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


International Migration from Latin America and the Caribbean

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Introduction—Latin American and Caribbean Migration in the past 30 years, 1990-2020

International human mobility from the Americas has increased dramatically to 40 million people in 2019, from 13 million in 1990. These migration flows respond to global demands for low-skilled foreign labor during the end of the 20th century. However more recently, they have responded to political challenges related to state fragility.



Source: UNDESA, 2020

The scope of this phenomenon is considerable. There are more than 80 million transnational households, including some forty million migrants living in the U.S., Spain, Canada and elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean, coupled with roughly forty million families of migrants living at home in the region.

¹ Manuel Orozco, 2020

The economic importance of migration is now undeniable and nonnegligible. According to ECLAC, growth in the entire Latin American region in 2019 was supported by migrant worker remittances.

Migration in the post 2009 global recession

The global recession planted seeds of political instability once the governments in place could not deliver on social demands or handle pressures from transnational organized crime networks. Political tensions and crises since the post global 2009 recession in several Latin American and Caribbean countries posed pressure on people to migrate, especially in countries like Haiti, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Colombia, Venezuela, Guatemala.

In many of these countries, out-migration has been a consequence of deteriorating political conditions. Overall, we find that countries where family remittances were higher in the post 2009 period, are also among those that are least democratic or politically stable. Migrants from these fragile states amount to over 13 million people. Moreover, over seventy percent of migrants from these countries are hosted by the U.S., Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Brazil.

When analyzing current migration flows, two key trends emerge. First, the rise in migration is coming from a handful of countries, many of which face severe political problems related to state fragility and poor economic development. Second, intra-regional migration has grown in absolute numbers since 1990, and has at least doubled from 2000 to 2017.

Table 1: Latin American and Caribbean Migration, 2000-2019

Countries	1990	2000	2005	2010	2019
<i>Colombia</i>	1,009,935	1,436,444	1,887,924	2,526,525	2,869,032
<i>Cuba</i>	835,796	1,049,761	1,162,586	1,313,321	1,654,684
<i>El Salvador</i>	1,242,075	949,270	1,119,319	1,337,458	1,600,739
<i>Guatemala</i>	348,332	583,020	737,106	925,252	1,205,644
<i>Guyana</i>	233,731	363,434	393,980	439,451	520,196
<i>Haiti</i>	528,873	805,430	972,717	1,123,759	1,585,681
<i>Honduras</i>	156,594	342,337	449,303	587,886	800,707
<i>Nicaragua</i>	442,126	502,243	436,780	610,902	740,000
<i>Venezuela, RB</i>	185,946	319,240	438,692	558,491	4,500,000
<i>Fragile/Difficult Countries</i>	4,983,408	6,351,179	7,598,407	9,423,045	15,476,683
<i>Latin American and the Caribbean</i>	13,271,542	22,110,620	26,602,460	31,751,744	38,918,668
<i>Fragile as a %</i>	38%	29%	29%	30%	40%
<i>Latin American intraregional migration</i>	7,124,874	6,522,460	6,756,354	7,713,916	12,814,376
<i>Fragile States YOY Growth</i>		2.5%	1.8%	2.2%	5.1%
<i>LAC Year on Year Growth</i>		5.2%	1.9%	1.8%	2.1%

Source: UNDESA, *Costa Rica*,

http://migracion.go.cr/integracion_desarrollo/Diagnostico%20Contexto%20Migratorio%20de%20Costa%20Rica%202017.pdf; UNDESA;


<https://www.laprensa.hn/honduras/1210397-410/puede-honduras-brindar-tps-venezolanos-crisis-humanitaria>; *Panama*:

<https://www.migracion.gob.pa/inicio/estadisticas>; *Chile*: <https://gestion.pe/mundo/chile-otorgara-visa-especial-venezolanos-huyen-del-gobierno-maduro-231056>; https://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inmigraci%C3%B3n_haitiana_en_Chile; *Colombia*:

https://robuenosaires.iom.int/sites/default/files/Informes/Tendencias_Migratorias_Nacionales_en_Americas_Venezuela_EN_Julio_2018_web.pdf; <https://www.lafm.com.co/colombia/en-medio-de-la-crisis-cuantos-venezolanos-hay-en-colombia>


These countries exhibit major political challenges which in most cases approach state failure or poor rule of law. There is a negative relationship between the growth in migration in the region and state governance (a measure of fragility). As performance in governance deteriorates, migration growth increases from those countries that are most affected by state fragility.

Graphic 1: Growth of Migration and Governance in Latin America and the Caribbean



Source: World Bank Governance Indicators; World Bank Governance Indicators (the indicators are measured in a scale of -2.5 to 2.5, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130##); Growth of migration measured by the change over time 2010-2017, data obtained from UNDESA.

Figure 2. Remittance Growth and Ranking on the Democracy Index for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2019



Source: Democracy Index, The Economist 2020.

Despite warnings from international groups regarding the emergence of forced or politically related migration, human mobility has been a topic that is largely been neglected if not ignored for more than a decade by countries in the Western Hemisphere.

The current situation presents numerous risks and challenges. Instability is forcing people out and causing hardship for at least 12million families, affecting their wellbeing as well as the personal safety of 50 million people. Among the consequences of mobility and separation are political, economic, and security problems.

As more people leave, options for political improvement diminish because many of those migrating had constituted a backbone for political change. Moreover, politically motivated migration is accompanied with economic insecurity and crisis in several countries, including Haiti, Nicaragua and Venezuela.

Table 2: Migration from Fragile or Difficult Countries (2017)

Migrants from	Brazil	Chile	Costa Rica	Colombia	Dom. Rep	Ecuador	Panama	United States	All countries	Share
Colombia	8,395	146,582	26739	..	3,687	200,539	98,253	753,847	2,736,230	47%
Cuba	2,544	3,173	5,791	1,945	3,927	3,083	2,917	1,251,037	1,558,312	83%
El Salvador	279	242	13,984	409	273	537	3,330	1,392,663	1,559,924	94%
Guatemala	357	236	2,676	490	438	442	1,658	975,504	1,117,355	89%
Haiti	10,000	179,338		122	336,729	98	559	671,499	1,364,492	87%
Honduras	155	249	3,947	376	433	482	1,553	597,647	722,430	85%
Nicaragua	449	249	340,298	611	298	403	13,335	275,909	689,978	93%
Venezuela	57,000	288,233	39,000	870,000	5,539	200,000	79,990	351,144	3,000,000	74%
Selected countries	79,179	614,153	432,435	873,953	351,324	405,584	201,595	6,269,250	12,048,721	76%
Latin America & Caribbean	286,092	1251,225	458,237	911,290	359,347	447,254	239,173	23,362,654	39,026,446	71%
Share	28%	45%	94%	96%	98%	91%	84%	27%	31%	

Source: same as table 1. As of 2018 there are over 700,000 Venezuelans in Peru.

Countries with state fragility and high levels of emigration exhibit important development challenges and share some important characteristics. One of the most important shared traits is visible in the presence of economic models based on labor-intensive activities in agriculture or low value-added resources, within highly informal economies. They are also countries with largely unskilled labor forces.

