]https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID.pdf

The workshop program was organized into four modules:

Module One: Concepts and Types of Election-Related Conflict
Module Two: Profiling Electoral Conflict Dynamics
Module Three: Electoral Security Administration
Module Four: Findings from the 2012 Electoral Security Assessment

The workshop attendees also participated in the second stage of the assessment; the field interviews.

In the second stage, the assessment team divided into two groups. One group conducted meetings in northern Haiti in the cities of Saint-Marc, Hinche, Gonaïves, and Cap-Haïtien. The second group travelled south and conducted meetings in Les Cayes, Jacmel, Miragoâne, and Petit Goâve. The north team was led by Jeff Fischer and the south team was led by Bruce Hatch. After the field assessments, Fischer and Hatch then conducted interviews in Port-au-Prince. Mr. Fischer is a Senior Electoral Advisor with Creative. He has extensive experience with both electoral violence and Haitian elections. Mr. Fischer was the lead writer for the two USAID publications cited above and has conducted numerous electoral security assessments. Mr. Fischer's experience in Haiti extends back to 1987 when he advised the first CEP. He was the co-director of the International Foundation for Electoral Systems' (IFES) electoral assistance project in 1990-1991. And, he led the electoral security assessment conducted in Haiti in 2012. Mr. Hatch is an international election operations expert with a special focus on electoral assistance programming in conflictive electoral environments. Since 1993, he has worked in over 20 countries. During the 1995 Haiti election, Mr. Hatch coordinated the development of the candidates' database and ballot production. In 2010, he was a member of the UN Election Feasibility Assessment Mission to Haiti. And, in 2011 he was a member of the OAS/CARICOM Joint Electoral Observation Mission (JEOM) in Haiti.

In each north and south location, the groups organized two sets of meetings. The first meeting was attended by state and international stakeholders involved with electoral security, including staff from the local Bureaux Electoral Departmental (BEDs) and Communales (BECs), Police Nationale d'Haiti (PNH), and the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). While the interviews conducted provided the assessment team with insights for its report, the meetings also served the participants by creating a forum to discuss the pertinent electoral security questions facing them. The second meeting was with representatives of CSOs that were to be engaged in election observation or civic education programs. OCID had the lead in organizing the attendance at these meetings. Representatives of the assessment teams subsequently met to discuss findings and recommendations for the assessment report. Guidelines for interview questions were provided and are shown in Annex II.

In the third stage, on August 4, initial findings from the assessment were presented in briefings to USAID and other government representatives.

III. Security and Political Environment

This assessment was conducted in a dynamic security and political environment, with circumstances changing on a daily basis; both while the assessment team was in Haiti and after their departure during the subsequent report development. The chronology of the assessment and report writing for the August 9 election has included the pre-election phase, Election Day, and post-election phase. There were a series of violent incidents in late June and early July, which served to foster an initial environment of intimidation surrounding the elections. However, during the initial interviews by the teams in the north and south during the week of July 20, there were few incidents of electoral violence reported. Additionally, political campaign activities were minimal.

This early lack of incidents was attributed to several issues. First, while there were disqualifications of some presidential and legislative candidates, there was not a resulting set of "spoilers" in the process, that is, a political grouping or tendency that was completely shut out of the process. In fact, there was a surge in candidacies – 41,000 in all three elections including 55 presidential candidates; 262 senate candidates for 20 seats; 1,777 deputy candidates for 119 seats; and the balance for local offices. There were 6,102 elective posts in total. This phenomenon may have a created an "absorption effect" on early electoral violence because there were too many candidates and rivalries had not yet crystallized.

Second, as a result of the lack of public funding and money from other campaign finance sources, campaign activities were kept at a minimum, producing fewer targets in terms of incidents at campaign events, or public attacks on candidates while campaigning.

And third, despite the recognition that the election would occur, doubts in the public mind persisted that the election would take place because of the CEP's delays in several important responsibilities including the distribution of the voter registry, the recruitment and training of Supervisors, Membres de Bureaux de Vote (MBVs), and Agents de Sécurité Électoral (ASEs). The distribution of the Carte d'Identification Nationale (CINs) was also cited as a concern, however, that distribution is the responsibility of the Office National d'Identification (ONI) and not the CEP. These doubts created a level of voter apathy about the elections in general.

Sub-national CEP staff had an additional concern, there was a ten-month delay in providing payroll and funding at the BED and BEC offices. The lack of sub-national funding reflected a broader issue of the CEP's relationship and communications with BEDs and BECs as their implementing partners in electoral administration. Further pressuring its capacities, the CEP also had to manage a 38.1 percent increase in the number of voters and a 38.5 percent increase in the number of polling stations. A matrix of polls and voters is shown as Annex III.

With the start of the week of July 27, the reports of incidents of electoral violence increased and continued through Election Day. In the pre-election phase, these incidents included homicides, physical assaults, disruption of political meetings, and property destruction/ arson. Attacks on women candidates and their supporters were reported. PNH have also been the target of attacks including several off-duty officers who were murdered On Election Day, the violence was directed at supervisors and MBVs at the polling centers and stations

including: hostage-taking, facility invasion, and destruction/theft of electoral materials. Violence was also reported between political rivals, primarily the mandataires, who are candidate and political party agents, in and around polling centers. A more detailed description of the electoral conflict profile is discussed later in this report.

From an international dynamics perspective, this electoral cycle is transitional, where MINUSTAH is further withdrawing its military and police assets, requiring a commensurate, yet thus far unachieved, enhancement of PNH capacities. The MINUSTAH withdrawals have occurred in the Northeast, Northwest, Central Plateau, Grand'Anse, the Nippes, and Southeast; with assets remaining in the North, Artibonite, South, and West. This resulted in 2,207 United Nations Police (UNPOL) officers available for electoral security deployments during this electoral cycle.

The PNH is generally viewed as having improved in its professionalization over the past two or three years. However, PNH pointed out that they did not have sufficient personnel (12,000 officers), vehicles, or communications equipment to fully secure voting on Election Day. There are two additional points to consider within this context of security: 1) decentralization of policing; and 2) justice. Decentralization in electoral security planning in PNH's command and control has two contradicting dimensions. First, decentralization is useful, and arguably necessary, because threats are localized and there is no "one size fits all" in such electoral security planning. However, while the progress made in professionalization is noted above, it is not complete, with some local police speculated to be directed and politicized by local political leaders.

The PNH requires a functioning judicial system so that the arrests they make are prosecuted. Such a justice component has been elusive and is at the root of the culture of impunity that exists for both the organizers of violence and many of their enforcers. This issue also concerns Justices of the Peace, who are engaged by the PNH in such actions as the seizure of arms. In one case reported during the interviews, the local Justice of the Peace refused to accompany the PNH to the site, citing concerns about reprisal from local political leaders. This culture of impunity has extended to the use of state resources, such as vehicles and staff, for campaign purposes without consequence in spite of a prohibition on such use in Article 121.1 of the election decree which reads, "No State materials, goods, and vehicles can be used for campaign purposes by candidates, political parties, or political groupings". During this electoral cycle, OCID indicated that the use of state resources by candidates will be noted in their observer reports.

Impunity is also fostered by "immunity" for candidates and elected officials. There are supposed legal protections for candidates and elected officials that shield them from unwarranted arrest. However, in practice, immunity has lost this focus and serves now as a status for these political actors to behave as they wish. Its basis in law is elusive to identify. Presidential pardons have also become instruments to free politically-connected perpetrators.

The CEP has assumed additional operational responsibility in election logistics. The total budget of $74 million for the three rounds of elections is supported by international donors; however most of the budget is covered by the Haitian treasury. Nevertheless, due to

insufficient technical and operational capacity, the CEP requested that the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) organize, coordinate, and conduct the distribution of sensitive election materials beginning three days before Election Day and the retrieval of sensitive materials beginning on election night.

While not without its societal impact, the situation regarding Haitian nationals and those of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic (DR) was not yet registering as a high concern during the period of the assessment. The only associated linkage identified on this assessment was an increase in demand for national identity documents because of a rumor that individuals without documents could be arrested and to assure that they would be distinguished from those coming in from the DR.

Finally, absent from the issues emerging in the interviews were references to activities by the Haitian diaspora. Diaspora voting is not permitted and those seeking to cast ballots must obtain a CIN and return to Haiti to vote. In some country contexts, diasporas can play provocative roles in fueling electoral violence through rhetoric or financing. However, while such connections should be monitored, there were no reports of such a direct diaspora role in the electoral violence.

These factors in the security and political environment can be distilled into the following common themes.

Security Themes

- There was an initial low level of electoral violence but the frequency and intensity of the incidents was increasing during the course of the week.

- While the political will and professionalism of the PNH was widely noted, PNH capacity is stretched and incapable of providing comprehensive physical security for all stakeholders, facilities, and materials.

- There were regular coordination mechanisms in place to manage the electoral security operations among the CEP, PNH, MINUSTAH, UNPOL, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).

- There will be too many mandataires, the rotation system will have to be ad hoc if it happens at all, and may result in conflict among mandataires. (The day before Election Day the CEP announced that there would be a five-mandataire limit within polling stations).

- There is a culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence.

- The perceptions of the vulnerability of women to electoral violence differed between men and women, with men generally not viewing it as a problem and women generally viewing it as a problem.

Campaign Themes

- There was a low intensity and visibility in campaigning until an anticipated "final push" just before Election Day.

- There was a lack of funding for campaign activities.

Election Preparation Themes

- There were communications gaps between the CEP and BED/BEC offices.

- The CEP was financially in arrears to the BEDs/BECs by as much as ten months.

- There was slow recruitment and training of Supervisors, MBVs, and ASEs.

- There was a late distribution of voter registries and concern about voter awareness of their correct polling station.

Summaries of each field meeting are provided in Annex IV.

IV. State, Non-State and International Electoral Security Stakeholders

The following section provides a summary profile of the activities associated with electoral security stakeholders.

A. *State Stakeholders*

1. *Regulatory Stakeholders*

a. Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP)

The CEP remains a "provisional" body, as it has been since 1987. In the pre-election phase, the general impression from all sectors was that this CEP was more capable and impartial than previous ones. This impression was largely due to confidence in the President of the CEP, Mr. Pierre-Louis Opont, who had previously served as its Director General. However, given the experience on Election Day, public opinion has largely turned against the CEP and Mr. Opont in the post-election phase.

The CEP was described as "re-appropriating" the election administration process from international stakeholders, an indicator of the transitional environment described above. MINUSTAH was described as making a "soft, progressive departure" from electoral assistance. Nevertheless, the UN is said to be filling some of the communications gaps between the CEP and BEDs/BECs, as described above through various offices.

