Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment

GUINEA-BISSAU

JUNE 2017

ECOWAS COMMISSION
COMMISSION DE LA CEDEAO
COMMISSÃO DA CEDEAO

USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

DISCLAIMER:
The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

Cover photo: “Raccolta di riso” by LVIA, accessed via Flickr (https://www.flickr.com/photos/lviaong/). Reproduced under CC BY-ND 2.0.

Table of Contents

Acronyms and Abbreviations 4
Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission 6
Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission 7
Preface 8
Executive Summary 9
Introduction 10
- Research Process 10
- Terminology and Conceptual Definitions 12
- Literature Review 13
- Research Questions 14
- Description of the Sample 15
- Data Analysis 17
- Scope and Limitations of the Study 17

Country Background 19
National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies 21
- Rule of Law (Most Vulnerable Pillar) 25
- Politics and Governance (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar) 28
- Economics and Resources (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar) 30
- Population and Demographics (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar) 32
- Security (Least Vulnerable Pillar) 33
- External Factors 35
- Gender Considerations 36

Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region 38
- Bafatá Region 38
- Bissau Region 44
- Cacheu Region 49
- Oio Region 53

Conclusion and Recommendations 57
Appendix A: Data Sample 59
Appendix B: Vulnerability Index 63
Appendix C: Additional References 65
Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar 66

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project
ACJT	Association for the Children
AfDB	African Development Bank
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
AU	African Union
CAJ	Access to Justice Centers
CPIA	Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Community of Portuguese Language Countries)
CRA	Conflict Risk Assessment
CRVA	Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
CSO	Civil Society Organization
DPA	ECOWAS Directorate of Political Affairs
DPKRS	ECOWAS Directorate of Peacekeeping & Regional Security
ECF	Extended Credit Facility
ECOMIB	ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau
ECOWARN	ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECPF	ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework
EU	European Union
EWD	ECOWAS Directorate of Early Warning
FCFA	Franc Communauté Financière Africaine/Communauté Financière d'Afrique (West African CFA Franc)
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSDRC	Governance and Social Development Resource Centre
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IncReps	ECOWARN Incident Reports
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organization
KII	Key Informant Interview
LGDH	Human Rights League in Guinea-Bissau
MAJ	Movement of Youth Action
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PAIGC	Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde)
PIB	Children's Parliament of Bafatá
PRS	Partido da Renovação Social (Party for Social Renewal)

REWARD	Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa
SitReps	ECOWARN Situation Reports
SNA	Stakeholder Network Analysis
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNIOGBIS	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Message from the President of the ECOWAS Commission

The 15 Member-States of the ECOWAS Community represent a thriving region of the world, with a population of approximately 366 million and a rich human and topographical diversity. From the coastline to the mountain peaks of Fouta Djallon, across the Sahara and the mangroves of the Niger Delta, ECOWAS is home to diverse families, communities, and nations.

Over the last decade, the region has witnessed significant progress in lifting the standard of living for millions. However, along with the richness of natural resources, human capital and great opportunity, there are also challenges to contend with such as natural disasters, pandemics, ethno-sectarian tensions, and security threats caused by extremism and terrorism.

Global developments and changes such as advances in technology, human migration and climate change, have added new levels of complexity, presenting new challenges for strategic planning and preparedness as we look ahead to the future.

This is where Early Warning plays a critical role in helping ECOWAS to understand the changing dynamics so as to strengthen decision making and early response at the regional and national levels. The Country Risk and Vulnerability Assessments (CRVAs) serve as an important resource in this regard. These reports are useful for strengthening the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework action plans as well as to serve as reference materials for an in-depth understanding of the human security dynamics in our Member States, and for our partners across the region.

I therefore invite national stakeholders, all ECOWAS institutions and our partners to make use of these reports for the entrenchment of peace and progress for the benefit of the Citizens of ECOWAS.

Jean-Claude Brou
President of the ECOWAS Commission

Statement from the Vice President of the ECOWAS Commission

ECOWAS takes pride in finalizing this CRVA report which aims to identify structural vulnerabilities, event driven risks and existing resilience factors in each Member State of the Community. Indeed, this is a remarkable feat towards boosting the African Peace and Security Architecture of the African Union, with ECOWAS setting the pace for the development of an African-owned data set that can be tapped into to enhance human security analysis and accurate forecasting to assist policymakers to make informed decisions on pressing issues in the region. This information can be used as a baseline for ECOWAS and its partners to inform early warning and response efforts, particularly in this time when Early Warning and Response Mechanism is being deployed at the National level.

The CRVA research leverages ECOWARN data—gathered by Field Monitors—to establish a country baseline for monitoring patterns and trends across human security pillars. By comparing ECOWARN data to other data sets, and complementing quantitative data with qualitative findings, the assessments also help the Early Warning Directorate of ECOWAS to gather more robust data that is rich, reliable and empirical. The resulting findings are more representative in terms of geography, time, and theme for each country and needs to be updated periodically.

ECOWAS will consolidate this achievement by applying the knowledge and skills embodied in the CRVA Manual. My conviction for this emanates from the fact that the training of all EWD staff in the development of the CRVA Index, which marks the climax of transfer of knowledge and skills from the USAID REWARD technical staff to ECOWAS, will allow ECOWAS to independently conduct future CRVAs. Already, the EWD has initiated a process to put to practice the defined methodological framework to conduct Regional Risk and Resilience Assessment in the Lake Chad Basin, thereby serving as the first pillar in implementing the decision of the joint ECOWAS and Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to engage communities in peacebuilding processes.

We hope the Member States of our Community take ownership of this report and anchor development and peace initiatives upon it, in addressing the risks and vulnerabilities in their communities. As we decentralize Early Warning and Response to the ECOWAS countries, the Commission stands ready to accompany each Member States in the implementation of the actionable recommendations embodied in the CRVA report.

Finda Koroma
Vice President, ECOWAS Commission

Preface

The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate has made giant strides in the practice of data driven early warning, through the qualitative and quantitative analysis of incidents and situations from multiple sources, with the added benefit of original data generated through the ECOWARN system. Indeed, the Center's state-of-the-art technological tools places it at a vantage position to monitor and analyze risks and vulnerabilities in the ECOWAS region, cutting across the key areas of human security.

ECOWAS has played, and continues to play, a critical role in the monitoring of threats to human security across the region including the Sahelo-Saharan, Mano River, Gulf of Guinea, Lake Chad and Senegambia conflict systems to improve response for the prevention and management of conflict escalation.

Beyond a narrow focus on violent conflict alone, and consistent with its mandate to promote the socioeconomic and political integration of the sub-region, ECOWAS applies a human security lens with a view towards enhancing the well-being of the population in accordance with the ECOWAS Vision 2020. Thus, this report highlights risks, structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors across five dimensions (demographic, economic, security, governance and rule of law) at the national and sub-national levels.

Each CRVA report represents a myriad of perspectives and experiences from affected stakeholders including community leaders, civil society, administrative officials, security agents, traditional and religious leaders, just to mention a few. In this way, the CRVA report serves as a strategic document to provide an overview of the human security challenges in each ECOWAS member state as well as the social and institutional resilience factors that can help manage those challenges.

We hope that this report will be useful for strategic planning in addressing issues of human security as well as to provide insights to a multitude of stakeholders including policy and decision makers in the public and private sectors for conflict-sensitive engagement within the region.

Dr. Abdou Lat Gueye
Director, ECOWAS Early Warning

Executive Summary

From 2016 to 2019, ECOWAS collected quantitative and qualitative data in Guinea-Bissau to better understand the structural vulnerabilities that may exist, and how those vulnerabilities affect the everyday lives of individuals and communities. This research was done in collaboration with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID)'s Reacting to Early Warning and Response Data in West Africa (REWARD) project, as part of a broader assessment of the entire West African region. As part of this process, a series of Focus Group Discussions and interviews were conducted in May 2017 in Guinea-Bissau to contextualize the findings and to learn more about resilience factors that mitigate risk and promote human security. The purpose of this report is to summarize these insights and perspectives, so that national stakeholders can build on their successes, and also to serve as a baseline for ECOWAS's monitoring of patterns and trends. The report provides an overview of national and subnational vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors, as well as conclusions and recommendations.