For the most part, these countries are classified as low performing (with some like Haiti, being dangerously low performing). These are also economies that exhibit decreasing labor productivity among the more remittance-dependence countries and greater dependence on agriculture.

Central America: El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua

Central American migration, particularly from the three countries in the northern part, underwent changes in the post-2009 period, in large part due to increased insecurity coming from transnational organized crime. The slow economic recovery, the effect of the military coup in Honduras, as well as the expansion of youth gang violence and narco-trafficking networks in El Salvador and Guatemala had broad and devastating effects on emigration. To understand the increase in migration, it is important to understand what has driven it.

Waves of severe violence and insecurity associated with an ecosystem of organized crime networks have informed decisions to emigrate. A larger number of people have sought to leave their home countries, including many applying for political asylum, to escape persecution from narco-trafficking networks,

gangs, or extortion rings. For example, in a 2014 study of Salvadorans, at least 20% expressed interest in emigrating, particularly among those between the ages of 18 and 24, and 28% stressed that insecurity was the primary reason.

Insecurity is not accidental; the Northern Triangle is affected by violent crime and extortions that intimidate people and push them out of their communities and their country. Since the mid-2000s, for example, there have been between 40 and 38 homicides a day for the three countries combined. They are accompanied by thousands of cases of extortion a year, and the intimidation and turf wars of an estimated 100,000 youth gangs (over half in El Salvador).

In addition to insecurity, economic factors are also central to this situation. Within a macroeconomic context, Central American economies are split between two poles of growth and wealth generation, with a 'missing middle.' First, the growth in the region has been driven by its dependence on the global economy, specifically on merchandise exports (predominantly agriculture and "maquilas") and tourism (much of which comes from the diaspora itself). In terms of merchandise exports, less than 20 products accounts for more than 60% of exports by 50 top companies, which in turn employ only a fraction of the total labor force.²

The second pole of growth is linked to migration. Remittances, nostalgic trade,³ diaspora tourism and other services represent nearly 20% of GDP, on average. Remittances alone amounted to \$17 billion in 2015 and represented over 50% of household income in some 3.5 million households in the region. Moreover, remittance recipient households have a total stock of savings of over US\$ 3 billion, the majority in informal, "under the mattress" savings.

In fact, between these poles is a vast informal sector, comprised of more than two thirds of the labor force and the business sector together. It is euphemistic to talk about a private sector in Central America when most of these enterprises are one-person businesses that make less than two minimum wages in revenue but earn only one. In turn, low income levels are the byproduct of an economic model based on agriculture or other low-performing products that rely on unskilled, uneducated and underpaid labor.

Therefore, the consequences of an obsolete growth model, accompanied by high rates of informal work, as well as the significant security issues previously described, have triggered emigration.

Recent studies have shown that the main reasons driving migration from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras include family ties, particularly those established through remittances, poor economic conditions at the household and macroeconomic level, and victimization. A 2019 study by Creative Associates showed that 25% of people from these countries have considered emigrating. Generally, people who have considered migrating reported being exposed to tough economic situations and have been victimized to a greater extent than those who had not considered emigrating. They also have larger transnational family ties than those who have not thought about migrating.⁴ The study

²² <http://www.thedialogue.org/blogs/2016/02/a-new-strategic-approach-for-el-salvadors-economic-development-challenges/>

³ In many cases, the diaspora purchases home-country products -- such as food, beverages, clothing or handicrafts -- while they are living abroad. This is known as the "nostalgic trade."

⁴ "Saliendo Adelante: Why migrants risk it all," www.saliendo-adelante.com

identified 12 situations related to these factors that are more frequently experienced by those who have considered migrating than those who have not.

Table 3. Characteristics of those considering migrating from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, 2019

INDICATOR	El Salvador	Guatemala	Honduras	All three countries
Percentage of people who would consider emigrating	23.9%	17.8%	33.0%	25.0%
Demographic				
Being between 18 and 29 years old	37.5%***	44.1%***	42.0%***	41.1%
Have at least a high school education	62.0%***	55.2%***	50.4%***	55.2%
Victimization, Crime and Insecurity				
Has been a victim of a crime or knows a family member / someone close who has been	25.0%***	26.2%	22.3%***	24.1%
Economic				
Believes that conditions are worse off now than before	46.4%***	44.1%***	64.6%***	54.0%
Believes that conditions will be worse next year	17.2%	23.4%	50.4%***	33.6%
Unemployed	11.5%***	9.7%***	13.5%	11.9%
Household lives on less than \$400 month and can't make ends meet	32.3%***	35.9%***	39.4%*	36.3%
Occupation as laborer	26.0%	43.4%***	37.6%	35.4%
Transnational				
Has a relative living abroad (United States)	66.1%	50.3%	76.3%	66.9%
Receives remittances	35.4%***	27.6%***	45.8%***	38.1%
Has been deported	2.1%	1.4%	6.2%***	3.9%

Source: *Saliendo Adelante: Why migrants risk it all,* www.saliendo-adelante.com; Note: *** statistically significant at 1%, ** at 5% and * at 10% level

Across the region, the individual experiences and characteristics associated with thoughts of migrating include: being young, living in a low-income household, being a low skilled worker, being unemployed, being a skilled worker with at least a high school education, having an unfavorable outlook on the future economic situation, having been victimized, and having transnational ties. Youth are twice as likely to consider the option of migrating than their older counterparts.

A range of economic issues influence whether residents from these countries consider migrating. Living in a household earning less than \$400 a month that can't make ends meet makes people 1.24 times more likely to consider migrating. Believing that conditions are worse off today than they were last year makes people 1.67 times more likely to think about migrating. Labor market conditions also matter.

Regarding transnational ties, having a relative abroad does not make a person more likely to think about migrating but receiving remittances does. In all three countries, receiving remittances has greater statistical significance than having a relative abroad. However, the statistical interaction⁵ between

⁵ In statistical analysis, two variables *interact* when a particular combination of variables yields results that would not be anticipated based of the main effects of those variables.

receiving remittances and having a relative abroad is significant and yields a 71% chance that the person has thought of migrating.

Nicaragua

The political crisis in Nicaragua has forced thousands of people to move abroad. In a recent December 2019 survey, 9% of Nicaraguan households said they have had a relative leave the country since the ongoing political crisis began in April 2018.

This number amounts to 140,000 people.⁶ Many of these individuals have fled to Costa Rica, Spain and the United States. In turn, many have sent money to their relatives upon arrival.

The Caribbean: Haiti and Cuba

Haitian Migration

The outflow of people from the Caribbean is also a significant reality, particularly among Haitians and Cubans. In the case of Haiti, migration from the island occurs in various stages and continued after the 2010 earthquake.

Haiti's political history is shaped by long-standing periods of dictatorship and repression followed by a difficult and highly contested transition. The transition has been truncated due to poor consensus and deep-rooted divisions among elites throughout the end of the XX century to the present.⁷ In turn, the state has failed to protect its citizens, either from violence or from violations of civil liberties. For example, homicides in Haiti reached their peaks during times of military unrest, and the country is regularly affected by civil disobedience and at times from threats coming from para-military organizations. The authority of the Haitian state is also curtailed by widespread corruption stemming from high opportunity costs to break laws without the presence of police enforcement or a functioning court system.⁸ Moreover, Haiti's economic performance is severely limited both in terms of its economic activities and its labor force.