The electoral decree of March 2015 has been described as superior to the previous election law in that it provides more detailed procedural descriptions, redesigns the electoral

complaints mechanism, and gives the CEP the authority to draft regulations; authority it did not previously possess. However, thus far the CEP is not yet using this important regulatory drafting authority. IFES and MINUSTAH have been encouraging the CEP to draft an internal regulation to guide their operational protocols as a Council.

As far as pre-election successes are concerned, the online registration of nearly 40,000 candidates has been well-regarded as has the production of ballots and the organization of polling materials into kits for distribution. However, as noted above, the delay with the voter registration, personnel recruitment and training, communications gaps, and slow payments to BEDs and BECs were concerns universally expressed about the CEP's performance.

For Election Day, the CEP established an Emergency Cell at the central offices involving CEP, OCID, the Government of Haiti, and security stakeholders to serve as a coordinated operations center for electoral security responses.

The CEP has refrained from public comments regarding concerns expressed by national and international election observer groups over problems experienced on Election Day.

2. *Security Stakeholders*

a. **Police Nationale d'Haiti**

The PNH currently consists of 12,000 officers with a planned staffing target of 15,000 officers to be attained by 2016. Both observers and the PNH reported that the PNH remains under-staffed and under-resourced to assume greater responsibilities in filling the electoral security gap being created by the withdrawal of MINUSTAH security forces. For Election Day, 2,000 officers were deployed outside of Port-au-Prince to locations where they did not have family or relatives, designed to enhance their behavioral independence. An electoral security simulation was conducted on July 1 involving all of the national and international stakeholders. Security Coordination Committees have been established at the national and BED levels involving the BED/BECs, MINUTSAH, other UN, and PNH. There is some PNH outreach to youth through the Explorer Scouts. Women currently comprise nine percent of PNH officers with the objective to bring the interim number to 11 percent and the ultimate goal being 30 percent, in keeping with the constitutionally mandated quota.

3. *Judicial Stakeholders*

a. Electoral Justice Mechanisms

Electoral justice is rendered through a three-tiered system: Bureaux du Contentieux Électoral Communal (BCEC), Départemental (BCED), and National (BCEN). Members of the BCECs include three members of the BEC, an attorney and a judge. The model is emulated for the BCEDs. For the national body, it is divided into three sections and for each section

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there were two CEP members, two attorneys, and one judge. This mechanism is new with the 2015 electoral decree and the perceptions of fairness and efficacy of judgments will be factors in the potential for post-election violence to occur as a result of disputed election outcomes.

B. *Non-State Stakeholders*

1. Political Parties

There were 128 political parties registered to participate in the August election competing for the 119 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 20 Senate seats. Of the 128 parties, approximately 10 to 15 can be defined as 'leading parties' with 8 of them fielding a total of 80 candidates or more. These parties represent an array of orientations. For example, rather than there being a single incumbent party, there are several associated with the Executive including PHTK and Bouclier. The established "opposition" holding seats in Parliament include parties such as Famni Lavalas, Fusion, Vérité, and OPL among others. Another class of parties can be labeled the "populist opposition" and includes Petit Dessalines among others.

The following section summarizes meetings held with three political parties. Meeting requests were made to the headquarters' offices of each major party, however, because of the proximity of Election Day, the balance of these parties were unavailable to meet with the assessment team.

a. *Vérité*

Former President René Préval was involved with the establishment of Vérité. Since the commencement of the campaign period on July 9, Vérité reported an increasing frequency of incidents involving their supporters during the July 29 interview. Incidents cited included the killing of four Vérité activists thus far in the campaign. The claim was made that the perpetrators were from parties "close to the regime". These perpetrators were also labeled as "legal bandits", in an apparent reference to a popular song by President Martelly. However, opposition parties have not responded with violence in spite of maintaining that they consider the current level of violence to be worse than that of 2010. Vérité also stated that they would not organize any conflictive response to electoral violence. Problems expected on Election Day included excessive numbers of mandataires and no consensual way to establish a rotation system regarding their presence within polling stations, problems with identity documents, and voters' issues in locating their correct polling station. Vérité raised the prospect of an Election Day boycott; however that did not take place for August 9. But, on September 9, Vérité announced that it was withdrawing from the 2015 elections because of the irregularities associated with the conduct of elections thus far. The irony associated with this action is that the elections may not have occurred without the support of the former president. The impact on the political/conflict dynamics of this move has not crystallized at this writing, but will create a new vulnerability for electoral violence to occur.

b. *Fanmi Lavalas*

During the July 29 interview, Lavalas representatives indicated that they have just started campaigning because they conduct an "underground" campaign, not putting up posters or advertising but focusing more on individual mobilizations of their two million members. The party lacks funding and has developed intra-party factions, which stress its political cohesion. Lavalas made the claim that the government is using state resources for campaign purposes while doing little to enhance a secure electoral environment. The representative did not indicate a high awareness about the CEP voter information call center and questioned the effectiveness of the Internet component because most of their constituencies did not have Internet access. The rotation concerns regarding mandataires were expected to be an Election Day problem with expectations that those mandataires who get to a polling station first would simply stay and not rotate.

In their situation appraisal, the electoral security environment was currently better than in 2010. In their estimation, the electoral violence stemmed from weak parties trying to impede the strong parties because they do not have the capacity to do anything else; a unique perception on perpetrators. Lavalas candidates have been attacked and candidates have requested PNH protection in Central Plateau and Hinche, but that request was still pending at the time of the interview. On Election Day, they expressed concern that violence will be employed to prevent voters from casting ballots and that post-election violence is dependent on outcomes.

c.   *Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats*

The Fusion representative reported a lot of "aggression" over the last two weeks in the July 31 interview. In Jacmel, a Fusion mayoral candidate was murdered, and in St. Pierre, a deputy candidate's rally was attacked by a PHTK activist with a machete. In Carrefour and Tabarre, Fusion workers putting up campaign posters were attacked resulting in the arrest of five perpetrators. The representative expressed concern that women candidates are more vulnerable to violence, are weaker financially than their male counterparts, and sometimes have issues with the approval of their participation by their husbands. There was also a distinction made between the specific incidents and a general "climate of intimidation" which pervaded the pre-election phase. Electoral violence was considered to be both "vertical", coming from the leadership downward; and "horizontal" from candidate to candidate.

The absence of public campaign funding has not affected their campaigning. Fusion stated that the public subsidy represents only two percent of their total campaign budget. However, concerns were expressed about the mandataires rotation arrangements, a lack of capacity of the voter information call center to handle the Election Day volume, and that the three-round election is 'one too many', creating unnecessary financial, administrative, and participation burdens. The local elections are an important priority for Fusion because these sub-national offices are the institutions to be fostered for their role in service delivery and economic development.

2. Civil Society Organizations: Electoral Security Programming

a. *Citizen Observatory for the Institutionalization of Democracy (OCID)*

The National Democratic Institute (NDI), through USAID funding, has supported the establishment and programming of OCID. In early July, OCID trained and deployed 1,640 volunteers from its network to interview a cross-section of citizens on topics related to the election. These volunteers conducted a voter survey on the pre-election situation in Haiti leading up to the first round of elections. The sample size was 3,704 voters. Several of the questions have relevance for electoral security. First, when asked for the reasons why a voter will not participate in the elections, 55 percent responded that either they were uninterested or saw no difference whether they voted or not. Only five percent indicated that they would not vote because of the threats of violence. Second, when asked if money has been offered for their vote, 17 percent responded affirmatively. And, third, there was overwhelming support (81 percent) for national observers over that of international observers (58 percent). In fact, 29 percent thought that international observers are a "bad" idea.

On Election Day, OCID deployed just over 1,700 observers, approximately 40 percent of whom were women. Instructions were provided to observers to be safe as OCID was concerned about general security in Artibonite and the Central Plateau. However, election observers had not been threatened in the past. And, although women observers had not expressed security concerns, they did have male counterparts with them on Election Day.

OCID established an observers' call center where observers reported at the opening of polls, mid-day, and at the close of polls according to a standardized set of questions on their polling center. The reporting provided a statistical portrait on what was occurring. There was also an emergency telephone number to call if the observers experienced difficulties.

OCID also monitored the use of state resources, such as official vehicles on Election Day and campaign techniques. In order to maintain impartiality, OCID proposed no names from its member organizations to be MBVs. There was some coordination intended on report sharing with the European Union (EU) observers.

b. Lakou Lapé

Lakou Lapé is a Haitian NGO which seeks to de-mobilize youth from gang-related violence. To achieve its mission, Lakou Lapé offers training, support, and interventions to reduce violent conflict within and between communities. Their strategy of inclusion works to bring together different sectors of Haitian society through the use of dialogue and encouragement of equal participation and tolerance.

Their representative reports that any political affiliation of gangs with candidates is purely dependent upon cash. There have not yet been many election-related incidents of violence involving gangs, trouble was reported to be starting as of the day of our interview (July 27). Each gang has around 30 members and controls a territory, such as the "Boston" gang and their territory in North Cité Soleil. Outsiders recruited for their expertise are termed "Argentines" from a time when Haiti imported football players from Argentina. The term came to mean a hired outsider. The average age of a gang member is from 16 to 25. After assuming their leadership role, gang bosses have an average life span of three or four years. They rarely leave their territories.

Gang members have their own heavy weapons, but new weapons are also reportedly coming in. Apparently, it is a rule that questions are not posed about the sources of weapons or money. In some situations, gangs assume a kind of local governance function and, as such, can impact the voter turnouts and selections. Only candidates paying the gangs may be permitted to campaign in their territories.

c. Le Réseau National de Défense des Droits Humains (RNDDH)

The RNDDH is a Haitian NGO focused on monitoring and reporting on the status of human rights in Haiti. Primary activities of the organization include providing human rights education to build civil society capacity and monitoring key state institutions with respect to their obligations to protect rights and uphold the rule of law. These activities are realized through the use of the organization's nation-wide monitoring networks. RNDDH observed the voting process on August 9 and deployed 1,500 observers to all departments of the country. Along with the groups CNO and CONHANE, RNDDH issued a report on Election Day detailing the various irregularities, incidents, cases of fraud, and incidents of violence.

Leading up to Election Day, the RNDDH representatives expressed concern over a number of issues including increasing electoral violence, the use of state resources for incumbent campaigning, and frustration about the incumbent parties having the advantage. In addition to state resources, money for licit and illicit campaign activities was coming from drugs and kidnapping. Their claim was that the PTHK has distributed weapons, there are not enough police, and some police with shifting loyalties are incapable of effectively responding to the gun threat. It was their belief that women candidates were not targeted, but youth were playing a worrying role as violent enforcers.

Among the parties, their view was that Fanmi Lavalas possesses the most effective mobilization power among their supporters, but there are factions, which impede intra-party cohesion.