The CRVA was conducted by ECOWAS to update and expand upon the Conflict Risk Assessment (CRA) 2013-2014 country reports. To better understand the sub-national patterns and trends, the research design began with a desktop study involving a social network analysis based on a survey of peace and security actors in the country and a scoping of experts to be consulted during the fieldwork. This was followed by a Geographic Information System (GIS) analysis of patterns and trends in escalation dynamics and a quantitative analysis of relative structural vulnerabilities by country and human security pillar.

In Guinea-Bissau, high levels of vulnerability were found in Rule of Law and Politics/Governance, while moderate levels of vulnerability were found in Economics/Resources, Population/Demographics, and Security.

Challenges included political gridlock, which began in August 2015 when President Vaz dismissed Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira, and then appointed and dismissed several more Prime Ministers. Divisiveness then spread throughout the government, with serious consequences for governance and the economy. Chronic poverty, unemployment and a lack of economic opportunity were also highlighted as key concerns throughout the country. In addition, natural resource management was cited as a contentious issue, especially pertaining to fishing and the cashew industry.

However, there were also strong social and institutional resilience factors for effective dispute resolution and peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau. These include social cohesion between ethnic and religious groups, as well as local justice mechanisms involving traditional, community, and religious leaders. The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) was also cited as having a positive impact on the development of peace in Guinea-Bissau.

The following report aims to provide an overview so that regional and national stakeholders can have a clear picture of the challenges faced by the country, as well as the capacities that can be leveraged and built upon for the promotion of sustainable human security in Guinea-Bissau.

Though risk/incident data naturally fluctuates and may therefore have changed since the publication of this report, the structural vulnerabilities are reflective of medium- and long-term trends. These reports focus on the identification of structural vulnerabilities and resiliencies, and how they may impact upon events and developments as they occur.

Introduction

Research Process

The CRVA assesses structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors according to five human security pillars as identified by ECOWAS in a 2016 scoping paper.[1] The pillars are: 1) Economics and Resources, 2) Politics and Governance, 3) Population and Demographics, 4) Rule of Law, and 5) Security.

The findings in this report describe how risks flow from vulnerabilities in the context of Guinea-Bissau both within and across the five pillars. In recognition of the fact that violent conflict has underlying social, economic, political, and security drivers but expresses itself differently depending on the context, a holistic human security framework was used in this assessment, and for the CRVAs in all ECOWAS member states.

Furthermore, the analysis also breaks out gender considerations and external factors as cross-cutting issues that need to be understood for effective early warning, planning, and mitigation.[2]

As shown in the figure below, the research was conducted in three main phases: Desktop Study, Field Research, and Analysis/Validation.

Phase 1: Desktop Study

The Desktop Study included a preliminary assessment of structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risks, and social and institutional resilience factors.

For the assessment of structural vulnerabilities, the research used data from dozens of sources, including ECOWARN Situation Reports (SitReps). Drawing on these pre-existing data sets,[3] a CRVA



[1] The EWD Scoping Paper was developed by ECOWAS to help inform the CRVA process, with the human security pillars identified based on best practice approaches such as ECOWARN guidelines and the New Zealand Agency for International Development (NZAID) framework.
[2] EWD Scoping Paper on "Risk Assessment of Five ECOWAS Pilot Countries: Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, and Burkina Faso"
[3] Data sources used in the development of the CRVA Index include Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, the Center for Security Studies ETH Zurich, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace.

Index was created to measure the relative levels of vulnerability across five human security dimensions in Guinea-Bissau.

For the assessment of event-driven risks, event data, including from ECOWARN's Incident Reports (IncReps), was triangulated against data from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) to estimate the locations and type of conflict issues at the sub-national level over time. Using multiple sources allowed for cross-validation, the filling of gaps, and the ability to identify trends in indicators and sub-indicators using queries and key word searches.

For the assessment of social and institutional resilience factors, a survey was deployed to all of ECOWAS's in-country contacts to learn more about the peace and security actors working to manage and reduce risks and vulnerabilities in the country. Respondents (including representatives of religious institutions, public sector actors, civil society, youth groups, and development actors, among others) were also asked to name organizations that they have partnered with in the last two years on issues of peace and security. Data was then uploaded to a Stakeholder Network Map for quantitative analysis and to identify leverage points, spheres of influence, and social capital. Based on this analysis, key technical experts were identified and were contacted for the next phase of the research.

Phase 2: Field Research

The Field Research began with a Scoping Workshop in Bissau. Using the Stakeholder Network Map, highly-networked technical experts were convened in a workshop to validate the initial desktop findings and suggest a way forward for the qualitative analysis in the field. The Scoping Workshop was also used to tailor and sensitize the broader research questions and the Key Informant Interview (KII) and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) instruments and questionnaires based on local context. Additionally, the Scoping Workshop served to attain references and contacts for key actors and stakeholders who would be consulted over the course of the fieldwork. Thus, the desktop study phase informed the research questions that needed further context and validation in the field, as well as the sample of respondents to be engaged.

A team of experts and researchers then conducted an in-country assessment between May 29th and June 7th, 2017 with participants from the regions of Bafatá, Bissau, Cacheu and Oio. The team traveled to the various hotspots identified in the desktop study and validated in the Scoping Workshop to interview key stakeholders affected by violence and with knowledge of local context and capacities. This team included representatives from the ECOWAS Directorates of Early Warning (EWD) and Political Affairs (DPA), as well as participants from USAID and affiliated experts. The KIIs and FGDs conducted during this in-country assessment collected qualitative data and information regarding various perspectives on structural vulnerabilities, event-driven risk factors, and social and institutional resilience factors relating to the different conflict issues across the country. These transcripts were then collated, streamlined to reduce repetition and vagueness, and categorized for analysis and prioritization during Phase 3.

Phase 3: Analysis and Validation

After the quantitative, GIS and survey data was validated and contextualized in the field, and the qualitative data was collected and organized, this report was drafted and was then validated by both ECOWAS and USAID. This report will serve as a baseline and resource for more targeted early warning products and analysis/planning towards strategic and operational prevention of human insecurity within the country of Guinea-Bissau as well as associated conflict systems more broadly.

Terminology and Conceptual Definitions

In this CRVA report:

"Vulnerability" is defined as any structural factor that has the potential to be a conflict driver. These can include such things as youth unemployment, poverty, inequality, climate, patronage, demographic factors, etc.

"Risk" is defined as any event-driven factor that has the potential to be a conflict trigger. Risk factors can include specific controversies or events such as disasters or elections that may occur.

"Resilience" is defined as any social or institutional factor that has the potential to help mitigate or manage risks and vulnerabilities. These include political, cultural, and community leadership with significant social capital to influence conflict dynamics in a constructive way, including public sector, private sector, religious institutions, civil society, opinion leaders, development workers, etc. Resilience factors can include institutions that play a stabilizing role in the short, medium, or longer term.

The CRVA analysis was conducted according to the framework depicted in the figure below, whereby event-driven risk factors flow out of the structural vulnerabilities (per the red downward arrow) while social and institutional resilience factors mitigate and prevent those risks and vulnerabilities (per the green upward arrow).

For ECOWAS, this framework is useful in that it is aligned with the existing ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), which is a strategic tool to strengthen the human security architecture in West Africa. Key to the ECPF are the categories of ***"Operational Prevention,"*** or measures applicable in the face of crisis, and ***"Structural Prevention,"*** or measures that ensure that crises do not arise or re-occur. The CRVA framework is aligned with the ECPF such that identified Vulnerability Factors are to be mitigated by Structural Prevention measures, and Risk Factors are to be mitigated by Operational Prevention measures. This alignment is important for the utility and actionability of this report by users in West Africa.