Haitian migration has turned out to be a consequence of the gradual failure of state performance. After the 2010 earthquake, people who initially migrated to Brazil have subsequently been moving to Chile. There were less than 5,000 Haitians in Chile in 2010, but the number has increased exponentially to more than 100,000 today.

Table 4: Haitian Migration and Remittances to Selected Countries

Country of migration	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2017	Estimated flows to Haiti (2017) (\$,000,000)
Canada	38,271	45,292	53,390	66,504	80,100	137,000	137,000	\$258
Chile	36	41	45	37	28	53,630	73,098	\$86
Dominican Republic	187,210	207,931	228,652	271,273	311,969	329,281	336,729	\$271
France	26,253	27,102	27,950	67,078	68,723	75,616	75,467	\$190

⁶ Orozco, Manuel. Based on survey with 1010 individuals conducted by Borge y Asociados, December 2019.

⁷ Fatton, Robert., Jr. *Haiti's Predatory Republic: The Unending Transition to Democracy*

⁸ Freedom House. *Freedom in the World, 2015. Countries at the Crossroads: Haiti.*

U.S.	225,393	326,669	429,964	491,772	570,290	649,941	671,499	\$1,269
Rest of the world	50,144	56,437	63,879	74,969	88,502		50,000	\$88
World	527,307	663,472	803,880	971,633	1,119,612	1,245,468	1,378,325	\$2,164

Source: UN/DESA, 2017. Author's estimates from interviews and press sources. Differences between the official volume and this table relate to research that shows that up to 20% of transfers recorded are not family remittances, but rather business transactions.

Cuban Migration

Cubans have historically emigrated for political reasons, though more recently this pattern of mobility has shifted to economic reasons. The political conditions in Cuba have been a key factor in the emigration of more than 40,000 people each year. In turn, the United States allowed any Cuban that set foot on US soil to obtain legal residency through refugee status up through 2017.

However, as the Cuban economic situation worsened at the end of the 2000s and the Obama administration ending the 'wet foot, dry foot' policy, a new trend of migration emerged, whereby Cubans are now using different routes to come to the U.S. seeking a better standard of living abroad.

Today, it is estimated that there are 1.5 million Cuban migrants living abroad.⁹ The United States is home to roughly 80% of them. More recently, Spain has emerged as an important destination, and today approximately 7% of Cuban migrants reside in Spain. Other destinations include Italy, Mexico, Canada and Venezuela.¹⁰

Table 5: Cuban Migrants by Country of Residence

	1990	2000	2010	2015	2017	Share
World	835,546	1,049,902	1,310,867	1,511,294	1,558,312	
United States	736,971	894,876	1,055,229	1,210,873	1,251,037	80%
Spain	21,854	45,738	103,189	131,134	132,378	8%
Italy	1,444	11,659	33,463	33,469	34,057	2%
Mexico	2,660	7,267	11,822	17,653	18,111	1%
Canada	1,737	5,269	13,340	14,918	15,509	1%
Germany	2,734	7,251	11,753	12,246	14,576	1%
Puerto Rico	19,579	19,054	12,882	13,321	12,988	1%
Venezuela	11,559	9,928	10,813	11,423	11,601	1%
Costa Rica	4,504	4,391	5,669	5,756	5,791	0%

Source: UNDESA

There are three key points with regards to how the Cuban government approaches the migration issue. First, remittances have represented a very important source of income for the Cuban economy and depend on a continued flow of migrants. Remittances to Cuba, which are estimated at US\$1.6 billion, are one of the primary sources of income and support for an estimated 700,000 households on the island.

⁹ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013).

¹⁰ United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2013). Trends in International Migrant Stock: Migrants by Destination and Origin (United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013). Note that part of this migration includes guest worker programs between the Cuban government and other countries.

Second, with declining economic performance and the loss of more than half million jobs between 2009 and 2016, outmigration became a matter of urgency and even constituted a very important “escape valve” for the Cuban economy. Moreover, economic reforms have actually relied on the increase of remittances, as well as investment by Cubans abroad and remittance recipients, to develop the local economy.

Third, rising unemployment, increases in the issuing of passports, the Ecuadorian policy of not requiring visas for Cubans contributed to additional migration. When the United States renewed its diplomatic relations with Cuba in 2015, rumors that the so-called “Wet feet, dry feet” policy would disappear caused fear among many Cubans. In turn, these events gave rise to a new wave of migration.

In fact, Cuban migration abroad, and to the United States specifically, has increasingly followed a trend of traveling by land from Quito, Ecuador. The journey is extensive, departing from Cuba towards Quito, Ecuador and passing through Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Mexico. Although thousands of Cubans have been passing through Central America for years, what changed was a breakdown in the trafficking networks that emerged as a result of the growing demand itself. In 2015, the network fell apart and many migrants became stranded in Panama or Costa Rica.

The Venezuelan migration crisis

As the political and economic crisis in Venezuela deepens to critical conditions approaching state failure, migration has spiked. Migrants are leaving as a direct consequence of what goes on daily in the country. Venezuela’s economic growth collapsed between 2010 and 2018, from US\$420 billion to US\$250 billion, while crime and political conditions worsened dramatically. By 2019 the country’s output was less than \$100 billion.

As a result, the number of Venezuelans migrating has exploded for the past ten years, but particularly since the increased economic scarcity of goods and jobs plagued the country, and on arrival of Maduro’s regime. The figures are uncertain to some extent. However, the existing information points to a large-scale outmigration similar to mass refugee movements of people escaping from fear and hunger.

The United Nations currently placed the number of Venezuelan migrants at an estimated 4.5 million in 2019. This number may be higher and has been constantly rising for the past 10 years as country conditions deteriorate.

A 2014 study showed that 6% of Venezuelans had emigrated that year. By 2016, a LAPOP public opinion survey already was reporting 13% of Venezuelans have a family member who had emigrated. A year later, Consultores21 reported that 29% of Venezuelans had someone leaving the country.¹¹ This latter number places the total estimate at 4 million people, compared to an estimated 2 million using the LAPOP’s data point.

Moreover, in addition to survey numbers, the pattern of migration is supporting these figures. News reports and government statistics show that more than a million Venezuelans are in Colombia, many of whom are already settled, not including those in the border. There are another 200,000 in Ecuador, 80,000

¹¹ <http://talcualdigital.com/index.php/2018/01/17/calculan-en-4-millones-la-diaspora-venezolana/>

in Panama, 85,000 in Chile, and 40,000 in Costa Rica, over 600,000 in Peru, from among several countries in the Americas.

In the case of migration to the U.S., the numbers are in flux. US Census figures pointed to 140,000 in 2004, to 170,000 in 2013, and 350,000 in 2017. The number of applications for asylum in the US alone illustrate the growing emigration pattern escaping from political turmoil. In 2017, at least 57,000 Venezuelans applied for asylum.¹²

Table 6: Venezuelan Migration

	Venezuelan migrants		
	2018	2019	2020
Costa Rica	36,000	39,600	43,560
Panama	79,990	87,989	96,788
Brazil	50,000	212,400	361,000
Chile	84,586	371,200	472,000
Colombia	870,000	1,400,000	2,009,000
Ecuador	200,000	330,400	659,000
United States	433,630	446,639	460,038
Peru	700,000	860,900	978,000
Spain	202,859	270,000	297,000
Rest of countries	579,424	480,872	323,614
World	3,000,000	4,500,000	5,700,000

Source: Manuel Orozco, 2018. Data based on surveys conducted in Chile, Colombia, Panama to Venezuelan migrants. Interviews with money transfer operators. For 2019, <https://r4v.info/es/situations/platform>, and RMRP, Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela, 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/72254.pdf>.