RNDDH expressed more confidence in the current CEP than in the 2010 Council. However, they suggested that the CEP should be more engaged in threats to election integrity and that it does not possess the capacity to prevent fraudulent acts from occurring. They also expressed their belief that, regardless of the quality or fairness of the election, the international community will give it a passing grade.

Turnout was projected to be low because of a general sense of fear. Even if the voting proceeds smoothly on August 9, they did not feel that has any relevance to the possible threats for October 25.

C. International Stakeholders

a. United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)

The 2012 assessment was prompted, in part, by the initial drawdown of MINUSTAH military and police forces in the Northeast, South, Grand'Anse, and Nippes. The further

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withdrawal of MINUSTAH security forces is creating vulnerabilities in the overall capacity to protect electoral stakeholders, facilities, and materials; and to provide logistical support to the CEP in election operations. The mission has a UN Security Council mandate to provide logistical and technical support to Haiti's Government to further build the capacity of its rule of law institutions. Air support may be needed because the roads can be blocked and ground transport impeded. However, because the air support is managed by civilian command and not the force commander there is up to a three hour response time as the request is processed and acted on. There were 2,207 UNPOL officers available for electoral security and support. MINUSTAH continues to provide security assistance by supporting the national police by providing planning and technical advice for crowd control operations.

b.   United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

UNDP is providing general electoral assistance, in particular with the procurement of election materials and equipment, including ballots and polling station kits. UNDP support activities have also included the training of CEP staff as well as technical, strategic, and operational assistance for the organization of the elections. UNDP is also collaborating with IFES regarding a range of voter education and outreach activities such as the voter information call center. The call center has been established with both national telecom companies' participation, enabling voters to ask the CEP for the location of their assigned polling center/station.

UNDP representatives observed that while the situation remains volatile, there was an overall lack of incidents reported up to that point in time. Intimidation against women candidates is seen as being more psychological than physical. UNDP recognizes a need to sensitize youth and conducted a one-day training program for youth leaders during the assessment.

UNDP expressed satisfaction with the ballot product, polling kits, and the registration of candidates. Their representatives indicated that OCID had informed them that the parties are satisfied with the CEP President. However, UNDP also recognize the gaps in personnel recruitment and training, sub-national financial resources, voter registry distribution, and voters locating their polling stations.

c.   United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS)

UNOPS has been working in Haiti since 2004 and works with a full range of stakeholders to coordinate a wide variety of operations including activities dealing with general infrastructure, housing, health, education, and the environment.

In support of the election, UNOPS agreed to provide logistical planning and transport services for the CEP in collaboration with MINUSTAH. UNOPS role was to transport all polling materials, including sensitive materials from the BEDs to the polling centers and return materials, including the results, to the BEDs immediately after polling. These services, to a large degree, mirror part of the logistical support provided by MINUSTAH during previous elections. Due to the draw-down of UN forces, MINUSTAH no longer had the capacity to provide a full range of logistical support, but continued to move polling materials

from Port-au-Prince to the departments and return the results to the Vote Tabulation Center (CTV) in the capital.

In so doing, UNOPS took note of conditions of roads, weight of materials, and created maps to direct their routing. The convoys involved 284 vehicles in total. Security for the convoys was provided by the PNH and UNPOL; however, at the time of the meeting there had been no threats to the convoys. The PNH had full responsibility for retrieval of these materials, in particular, the voted ballots and polling station forms on Election Night. The plan was to recover these materials at around 9:00 P.M. to 9:30 P.M.

The plan was to start the distribution three days before Election Day, with the most remote areas first, followed by urban areas on the second day, and then the red zones on the day before Election Day.

d.   *International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA)*

International IDEA has been in Haiti since 2011 and works to enhance democratic governance and political participation in the country. International IDEA's activities in Haiti include political party assistance, parliamentary development, and political participation of women and youth. Political party assistance activities include the organization of capacity building trainings and workshops as well as the facilitation of inter-party dialogues. In 2014 International IDEA launched a study on the state of political parties in Haiti.

The International IDEA program in Haiti supports women in political parties, parliament, and the implementation of the 30 percent quota for women in public life. The major challenge for women candidates is funding. Political parties do not assist them financially. However, Fusion is the most open party, with the most women candidates.

The International IDEA representative observed that there was an increase in the frequency of security incidents as Election Day approached. She also stated that a permanent political party council is needed as well as a permanent CEP. Otherwise, elections are always an "emergency".

e.   *Organization of American States (OAS)*

For the August 9 election, the OAS fielded 28 short term observers from twelve countries covering 171 polling stations (1.2 percent of the total) throughout the country. While expressing support for democratic development in Haiti, the OAS report noted several concerns which echo others expressed during the assessment. The principal issue cited in their preliminary report was the confusion over polling station assignments and voting procedures. The OAS Mission statement went on to assert that it "will pay special attention to the reports of authorities with regard to the violence reported on Election Day". However, the statement continued that "It is important, though, to note that these violent actions were not widespread and that they did not affect the overall voting process…"

The OAS intends to field another short term observer mission for October 25; however, it

plans to double the numbers of observers over that of August 9. In addition, the OAS is considering the adoption of an electoral incident monitoring component to the scope of their observation efforts.

f.   European Union (EU)

The EU deployed 60 observers covering 253 polling stations (1.8 percent of the total). The first group of observers arrived on July 12. Their observation report notes "There was an atmosphere of agitation in the voting centers, often linked to disagreement concerning the presence of mandataires". They reported incidents of intimidation in the vicinity of 40 percent of the Voting Centers (CVs) and inside 32 percent of them. The EU report also noted the low turnout of voters. While these conditions were cited, the EU seemed to echo the OAS's position and concluded "Election Day was plagued by localized incidents, sometimes violent, however they did not prevent the conduct of the poll in the vast majority of the voting centers".

EU observers will be present for the October 25 and December 27 elections.

g.   International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)

Through USAID funding, IFES provides a general electoral assistance program for the CEP with a focus on assistance to women and disabled voters. A key focus of this program is on assisting the CEP with messaging priorities with activities that include the support of the design and implementation of an inclusive communications strategy and how to target key electoral stakeholder groups. Another activity of this program is supporting the implementation of mechanisms to help facilitate communication and information exchange between the CEP and political parties. IFES also works to engage local civil society groups in the process of developing and disseminating voter education and motivation messages. Additionally, the program provides training to journalists on specific reporting skills and their involvement in the election process.

As of the July 31 interview, the IFES representative commented that there was an increase in violence over the last three weeks, however, it was noted that the candidate disqualifications did not provoke violence. Nevertheless, women candidates are intimidated and IFES was establishing an emergency telephone number for women candidates or voters to call if in difficulty. There will be a tracking system to monitor PNH response to the calls. Overall, the campaign was low profile, in part, because of a lack of funding.

In their estimation, there was a generally improved opinion of CEP's impartiality over 2010. The CEP's management of the post-election appeals process will impact their further credibility. However, institutionally the CEP does not possess 100 percent confidence in the BEDs and such confidence gaps triggered the CEP decision to send a CEP councilor to each BED for Election Day. The representative was not familiar with how the new selection process of MBV's played out in practice.

h.   National Democratic Institute (NDI)

NDI is currently conducting a program aimed at supporting the 2015 election cycle. Through USAID funding, the program aims to build the capacity of a coalition of Haitian CSOs to provide credible observation of the elections and mitigate the risk of electoral violence. NDI has been working with civil society groups, such as the organization, Youth Against Electoral Violence (JCVE), by holding workshops to discuss the causes and impacts of electoral violence as well as the role of youth in fostering a peaceful democratic society. The program has a specific gender element focused on assisting political parties to train women candidates and advocate for the implementation of the 30 percent gender quota. The program also supports CSOs to hold issue-based dialogues and candidate debates.

NDI was conducting a training program in violence mitigation directed at mandataires and a women's leadership workshop, as women are seen as targets of political intimidation. It was also working with OCID on a sample-based observation program for Election Day. NDI is also working to mobilize youth wings of political parties to advocate against political violence and help promote peaceful elections; and was planning to organize debates for the local elections.

The opinion of the NDI representative was that the initial low level of violence is a result of less campaigning. There are no major strikes so citizens are less able to be mobilized. However, structural drivers of electoral violence include impunity, rule of law, and the continued flow of new weapons. The NDI representative also posed the question on the "Aristide Factor", wondering when he will speak out and what impact it will have.

V. Baseline Electoral Conflict Profile

August 9 – First Round Parliamentary Election

The following baseline electoral conflict profile has been developed for the August 9 electoral cycle.

A. Pre-Election Phase

In terms of electoral violence, during late June and early July, before the commencement of the official campaign period, there was a spate of deadly incidents with political undertones:

- June 27 and 28: Simon-Pele (Cité Soleil/Port-au-Prince) – 12 people killed;
- June 29 and 30: Delmas (Port-au-Prince) - two incidents of multiple shootings – people blame gang leaders for a presidential candidate who financed a group called Base 117 after the Lavalas candidate campaigned in the neighborhood;
- June 30 and July 1: Solino (Port-au-Prince) – Three members of one family killed; and
- July 4: Petionville (Port-au-Prince) - Gunmen killed CEP official Claude Delatour.

While direct correlations cannot be made between these events and the elections, the timing, targets, and severity of these incidents served to foster an early environment of intimidation.

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As the campaign period formally commenced, the political landscape was largely peaceful. As discussed above, the explanations for the paucity of incidents included an uncertainty about whether the election would occur, voter apathy, and the lack of campaign funds and activities. But, during the course of the late July/early August campaign period, media and official reports showed an increase in the number of violent incidents related to the elections. The victims largely, but not exclusively, represented opposition candidates and their supporters and several cases of electoral violence against women had been identified. The tactics employed included homicide, physical assaults, destruction of campaign materials, shooting at candidates' vehicles, and meeting disruptions. Weapons utilized included firearms, machetes, and rocks. The geographical locations largely conformed to the "red zone" coding system by MINUSTAH. See Annex V for a zone map. Incident venues included rallies, campaign activity sites (such as putting up posters), and candidates' homes.

By the conclusion of the pre-election period, RNDDH reported the following incident accounting from July 9 to August 2: nine armed clashes; five homicides, two attempted homicides, seven bullet wounds, two knife injuries, 17 injured by stones, and ten physical assaults.

There were examples of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives as mitigating factors. In Petit Goâve, PHTK and Vérité supporters had an altercation with two people being injured and were sent to the hospital as a result. However, this confrontation contributed to the two candidates signing a code of conduct and renouncing violence. Also in Petit Goâve, the Artists for Peace and Justice group organized a peaceful march to denounce electoral violence.

B. Election Day Phase

On the eve of Election Day, Prime Minister Evans Paul announced a policy of "zero tolerance" for violence during the voting. The PNH, he stated, were instructed to arrest perpetrators regardless of their political affiliation.