Literature Review

A Human-Centric Approach to Early Warning

In academic literature, the human security lens to conflict early warning is a change from the more state-centric approaches that were in vogue throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Historically, early warning was focused on prevention and mitigation of conflict between states. In the post-Cold War period with a surge in intra-state conflict, early warning was focused on identifying the drivers and impacts of civil conflict on states. At that time, analysis focused on terminology of state "collapse" and "failure," emphasizing impacts to neighboring countries or regions, and perpetuating a comparative paradigm of poverty and limited economic growth and conflict in contrast to more developed countries.[4]

However, as a more interconnected human and global security approach emerged in the 2000s, conceptions of state fragility and conflict analysis evolved in both development aid and policy approaches. As the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC) describes, "At a very broad level, fragility is the result of a dynamic interplay between internal factors (including violent conflict, poverty, economic and structural conditions, weak formal institutions), and external factors (including international political economy, regional and global insecurity)."[5] While not discounting the role of the state as a key vehicle for managing and preventing conflict, the human-centric approach looks first and foremost at the impact of demographic, economic, political, and security conflict drivers on individuals and communities as well as the role that a wide variety of social and institutional factors play in preventing conflict. Thus, the human security framework provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats that affect individuals' lives, whether this is through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political or economic factors.

The United Nations Trust Fund for Human Security outlines a human-centric approach to security in five principles: 1) *People-centered*, with a focus on protecting basic human freedoms; 2) *Multi-sectoral*, encompassing a broad understanding of threats and causes of insecurity; 3) *Comprehensive*, taking into account different types of individuals' security from economic to social; 4) *Context-specific,* emphasizing the need to analyze specific conflict contexts and root causes of insecurity; and 5) *Prevention-oriented,* highlighting locally tailored risk prevention and mitigation measures through early warning mechanisms.[6] This focus on cross-cutting issues and situation-specific analysis and response are central to the CRVA process and broader objectives of integrated conflict early warning and response by ECOWAS and its partners. For the CRVAs, this involves identifying conflict risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies across the human security pillars of Population and Demographics, Politics and Governance, Security, Economics and Resources, and Rule of Law.

Many indices and development frameworks have emerged for measuring resilience and fragility, from the Fund For Peace's *Fragile States Index*[7] to the African Development Bank (AfDB) and World Bank's *Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA)*[8] and Mo Ibrahim Foundation's *Index of African Governance*.[9] Today, leading international development actors and multilateral

[4] "Defining and measuring state fragility: a new proposal", Ferreira, I., The Annual Bank Conference on Africa, June 2015
[5] "Topic Guide on Fragile States", Mcloughlin, C., Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), August 2009
[6] "Human Security in Theory and Practice", Human Security Unit, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nations, January 2009
[7] Fragile States Index, The Fund for Peace
[8] Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), World Bank and African Development Bank (AfDB)
[9] Ibrahim Index of African Governance, Mo Ibrahim Foundation

agencies such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the AfDB have also produced strategies, practice areas, and tools, which seek to address the drivers of fragility. The AfDB, for example, has a 2014-2019 Strategy for *Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa*, with a focus on building member state capacities and focusing on "fragile situations rather than fragile states alone."[10]

As the AfDB Strategy notes, however, "there is no single solution and no predefined 'toolbox' for addressing fragility."[11] Older academic and policy conceptions of "state failure" used analysis centered on "traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression," as outlined in a 2009 paper by the United Nations Human Security Unit. Newer models of analysis have taken on a broader human security lens, which was in "response to the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats – from chronic and persistent poverty to ethnic violence, human trafficking, climate change, health pandemics, international terrorism, and sudden economic and financial downturns. Such threats tend to acquire transnational dimensions and move beyond traditional notions of security that focus on external military aggressions alone."[12]

Thus, a human-centric approach, as opposed to a state-centric approach, is important for analyzing risks and vulnerabilities to society for robust early warning and response mechanisms. Human security provides a holistic approach to understanding different threats which affect individuals' lives, whether through conflict, health, food, environment, or other social, political, or economic factors. As such, the CRVAs seek to draw upon the more dynamic and interrelated aspects of risk and vulnerability, which look at capacities and pressures within a society with a view to identifying structural vulnerabilities, resiliencies and risks across key human security pillars. As defined by the United Nations General Assembly, "human security is an approach to assist Member States in identifying and addressing widespread and cross-cutting challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people."[13] This approach is also in line with the ECOWAS Vison 2020 which seeks to promote peace, prosperity, and cohesion across the region,[14] and includes a focus on strengthening many human security aspects within member states.

Research Questions

Based on the initial desktop findings, the research team developed a set of framing questions broken out by the five human security pillars. These framing questions were not asked verbatim in the field, but rather informed the design of the KII and FGD instruments. These instruments included simple, open-ended questions intended to prompt a discussion during which respondents could express their opinions, experiences, and perceptions about the ways in which they had been impacted by vulnerabilities, risks, and resilience factors in Guinea-Bissau.

Politics and Governance: What are the prospects of peaceful democracy and governance given Guinea-Bissau's history of civil war, coups, military intervention, and political crises, especially in the upcoming 2018 and 2019 elections? To what extent does this history and perceptions of corruption and nepotism in government erode the legitimacy of state institutions and electoral process?

Population and Demographics: To what extent is tribalism (e.g., between the Balanta, Mandingos,

[10] "Addressing Fragility and Building Resilience in Africa, 2014 – 2019", AfDB
[11] Ibid.
[12] "Human Security in Theory and Practice", Human Security Unit, OCHA, United Nations, January 2009
[13] General Assembly resolution 66/290, October 2012
[14] ECOWAS Vision 2020: Towards a Democratic and Prosperous Community, ECOWAS, June 2010

and the Fulas) or religious intolerance salient in terms of political representation, access to resources, or group grievance?

Economics and Resources: Considering that Guinea-Bissau is one of the more unequal countries in Africa in terms of income share and rural vs urban development, to what extent has volatility in commodity prices (especially cashews and oil) negatively impacted the most vulnerable groups? Has this been a driver of food insecurity or conflict?

Security: To what extent have inter- and intra-party tensions fueled political violence? Are there linkages between political violence and criminality (e.g. narcotrafficking)? What role do the security forces play in managing or worsening political unrest and criminality? Are they legitimate, representative, and professional? Aside from political fragmentation, are there other conflict drivers such as land disputes or resource competition? Are there cross-border, maritime, or transnational threats?

Rule of Law: To what extent is the judiciary independent of the executive? Is there access to justice and legal services throughout the country?

Description of the Sample

Data collected and analyzed for this research included hundreds of ECOWARN SitReps, ECOWARN IncReps, ACLED event data, and a scoping survey, as well as transcripts and notes from FGDs and KIIs in the field. Other sources, integrated to form a vulnerability index (the CRVA Index), included Global Integrity, the Economist Intelligence Unit, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Transparency International, Freedom House, Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database, World Bank, Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index, Political Terror Scale, United Nations Refugee Agency, Uppsala University, UN Statistics, and Institute for Economics and Peace. A complete breakdown is included in Appendix A.



The heatmap above shows hot spots of human security incidents between 2015 and 2018.



The graph above shows the trends in risk layered against vulnerability. The y axis on the left (0-80) shows the level of vulnerability with a score of over 60 reflecting higher levels of vulnerability. The y axis on the right (0-35) shows the number of conflict fatalities by month.

The map above shows regions where CRVA fieldwork was conducted in May 2017.

Data Analysis

ECOWARN data shows that vulnerability in Guinea-Bissau has steadily increased as measured by taking a monthly average of the SitReps. There were some spikes in risk as measured by conflict fatalities, including a significant spike in August 2014 caused by the explosion of a landmine. Additionally, a failed coup in October 2012 led to at least six reported conflict fatalities. In the graph below, trends in risk are layered against vulnerability, as measured by ECOWARN SitReps.

The CRVA Index, shown below, indicates that in Guinea-Bissau the human security pillars that exhibit the most severe levels of vulnerability are Rule of Law and Politics and Governance. Data suggests that the area of Security is the most resilient pillar in the country. See Appendix B for a brief description of how the indicators and sources were selected, as well as how the data was normalized, scaled, and integrated. In the graph below, the lower the score on the y axis (0-10), the more vulnerable the human security pillar.



Event data, including ECOWARN IncReps and data from ACLED, shows hotspots, patterns, and trends at the sub-national level, including incidents of political tension and violence, and criminality in the capital, Bissau. The heatmap below shows hot spots of conflict incidents in Guinea-Bissau from January 2015 – March 2017.

Field research was then conducted to validate and contextualize these preliminary findings. As illustrated in the pages below, FGDs and KIIs did validate these findings, but field research also brought out issues and dynamics that were not captured in the Desktop Study at all.