The economic importance of migration and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic

One of the several economic contributions of migration is family remittances. Family remittances are extraordinarily important for most Caribbean and Central American countries, and a few countries in South America like Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Paraguay. For all of Latin America and the Caribbean, remittances represent 2% of gross domestic product.

But for ten countries remittances represent over 5% of gross domestic product. This migrant labor force keeps their homelands integrated to the global economy through their support. However, these are predominantly the countries where migration is being slowed, either through design or policy consequence.


Development policies are to be aligned with the foreign policy interest as well as with immigration policies in ways that they support each other for the largest number of beneficiaries. The impact of

¹² Camilleri, Michael J. and Fen Osler Hampson. *NO STRANGERS AT THE GATE Collective Responsibility and a Region's Response to the Venezuelan Refugee and Migration Crisis*. 2018. p10.

remittances on economic growth and development is a positive one, for which evidence has been provided in many instances and cases. Migration overall decreases with greater wealth in low income societies. Therefore, bringing stability in many fragile migrant sending countries, and making migration a more rational process, is reinforced with a development effort to create wealth.

Triangulating development, migration and stability is central to ensure a positive impact of remittances and migration beyond issues of instability.

Figure 3: Income dependence on remittances: Remittances as share of GDP, 2019



Source: Author's estimates based on the World Bank Development Indicators.

In 2020, the global COVID-19 pandemic has had different effects on migrants and may impact continued migration. There are four major considerations about the impact of the pandemic.

First, at least 60% of all the world’s migrants, and more than 80% of Latin American and Caribbean migrants are living in countries where 90% of all cases have taken place. Second, the pandemic effect on migrants has health and economic effects. Most migrants suffer from lack of medical access and insurance, and in some US cities have been disproportionately affected.¹³ Economically, they have lower earnings and as layoffs take place, they will be unable to send money to their relatives.

Third, the most remittance dependent countries are also countries whose migrants were most affected by the unemployment resulting from the pandemic: Latin American and Caribbean migrants in the United States, Canada, Spain, Panama, Costa Rica (some of the most affected countries by the pandemic) capture 70% of all the region’s labor migration. The drop in remittances resulting from unemployment and lack of a social safety net is estimated at least at -18% relative to the \$100 billion received in 2019.¹⁴

Fourth, these countries are also among the ones that exhibit greater weaknesses in their economic and political performance, and as with the case of fragile states, the impulse to migrate may ensue. The table below points to the fact that Latin American and Caribbean countries are among many that show significance dependence on remittances but also are weak economies, with strong external dependence, lower democratic regimes, limited health preparedness and low economic performance.

Table 7: Characteristics of Major Remittance Recipient Countries

	Under 1%	Between 1 and 5%	Over 5%	Latin America and Caribbean
Global Health Index ^a	51.2	41	38.2	39.9
Population ages 65 and above (% of total population) ^b	11.53	9.76	7.03	8.32
Democracy Index ^c	6.59	5.59	5.06	6.43
Tourism % of total exports ^b	12.73	18.17	25.78	23.53
Personal remittances, received (% of GDP) ^b	0.32	2.62	11.61	6.23
Economic Complexity Index ^d	0.32	0.04	-0.31	-0.15
Government measures addressing COVID-19	121	102	79	71
Per Capita GDP ^b	28,959	11,005	3,221	8,366
Share of rural areas ^b	28.82	46.13	49.57	38.19
Share of migrants to pop. ^b	6%	10%	16%	19%
Social Progress Index	59.94	49.66	48.43	47.27
Govt. Expenditure ^b	17%	17%	13%	12%

Source: data compiled by the author. a Global Health Security Index 2019, Economist Intelligence Unit; b World Bank Development Indicators; c Democracy Index, Economist Intelligence Unit; d The Atlas Of Economic Complexity.

¹³ Orozco, Manuel. Migrants and the Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Remittances, Inter-American Dialogue, March 18, 2020.

¹⁴ Orozco, Manuel. Migrants and the Impact...

A Much-Needed Policy Engagement

Two underlying issues shape this outmigration: first, that people are not leaving out of a temporary need; and second, that the source factor of emigration is tied to state fragility, whether it be social, economic and/or political.

As noted earlier, many of these migrants are not seeking short-term relief, posing a policy problem and a migration management challenge for countries like Colombia, Panama, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Panama, and Ecuador. For example, our research shows that while one quarter or more of people migrating from the Northern Triangle did so due to insecurity and fear, the rest have done so due to economic necessity resulting from the instability (and an ecosystem of organized crime) governing their nations.

Here the underlying issue is state fragility, that is a situation where economic and political institutions are not strong enough to provide basic provisions to its citizens. The ability of many Latin American and Caribbean states to deliver public goods to their society is weak. When a state struggles to deliver the most basic public goods, such as protection, shelter, or food, it is poorly performing. Poor performance can yield to state failure.

In fact, over the past 20 years a literature on what is referred to as fragile states has emerged in response to an emerging number of states unable to deliver to its citizenry. Now, fragile states in the Americas are responsible for large outflows of migrants. **States have now facilitated an 'exit' strategy as the third choice available to citizens using Hirschman's analysis.**¹⁵

Few countries in the Americas have historically had a migrant or refugee host tradition, and thus it makes it difficult to find policy solutions, even for countries like Costa Rica, with a history of hosting refugees since the 1970s.

All these patterns are creating widespread tensions, ranging from extreme xenophobia to border disputes, to public intolerance toward immigration. These tensions will not lead to the expulsion of migrants, but rather to their vulnerability and marginalization.

One way to look for solutions is to consider the central and immediate challenges that migrants and migration represent for the Western Hemisphere. There are four challenges that seem to be pervasively touching on these nationalities and those host countries:

Legal Status

The matter of legal status of migrants has become a critical problem. Central Americans in the Northern Triangle entering the United States are confronted by closed boundaries that assume these nations are opportunistically entering the country. At least three quarters of Central Americans migrating to the United States are undocumented. Similarly, many Venezuelans that have entered several countries have irregular or temporary status. For example, according to a survey of Venezuelans in Colombia, in the cities

¹⁵ Hirschman, Albert. *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States*. 1970.

of Bogota and Cucuta, more than two thirds had irregular status, and only one third had a temporary permit.

More importantly, **this approach needs to problematize the assumption that migration from fragile countries is temporary.** Instead, an alternative policy narrative is necessary to prevent backlash as well as vulnerable populations from emerging. It does not mean to offer an immediate path to permanence, but to offer a reasonable temporary stay with at least three years of duration.