Election Day incidents involved dissatisfied and angry voters, rivaling mandataires, and attacks on polls. In several locations, large crowds pressed into polling stations effectively capturing the locations and halting the balloting. For example, in one Port-au-Prince polling center, PNH fired shots in the air to break up protests by Fanmi Lavalas who accused PHTK supporters of ballot box stuffing. Lavalas voters tore up their ballots in protest. In Rue Vaillant, MBVs fled the polling center and the supervisor locked himself in a classroom as a crowd took over the center. In Limbé, the building housing the Office of the Mayor was the target of arson. There was also an attempt to burn the BED offices in Grand'Anse, which was prevented by the PNH.

Mandataires were cited in international and domestic observation reports as persistent sources of conflict an intimidation within polling stations and their environs. Their presence was heavy and pervasive, with EU observers stating that mandataires were present in 97 percent of the polls they visited. In addition, there was also the phenomenon reported of

"false observers". False observers were de facto agents of political parties and candidates gaining access to polling stations under the guise of being observers. While many sported t-shirts saying "Observer", there were no associated organizations cited to which the observer belonged. False observers were reported to be sources of disruption inside polling stations.

C. Election Night

Sensitive election materials continued to be targets even after the close of polls. For example, in Damassin in the South, two gang members attempted to destroy election materials, however, they were detained by bystanders until the PNH arrived. The gang members said that they were brought in to destroy polling centers where deputy candidate Astreel Dolne was not popular. Further, Dolne's supporters in Despa were observed throwing rocks at PNH and MBVs at two polling centers. The PHTK, Dolne's party, was third in the running on the count at those polling centers.

D. Post-Election Phase

The post-election incidents have involved protests and clashes between candidates, their supporters and election officials over the vote tabulations and anticipated outcomes. There have also been arrests of candidates on firearms and assault charges. Examples of the protests include an attempt to set fire to a BEC in Léogâne; and a protest over the electoral process in Cap-Haïtien, where a BEC office was vandalized and burned. In the South Department, suspected supporters of Fanmi Lavalas attacked a polling center and burned the ballots. However, these ballots had already been counted at the time of the incident. And, in Port-Margot there was a protest by some voters who believed that the BEC president left ballots in a private vehicle rather than an official vehicle.

Regarding the candidate arrests, the Mayor of Ouanaminthe (Northeast) was arrested for possession of a firearm at a polling center. A Petit Dessalines deputy candidate was arrested for violations including: assault, vandalism, the willful destruction of property, obstructing a magistrate from discharging his electoral duty, and illegal possession of three firearms, sixty-seven rounds of ammunition, and one knife. In Mirebalais (Center), a Lavalas and a Vérité deputy candidate were arrested on the same charges as the Petit Dessalines candidate. However, in the latter case, a group of supporters protested the arrest and were dispersed with tear gas by the PNH and l'Unité Départementale de Maintien d'Ordre (UDMO). Finally, it should be noted that one incident of a UNOPS convoy being fired on was reported in Port-Margot.

E. Electoral Violence Intensity

The OCID call-in report (sample size 1,156) revealed that voting was disrupted in 14.22 percent of the cases; 9.71 percent reported violence within the polling station; and 6.97 percent reported firearms inside the polling station.

The MINUSTAH incident reporting profiled the violence as follows. There were six homicides and 25 injuries including three PNH officers. Further investigation is required in order to identify the gender, role, and political affiliation of those murdered and injured.

- The homicides occurred in the Center, Artibonite, West, and North departments.
- There were 147 people arrested including three PNH.
  - The top three departments accounting for nearly 61.9 percent of the total for these arrests were:
    - West (41),
    - Artibonite (26), and
    - Northeast (24)

- Thirty-four firearms and eight vehicles were seized;
  - With 58.8 percent of the firearms seized coming from 2 departments:
    - West (10) and
    - Artibonite (10).

- There were 103 polling centers out of 1,508 (6.83 percent), which closed prematurely for reasons related to security issues involving mandataires and attacks by armed groups.

- Roads were blocked in seven departments with demonstrations occurring in the Center, West, Southeast, and North.

Based upon the criteria in the Electoral Security Framework to measure the intensity of the violence, the August 9 electoral cycle would be rated as a 2, with 0 representing no violence and 3 representing severe violence. The table referencing this coding system is shown below.

Code Level	Description
0	No reported electoral violence before or after a vote.
1	The second level of violence is violent harassment, indicated by police breaking up rallies, party supporters fighting, street brawls, opposition newspaper being confiscated, and limited short-term arrests of political opponents.
2	The third level of violence is violent repression, as indicated by long term high-level arrests of party leaders, the consistent use of violent intimidation, limited use of murders and assassinations, and torture.
3	The fourth level is a highly violent campaign, in which there are repeated, coordinated physical attacks leading to 20 or more deaths.

The rationale for selecting Code Level 2 is based upon the metric that this level is the threshold for incidents of violence involving homicides, which is consistent with the conflict profile revealed in the assessment. [3]

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[3] The methodology for this system of coding can be found in the research at the link below.

A chart showing a preliminary summary of incidents surrounding Election Day per department is shown as Annex VI.

VI. Upcoming Presidential, Parliamentary and Local Elections

A. Implications for October 25 Electoral Cycle

While the August 9 electoral conflict profile will be broadly relevant to identify national antagonists in the October elections, the dynamic will differ and stretch in two directions. First, it was stated that the presidential elections hold more potential for violence than the legislative elections. This is the result of the motive to obtain benefits of holding that office; and the means of the financial resources available to candidates to connect money and violence. As a result for October 25, on the national level, inter-candidate and inter-party violence will continue. Thus, rallies and campaign activities will remain the vulnerable venues for such attacks. In keeping with the previous tactics, candidates and their supporters' homes could also be incident venues. The impact of the withdrawal of Vérité from the electoral process has not been felt yet at this writing; however, it creates a new vulnerability for electoral violence to occur. This is because the withdrawal creates a "spoiler" in the form of a boycott, which was not the case for August 9. Also, INITE called upon its representative to leave the "consensus" government. Both parties are associated with former President René Préval and both actions can be considered as confrontational moves.

While this conflict dynamic will be occurring on the national level, a different dynamic will be occurring on the local level. In local government contests, the political competition is often familial, personal, or the result of other local economic or social rivalries. As a result, the conflict could occur between candidates (there are probably not many active supporters on this level) with known grudges or grievances. Political parties will not have the influence they do on the national level. Because of the large number of ballots and candidates, the local elections are more complex logistically than a national election alone. As such, the quality of electoral administration can also be a factor in whether Election Day and the post-election phase are peaceful or not, just as was seen in August.

As the principal national monitors of electoral violence, the organizational dynamics between OCID and RNDDH warrant attention. Their monitoring and reporting methodologies differ, but should be viewed as complementary, with OCID collecting information through a systemic structure with validation and RNDDH taking a wider ranging approach in its monitoring.

B. Implications for December 27 Electoral Cycle

The conflict dynamic for December will be consolidated into the camps of the two finalists. Similar victims, perpetrators/leaders, tactics, and locations, which were characteristics of

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Straus, Scott and Charlie Taylor, Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa – 1990 – 2007, University of Wisconsin, 2009
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=145156

August and October, can be considered as relevant for the December election. The campaign tone and the effectiveness of violence prevention programming, as informed by the August and October experiences, will be factors in whether there is violence in the December election. The August post-election evaluations recommended above can be performed again after the October election in advance of December.

VII. Mitigating Factors

Mitigating factors that served to dampen the potential for violence in the August 9 electoral cycle include a reduction in the Internally Displaced Person (IDP) population, lack of hate speech, lack of boycotts, and the presence of national observers.

Reduction in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Population

The IDP population has been reduced by 96 percent with 66 open sites to house 64,680 persons. By the end of the year, there are projected to be 11,000 families in 31 camps. This reduction diminishes societal stresses produced by living conditions, family separation, and uncertainty about the future.

Lack of Hate Speech

While candidates have been disqualified, most candidates appear to have accepted the disqualifications without calls for protests by their supporters, Vérité being the exception thus far with a late July protest at the CEP headquarters. However, no candidate has overtly called for violence or inciting violence.

No Boycotts

There were no boycotts from the August 9 process; however, as stated above, this will not be the case for October 25.

National Election/Human Rights Observers

The deployment of 1,700 OCID election observers and 1,500 RNDDH human rights monitors established a presence for documentation and accountability for those engaged in acts of violence.

VIII. Structural Drivers of Electoral Violence

In this section, the question posed concerns that of why violence has been a persistent characteristic of elections in Haiti since and including the first post-Duvalier general elections conducted in 1987. In this regard, the structural drivers of electoral violence should be examined. Structural drivers are those factors which create conditions for electoral violence to be triggered, and, in combination, become a framework of long-term vulnerabilities. Structural drivers can be internal to the electoral process or external to it. Below is a description of each major driver.

A. Internal Structural Drivers of Electoral Violence

The internal drivers include a lack of permanent electoral institutions, EMB model, electoral system, political party system, political finance/use of state resources, and electoral stakes.

1.   Lack of Permanent Electoral Institutions

Since 1987, elections have been administered by a provisional electoral management body (EMB). Such a continued provisional arrangement creates institutional fragilities reflected in staff turnover and skill deficits, fleeting institutional memory, and the inability to build a continuing operational capacity. This fragility is also reflected on the BED and BEC levels. Similarly, the electoral justice mechanisms are provisional. And, the political party consultative mechanisms to connect the CEP with political parties and to foster dialogue among the political parties themselves are ad hoc and episodic.

2.   Electoral Management Body (EMB) Model

Electoral literature describes four basic models of EMB membership: 1) political party model; 2) expert model; 3) judicial model; and 4) mixed model. Under the political party model, the members of the EMB are representatives of political parties. The expert model draws its membership from civil society, academia, and noted leaders. In the judicial model, the members are jurists. And, the mixed model involves combinations of the first three models. The CEP can be considered a form of expert model, with nominees put forward by sectors of civil society and religion. However, this sectoral delineation of members is creating political dependencies for the members on their sectors, inhibiting their behavioral independence in decision-making.

3.   Electoral System

The majoritarian electoral system structure in the legislature fosters an "all or nothing" campaign culture. Such electoral stakes (discussed below) create incentives to engage through any means available, including violence, to obtain the majority of votes and win it all.

4.   Political Party System

The political party system is both fragmented and personalistic. These two factors combine to make the system weak and fails to position political parties to perform in their fundamental roles of interest articulation between citizens and elected officials; and aggregation of opinion in coalitions of groups and individuals. The personalistic quality also plays into the electoral stakes incentive in that the transfers of wealth between public office and officeholder can be virtually seamless.