For instance, local stakeholders highlighted tensions between the Fula and Mandingo groups, including disputes between pastoralists and farmers over land. Field research also emphasized challenges related to the cashew monoculture, which makes up about 90 percent of Guinea-Bissau's exports. Although in 2017 prices were high on the global market, stakeholders were concerned about the impact of a potential decrease.

Scope and Limitations of the Study

This report seeks to layer, triangulate, and juxtapose quantitative, GIS, and qualitative data in a way that is accurate, meaningful, and representative. However, limitations to this analysis include the two- year date range for the event/GIS data and the seven-year date range for the ECOWARN SitReps. If there are conflict cycles that fall outside those parameters, there will be constraints on the ability to analyze those patterns in this report. Furthermore, this research sought to ensure representativeness in the sample of stakeholders engaged through KIIs (11 prominent individuals) and FGDs (11 focus group discussions). To the extent that these stakeholders were representative, they added vital contextualization and validation of the desktop research.

Scope and limitations also apply to the use and purpose of the study. The CRVA reports support the objectives of ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF). In particular, the CRVA reports identify vulnerabilities across the human security pillars in order to inform structural prevention. Structural prevention, as defined in the ECPF, comprises "political, institutional (governance) and

developmental reforms, capacity enhancement and advocacy on the culture of peace." While this report can also be used to inform operational prevention, which includes "early warning, mediation, conciliation, preventive disarmament and preventive deployment using interactive means such as good offices and the ECOWAS Standby Force," it seeks primarily to identify the key areas of structural vulnerability at the national and sub-national levels for strategic planning by ECOWAS and other partners in the peace and security space. However, inasmuch that operational prevention can be informed by patterns and trends in the event-driven risk factors highlighted in this report, the CRVA should serve as a baseline analysis of dynamics that are closely monitored over time. Thereby, in addition to informing strategic planning on structural vulnerability issues, the CRVA will also inform early warning products such as weekly, monthly, and quarterly situation reports that inform analysts and potential responders as to heightened conflict risk across one or more indicators, and propose recommendations on response. The CRVA reports can also be used as a foundation to inform more detailed case studies around identified risks, vulnerabilities and resiliencies for a country of interest or concern.

While many reports that seek to identify structural vulnerabilities and resilience factors focus almost exclusively at the national level, ECOWAS seeks to support a more decentralized early warning and response infrastructure across the region. As such, the CRVA reports also take into consideration dynamics at the sub-national level. These sub-national factors are critical to consider as they help analysts and potential responders understand the context in which specific events (risks) are occurring, which may be markedly different from the national context. A mapping of sub-national level risks, vulnerabilities, and resiliencies can also help inform strategies for engaging at the local level for structural prevention. In particular, as defined by the ECPF, taking "measures to ensure the crises do not arise in the first place or, if they do, that they do no re-occur."

Finally, as also noted in the ECPF, conflict in West Africa tends to be highly interconnected, which often leads to cycles of violence that cross borders and can keep countries emmeshed for decades. The CRVA reports, covering all fifteen member states of ECOWAS, are also useful in helping to inform and understand the dynamics of specific regional conflict systems, such as those that occur across the Mano River and Sahel. These regional conflict systems are influenced and interconnected not only historically and culturally, but also share many of the same structural vulnerabilities that give rise to risks and the eventual outbreak of violence, decade after decade. Thus, the CRVA reports present an opportunity to view not only the specific national and sub-national factors that lead to structural vulnerability and heightened risk, they also help highlight the nature of regional conflict systems, and the need for a holistic and systemic lens in both analysis and response.

Country Background

Guinea-Bissau, formerly known as Portuguese Guinea, gained independence from Portugal in 1974 following a decade-long war for independence. Since that time, the country has seen significant political volatility, including a period of civil war and successive military coups. The country's first post-independence president, Luís de Almeida Cabral, was ousted in a military coup in 1980 by then-Prime Minister João Bernardo Vieira.[15] The country moved toward multiparty democracy in the early 1990s, though politics has continued to be dominated by the ruling *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde, PAIGC). The first multiparty elections were held in 1994, and Vieira was elected president.[16] In 1998, a military revolt led by General Ansumane Mané against the government of President Vieira led to eleven months of fighting, extensive damage to infrastructure and the displacement of thousands of people.[17]

The latest political crisis began in April 2012, when military commanders staged a coup during the presidential elections that followed the death in office of President Malam Bacai Sanhá.[18] The coup was widely condemned by international and regional institutions, with the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) Security Council imposing sanctions and travel bans and the African Union (AU) suspending Guinea-Bissau until constitutional order was restored.[19] Mediation efforts by the ECOWAS led to the creation of a transitional government and the deployment of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) to oversee the transition.[20]

Presidential elections were held in April 2014, and José Mário Vaz became president with 62 percent of the vote in an election deemed free and fair by the international community.[21] While this return to constitutional order has permitted the economy to stabilize, political volatility has continued. In August 2015, President Vaz dismissed Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira, a popular rival within his own party, the ruling PAIGC.[22] This triggered a new period of political instability, with three more Prime Ministers appointed and subsequently dismissed between August 2015 and November 2016. Brokered by ECOWAS, a new plan – the Conakry Agreement - was announced in October 2016, calling for the formation of a coalition government and the implementation of constitutional and security sector reforms. However, to date, implementation of the Conakry Agreement has lagged and as of March 2017, the country's parliament had not met for more than a year. Frustration over the ongoing political gridlock contributed to protests in Bissau in March 2017 in which hundreds of protestors called for Vaz's resignation.[23] In April 2017, ECOWAS sent a high-level delegation to Guinea-Bissau to assess the implementation of the Conakry Agreement. The delegation expressed concern at the non-implementation of key provisions of the Conakry Agreement, as well as the rise in "belligerent and incendiary political statements" and increased socio-political tensions.[24]

[15] "Timeline of key political events", IRIN, May 2010.
[16] "Guinea-Bissau | Freedom in the World 2006", Freedom House, 2006.
[17] "Roots of Conflicts in Guinea-Bissau: The voice of the people", Interpeace/Voz di Paz, 2010.
[18] "Latest coup another setback for Guinea-Bissau", IRIN, April 2012.
[19] "UN Security Council slaps sanctions on Guinea-Bissau coup leaders", Morrow, A., PRI, May 2012.
[20] "ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau to be Formalized", ECOWAS, November 2012.
[21] "Vaz wins Guinea-Bissau presidential vote, loser rejects result", Dabo, A., Reuters, May 2014.
[22] "Guinea-Bissau profile - Timeline", BBC, February 2018.
[23] "Hundreds protest in Guinea Bissau as political crisis deepens", Reuters, March 2017.
[24] "ECOWAS high-level mission to the republic of Guinea-Bissau: Final Communique", ECOWAS, April 2017.

In addition to internal political crises, Guinea-Bissau faces a number of regional and internal security pressures. Although there have been no direct incidents in Guinea-Bissau, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other extremist groups are active in nearby countries such as Mali. In addition, Guinea-Bissau has long been involved in the conflict between Senegal and the *Mouvement des forces démocratiques de Casamance* (Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance, MFDC), a separatist group who has operated out of northern Guinea-Bissau. Security in Guinea-Bissau is further compromised by the active presence of organized crime networks, primarily related to cocaine trafficking. Since the early 2000s, Guinea-Bissau has become a key transit point for drug trafficking networks, and senior officials in the government and military have documented ties to the drug trade.[25] In 2013, for example, the former navy chief José Américo Bubo Na Tchuto and two aides were arrested by the United States government for their role in cocaine trafficking.[26] The drug trade has impacted both governance and security in Guinea-Bissau, as a desire for control of cocaine smuggling profits may have exacerbated competition between political elites in the leadup to a series of coups and assassinations in 2009.[27]

One of the least developed countries in Africa, Guinea-Bissau also faces significant economic pressures.[28] Colonial-era economic policies and the economic programs of the PAIGC following independence have resulted in a country heavily dependent on agricultural exports and subject to volatile commodity prices. The largest and most important industry in Guinea-Bissau is cashew farming, employing over 80 percent of the population and accounting for more than 80 percent of the country's exports.[29,30]

Despite a return to an elected government in 2014, Guinea-Bissau's political future remains uncertain. Though Guinea-Bissau has not experienced widespread violent conflict in recent years, security sector reform remains a critical issue due to the history of military interference in government. The ECOMIB mandate is currently set to end in October 2017, and without the implementation of meaningful reforms and a resolution of the current political gridlock, concerns remain about the possibility of military interference in political affairs following the withdrawal of ECOMIB, or for drug cartels and extremist groups to exploit the resulting political vacuum.