In the United States, the debate about immigration reform has predominantly focused on a two-tiered context; one, providing a legal path to US citizenship, and two, enforcing migration laws by strengthening the border and reducing undocumented workers in the labor force. However, the benefits of legalizing a large portion of those with irregular status will have a positive effect on diplomatic efforts to mitigate state fragility. Simply put, organized diaspora groups are far more effective when they have legal status. Moreover, the economic contributions in the host country of those with legal status are greater than among those who with undocumented status.

The Issue of Relief

Asylum and refugee solutions are central to any effort to deal with the outflow of people from fragile states. In fact, there are more than 100,000 asylum applications from unaccompanied minors coming from Central America alone in the United States. There are also more than 50,000 asylum applications of Venezuelans and the number of applications from Nicaraguans in the U.S. is on the rise. In Costa Rica, more than 20,000 people applied for refugee status in the first four months of the political crisis.

Their claims for asylum need a fair hearing and due process. Currently, a large number of these applications in the U.S. are denied; in fact, only 5% are adjudicated for asylum.

Many people in the United States (over 50%) apply for asylum without legal representation and face immediate deportation once denied. Their claims are coming from some of the most dangerous places in the world, places from which more than 350,000 attempts to enter the US occurred in 2016. The problems asylum seekers face are not limited to due process and lack of legal counsel, but also relate to their social and psychological needs. In order to deal with these issues, it is important to provide greater weight to asylum claims, clarify the claims for asylum, improve the training of judges, improve legal counsel, and provide better information about regional insecurity.

Labor Vulnerability

People who have left their homelands escaping the fragility that shapes the conditions in their home country settle in host nations to confront serious vulnerabilities. In the economic front, the labor force faces significant losses vis a vis the local economy. Migrants from Central America in the U.S. often earn 35% less than their counterparts in construction, domestic work, and other economic activities.

Table 17: Earnings in Selected Occupation vis-à-vis Migrant Earnings, 2017

Occupation — annual income	DC	LA	NYC	Miami	Chicago	USA	Undoc. Migr.	Relative
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
								To nation
Restaurant Industry	26,340	27,570	29,290	29,034	21,980	23,020	18,798	82%
Construction Industry	34,430	42,660	50,980	73,488	56,890	31,000	22,229	72%
Child/Elder Care Industry	25,780	24,416	22,850	21,272	24,000	22,000	12,500	57%
Maintenance	28,700	29,780	34,270	32,767	30,210	36,550	21,785	60%
Cleaning	27,210	28,890	33,000	20,423	29,590	23,000	14,807	64%
Professional—Management	70,154	70,124	80,137	60,873	73,198	78,232	27,500	35%
Professional—Technical (Engineering, Etc.)	99,690	96,370	84,060	74,528	80,490	82,980		

Source: Wage data based on state information (Bureau of Labor statistics and other market sources).

Venezuelans in Colombia have earnings that are one fifth that of Colombians, even though many have useful skills. Escaping from their country has come at a price: for example, while over 60% had a professional degree in Venezuela, in Colombia only one quarter were working in that capacity. The rest work in the informal economy.

This trend is also common in other countries. In Panama, although not in the informal economy, there are fewer Venezuelan migrants in professional jobs and more in technical or sales occupations.

Graph 3: Venezuelans in Panama and Chile- Occupation



Source: Surveys of Venezuelan Migrants, 2018-2019. Includes 99 Venezuelans in Chile, 436 Venezuelans in Colombia, 75 Venezuelans in Panama, and 75 Venezuelans in Costa Rica.

Even though migrants meet fundamental economic needs in the host countries, their vulnerability is also observed in their low capacity to generate assets. The underutilization of their skills and their contribution to the economy is often ignored or not addressed as a matter of economic opportunity for the host country.

Table 18: Income of Venezuelans in Colombia

Income	Venezuelans in: Bogota	Cucuta	Colombians in Bogota
Less than 560,000 pesos (USD\$170)	1.90%	95.70%	3%
From 560,001 to 800,000 pesos (USD\$170-243)	81.60%	1.00%	5%
From 800,001 to 1,500,000 pesos (USD\$243 – 456)	13.90%	1.00%	6%
From 1,500,001 pesos to 2,500,000 pesos (USD\$456-760)	1.50%	1.00%	3%
More than 2.5 million pesos (USD\$760+)	1.10%	1.00%	82%

Source: survey of Venezuelans in Colombia.

The United States and other migrant host countries in Latin America (Argentina, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic), in Europe (Spain, Italy), and Asia (Japan) show a demand for foreign labor, both high-skilled and low-skilled. Regarding low skilled labor, guest worker programs or temporary permits can offer important solutions to prevailing challenges.

In the U.S. context, temporary worker visas (plus NAFTA visas) amount to less than 6% of all non-immigrant visas. In total, the H visa category amounts to 533,000 visas. However, with an annual increase of 0.2% in our labor force of 170 million people, there is a substantive need to replenish labor through migration.

A win-win approach would be to expand H2B visas as a means to address the demand for low-skilled labor, particularly from countries that exhibit state fragility. Currently most low-skilled migrant workers are already crossing the border without papers, in an insecure and unauthorized manner. About three quarters of undocumented migrants that cross the border from Mexico and Central America work in three predominant occupations: domestic work, construction and hospitality. Those workers could benefit from a guest worker program under H2B as a means to realistically integrate them and ease labor pressures in the US.

This particular approach would tackle irregular migration from Central America and Haiti among those seeking economic opportunities from these weak states, roughly 60,000 people. While nearly one in four people leave the region out of insecurity, another half leaves because of economic opportunities. Therefore, it is important to use these visas to recruit laborers and reduce irregular, cross-border flows.

Table 19: Reasons for Migrating From Their Countries

Reason Cited	El Salvador		Honduras		Guatemala	
	2016	2017	2016	2017	2016	2017
Violence/Insecurity	24.70%	35.70%	26.80%	31.70%	12.90%	17.90%
Economic Opportunities	59.40%	48.10%	62.50%	58.50%	65.30%	73.20%
Family Reunification	7.10%	16.20%	1.80%	9.80%	11.90%	8.90%
Other (mix of insecurity and economics)	8.80%		8.90%		9.90%	

Source: Orozco and Yansura, "On the Cusp of Change: Migrants' use of the internet for remittance transfers," Inter-American Dialogue, 2017.

Integration

In most host countries, the current situation has evoked a polarization of perspectives about migration, where many forms of anti-immigrant sentiments have been brought to light. In Panama, at least two movements, *Frente Nacional Panameño* and *Panamá para los Panameños* have demonstrated in the streets protesting the government humanitarian assistance to

Venezuelans and Cubans.¹⁶ In Costa Rica, xenophobic sentiments are not new but surfaced in the wake of the political crisis in Nicaragua and the influx of people escaping the Ortega regime. Some people took to the streets to demonstrate with radical perspectives on migration and deportation.¹⁷ Brazilians had expressed discontent and violence against Venezuelans, and demonstrated in the streets of the border city of Pacaraima,¹⁸ while Colombians in Cucuta reject the presence of allegedly what they think is too many migrants. The backlash of the Haitian influx to Chile has provoked shocking reactions, many resulting from cultural differences between the black Haitian and the Chilean population.¹⁹ Meanwhile, the Trump administration's dislike of migrants and dismissal of the reasons why they are migrating has caused extreme situations of hate speech and further polarized citizens.