5.   Political Finance/Use of State Resources

While there are political finance regulations in Haiti, these regulations do not appear to be enforced or that any penalties have been issued as a result of financial violations. Such circumstances open the door to candidates for receiving money to finance illicit activities, including the purchase of weapons and ammunition and the hiring of enforcers. It is a factor contributing to the culture of impunity for crimes of electoral violence because these actions can be financed without accountability or sanction. And, for incumbents, there is an added bonus in the access of state resources, in particular staffing, vehicles, facilities, financial resources, police, and state media.

6.   *Electoral Stakes*

Holding elected office in Haiti is a lucrative enterprise and the legitimate prerequisites include salary, benefits, vehicles, and staff. As an elected official, the officeholder enjoys immunity from prosecution, as stipulated in Articles 114-2 and 115 which states, "No member of the Legislature may be subject to civil imprisonment during his term in office". (114-2) And, Article 115 further elaborate on the terms of this immunity when it states, "No member of the Legislature may during his term be arrested under ordinary law for a crime, a minor offense or a petty violation, except by authorization of the House of which he is a member, unless he is apprehended in the act of committing an offense punishable by death, personal restraint or penal servitude or the loss of civil rights. In that case, the matter is referred to the House of Deputies or the Senate without delay of the Legislature is in session, and if not, it shall be taken up the next regular or special session". And, as linked with other drivers above, the stakes also have connections with issues of political finance and the use of state resources for political or personal gain, which further enhance the stakes of holding office.

B. External Structural Drivers of Electoral Violence

External drivers for electoral violence include the culture of impunity, PNH capacity, availability of illicit firearms, and economic factors.

1.   *Culture of Impunity*

While street-level enforcers are arrested, it is not an uncommon practice to see them released shortly after their detention. These enforcers may be individually recruited by politicians; or gangs may be hired. However, for those individuals organizing and financing the violence, there have not been any such actions to bring them to justice. This impunity allows the organizers to freely operate, distribute weapons and cash, and identify targets for attack with no apparent deterrent that they could be apprehended for such acts.

2.   *PNH Capacity*

The PNH capacity to provide physical protection of stakeholders, facilities, material, and events is an important factor in violence prevention. The trajectory of PNH capacity building and professionalization has been generally seen as positive, as measured since 2012. However, as this assessment shows, electoral conflict dynamics are complex and not solely a matter of policing. Nevertheless, the security sector development is critical to transforming elections in Haiti to be less violent.

3.   *Availability of Illicit Firearms*

During the assessment, remarks were made about both illicit weapons which were already in the hands of enforcers and, in some cases, had been for some period of time, and new weapons which were being distributed. In any case, the flow of weapons seems to occur with some ease and seizures of caches of weapons are rarely conducted. Firearms of many kinds were specifically mentioned including: AK-47s, pump-action shotguns, and pistols.

4.   *Economic Factors*

The major economic indicators reveal a financially poor country, with a small economy, and significant disparities in the distribution of wealth. The Gross Domestic Product is $8.919 billion and research shows that poorer economies (under $100 billion GDP) are more vulnerable to violence than wealthier ones.

The Per Capita Income is $1,800 (2014) and research shows than countries with PCI under $2,700 are more prone to electoral violence (Collier/Oxford University) than those above that threshold.[4]
The GINI Co-Efficient is a measure of income distribution. If the factor is higher than 50, the wealth inequity is seen as a vulnerability for violence (Electoral Security Framework). The GINI factor in Haiti is 59.9.

IX. Recommendations for Countering Electoral Violence

The programmatic response to counter electoral violence can be constructed on three levels: 1) strategic objectives; 2) programming sectors; and 3) chronology.

There are four strategic objectives associated with these program recommendations:

- Improve electoral administration;

- Reduce the culture of impunity;

- De-conflict political relationships; and

- Foster a public intolerance for electoral violence.

Second, given the complexity of the electoral conflict profile, the programmatic approach should be multi-sectoral in scope and involve state, non-state, and international stakeholders engaging in the following activities:

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[4] For an introduction to this research see:

Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 2009.

- Electoral administration;

- Political parties;

- Civil Society;

- Rule of law;

- Women;

- Youth;

- Security sector reform; and

- Livelihoods.

And, third, the programming should be organized into four chronological stages:

- Post-August 9 review;

- October 25 preparations;

- December 27 preparations; and

- Confronting the structural drivers.

Stage 1 – Post-Election – August 9

The following program actions can be considered in immediate follow-up to the August 9 experience in order to better understand the vulnerabilities to counter violence during the October 25 electoral cycle.

Program Recommendation 1: Conduct a detailed diagnostic of the electoral violence experience in the August 9 electoral cycle, creating a searchable database to house the profile data, and a mapping platform to identify patterns of victimization, perpetration, gender, incident venue, and tactics/weapons employed. The purpose of this program action is to document the experience from August 9 to inform prevention measures for October/December.

Program Recommendation 2: Review the call-in archives from the voter information call center, observer emergency call center, and women's emergency call center for number of calls, locations, times of day, and, in the latter two cases, the types of incident reported. The purpose of this program action is to develop recommendations on how to improve these channels for October/December.

Program Recommendation 3: Review the experience of the new selection process for

MBVs. The purpose of this program action is to provide recommendations on how this process can be made more effective, in particular, by engaging more university students on the lists of nominees.

Program Recommendation 4: MINUSTAH, CEP, and PNH should conduct an After Action Review (AAR) to assess the performance of their electoral security planning. The AAR should be decentralized by department. This effort can be coordinated with the diagnostic review described above. The purpose of this program action is to inform the development of electoral security planning for October/December.

Program Recommendation 5: Extract insights and profiles on the use of state resources for campaign purposes by OCID monitors. The purpose of this program action is to establish seminal documentation that such abuses do exist, what resources are used, who uses these resources, and at what cost to the public.

Program Recommendation 6: Obtain the arrest records for the 147 people detained on Election Day and profile their political affiliations and follow their cases for follow-up prosecution. The purpose of this program action is to build the documentation on the issue of a culture of impunity, even on the enforcers' level.

Program Recommendation 7: Review the record of formal electoral complaints filed and adjudicated with the national, departmental, and communal complaints boards for the nature of the complaint, plaintiff, defendant, location, date of complaint, and outcome. The purpose of this program action is to examine the performance of the new composition of the complaints board and the quality of their adjudications.

Stage 2 – Pre – Election - October 25

Program Recommendation 8: In keeping with the integrated sectoral program strategy cited above, integration of effort among stakeholders can also be considered. As an initiative in preventive diplomacy by the international community, a point person in the international community should be identified to manage the issue of electoral violence among international and national stakeholders for the balance of the electoral cycle. At the conclusion of this electoral cycle, the point person could publish an official report on the experiences that could serve as evidence and documentation for future actions in transitional justice, if warranted. The purpose of this program action is to assemble the complex network of issues and institutions into a coordinated mechanism for better insights into the problem that results in more effective responses.

Program Recommendation 9: Introduce electoral violence and fraud monitoring methodology for international observer groups to employ in their monitoring activities. The fraud component would include monitoring for the use of state resources. The purpose of this program action is to provide a methodology to international observer groups to document incidents of violence and fraud in a consistent manner to bring more transparency to the issue for subsequent remedial measures.

Program Recommendation 10: Establish a project to monitor and mine social media for

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potential threats of violence against particular candidates or to organize mass protest actions. Software such as Aggie and AIME can be employed. While the potential for violence in the October 25 election has been forecast on the macro-level, the purpose of this tool is to allow forecasting on the micro or incident level for measures to be taken in response to posted intended incidents or threats. Descriptions of these software platforms and their electoral applications can be found in Annex VII.

Program Recommendation 11: Encourage the CEP to establish a permanent political party consultative mechanism (PPCM) to provide an on-going platform for communications between the CEP and the parties and among the parties themselves. In addition to its communications and consultation functions, the PPCM could assume enforcement responsibilities for: political finance; promulgate a code of conduct for candidates; enforce the quota for women among candidates, party leadership positions and other spheres of public life affecting parties. It can also serve as an alternate election dispute adjudication mechanism for minor issues. The purpose of this program action is to establish improved communications between the CEP and parties and parties among themselves, but also to focus on certain un-enforced issues concerning parties, such as political finance compliance.

Stage 3 – Pre- Election – December 27

Ascertain which of the program actions 1 through 7 are relevant to be conducted again and updated into the December electoral context.

Stage 4 – Restructuring Drivers of Electoral Violence

<u>**Restructuring Internal Drivers of Electoral Violence**</u>

Lack of Permanent Electoral Institutions - With the local elections conducted, a permanent electoral management council should be established. While the membership on the council will change with their terms of office, a permanent EMB will facilitate the development of a skilled and permanent staff and secretariat on both the national and subnational levels. The establishment of a permanent council should be encouraged by the international community as a priority for the new executive and legislature. The permanent institution should extend as well to the electoral justice mechanisms.

EMB Model – The current sectoral membership model can be reformed to a mixed model with one representative of the five political parties holding the largest number of seats in the parliament (combined Deputy and Senate) and four members from civil society at-large. Parties would nominate their own members for legislative approval. Civil society organizations would nominate members, four of whom would be confirmed by the legislature. The chair and secretary would be selected from the civil society members. The advantage of this model is that it provides a role for political parties, thus "hard wiring" them into the electoral process while eliminating the sectoral dependencies of the civil society representatives and allowing them to function in a more "at large" capacity. This reform would require a constitutional amendment.

Electoral System – As International IDEA's handbook on *Electoral System design* states,

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It is clear that different electoral systems can aggravate or moderate tension and conflict in a society".[5]   This impact on conflict concerns how representation, competition, and fairness are perceived by contesting stakeholders.   While the prospects for reforming the electoral system are low, if such reform is under consideration, the following model can be evaluated. The majoritarian system for the Chamber of Deputies can be changed to that of a List Proportional Representation (PR) system. All deputies would be elected at large. The benefits of such a reform are that it reduces the head-to-head competition of the majoritarian system, those elected are not as beholden to local interests, local government can assume local development initiatives, and the women's quota can be guaranteed. However, the senate would remain departmentally elected, so that their sub-national constituent interests are represented. This reform would require a constitutional amendment.

Political Party System - Strengthening the political party system is linked to several other program actions. First, communications and conflict can be better managed through the establishment of a PPCM by the CEP as a mechanism between the CEP and parties and among parties themselves. If the CEP is unwilling or unable to launch such an initiative, it could become a project for civil society to undertake, possibly led by OCID. Second, including political party representation in the CEP membership gives them a tangible stake in conducting a fair election. Third, the political finance issue discussed below must allow for public funding for inclusive purposes, while also providing transparency to reduce the impact of illicit funding and spending. And, fourth in keeping with the 30 percent women's quota, political parties should be subject to the quota as far as their leadership positions are concerned.