[25] "Drug Trafficking and Threats to Regional and National Security in West Africa", Aning, K and Pokoo, J., West Africa Commission on Drugs, January 2013.
[26] "Guinea-Bissau's ex-navy chief sentenced in prison in U.S. drug case", Pierson, B. and Raymond, N., Reuters, October 2016.
[27] "Guinea-Bissau struggles to end its role in global drugs trade", Loewenstein, A., The Guardian, January 2016.
[28] "Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development", UN Development Programme, 2015.
[29] "Cashew Nut Central to Guinea-Bissau Economy: A Blessing or a Curse?", United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), April 2016.
[30] "Guinea-Bissau: 2015-2019 Country Strategy Paper", African Development Bank, January 2015.

National-Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resiliencies

Based on desktop research using the ECOWARN and ACLED data sets, surveys of peace and security actors in key regions in Guinea-Bissau, field research that included KIIs and FGDs, and participatory analysis by the CRVA field research team, the following national-level risks, vulnerabilities, and resilience factors were identified:

Structural Vulnerabilities

Rule of Law

- Allegations of corruption and impunity in the justice system
- Lack of trust in formal justice mechanisms
- Lack of resources for formal justice system
- Poor prison infrastructure and conditions, including overcrowding
- Inadequate inclusion of women in the formal justice system
- Lack of independence of the judiciary
- Alleged politicization of the justice system

Politics and Governance

- Political and institutional fragility
- Lack of transparency and accountability
- Perceptions of corruption and nepotism within the public sector
- Weak state presence and poor provision of public services
- Underrepresentation of women and youth in political decision-making process
- History of military interference in politics
- Cyclical political stalemate
- Politicization of state institutions

Economics and Resources

- Poverty, unemployment
- Lack of infrastructure (roads, water, electricity)
- Undiversified economy/dependency on single cash crop (cashews)
- Low agricultural output
- Resource mismanagement and exploitation
- Weak private sector

Population and Demographics

- Rural to urban migration
- Low capacity of health and education services
- Cross-border migration
- Weak education system and infrastructure

- Environmental degradation
- Food insecurity
- Unfavorable climatic conditions

Security

- Under-equipped and poorly trained security/defense forces
- Porous borders
- Perceptions of corruption within the security forces

Event-Driven Risks

Rule of Law

- Incidents of corruption or impunity within the court system
- Weak enforcement of criminal penalties
- Violation of code of criminal procedure especially cases of police playing the role of the judiciary
- Prison break
- Overcrowding of prisons
- Impunity
- Increased criminal activities (including drug trafficking, illegal logging)
- Abuse of power
- Diminished confidence/trust in the judicial system and in public administration

Politics and Governance

- Electoral process in 2018 and beyond
- Military coup attempts
- Political instability
- Delayed/Non-implementation of Conakry Agreement
- Street demonstrations/protests
- Arbitrary and selective imprisoning of political rivals
- Violation of civil rights
- Weak coordination among international partners to resolve the ongoing political stalemate

Economics and Resources

- Fluctuating commodity prices
- Illegal fishing and logging activities
- Farmer/herder conflicts over land access
- Unequal sharing of resources
- Illicit economy on Bijagos Islands

Population and Demographics

- Conflict between groups over access to land and other natural resources
- Salinization of ground water and rice fields
- Gender-based violence (GBV)

- Early marriage and pregnancy

Security

- Withdrawal of ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB)
- Farmer/herder disputes over land access
- Political violence related to elections and institutional impasse
- Attempted coup d'état
- Inconclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR)
- Increased criminal activities (including drug trafficking and illegal logging)
- Diminished public trust in the police institutions
- Political protests
- Human rights violations
- Abuses by security forces

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Rule of Law

- Role of traditional and religious leaders
- Access to Justice Centers (CAJs) and civil society initiatives to improve access to the legal justice system
- Initiative for justice sector reform, supported by the UN system and partners
- Gender Law
- Anti-human trafficking law
- Strong civil society organization (CSO) networking

Politics and Governance

- Signature of Conakry Agreement

Economics and Resources

- Microcredit and other lending initiatives, particularly for women
- High price of cashew nuts

Population and Demographics

- Interfaith dialogue
- Adoption of the measures to curb female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C)

Security

- Presence of ECOMIB, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), African Union (AU), European Union (EU), and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP)
- Implementation of the Defense and Security Sector Reform program (DSSR)

A key theme that emerged in the CRVA research was political gridlock at the federal and regional levels. While ECOWAS has been proactive in helping to resolve the impasse, particularly with the six-point Roadmap and the Conakry Agreement, tensions and uncertainty remain, which could worsen in the run-up to the 2018 legislative elections and the 2019 presidential elections. Other themes included illicit economic activities, such as narco-trafficking, on the islands off the coast of Guinea-Bissau as well as illegal smuggling of cashews. Cashews make up 80 percent of Guinea-Bissau's export revenue, which makes the country particularly vulnerable to fluctuating prices on the global market. Stakeholders also highlighted significant levels of underdevelopment across the country in terms of infrastructure, social services, and overall government presence.

Rule of Law (Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Allegations of corruption and impunity in the justice system • Lack of trust in formal justice mechanisms • Lack of resources for formal justice system • Poor prison infrastructure and conditions, including overcrowding • Inadequate inclusion of women in the formal justice system • Lack of independence of the judiciary • Alleged politicization of the justice system
Risks	• Incidents of corruption or impunity within the court system • Weak enforcement of criminal penalties • Violation of code of criminal procedure especially cases of police playing the role of the judiciary • Prison break • Overcrowding of prisons • Impunity • Increased criminal activities (including drug trafficking, illegal logging) • Abuse of power • Diminished confidence/trust in the judicial system and in public administration

Vulnerabilities and Risks

According to the CRVA Index, Guinea-Bissau is most vulnerable in the area of Rule of Law. Guinea-Bissau has a particularly low score in Judicial Independence. The Supreme Council of the Judiciary - the body that oversees the Supreme Court of Justice and appoints Supreme Court justices - is comprised of 15 members, but only five of these are judges. The remaining members are appointed by the president and National People's Assembly, leaving the Council (and, by extension, the Supreme Court of Justice) vulnerable to political manipulation and corruption.[31] In addition, judges in the Superior Military Tribunal and regional military tribunals are appointed by the executive branch.[32] The United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has also noted that reports of bribery and threatening of judges are common.[33]

Respondents in the fieldwork identified low levels of trust in the formal judicial system and widespread perceptions of corruption, bias, impunity, and ineffectiveness. Participants noted

> *"The islands, for instance, lack the presence of courts. The people living on these islands have to travel for an average of six hours to Bissau and an additional three hours to Bouba to get access to a court. It is discouraging, and the people often give up on undertaking such a long journey.*
>
> *- Interviewee in Bissau*

[31] "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on her mission to Guinea-Bissau", UN Human Rights Council, April 2016.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

that local populations believe that only the wealthy can access the legal system, or that political or personal connections change the outcome of a case. Respondents also reported instances whereby the police rule on cases brought up by the local population without providing them with options for the due process of the law.

The court system's lack of resources was also identified as a key concern. In Cacheu, for example, fieldwork participants reported that the local court currently lacks a judge, and that the region does not have a prison. According to a representative from the Ministry of Justice, "sector courts" (which operate in strategic areas that exhibit recurring or intense conflicts) rely on the use of privately owned buildings; however, the lack of financial resources to fund these courts means that they are often shut down due to nonpayment of rent. In addition to its impact on local communities, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has reported that the judiciary's lack of resources and inability to conduct basic investigative procedures have contributed to a high rate of impunity around organized crime.[34]

During the fieldwork, participants noted poor prison conditions and mentioned that people become more radical after spending time in that environment.