Migration and Development: a Question of Retention and Return

Migration policy includes addressing root causes, particularly in contexts of state fragility. In practical terms, it is about retaining the labor force by offering better opportunities at home to those who might otherwise consider migration. It is also about offering a favorable environment to those migrants who return.

The approach needs to be different from previous interventions because despite of many development strategies have been implemented to date, they have not yielded the desired result and migration has not gone down. Making governments accountable for their actions and compliance is a step in the right direction, particularly when it comes to foreign assistance.

A focus on people is essential. It is important to deal with social inclusion, economic transformation, transnational engagement and tackling disruptors as means to increase development. Some tools or methods to do this include a better integration of migration and development policies. For example, formalizing savings resulting from increases in remittances, mobilize those savings into credit for knowledge economy entrepreneurs, partner with diaspora groups on small scale, implement local development initiatives on strengthening human capital, and offer after-school education programs.²⁰

The aim is to mitigate state fragility and help create more livable and prosperous communities, both for those to choose to stay at home and for those who return home after migrating.

¹⁶ https://www.tvn-2.com/nacionales/Panamenos-protestan-rechazo-politica-migratoria-venezolanos-y-cubanos_0_5153484653.html

¹⁷ <https://www.prensalibre.com/internacional/protesta-de-costarricenses-contra-migracion-nicaraguense-termina-en-disturbios>

¹⁸ <https://www.brasildefato.com.br/2018/10/31/por-violencia-e-xenofobia-250-venezuelanos-voltam-ao-seu-pais-vindos-do-brasil/>

¹⁹ <https://www.biobiochile.cl/noticias/sociedad/debate/2018/09/17/ni-racismo-ni-xenofobia-lo-que-en-realidad-hay-en-chile-es-aporofobia-y-eso-es-peor.shtml>

²⁰ Inter-American Dialogue. *Opportunities for My Community Project: A Strategy for Guatemala*, August, 2018.

Moreover, the vast majority of those who return do so through annual deportations nearing one hundred thousand. Those deported are people who have lived more than eight years in the US, whose habits and realities have changed and are different from life in the region. The solutions to those returned should be commensurable to their needs.

In summary, we should promote positive outcomes from the challenges, uncertainties, and risks that are currently overshadowing the important contributions that migrants make in the global sphere.

A Necessary Approach to Migration

All these issues point to the need to establish a dialogue about how state fragility is affecting migration and people. It is important to focus on the conditions of vulnerability these migrants are faced with, discuss practical solutions and the facts that shape the lives of these populations, while separating the nationalistic narrative from humanitarian and development realities.

This population is often assumed to be a burden to the host countries, however, the critical debate in a democratic space may shed a different light. The consequence is efforts to deport, close borders, and establish barriers to entry. However, people will continue to emigrate because conditions do not allow them to stay safely in their homeland. Their emigration is not temporary nor opportunistic. Constructive perspectives can help mitigate fears of migration, foster integration and help address state fragility in home countries.

Appendix: Fragile or weak states

Since the post-cold war period, there has been a growing concern in the international community to address the limited strength or fragility of states.

Because the state continues to be the superior political institution that enjoys or has been entrusted with the monopoly of force over a defined territory, its strength is of crucial importance.²¹ The state is an institution created with the capacity to establish order and authority, based on the legitimacy and power provided by its members, citizens of the polity.

In the modern world the polity is formed by free and equal individuals who consensually have transferred their sovereignty to the state with the purpose to protect and regulate them through rights and responsibilities.

However, the monopoly of force by the state is accompanied by check and balances stipulated by accountability and the rule of law as means to prevent abuses or excesses of the state.²² The state is thus held accountable in the handling of its authority. In this sense, the institutions that embody the state concentrate power to enforce laws, keep the peace, defend itself against outside enemies, and provide necessary public goods. The rule of law and mechanisms of accountability, by contrast, pull in the opposite direction: they constrain the state's power and ensure that it is used only in a controlled and consensual manner.²³ Together, these two forces ensure state legitimacy.

A state thus is legitimate when it performs its functions and is accountable for its actions.

These principles are the criteria for concrete activities and obligations of the state and measured according to their performance.²⁴

Fukuyama further points out that when referring to these principles is important to explore the performance of the state along two continuums: *scope* and *strength*. *Scope* refers to the extent of obligations and tasks entrusted to the state. And *strength* refers to the skills and resources adopted to perform those activities. In turn the scope of state activities appears in a hierarchy "that stretches from necessary and important to merely desirable to optional."²⁵

Strength can be best understood in terms of the access and use of state resources (norms or rules, intervention or intermediation) to ensure those activities are carried out. The scope of state functions is outlined by Fukuyama in the following chart:

²¹ David Held. *Political Theory and the Modern State*. Stanford University, 1988.


²² Fukuyama, Francis. *Political order and political decay*. Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2014.

²³ Fukuyama, Francis. *State building: governance and world order in the 21st century*. Cornell University Press, 2004.

²⁴ Rotberg, Robert. *On Governance: What it is, what it measures and its policy uses*. 2015.

²⁵ Fukuyama, Francis. *Political order*, 7

Figure 1. Scope of state Functions



Source: Fukuyama, Francis. Political order...

The ability of states to deliver public goods to society is a central factor influencing its citizens' wellbeing. When a state struggles to deliver the most basic public goods, such as protection, shelter, or food, it is poorly performing. Poor performance can yield to state failure. In fact, over the past 20 years a literature on what is referred to as fragile states has emerged in response to an emerging number of states unable to deliver to its citizenry.

This literature coming from academic research, international development organizations, civil society groups has provided some definitions, characterization and guidance regarding fragile states.

For example, Robert Rotberg has been a key expert defining state fragility and depicting its causes. To Rotberg, weak or fragile states are those political institutions that are unable to perform their functions and activities.²⁶ Rotberg and other analysts point out that the causes of state fragility or weaknesses are typically associated to various forms of internal conflict (ethnic, religious, ideological, etc). Typically, internal conflict generates elite fragmentation and polarization, a dysfunctional government due to lack of consensus in policy making among political authorities in all state branches, and gradual economic and social decomposition due to poorly supporting elites or bureaucracies of their private sector and the state.

The range of studies looking at this issue from an academic stand point ranges from conceptual to empirical measurements. Many of these authors argue that fragility while variable, affects three kinds of functions or activities of the state, namely, capacity, legitimacy and security.²⁷

²⁶ Rotberg, Robert. *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton University Press, 2010. "Aid and Institution Building in Fragile States: What Do We Know? What Can Comparative Analysis Add?", Rachel M. Gisselquist, *ANNALS, AAPSS*, 656, November 2014

²⁷ State Fragility: Towards a MultiDimensional Empirical Typology; Beyond the 'failed state': Toward conceptual alternatives, Charles T. Call Milliken, Krause (2002), the Commission on Weak States and US National Security

Carment established a framework to analyze fragility using a combination of variables based on the consideration that three factors determine strength--fragility: authority, legitimacy and capacity.²⁸ In other words, illegitimate ruling, fragmentation of authority, and state incapacity lead to state fragility. In turn, fragility reflected through the performance on those clusters becomes a “measure of the extent to which the actual institutions, functions and political processes and capacities of states accord with the strong image of sovereign state, the one reified in both state theory and international law.”²⁹

Meanwhile, the World Bank, the OECD and some regional development agencies have also provided their definitions. The World Bank, which has led some of the discussions, adds another layer that characterizes state fragility including “periods when states or institutions lack the capacity, accountability, or legitimacy to mediate relations between citizen groups and between citizens and the state, making them vulnerable to violence.”³⁰ However, the Bank also emphasizes that when it comes to official development assistance, is important to stress efforts along the lines of initiatives that strengthen authority, legitimacy and capacity.