Electoral Stakes - Modifying the benefits enjoyed by holding public office will be difficult through conventional internal reform initiatives. These benefits are well guarded by elected officials.   Reform advocates should await an opportunity, such as a public scandal, for a triggering event and seize on such a trigger to provoke reform.

Political Finance/Use of State Resources - The CEP should be engaged to provide more rigorous enforcement of the current political finance regulations, potentially engaging the PPCM in an enforcement role as well. Similarly, transparency in political finance should be a continued issue associated with political party assistance programming. The CEP can assume some jurisdiction over the enforcement against the use of state resources (on the national, departmental or local levels) by including any such use as a disclosure requirement. Failing to do so results in a violation of the law. The public funding mechanism should be managed to provide funding before the election.

Employing the methodology of the Open Society Institute[6], OCID could include political finance monitoring in its scope of observation activities. Such monitoring would complement the observation of the use of state resources for campaign purposes.

<u>Restructuring External Drivers of Electoral Violence</u>

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[5] International IDEA, *Electoral System Design,* 2005, page 6

[6] The Open Society methodology is found at the link below.
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/Handbook_in_full.pdf

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Culture of Impunity - While there are arrests of the street level enforcers of electoral violence, many of these individuals are released a short time after their arrests. However, the leadership escapes such accountability and sanction. After the conduct of this three-round electoral cycle, an examination of the electoral violence should be conducted with a perspective on evaluating the role of the leadership behind the violence. If the scale and orchestration warrants it, an ad hoc transitional justice mechanism can be established. The mandate for such a mechanism is to conduct a public investigation of the organizers and financiers of the violence. The investigation could also reveal how much money is involved, chains of payment, currency employed, kinds of weapons and their sources, and transnational influences. The mechanism would have authority only to investigate and would forward evidence to the competent judicial authorities for prosecution. As the prosecutors are national, the investigative mechanism should seek sufficient clout in the public mind that its evidence cannot be ignored. Haiti is not a signatory to the Rome Statute; therefore, prosecution in the International Criminal Court would not be possible. A model for such a mechanism is the Lemu Commission in Nigeria, which was established by President Goodluck Jonathon to investigate the post-election violence in 2011. Haitian civil society groups have called for an investigation of the August 9 electoral violence.

PNH Capacity - The trajectory for capacity building and professionalism of the PNH seems to be an appropriate one. In building security forces, an accelerated timeline can bring in individuals who are insufficiently vetted and ill-suited for policing responsibilities. However, until this capacity is sufficient to meet the challenges, security gaps will persist during electoral cycles.

Availability of Illicit Firearms - Just as the distinction was made about the weapons being pre-existing or newly distributed, the strategy for the reduction in illicit firearms should be bifurcated to address these two firearms dynamics. First, for existing weapons, the seizures of known caches of weapons can be undertaken and buy-back programs conducted in the attempt to reduce the stockpile. One reported practice of the organizers of electoral violence is to "give" firearms to their enforcers and then "buy" the weapons back after the crime is committed. For new weapons, the flow of firearms probably cannot be halted, but it can be made more difficult. The payment for guns and ammunition is linked to the political finance and transitional justice program actions. Unless there are constraints on funding to purchase weapons and sanctions on individuals who distribute them, the availability of firearms will remain a significant driver of electoral violence.

Economic Issues - Economic solutions are protracted at best and are the least responsive to short and medium term programming. Election-related economic programming is not intended as a poverty reduction measure; however, such programs can be configured to mitigate the impact of economic drivers on fostering electoral violence. For example, unemployed youth can be the focus of livelihoods programs during the electoral cycle to provide them with income during the campaign. Commercial associations could be recruited to offer such employment opportunities. Economic empowerment programming for women can also address the political weakness of not having the same financial basis to contest for office that men possess.

X. Conclusion

The assessment revealed the new profile of electoral conflict dynamics in Haiti. With years of election postponement and rule by decree, new political rivalries have developed and this election was the first opportunity for these rivalries to be played out in a violent context. While the violence has an immediate impact on the conduct of the election, affecting turnout, campaigning, and outcomes; its long-term impact is deleterious to public perceptions about the efficacy of elections to decide questions of governance.

However, specific programming has been proven effective at countering electoral violence. The program recommendations put forward in this assessment provide a strategic, multi-sectoral, and phased response to the patterns of violence experienced in August. In so doing, the level of violence can be reduced in 2015 and the structural drivers addressed for long-term solutions to the persistence of violence in Haiti's elections.

Annex I – List of Acronyms

ADR	Alternate Dispute Resolution
AJPDNE	Association des Jeunes Patriotes pour le Developpement du NE
ASE	Agents de sécurité électoral (Electoral Security Agents)
BCEC	Bureau du Contentieux Électoral Communal
BCED	Bureau du Contentieux Électoral Départemental
BCEN	Bureau du Contentieux Electoral Departemental
BEC	Bureau Electoral Communal
BED	Bureau Electoral Departmental
BV	Bureau de vote (Voting center)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEP	Conseil électoral provisoire
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNO	Conseil National d'Observation des Elections
CONEFEL	Coalition Nordesienne des Femmes Leaders
Creative	Creative Associates International
CSI	Civil Society Initiative
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CSPJ	Conseil supérieur du pouvoir judiciaire
CTV	Vote Tabulation Center
CV	Centre de Vote (Voting Center)
DTO	Drug Trafficking Organizations
EMB	Electoral Management Body
ESIG	Electoral Security Interest Group
EU	European Union
FBO	Faith Based Organization
FL	Famni Lavalas
FUSION	Fusion des Sociaux-Démocrates Haïtienne
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICG	International Crisis Group
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
IRI	International Republican Institute
JCVE	Jeunes Contre Violence Électorale (Youth Against Electoral Violence)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MBV	Membres de Bureaux de Vote
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NDI	National Democratic Institute for International Affairs
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OAS	Organization of American
OCID	L'Observatoire Citoyen pour l'Institutionalization de la Démocratie

ODIFF	Organisation pour le Developpement Integre des Femmes de FL
ONI	Office National d'Identification (National Identification Office)
OPL	Organisation du peuple en lutte
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
PAG	Private Armed Groups
PAP	Port-au-Prince
PCM	Party consultative mechanism
PNH	Police Nationale d'Haiti (Haitian National Police)
PPCM	Permanent Political Party Consultative Mechanism
PV	Procès-verbal or Procès Verbaux
PVT	Parallel Vote Tabulations
RAFAO	Rasanbleman Fanm Angaje Wanament
RNDDH	Réseau national de défense des Droits Humains
SMS	Short Message Service
TKFD	Tet Kole Fanm Dile
UDMO	l'Unité Départementale de Maintien d'Ordre
UNCRH	Union Nationale Chrétienne pour la Reconstruction d'Haiti
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project
USAID	United Stated Agency for International Development
VDH	Volontaires pour le Développement d'Haïti

Annex II - Template for Interview Questions

State Stakeholders

Regulatory Institutions

Conseil Electoral Provisoire (CEP)

- What is the status of administrative preparations for the August 9 elections? Ballot printing, polling station locations, polling worker recruitment and training?

- Where are the shortfalls and how are you addressing these shortfalls?

- From what sources to you recruit poll workers? Are 20 percent of the poll workers women?

- Are there any on-going complaints emerging from the candidate and political party registration process?

- What form of electoral conflict have you experienced in past elections?

- What kind of electoral disputes have been experienced in past elections?

- What directions on electoral security do you receive from the CEP Headquarters?

- What coordination does the CEP have here with the PNH? What is the role of the PNH? What are the protocols on when the PNH is deployed to an election facility?

- Do you employ Brigades to Vigilance? If so, how are they recruited and trained?

- Describe your security procedures for sensitive electoral materials (ballots and registers) while in storage and transit?

- Have polling stations been targets of attacks?

- Do mandataires pose problems, disruptions, or intimidation in the polling stations?

- Have local election officials been targets of intimidation or attack?

- Are there local political groups or rivals who may be more susceptible to violent attacks against each other?

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- Do you have areas within your jurisdiction where violence has occurred more frequently than in other locations?

- Describe the process by which election results are made public, both provisional results and final results.

- How to do handle blank ballots, are they counted as ballots cast?

- Does your office employ social media as an education tool? Please describe your voter education programming?

- How you do view media coverage of CEP activities?

Security Institutions

Police National de Haiti

- How many police officers are employed in this jurisdiction? How many of these officers are women?

- What are the general concerns about crime in this jurisdiction?

- When and where do police vote?

- How will the withdrawal/drawdown of MINUSTAH impact your ability to enforce the law?

- What special coordination or focus committees you create around elections? Quick Reaction Forces?

- Under what situations will PNH enter polling stations?

- How many people have been arrested for acts of election violence since March when elections were called?

- What training has the PNH received in electoral security?

- What are the uses of force protocols?

- What kinds of electoral violence have been experienced?

- Are there certain areas of your jurisdiction which are more susceptible to electoral violence or violence in general?

- How do you view media coverage of police activities?

Judicial Institutions

Municipal Electoral Ligation Committees

- What kind of electoral complaints have been brought before your panel?

- Are there predictable patterns of complaints and defendants?

- Have your cases been either preceded or succeeded by violence among the complainants?

Non-State Stakeholders

Political Parties

- Does your party disclose contributions of 100,000 gourdes or more?

- Do you file a report with the Ministry of Economics and Finance on your campaign expenditures?

- Do you receive public funding?

- Have candidates or supporters from your party been targets of attack? Is so, by whom?

- Have your supporters ever been accused of committing acts of violence?

- Has your party signed any Code of Conduct?

- How does your party communicate with other political parties?

- Does your party receive assistance or training from any international organization? If so, what forms of assistance?

- How many candidates is your party fielding?

- Is your party represented in the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate?

- Does your party have a youth wing?

- How many of your candidates are women?

- How many of your mandataires are women?

- Have any of the party/candidates offices or homes been subject to attack?

- How does your party employ social media?

Civil Society and Faith Based Organizations

- Describe your role in elections – observation, education, or mediation?

- In what parts of Haiti are your members active?

- What has your organization observed in the way of incidents of electoral violence?

- What are the patterns to this violence as far as victim, perpetrators, and types of incidents?

- Have you found that certain locations are more prone to violence than others?

- How many of your members are women?

- Have any of your members been subject to attack because of their electoral activities?

- Is your organization in any coalition with other like-minded groups?

- What you see as the greatest threat to peaceful elections?

- How does your organization employ social media?

- How do you view media coverage of the election and in particular election violence?

International Stakeholders

MINUSTAH

- What will be your role in the 2015 elections?

- How are you liaising with the PNH and the CEP?

- What will be your field strength in the departments were you are remaining?

- What logistical support that you provided in the past will be absent from the assistance this year?

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- Do you have an electoral security plan?