In addition, judicial structures are largely centered in the capital and some larger cities throughout the country, with little presence in rural areas. As a result, rural populations must spend significant time or resources to access the courts. According to a representative from the Ministry of Justice, the government does not have adequate funding to deploy judges and lawyers throughout Guinea-Bissau.

Due to the above factors, fieldwork participants reported that community-based or traditional justice mechanisms are the preferred form of dispute resolution. As interviewees in Oio region described, traditional leaders are the primary resource for mediation and dispute settlement. If the problem is not resolved there, the conflict is referred to local police, then the sector or regional police, and then to tribunal for civil cases, or to the court for criminal cases.

Women also remain underrepresented in the judicial system. Women make up only 11 percent of the country's Supreme Court, and key gender-based protections such as equal remuneration are missing from the law. In addition, existing laws affecting women, including provisions around domestic violence and female genital mutilation (FGM), have not been appropriately enforced or are not applied due to the reliance on traditional justice mechanisms.[35]

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Traditional leaders were identified throughout the fieldwork as a resiliency under Rule of Law, as traditional or community-based justice mechanisms are preferred over the formal court system. In addition, civil society organizations (CSOs) and government efforts to expand access to the legal system were identified as resiliencies. In particular, the UN-funded Access to Justice Centers were identified by participants in Oio region as having a positive impact. Five Access to Justice Centers (CAJs) were established in four regions, and provide free legal aid, mediation, counseling, and awareness-raising activities. These CAJs specifically reach out to vulnerable populations (including women and children), and provide resources on women's rights, children's rights, gender equality and illegal detention.[36] Respondents reported that even though the CAJs

[34] "Guinea-Bissau: 'The Situation of justice is terrible, but there are encouraging signs,' UN experts says", UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights, October 2015.

[35] "Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers on her mission to Guinea-Bissau", UN Human Rights Council, April 2016.

[36] "Guinea-Bissau: Final Narrative Report", United Nations MDG Achievement Fund, November 2013.

cannot always effectively respond to the demands of population due to workload, they are still viewed positively.

Politics and Governance (Second Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Political and institutional fragility • Lack of transparency and accountability • Perceptions of corruption and nepotism within the public sector • Weak state presence and poor provision of public services • Underrepresentation of women and youth in political decision-making process • History of military interference in politics • Cyclical political stalemate • Politicization of state institutions
Risks	• Electoral process in 2018 and beyond • Military coup attempts • Political instability • Delayed/Non-implementation of Conakry Agreement • Street demonstrations/protests • Arbitrary and selective imprisoning of political rivals • Violation of civil rights • Weak coordination among international partners to resolve the ongoing political stalemate

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Politics and Governance is Guinea-Bissau's second-most vulnerable category, according to the CRVA Index. Guinea-Bissau has a long history of political instability, including multiple military coups. The country has been experiencing a period of political impasse since August 2015, when President Vaz dismissed Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira. Since then, President Vaz has appointed and dismissed multiple prime ministers, which led to institutional gridlock involving the ruling PAIGC party and the political elite.[37] The six-point roadmap adopted by ECOWAS and the subsequent Conakry Agreement reached in late 2016 call for the development of an inclusive consensus government and the implementation of constitutional, electoral, political, security and judicial reforms stemming from a national dialogue process. To date, however, little progress has been made in the implementation of the Conakry Agreement.[38]

Although the current situation has not yet turned violent, in March 2017 the UN, European Union (EU), African Union (AU) ECOWAS, and Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP) issued a joint statement expressing concern about "a rise in political and social tensions, as well as a verbal escalation by proxy, by political actors in a context of accusations and counter-accusations."[39] Fieldwork participants also raised concerns around the current political rhetoric, noting that it risks encouraging political violence. Particularly in

[37] "Guinea-Bissau country profile", BBC, February 2018.
[38] "Structural Causes of Instability in Guinea-Bissau Must be Tackled, Top Official Tells Security Council, Urging Parties to Implement Conakry Accord", UN Security Council, February 2017.
[39] "Deeply Concerned, Guinea Bissau Partners Call on Political Actors for Moderation", United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), March 2017.

Bissau, interviewees reported that the current political situation has created frustration and fears of a military coup among local populations.

Several participants also expressed concerns around the potential for politicians to manipulate the population along ethnic, religious or political lines ahead of the 2018 elections. Particularly in Bissau and Oio, fieldwork participants reported that local populations and organizations such as teachers' unions are highly politicized.

Beyond the ongoing conflict within the political elite, respondents in the fieldwork identified a weak state presence in regions beyond Bissau and perceptions of government neglect, as exemplified by the poor provision of public services. Several regions currently lack governors and administrators, due to the institutional impasse at the national level, which has created a political vacuum and further exacerbated these perceptions. Particularly in Bafatá, Cacheu, and Oio, interviewees reported a lack of access to water, inadequate training for teachers, poor roads, inaccessible healthcare, and a lack of public institutions such as police stations, courts and hospitals.

Fieldwork participants also expressed perceptions of corruption, nepotism and mismanagement within government and political parties. Patronage networks and political affiliations were reported to affect employment opportunities and resource allocation.

Women and youth also remain underrepresented in politics in Guinea-Bissau. In fact, a 2014 study by the Transitional Government, the Women's Political Platform, and UNIOGBIS found that women's political participation declined from 20 percent between 1998 to 2004 to 10 percent in 2013.[40] Participants in the fieldwork reported that few women are involved in politics at either the local or national level. Some interviewees expressed that many women feel that participation in politics is reserved for wealthy or highly educated women. Particularly in Bissau, fieldwork participants reported that youth are highly engaged with politics, yet have little influence in decision-making processes. There is, however, an active civil society that has engaged many women and has served to promote women's involvement in decision-making.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

In some communities, traditional and religious leaders were identified as playing an important role in conflict mitigation and dispute resolution. Others, however, noted that these leaders lose credibility when they are perceived to be politicized.

The presence of ECOMIB and UNIOGBIS was also identified by interviewees in Bissau as having improved security and mitigated some instances of political violence. To the extent that the signature of the Conakry Agreement in 2016 has provided for the continued engagement of ECOWAS (and therefore ECOMIB) in the country, the Conakry Agreement can be viewed as a source of resilience.

[40] "African Women's Decade 2010-2020: 2014 Annual Review", Make Every Woman Count, 2014.

Economics and Resources (Third Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Poverty, unemployment • Lack of infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) • Undiversified economy/dependency on single cash crop (cashews) • Low agricultural output • Resource mismanagement and exploitation • Weak private sector
Risks	• Fluctuating commodity prices • Illegal fishing and logging activities • Farmer/herder conflicts over land access • Unequal sharing of resources • Illicit economy on Bijagos Islands

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Economics and Resources is Guinea-Bissau's third most vulnerable category. More than 65 percent of the population in Guinea-Bissau lives below the poverty line.[41] Poor infrastructure, a lack of electricity, low levels of investment and banking opportunities and a large illicit economy continue to stifle economic productivity in the country.[42] The Bissau-Guinean economy is largely dependent upon agriculture, primarily cashew exports, which leaves the economy and population vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Nearly 85 percent of the population is reliant on agriculture as their primary source of income.[43] In 2013, political instability and a drop in global cashew prices negatively impacted the economy, but recent years have seen a return to GDP growth and increasing economic productivity. The economy is projected to grow by an average of 5 percent per year between 2016-2018.[44] However, the undiversified economy is still at risk from market volatility.

In the fieldwork, participants cited ongoing poverty, lack of resources and infrastructure, and unemployment as key vulnerabilities in Guinea-Bissau. Several interviewees discussed an ongoing lack of water and electricity infrastructure, especially in more rural areas of the country. Additionally, many farmers lack machinery that would allow them to produce goods more efficiently. Resource mismanagement and a lack of capacity to store and process products were also reported as economic vulnerabilities. High unemployment and a few economic opportunities due to a lack of education and job training were also discussed during the fieldwork.