Aid effectiveness and fragile states

The support to strengthen fragile states is informed by an international community aware of the importance to mitigate state weakness. For example, in the early 2000, the donor community presented a position about their role working with vulnerable countries in need for foreign assistance.

The confluence is associated to important developments, one of which is the recognition in the donor community that development policies were more likely to succeed among well-functioning states.³¹ The second being that weak states were increasingly becoming a threat to the international community as they were operating in contested terrains of political authority and territorial control, to the extent that could be utilized to inflict damage in the rest of the world. Afghanistan, Iraq, Georgia, Colombia, Tajikistan, Somalia, Liberia, or Haiti, for example illustrated this phenomenon dating from the past 20 years. In fact, in 2006 there were more than 20 countries regarded as fragile, and by 2015 over 35 countries out of 178 were regarded as in alert or high alert of being at risk of failing by the Fragile States

(2004), Schneckener (2004), Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan (2005), Patrick (2006), Cliffe and Manning (2008), Carment, Prest and Samy (2010).

²⁸ <http://www4.carleton.ca/cifp/ffs.htm>

²⁹ Carment, David and Yiagadeesen Samy, “The future of war: understanding fragile states and what to do with them” in Trauschweizer, Ingo. *Failed States and Fragile Societies: A New World Disorder?* (Baker Series in Peace and Conflict Studies)

³⁰ World Bank. *Guidance for Supporting State-Building in Fragile and Conflict-Affected States: A Tool-Kit*. World Development Report, 2011. World Bank.

³¹ There are a number of scholars and experts who criticized approaches such as that of the Washington Consensus emphasizing markets over state institutions, Theda Skocpol among the lead scholars in the late 80s, with her book and following discussion of *Bringing the State Back In*.

Index. Interestingly the large majority of the most fragile countries in 2015 were practically the same in 2006.

Given the number and continuous problem of fragility, experts agreed that bridging development and security as central elements for policy design and implementation, particularly among weak or fragile states should be a priority.³²

Table 1: Fragile states in the world

Rank	Fragile States Index	2006		Fragile States Index	2015
10	Afghanistan	99.8	8	Afghanistan	107.9
19	Bangladesh	96.3	18	Burundi	98.1
15	Burundi	96.7	3	Central African Republic	111.9
13	Central African Republic	97.5	6	Chad	108.4
6	Chad	105.9	5	Congo (D. R.)	109.7
2	Congo, D.R.	110.1	15	Cote d'Ivoire	100
3	Cote d'Ivoire	109.2	20	Ethiopia	97.5
11	Guinea	99	10	Guinea	104.9
8	Haiti	104.6	17	Guinea Bissau	99.9
4	Iraq	109	11	Haiti	104.5
11	Liberia	99	12	Iraq	104.5
18	Myanmar	96.5	19	Niger	97.8
20	Nepal	95.4	14	Nigeria	102.4
14	North Korea	97.3	13	Pakistan	102.9
9	Pakistan	103.1	2	Somalia	114
16	Sierra Leone	96.6	1	South Sudan	114.5
6	Somalia	105.9	4	Sudan	110.8
1	Sudan	112.3	9	Syria	107.9
16	Yemen	96.6	7	Yemen	108.1
5	Zimbabwe	108.9	16	Zimbabwe	100

Source: Fragile States Index

Donors introduced the Paris declaration in 2005 and the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007) as a matter of norm and practice with these countries. The declaration and its principles were aimed at streamlining the quality and impact of foreign assistance, particularly among weak states. The OECD as well as several European countries and European Union member countries also introduced the concept of policy coherence as a tool to ensure the implementation of the principles.³³ The table below outlines those principles.

³² Robert Picciotto (2004) "Aid and conflict: the policy coherence challenge", *Conflict, Security & Development*, 4:3, 543-562.

³³ Lockhart, Clare. *From aid effectiveness to development effectiveness: strategy and policy coherence in fragile states*. 2010. Overseas Development Institute

Table 2: Aid effectiveness in Fragile States, declaration and principles

<i>Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005)</i>	<i>Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations (2007)</i>
<p><i>Ownership:</i> Developing countries set their own strategies for poverty reduction, improve their institutions and tackle corruption.</p> <p><i>Alignment:</i> Donor countries align behind these objectives and use local systems.</p> <p><i>Harmonisation:</i> Donor countries coordinate, simplify procedures and share information to avoid duplication.</p> <p><i>Results:</i> Developing countries and donors shift focus to development results and results get measured.</p> <p><i>Mutual Accountability:</i> Donors and partners are accountable for development results.</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Take context as the starting point. 2. Ensure all activities do no harm. 3. Focus on statebuilding as the central objective. 4. Prioritise prevention. 5. Recognise the links between political, security and development objectives. 6. Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable societies. 7. Align with local priorities in different ways and in different contexts. 8. Agree on practical co-ordination mechanisms between international actors. 9. Act fast... but stay engaged long enough to give success a chance. 10. Avoid pockets of exclusion ('aid orphans').

Source: OECD.

The OECD approach to development (promote ownership, ensure alignment, harmonize strategies through donor coordination, focus on results and ensure accountability) is not new, but reflects decades of reflection about development practice as well as an adjustment to the realities of the XXI century, particularly in regards to security issues.³⁴

A large number of studies and reports were published right after the declaration assessing the principles in accordance to prevailing concepts of development and security, and insight as to the practical matters of effectiveness.

The OECD for example established some basic guidelines to consider intervention, including an understanding of the local context, awareness of potential partners and policy coherence. It also highlighted the importance to contextualize existing program delivery to fragile contexts and to prioritize areas of intervention.

On this latter the OECD stressed a focus on security forces, revenue and expenditure management, employment generation and service delivery. These guidelines are to be contextualized in every country facing fragility in order to find partners and priorities.³⁵ Similarly, the United Kingdom's DFID identified four core objectives associated to intervention in state fragility, namely, to

- Address the causes and effects of conflict and fragility, and build conflict resolution mechanisms

³⁴ Wennmann, Achim. Grasping the Strength of Fragile States: Aid Effectiveness: Between 'Top-down' and 'Bottom-up' Statebuilding, Swiss Agency for Cooperation and Development, 2009.

³⁵ OECD, Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility. POLICY GUIDANCE, 2011.

- Support inclusive political settlements and processes
- Develop core state functions
- Respond to public expectations³⁶

These objectives are broader than those presented by the OECD but highlight the need for inclusiveness and focus on core state functions. On this issue it points that donors “should think carefully about the nature of support for basic services from a state-building and peace-building perspective, including which services should be prioritized, how to provide support, when, and for whom.”