- What are the protocols associated with your intervention in the electoral process?

UNDP

- Describe you program of electoral assistance.

- What elements of your electoral assistance program involve electoral security or conflict management?

- Where do you observe shortfall in administration which could trigger electoral violence?

IFES

- Describe your program of electoral assistance

- What elements of your electoral assistance program involve electoral security or conflict management?

- Where do you observe shortfall in administration which could trigger electoral violence?

NDI

- How are the Tolerance Committees and Citizen Intiative Committees being employed to prevent electoral violence?

- Describe other electoral programming you are undertaking.

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Annex III – Voter Registration and Polling Center Data[7]

HAITI ELECTION AUGUST 9, 2015

CENTRES DE VOTE, BUREAU DE VOTE, INSCRITS

DEPARTEMENT	TOTAL CV	TOTAL BV	INSCRITS
ARTIBONITE	208	1,779	752,267
CENTRE	90	916	391,144
NORD	192	1362	236,939
NORD EST	86	559	190,940
NORD OUEST	99	724	566,502
GRAND ANSE	104	587	227,079
SUD	157	1057	303,863
SUD EST	123	767	2,413,295
NIPPES	85	465	441,011
OUEST	364	5,509	312,255
TOTAL 2015	**1,508**	**13,725**	**5,835,295**
TOTAL 2010	1,483	9,911	4,223,219
Increase over 2010	25	3,814	1,612,076
% Increase over 2010	+ O1.7%	+ 38.5%	+ 38.1%

[7] Compiled by Bruce Hatch from the CEP web site and CEP/UN/MINUSTAH data from 2010

Annex IV – Field Interview Notes

North Assessment Team

> ### *Saint-Marc – BED*

State and International Stakeholders

A meeting was held with the National Identification Office (ONI). While in the ONI office there were 200 to 300 people either waiting to receive the ID cards or applying for them. Most were said to be waiting to pick them up. There was reportedly a rumor that if you do not have an ID card, you will be arrested. Also, there was concern about the impact of the DR returns on the need to have an ID card. At the time of the meeting, ASEs had been recruited but not trained with training scheduled to occur later in the week. There are 32 polling centers (stations) and four agents per location. The ONI office oversees VR and allocations of voters to polls. The VR list is to be posted at BED, polling stations, and BEC. A call center was to be established in the coming weekend. People can send an SMS to a number established by the CEP to inquire about their voting locations. One of the points of tension on Election Day is the concern among people who do not know where to vote. Additionally, political partisans will pressure people in line to vote a certain way. The PNH are responsible for area security and the ASEs are charged with maintaining the interior security. This leaves a potential security gap for exposures to pressure in the queues. There is also a problem of how many mandataires are allowed in a polling station. BEC has met with political parties but these meetings seemed episodic. ASE training has taken place which is mostly about proper attitude and communication with PNH and MINUSTAH.

The concern about presidential elections is that there are more resources, higher stakes, and they coincide with local elections with emergent political rivalries. Mayors run as cartels of 3. There are 28 cartels now and no clear leader.

At the time of the meeting, poll workers were in the final phase of recruitment. Political parties choose from nominees provided by CSOs, universities, and church groups. There is no clear record of intimidation of women in this department. Youth gangs are also not much of a problem in this department. Parties and candidates get their money from a couple of sources including individual donors, self-funded, and hidden money from DTOs. PNH has just three vehicles at their disposal in this department. UDMO is charged with keeping public order. There are two polls so remote that PNH must be deployed two days before. Intensity was expected to increase in the coming days and confrontations at candidate rallies were expected. The fire service is staffed by the police and has only one truck. The land owners in this department employ their own militias.

Non-State Stakeholders

This was a meeting with a single OCID representative. Thus far, the local OCID observers monitored the candidate registration program which was conducted without incident. The representative indicated that the OCID methodology does include recording incidents of

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violence that are witnessed. SMS texting and e-mail are employed to submit certain reports. At this level, there was not coordination of international observer groups.

➢ Hinche - BED

State and International Stakeholders

Their Coordination Steering Committee meets every Thursday. The ASE recruitment was already completed. Those who were ASE's in the 2007 election confirmed availability with the BED to participate again. The training of trainers is complete for the MBV's and the training of supervisors had yet to take place. IFES is in charge of the call-in center and had started to interview workers; no deadline set for bringing it online. The issue of payments is a "cathedral" of problems as staff hadn't been paid in 10 months. There are 90 polling centers in this department. In 2009, heavy weapons at polls forced voting to stop in at polling stations in this department. At the time of the meeting there had been no incidents yet this year. Those interviewed could not identify which specific Election Day triggers would materialize. One issue of note is that some powerful candidates are known to provide weapons. Women are not seen as targets. There had been no formal complaints placed. Traditional leaders are not seen as being involved. It is thought that the second round will bring more problems because the resources around presidential races are greater. SMS is not seen as being used for intimidation but for political campaigning. The Fifth section is the hot spot in this department. There were a number of incidents in the candidate registration process, but overall voter registration was peaceful.

Non-State Stakeholders

OCID is coordinating a region-wide observation effort. They are focused on Election Day. Twenty-six observers have been trained thus far for deployment in six municipalities. So far the campaigning is going well with moderate speech by candidates However, many were not comfortable with electoral security, concerned about the MINUSTAH withdrawal, and cited a recent example of a disruption of a political party meeting and a few minor incidents at the BEC during candidate registration. Firearms are common and remote polling centers are under-protected. Youth are paid three or four dollars to disrupt elections. In terms of election preparations, concerns were expressed about having to walk far to get tot her polling stations and problems with the distribution in CINs.

➢ Gonaïves

State and International Stakeholders

ASEs had been selected and supervisors took examinations, but political parties had not yet selected the MBV from the lists presented to them. The BED representative did not have a high awareness of the voter information call center and how it would operate. Payment from the CEP had been delayed for ten months.

There have been incidents of electoral violence, but the issue is more with anxiety in the

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population in general. However, a Vérité party meeting was reportedly disrupted. The lack of incidents was attributed to a non-intense campaign and a lack of funding for candidates. Women have not been targets. Businesses have not contributed money because they were unsure at that time that the elections would occur. PNH was respected, but others were said to have heavier weapons than the PNH. The BED is not yet organizing a regular, Thursday security coordination meeting, but has conducted meetings with MINUSTAH Civilian Affairs, UNPOL, military, and PNH. However, in Artibonite, there is remote access, land tenure and conflict issues which elections exacerbate. PNH reactions cannot be fast, there are not enough police, and many weapons are already in place. However, weapons are removed from markets in the days before the voting. SMS is used for campaigning and not the conveyance of threats. The media does not convey hate speech.

The BED has had ad hoc *c*ommunications with political parties through occasional meetings. A Code of Conduct has been issued and there is a requirement to give a 48 hour advance notice to obtain permits for rallies. Problems anticipated on Election Day included queue intimidation, voter changes of address, and the number of mandataires

Non-State Stakeholders

It has not been an intense campaign thus far, with few incidents reported. The candidates are not visible, and the population is not certain that election will occur. Only the big meetings have experienced violence. As recourse, candidates are campaigning on radio because there are still doubts about electoral security.

The electoral concerns include the number of mandataires, voter identifying their polls, queue intimidation, inability to locate name on registries, difficulties voting by people with disabilities, and that some national observes have mandataire cards as well.

At this level, OCID is not coordinating with international observer groups.

> **Cap-Haïtien**

State and International Stakeholders

At the regular Thursday coordination of electoral security stakeholders, the BED president reported that the ASEs and supervisors had been selected and MBV selection was almost completed. However, some parties had not yet made their selections. The protocols surrounding the voter information call center were unclear. Payments were an issue with ten months in arrears at the BED and workers threatening to strike. The BED had not yet received the voter registry and the issue of voters changing polls remained unresolved for the most part. Not all supervisors will have mobile telephones to take photographs of the PVs. Concerns were expressed about the communications gaps between the CEP and the BED where election information from the CEP is obtained by the BED through the CEP web site. Thus far (July 23), the campaign had been "timid" with two incidents of confrontation between Vérité and PHDK supporters with firearms displayed resulting in one arrest.

<u>Non-State Stakeholders</u>

There was a reported low level of campaigning and incidents of violence resulting from voter apathy and candidates skeptical that the election will take place. Additional causes of voter apathy cited include: poverty; a general deficit in political leadership; candidates reluctant to invest their own money; and voters which sense a culture of electoral postponement and uncertainty. OCID's observation efforts are mostly focused on Election Day. They will employ, among other means, SMS to text reports.

Their concerns included overcrowding of polls by mandataires and that women are the targets of electoral violence. On Election Day, the concern was expressed that women in line will be intimidated and mandataires will intimidate women inside the polling station. In past elections, church leaders have conducted some inter-party mediation, but that has not been the case recently.

South Assessment Team

> **Les Cayes**

<u>State and International Stakeholders</u>

The BED President expressed confidence in the overall state of preparations and the feasibility of the electoral calendar in spite of clearly stating that the CEP was becoming critically late in rendering decisions on a number of important operational issues. There was a general unease when asked to be more explicit in addressing questions on particular topics; however at no time was there any hesitation in at least attempting to do so.

Numbers and locations of Voting Centers were largely agreed; however the number of Polling Stations within the Centers had not yet been confirmed by the CEP. In many instances the number of Polling Stations had been increased substantially to accommodate a relatively large numbers of new voters who all required confirmation of their voting locations.

The related issues of Voting Center and Polling Station staffing and training remained outstanding in spite of repeated requests for CEP confirmation of staffing lists submitted.

The unavailability of the Voter Register two weeks out from elections was the most serious concern expressed by all participants. The Register was to be used to confirm voting locations for all voters, finalize supply logistics plans, and to assign Supervisors and Agents de Sécurité Électorale (ASE). The BED President was clear in his criticism of the CEP and wondered how the national body could miss such an important benchmark on which the overall success of the election hinged.

There was general consensus that material distribution and retrieval plans were sufficiently developed and in place, and that the participation of MINUSTAH and UNOPS would ensure that plans are implemented thoroughly. Few other logistics concerns were raised.

The Département election security plan was presented by the PNH Representative with commentary from UDMO. Although generally confident, concern was expressed regarding the limited capacity to deal with security incidents in less accessible parts of the Department and the challenge of dealing with multiple security incidents concurrently. Police are also concerned about the limited numbers of vehicles and motorcycles available by which to deploy forces. Party rivalries were discussed with acknowledgement that additional weapons were being distributed to party 'partisans' by individual candidates. Authorities have identified 33 Security 'Red Zones' that pose serious threat levels but, due to operational limitations, will not deploy to these areas until Election Day. The role of 'Justice de la Paix' and impact on local security was discussed at length with strong suggestion that Magistrates are politically intimidated and reluctant to act on requests of the PNH. The PNH expressed frustration, even suggesting that Judges be 'rotated out' of their respective areas of jurisdiction for the election period in order to avoid intimidation from known local political operatives.