Another issue that emerged in the fieldwork is increasing perceptions that foreigners have begun to dominate economic activity in the country. A participant during the fieldwork noted that these perceptions may cause an "indigenous revolt." In discussions with Ministry of Interior officials, concerns were raised regarding the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the potential impacts of sea level rise and flooding due to climate change. Participants in the fieldwork expressed concerns that the fishing industry has been exploited by the citizens of neighboring countries. A lack of refrigeration capability coupled with a lack of equipment in the fishing business

[41] "Guinea-Bissau: Human Development Indicators", UN Development Programme
[42] "Guinea-Bissau Economy", Economy Watch, June 2010.
[43] "Where We Work: Guinea-Bissau", World Food Programme
[44] "The World Bank in Guinea-Bissau: Overview", World Bank, October 2017.

makes it difficult for local fishermen to compete with fishermen from surrounding countries.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Access to credit and grants from NGOs, specifically for women, has been a source of resiliency in some regions of the country. Women have been actively involved in horticulture and trade, which has allowed them to provide for their families. People have also organized themselves into small trading associations, which have given them access to funding.

Population and Demographics (Fourth Most Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Rural to urban migration • Low capacity of health and education services • Cross-border migration • Weak education system and infrastructure • Environmental degradation • Food insecurity • Unfavorable climatic conditions
Risks	• Conflict between groups over access to land and other natural resources • Salinization of ground water and rice fields • Gender-based violence (GBV) • Early marriage and pregnancy

Vulnerabilities and Risks

The country has a large youth population, with a median age of 19.4 in 2015 and 61 percent of the population under the age of 25.[45] The population of Guinea-Bissau is growing at a rate of 2.4 percent, which is slightly below the regional average.[46] Women and girls are particularly vulnerable in Guinea-Bissau. Though the country has made overall progress on development goals in recent years, maternal mortality rates remain high (549 per 100,000 live births), few women have reliable access to contraceptives, and over half of women aged 20-24 were married or in a union before the age of 18.[47] Women are traditionally relegated to second-tier status within Guinea-Bissau and continue to face limited access to resources.

In the field research, interviewees identified unemployment, rural to urban migration and a poor healthcare system as key vulnerabilities. Unemployment is especially high among youth and women. Lack of opportunity, even for those who are educated, has led to increased migration to the capital, Bissau. Interviewees also discussed an increasing influx of immigrants from neighboring countries, such as Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria, and Niger, which has contributed to population growth in some regions, such as Bafatá and Bissau.

Ethnicity was also discussed during the fieldwork, and though interviewees said that there is social cohesion between different ethnic groups, several discussed tensions between the Fula and Mandingo ethnic groups. Some interviewees stated that tension between the two groups is rooted in religious disagreements, while others cited conflict surrounding resource access and farmer/herder tension. The Mandingo ethnic group is primarily involved in agriculture, while the Fula are herders.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Positive inter-religious relationships between Muslims and Christians was cited as a resiliency during the fieldwork, and interviewees said that they believed religious conflict to be unlikely. Interviewees also discussed social cohesion between ethnic groups as a resiliency, citing the growth of interethnic marriage.

[45] "World Population Prospects 2017", UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population Division
[46] "Guinea-Bissau Population", Index Mundi
[47] "Guinea-Bissau Demographics Profile 2018", Index Mundi

Security (Least Vulnerable Pillar)

Vulnerabilities	• Under-equipped and poorly trained security/defense forces • Porous borders • Perceptions of corruption within the security forces
Risks	• Withdrawal of ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) • Farmer/herder disputes over land access • Political violence related to elections and institutional impasse • Attempted coup d'état • Inconclusive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (DDR) • Increased criminal activities (including drug trafficking and illegal logging) • Diminished public trust in the police institutions • Political protests • Human rights violations • Abuses by security forces

Vulnerabilities and Risks

Guinea-Bissau is least vulnerable in the category of Security. Two of the most pressing threats facing the country are the international organized drug trade and regional threats of terrorism. The country is a transit point for drugs, primarily cocaine, and other illicit activity, including human trafficking. While no attacks have yet occurred in Guinea-Bissau, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has previously perpetrated attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali and has a notable presence within several neighboring countries. The Bissau-Guinean government must also contend with weak borders and a military with strong ties to the drug trade and organized crime.[48]

During the fieldwork, interviewees identified the lack of a trained police force and resources for security forces as a key vulnerability pertaining to security throughout Guinea-Bissau. Police lack the training to effectively respond to emergencies. Some regions lack a police force, or the police force is drastically understaffed, meaning that crimes go unreported. Additionally, the average salary for security forces is low. These concerns have contributed to perceptions of ineffectiveness and corruption within the police.

Another security concern that was cited in the fieldwork is crime, specifically armed robbery and assault. Despite understaffed security forces, several interviewees noted that these crimes are infrequent. Theft of cattle and other livestock, which are sometimes tied to farmer/herder conflicts, were also cited. Interviewees also reported land based conflicts and herder-farmer conflicts between ethnic groups as security concerns in rural areas.

Political tension and violence was also discussed during FGDs and KIIs. Several interviewees discussed the potential for a military coup due to the current political stagnation. With the upcoming 2018 elections, there is also concern that political demonstrations could lead to violence, especially in the capital, Bissau.

[48] "Countries/Jurisdictions of Primary Concern – Guinea Bissau", U.S. Department of State, 2016.

Officials from the Ministry of the Interior emphasized concerns regarding cross-border crimes, as well as drug and human trafficking. It was noted that the police and gendarmerie are underequipped and underfunded, and that "the structures for rapid response to emergencies are not yet operational within the country." Other concerns included drug trafficking, as well as maritime safety. Others noted collusion between police and bandits and attributed the problem to low police salaries and bad equipment. They also highlighted the potentially worsening of rivalries between herders and farmers.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

ECOMIB and the United Nations sanctions put in place after the 2012 military coup were cited during the fieldwork as positive contributions to the development of peace and security in Guinea-Bissau. Several interviewees also discussed mentioned neighborhood watch groups in some communities to fill security gaps. These groups are viewed positively by their communities and generally work with police and local security forces.

External Factors

Guinea-Bissau is actively engaged with a number of regional organizations, including ECOWAS, the AU, the EU and the CPLP. ECOWAS has played a key role in mediating the current political situation and in developing the six-point roadmap that led to the Conakry Agreement in 2016. The ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB) has been deployed in the country since 2012 and has been playing an important role in security provision. The ECOMIB mandate is currently set to end in October 2017.

At the international level, the UN is also active in Guinea-Bissau. The UN Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) also has a mandate to support the Bissau-Guinean government with implementing political and security sector reforms and reconciliation processes, among other activities. The UNIOGBIS mandate is currently set to expire in February 2018.

In the area of economics, Guinea-Bissau is impacted by changes in global commodity prices (particularly of cashews) and the activities of international financial institutions (IFIs), such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and donor countries. Guinea-Bissau is currently engaged in an Extended Credit Facility (ECF) arrangement with the IMF which expires in July 2018.

Since the early 2000s Guinea-Bissau has become a key regional transit point for drugs, particularly cocaine, destined for European markets, thanks to the dozens of unpatrolled islands along the country's coast. There is also increasing evidence that regional extremist groups, including al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have ties to the drug trade in West Africa, which may pose a security threat for the country in the future.[49] The Bissau-Guinean government is involved in counter-narcotics programs with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), UNIOGBIS and the EU.[50]

More recently, cross-border smuggling of cashews from Guinea-Bissau to neighboring Senegal has become a salient issue affecting government revenues.[51] The country's porous borders and low capacity for law enforcement have exacerbated this problem.

Finally, Guinea-Bissau faces pressures from climate change and environmental factors such as deforestation, rising sea level, salt water intrusion in rice fields and uneven precipitation patterns. Given the country's economic dependence on agricultural production, these trends could pose a serious risk to livelihoods and government revenues in the future.

[49] "Exclusive: Al Qaeda linked to rogue air network: U.S. official", Gaynor, T. and Diallo T., Reuters, January 2010.
[50] "Guinea-Bissau", UN Office on Drugs and Crime
[51] "Guinea-Bissau President bans cashew sales amid smuggling", Reuters, May 2017.