According to Christina Bennet³⁷, there are important lessons learned on aid effectiveness to fragile states, specifically about three major points that shed light about the guidelines proposed by the OECD.³⁸ The point first is to improve priority setting and implementation. She means that is important to “produce national and international agreement on a narrow set of priorities that conform to a host government’s ideas of what is urgent and important.” Second, improved aid flows can continue but “require more efficient and effective global and country-level mechanisms for mobilizing, distributing, coordinating, and reporting bilateral and multilateral aid.” Third, strengthen mutual accountability as a means to “galvanize national and international actors around a set of agreed priorities and provide a vehicle for channeling donor funds more effectively.”

Along these lines, and based on a comparative analysis of four countries (Afghanistan, Georgia, Kosovo, and Moldova), Herd points out four other key challenges specific to fragile states that complement Bennet’s observations. First, Herd stresses the importance of contextualizing fragility within the experience of the state (for whom is the state fragile?). In this sense, pin pointing the key determinants of fragility is very important, rather than implementing sets of preconceived strategies, i.e., sustainable development goals.

Second, that external support is much needed in a world where the “gap is growing increasingly larger between the rate and speed of systems change the ability and capacity of societies, bureaucracies, states and regions to respond and manage these changes.” Haiti is particularly telling of that reality. Even, with international support, the magnitude of challenges has overwhelmed not only the state itself but international players. Thus, the issue is not only one of context but effort. The magnitude of challenges is already overwhelming to any developing country, and more so for a fragile state and to donors. Official development assistance is exceeding the capacity of multilateral development banks, as well as other official aid donors.

Third, Herd adds another challenge of “how an intervention can legitimately, effectively and efficiently be executed.” Fourth, intervention, Herd asks, on whose behalf?³⁹ The third and fourth challenge are

³⁶ Building Peaceful States and Societies A DFID Practice Paper,

³⁷ Bennett, Christina, Aid Effectiveness in Fragile States: Lessons from the First Generation of Transition Compacts. April 2012, International Peace Institute.

³⁸ These compacts applied to five countries, Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Timor Leste, and Democratic Republic of Congo.

³⁹ Herd, Graeme, “Challenges of state reform and state building” in Collmer, Sabine...

often repeated in the critique of the extent of aid effectiveness, particularly as it relates precisely to setting priorities and achieving buy in from the local partners.

Setting priorities within the context of fragility, cooperating among donors, setting mechanisms for accountability, measuring the level of effort by those engaged, and ensuring legitimacy of intervention are thus among some of the lessons found in making aid effective among these countries.⁴⁰ Many of these observations are applicable to the case of Haiti as they highlight the relationship between legitimacy and state performance.

From lessons learned to next steps

Moreover, within the scope of the lessons learned, and as means to act, experts have stressed that the first step for engagement in a fragile state consists to identifying the tools needed to create a pathway to a stable state in order to apply those observations raised above (setting **priorities for intervention, for accountability, among others**). In turn, development experts can work in specific areas of operation and inform development administrators and local partners.

Experts also agree that every state presents itself with different issues that require different solutions, partly depending on whether a country is coming out of war, civil conflict, or some form of intense violence or political disarray.⁴¹ Thus the extent of engagement will partly be determined by the conditions shaping insecurity and violence.

Along those lines, the need to focus on rule of law and other aspects of state legitimacy as preconditions to strengthen a fragile state has been another agreement among experts and an issue that differentiates intervention between fragile states and other countries.

Another consideration is to stresses the importance of addressing the critical components of state performance as a means to begin mitigating fragility. These issues are typically clustered in four to ten areas and coincide with what Fukuyama termed the minimal scope of state functions.

To Patrick⁴² for example, there are functional gaps in the state ability to perform and ensure physical, political, economic and societal security. Ghani⁴³ presents 10 basic state functions that include

⁴⁰ Others have raised a series of caveats for effective engagement, del Castillo, Graciana in *Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction*, points out to 11 areas of attention, most of which are mentioned above.

⁴¹ Collmer, Sabine. *From Fragile State to Functioning State: Pathways to Democratic Transformation in a Comparative Perspective* (George C. Marshall European Center for Security); del Castillo, Graciana. *Rebuilding War-Torn States: The Challenge of Post-Conflict Economic Reconstruction*; Ghani, Ashraf and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*; Kaplan, Seth D. *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development* (Praeger Security International); Katarina Ammitzbøll and Harry Blair. *First Steps in Post-Conflict State-Building: Establishing Critical Functions and Setting Priorities*. Patrick, Stewart. "Weak states and global threats: fact or fiction" *Washington Quarterly*, V.29, n.2, 2006.

⁴² Patrick, Stewart. "Weak states and global threats: fact or fiction" *Washington Quarterly*, V.29, n.2, 2006.

⁴³ Ghani, Ashraf and Clare Lockhart. *Fixing Failed States: A Framework for Rebuilding a Fractured World*; Kaplan, Seth D. *Fixing Fragile States: A New Paradigm for Development* (Praeger Security International)

administrative control and, social policy among others. Ammitzbøll and Blair speak of functional domains of the state.

Table 3: Approaches and Guides for Priorities of Intervention

Patrick (functioning gaps)	Ammitzbøll and Blair (state functional domains)	Ghani (functions of the state)
Physical security Political security Economic security Societal security	Security Political Economic Administrative Judicial	Rule of law Monopoly of force Administrative control Sound public finances Investments in human capital Social policy Infrastructure services Formation of a market Management of public assets Effective public borrowing

Patrick and Ghani point the general principles, but Ammitzbøll and Blair⁴⁴, go a step forward and offer a list of 20 priorities and 3 phases within the 5 core state functions.

The relevance of these priorities and phases is the specification and timing in working on critical administrative or institutional functions. Security and economic issues are first prioritized, followed by support in political, administrative and judicial areas.

The literature is clear in pointing out that any approach to mitigate state fragility includes a **simultaneous effort to addressing legitimacy of the state, as well as its functional institutional role taking in consideration the severity of violence or insecurity and a specific pathway (as that presented by Ammitzboll and Blair) to build a stable state.**

⁴⁴ Katarina Ammitzbøll and Harry Blair. *First Steps in Post-Conflict State-Building: Establishing: Critical Functions and Setting Priorities.*

Figure 2: Functional Domains and Core Functions for Support

Functional domains	Core function	First phase (up to 4-5 months after UN mandate)	Second phase (up to 18-24 months after UN mandate)	Third phase (begins with turnover)
Security	Legitimate monopoly over violence (disarmament & demobilization)	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Reintegration	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Repatriation for IDPs and refugees	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Humanitarian assistance	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Police, border patrol, army	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
Political	Constitution (or operating rules)	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Legitimizing elections	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Civil society & media	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
Economic	Basic market formation	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Employment generation	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Management of public finance	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Management of natural resources & export crop production	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
Administrative	Civil service (pay)	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Civil service (rebuilding)	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Infrastructure & essential services	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Human capital investment	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Service delivery management	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
Judicial	Justice system – rule of law	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Truth and reconciliation	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
	Customary law & ADR systems	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
Key:		Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority	Urgent & heavy priority
		Serious but less urgent priority	Serious but less urgent priority	Serious but less urgent priority
		Lower priority	Lower priority	Lower priority

Source: Ammitzbøll and Blair.