Non-State Stakeholders

Civil Society representatives were generally less optimistic about elections than their election administration counterparts. Common concerns among them included: an insufficient number of police within the Department, the lack of official public response to inflammatory rhetoric by competing Parties, no attempt to limit the arming of party militants, no clear messaging from the CEP on election preparations or consequences of electoral malfeasance and violence, and the general lack of a civic education program.
They referred to the South as being 'historically violent' and were critical of the PNH tactic of essentially abandoning well known areas of trouble and the defined security 'Red Zones'.

➤ **Miragoâne**

State and International Stakeholders

The BED President immediately raised concerns related to a broad range of operational issues from staffing, morale, logistics, and security, and seemed particularly happy to have finally found an audience to whom he could express his concerns and frustration.

It was generally thought that voters had a clear sense of where they were to vote, providing the CEP had not changed voting locations from the former 2010 election. There was concern that the substantial number of additional first-time voters may not be sufficiently aware of their voting location while reference was made to the CEP's 'Where to Vote' online verification service as well as the planned SMS 'push' to all mobile users regarding their voting location. Both were seen as being valuable tools in offsetting possible troublesome reaction by masses of youthful voters not being able to vote for simply not

knowing what polling station list their names appeared on. Voting Center and Polling Station staff training was late and remained dependent on the CEP confirming staffing lists.

Again, significant frustration was expressed at the fact that the voter's list had not yet been delivered by the CEP. Reasons speculated upon ranged from intentional political manipulation by the Party in power to data transfer and production problems. The BED President stressed that regardless of the reasons for the delays, there was resentment at not being able to more thoroughly prepare for Election Day and the assertion that the CEP was transferring significant operational problems onto the BED and BECs.

A shortage of vehicles could compromise logistics plans and has forced the BED to employ private contractors in assisting with logistics. Again, reliance was being placed upon the support of MINUSTAH and UNOPS.

PNH representatives spoke of the 'territorial' nature of the Department and the fact that it was split into two zones under control of opposing political factions. Local Magistrates have political affiliations and will do little to counter the wishes of political interests in spite of PNH actions. The PNH confirmed that all Voting Center locations had been visited and that they are well aware of problem areas and competing groups.

Concerns were raised regarding the late recruitment of ASEs and the fact that ASE nominees were not vetted by the police who have a good knowledge of local players and history.

Non-State Stakeholders

Representatives were generally favorable in their assessment of election preparations and praised the success of the CEP's candidate and voter registration programs. Reference was made to the general improvement in the perception of the CEP after it had rejected high-profile candidates as well as the professionalism of the PNH in covering subsequent protest rallies.

The campaign had been very slow to non-existent however, with little 'election fever' apparent, resulting in the public perception that elections may simply not happen. Voter turn-out has been steadily declining and the CEP was doing no civic education or messaging of any sort to encourage participation; allowing public apathy to grow. Frustration was also expressed with the fact that, when finally publically posted, the Voter List is usually defaced or removed.

➢ **Petit Goâve**

State and International Stakeholders

A special assessment visit was made to Petit Goâve due to incidents of election related violence and unrest. The BEC office had been ransacked and burned on May 15/16 in

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response to the rejection of a local candidate for Deputy by the CEP and had subsequently been relocated inside the local PNH compound. The delegation was met by heavily armed security forces outside of Petit Goâve and escorted to the PNH Headquarters. BEC representatives were visibly anxious and concerned with the lateness of preparations which they believed had a significantly negative effect on public perception of transparency. As heard elsewhere, unmet CEP responsibilities were contributing to public suspicions of intentional electoral manipulation rather than operational constraint.

The Petit Goâve BEC is responsible for 26 Voting Centers consisting of 212 Polling Stations. Once again, concerns were raised regarding 'everything being late' with frustration expressed about the poor quality of Polling Station staff, the lack of a training manual, and the fact that 'political party' training frequently supersedes CEP efforts. Discussion continued around the inability of staff to properly complete the 'procès-verbal' of the vote-count at the close of polls and the related severe negative consequences on political party operative behavior within the Polling Center.

Concerns mirrored those of BED representatives in Les Cayes and Miragoâne. The all-important work of verifying the correct assignment of voters to polling locations was not possible in the absence of the list.

Security concerns far outweighed any logistics issues primarily as a result of the support of MINUSTAH and UNOPS.

The violent incidents at the BEC on May 15/16 confirmed the 'special case' of Petit Goâve being volatile and politically divided according to the local PNH Commissair. Persistent problems with armed gangs harassing the public are exacerbated by the intense rivalry between political parties PHTK and Vérité. The PNH acknowledged that political candidates are supplying 'heavy arms' in the run-up to elections and that the police had requested additional supplies of batons, shields, protective vests and helmets, ammunition, handcuffs, and mobile phones to better police Election Day crowds.

All areas have been visited by the PNH however, as seen elsewhere; there are no planned 'interventions' into the eight designated' Red Zones' prior to Election Day. Additionally PNH Inspecteur General Jean Saint-Fleur, head of a special National Commission responsible for public security during elections, met with various local representatives to review security plans following the events of May 15. The fact remains however that members of the BEC continue to work under severely strained security conditions and move only with armed escort. The PNH again raised the topic of 'impunity' saying that local Magistrates were extremely reluctant to follow through on initiatives undertaken by the police, frequently resulting in the release of known criminals.

Non-State Stakeholders

Representatives spoke of armed bandits' history of operating locally and aligning themselves with competing political parties at election time. There is general agreement on the ease of arms availability, intimidation, and continued threats as well as suggestions that there were insufficient numbers of Election Observers to properly cover the area. Civil

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society initiatives were being undermined by public fear and apathy while observers are frequently intimidated by Mandataires on Election Day.

The campaign has been very low-profile with candidates almost 'invisible'; often citing a lack of funding as a cause. It was felt that voters in outlying areas will not vote due to security concerns and that voter turnout will once again be very low, not exceeding that of 2010.

> **Jacmel**

State and International Stakeholders

Unlike previous meetings, the BED President in Jacmel suggested he was not aware of the meeting arrangements previously confirmed and only after further discussion with our CEP Security Representative agreed to summon relevant parties.

After offering generalized platitudes regarding elections in the Southeast, it became clear that he was reluctant to respond to more specific questions or volunteer opinion on electoral issues. During discussions additional members of the BED, PNH, MINUSTAH, UNOPS, and UNPOL joined the meeting.

There seemed to be confusion in the confirmation of numbers and locations of Voting Centers and Polling Stations with the President stating that they had yet to be finalized. With an addition of over 200 polling stations to a total of 767 among 123 Voting Centers, he stated that he did not know how the additional stations could be physically accommodated within existing premises or what would be done if they could not. Polling Staff and Supervisors have been identified but must still be confirmed by the CEP before training can take place.

As the register was not available there was no way to confirm vital information regarding the allocation of voters to specific stations, further confusing the issue of the additional polling stations. When asked what would be done with large numbers of disgruntled voters not being able to find their correct voting location, he did not respond.

Once again logistics are not perceived to be a problem, largely due to involvement of MINUSTAH and UNOPS.

The PNH Representatives stated that the Southwest had always been a 'peaceful' area and that they did not expect any trouble with voting. Their reaction to further questioning became hostile however, particularly when asked about the relationship between PNH action and local Magistrates and suggestions of 'impunity' which were encountered in other Departments. The BED President did eventually confirm that there was significant local tension and that les Frères Lambert exerted significant economic and political control over the entire Southeast. There was little discussion of an election security plan and he would not respond to questions on political rivalries.

Reference was made to PNH Rapid Reaction Force capacity being enough to deal with any

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violent incidents. A list of former Agents de Sécurité Électoral (ASE) has been sent to the CEP by the BED but was not yet approved.

<u>Non-State Stakeholders</u>

Representatives strongly contradicted the position of the BED and PNH regarding security, suggesting that many candidates feared for their personal well-being. There are volatile 'Red Zones', such as Beaudouin, where public mobility is severely restricted as it is simply too dangerous. We were told that the killing of Pierre Lafond, the candidate for Mayor of Marigot under the banner of the FUSION, on July 22 has had the effect of further alienating voters. Although unclear whether or not the killing was politically motivated, the public sees it as a sign of dangerous volatility associated with elections.

Remarks were made about the lack of campaigning and 'electoral fever' with speculation again being that financing and security issues were the main causes. The absence of a CEP sponsored civic education program is also causing concern as the public remains highly skeptical that elections will actually take place. Additionally, there was an open discussion of the question of who benefits as a result of CEP operational delays with suggestions that it is in the best interest of PHTK to inject as much uncertainty and confusion into the electoral process as possible.

Annex V - Electoral Security Zonal Map

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Annex VI - Incidents of Electoral Violence Surrounding Election Day by Department (August 9 – August 18, 2015)

Reported Incidents from 1st Round of Elections

- North
- North West
- North East
- Grand Anse
- South
- South East
- Nippes
- West
- Artibonite
- Center

Center 9 — North 9 — North West 4 — North East 2 — Grand Anse 4 — South 11 — South East 7 — Nippes 2 — West 24 — Artibonite 7

Reported Incidents from 1st Round of Elections

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Annex VII – Social Media Diagnostic Software

Aggie

Aggie is a real-time social media aggregator designed for election monitoring. The system is intended to enable real-time response feedback and recommendations in order to improve the electoral process. The platform brings together relevant reports from Twitter based upon matches to pre-selected keywords, and from pre-identified Facebook pages and groups and website feeds, to allow users to handle roughly 60,000 reports per minute. It was first developed for the Nigerian elections in 2011, and has since been used for elections in Nigeria, Liberia, Ghana, Kenya and Uganda. Recently, Aggie 2.0 was launched which provides better usability and integration of formal reporting with social media aggregation.

Artificial Intelligence for Monitoring Elections (AIME)

AIME is powered by the Artificial Intelligence for Disaster Response (AIDR) platform which was created to gather information to help respond to natural disasters worldwide. AIME automatically works to identify relevant information for very large volumes of tweets and text messages through machine learning. AIME is an experimental solution that combines crowdsourcing with artificial intelligence to automatically identify tweets of interest during major elections. Users of AIME can tag tweets themselves or ask crowd-sourced volunteers to tag tweets indicative of electoral violence, rigging, or voter issues; after which, the system uses statistical machine learning to understand patterns in the human-tagged tweets. It then autoclassifies new tweets that are related to these categories at the rate of 2 million tweets or text messages per minute. AIME was first tested in the 2015 Nigerian elections, and Creative was the first group to independently use this platform for the Guyana election in May 2015.