Gender Considerations

Despite passing legislation in 2015 against domestic violence, it remains a prominent aspect of life for many women in Guinea-Bissau. In most regions visited during the fieldwork, women and girls reported the prevalence of domestic violence in their communities, with perpetrators rarely punished, despite the law criminalizing it. Women and girls interviewed also noted the high degree of inequality in the judicial system, with women reluctant to bring cases to the police or to court due to the perception that they system automatically favors men. Women in Bafatá further noted that in cases of domestic violence, women are more likely to turn to the traditional or religious authority to mediate, as takings one's husband to court can result in the marriage being officially annulled. In cases where women are not officially seeking to dissolve the marriage but to have their husbands punished, an annulment by the courts can leave women in a precarious financial and social situation.

Women also face pressures related to early marriage and early childbirth in the country. The maternal mortality rate, at approximately 549 per 100,00 births in 2015 according to the UN, remains high, despite the country's progress overall on the UN Sustainable Development Goals over the past several years. Access to proper medical facilities remains low, particularly in rural communities. The high prevalence of FGM was also noted by some interviewees as putting the lives and health of young women at risk. Other respondents reported strong civil society awareness raising campaigns on the issue.

Politically, women are underrepresented in both national and local government structures. In FGDs conducted throughout the country, female participants noted that because access to education remains low for girls, especially in rural areas, most women do not feel qualified to run for office. There remains the perception that only wealthy and well-educated women have access to political platforms. The rate of female illiteracy is also high in many areas of the country, according to a January 2017 report by the UN, with girls at 76 percent, compared to boys at 48 percent.[52] Women in FGDs also reported that in many regions, traditional and religious rules regarding women's education often prevail, with women and girls expected to run the household and participate in agricultural activities and trade, rather than go to school. Although this is less prevalent in the capital and more developed urban centers, it remains the norm in rural areas throughout the country.

Economically, women have benefited from various microcredit schemes across the country. Women's access to financial capital remains limited, so informal money-lending structures often help women, especially widows and single mothers, start small businesses. According to UNIOGBIS, women are the breadwinners in the country and mostly employed in the informal market.[53] Women are involved in trade and in some regions have formed local trade unions and solidarity groups to protect their rights.

Additionally, some women interviewed raised the delicate issue of *talibé* children in the country. These are children who, for economic or religious reasons, are sent to neighboring countries to study in Islamic schools. Once there, the children are often forced into begging or hawking products on the streets, rather than being educated. Women in FGDs noted that there are increasing awareness-raising and repatriation campaigns being launched by local NGOs to warn families about this scam and help them find and repatriate children who may have been victims of this human trafficking scheme.

[52] "Violence and Discrimination Continue to Effect Women in Guinea-Bissau," United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), January 4, 2017

[53] "In Guinea-Bissau, Women are the Breadwinners," UNIOGBIS, April 6, 2016.

Overall, women are both highly vulnerable and a source of resiliency in Guinea-Bissau. Women's NGOs, which some noted have expanded over the recent years, are active in helping to raise awareness about issues of most concern to women's right and health in the country. In many parts of the country, traditional and religious rules still predominate and result in fewer women being educated and many more being married at a young age. However, where women have been able to organize, they have formed unions to help improve their living conditions. Finally, local and international microcredit schemes, as well as health and educational initiatives, were routinely cited as a critical part of capacity building for women and girls throughout the country.

Sub-National Level Vulnerabilities, Risks and Resilience Factors: Observations by Region

Bafatá Region

The Bafatá region of Guinea-Bissau is located in the eastern half of the country and is home to more than 211,000 people.[54] Eighty percent of the population in Bafatá live in rural areas.[55] The Mandingo and the Fula are the main ethnic groups in the region and a majority of the population is Muslim. Trade and agriculture are the region's primary economic activities.

Structural Vulnerabilities	• Weak state presence in the region • Poor provision of public services • Lack of infrastructure • Underrepresentation of women in politics • Perceptions of corruption and bias in the judicial system • Lack of resources for judicial system • Lack of mechanization and low capacity in agricultural sector • Sectarian divisions within the Muslim community • Land-based and herder-farmer conflicts • Gender-based violence • Lack of training and resources for security forces
Event-Driven Risks	• Herder-farmer conflicts • Drought or climatic changes that affect agricultural outputs
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Traditional and religious leaders • Non-governmental and civil society organizations • Government officials who are engaged in projects that benefit local communities • UNIOGBIS Regional Office covering Bafatá & Gabu

[54] "Guinea Bissau Socio-Economic Data, 2015", National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau
[55] Ibid.

In terms of vulnerabilities and risks, a relative lack of government presence in the Bafatá region presents legitimacy challenges with no local governor in position and access to courts limited to those who can travel to the main urban center. Traditional leadership plays a key role throughout the region, with many participants noting that they prefer to use traditional and religious mediator and arbitrators rather than turn to the police or court system. Economically, the region is a major producer of cashew nuts and other agricultural staples, but mainly exports the raw materials for processing and selling in other countries, driving down the price farmers can get for their products. Specific sectors of trade and agriculture are dominated by different ethnic groups, participants reported, as well as immigrants from neighboring countries. This has caused some tension in the region, particularly in cases where foreigners were granted land ownership or tenure over locals, based on the perception that foreigners would accept higher rates. Additionally, there are some intercommunal tensions between Muslim Shiite, Sunni and other religious communities. Other sources of tension between communities was noted by interviewees as having been heightened due to the influx of immigrants from neighboring countries, which also puts pressure on limited resources. Further, due to the heavy reliance on the agricultural sector, the region is also vulnerable to environmental pressures such as drought or flooding, as well as fluctuations in global food prices. In terms of resilience, partnerships between local government administrators and local community leaders has often produced welcome results. The presence of NGOs providing capacity building and microlending programs were also a noted resilience in the region, particularly those serving women and children. As noted, traditional and religious leaders are also mainly viewed as a resilience, particularly in areas underserved by government and lacking in public services. Some did note, however, that some traditional authorities had lost public confidence by becoming increasingly politicized over the recent years.

Rule of Law

Interviewees during the fieldwork reported a general lack of trust in the judicial system, due to perceptions of corruption, bias and ineffectiveness within the system. For example, one interviewee recalled a recent rape case in the sector of Xitole in which the suspect, a prominent individual in the community, was not prosecuted due to his ties with the local government. Other fieldwork participants reported instances where employees in the judicial system allegedly accepted bribes and let suspected criminals go free.

In addition, fieldwork participants expressed that local populations generally lack awareness of their rights and due process. The long processing times and the cost of gaining access to the system – i.e. monetary resources needed to go to court and for legal assistance – were also reported as barriers. Finally, the only court in Bafatá region is located in the city of Bafatá, making it difficult for communities in other sectors to access the court.

> *"…last year they caught two thieves with pistols – they were taken to the police and then taken to the court. They were jailed for two years but were released after 11 months. He reported to the new judge at the court – the judge took offense at the action of the President of the CSOs Network and reprimanded him for protesting the release of the criminals."*
>
> *- KII, Bafatá Region*

As a result, interviewees reported that traditional and religious leaders are the primary avenues for seeking justice in Bafatá. Once traditional mechanisms have been exhausted, cases may then move to the formal judicial system. One interviewee noted that women usually prefer to

seek help from traditional or religious leaders in cases of domestic violence.

Politics and Governance

Participants in the fieldwork reported a perceived lack of government presence in the Bafatá region and expressed grievances about the poor provision of public services and infrastructure (namely electricity, drinking and irrigation water, and roads).

A key concern was the perception of a leadership vacuum due to the lack of a governor for the Bafatá region, which respondents connect to the political gridlock at the national level. Participants in the youth Focus Group Discussion (FGD) stated that the lack of a governor has prevented the government from adequately responding to the social problems within the region.

Traditional leaders hold a significant degree of power within the region and play a key role in conflict mitigation and dispute resolution. However, one interviewee noted that the influence of traditional leaders has been damaged by perceptions of politicization. In some cases, traditional leaders have reportedly encouraged people to support a particular political party or have been perceived to be influenced by political leaders.

> *"In terms of participation in political issues, it is very difficult to find [women] in this sector. Some of them are there, but not deeply engaged."*
>
> *- Youth FGD, Bafatá Region*

While participants noted that women are increasingly active in politics in Bafatá, women remain underrepresented at both the local and national levels. At the national level, only two of Bafatá's 12 parliamentarians are women. At the local level, fieldwork participants reported that few women are engaged in politics or government administration. Participants in the women's FGD expressed that many women feel that participation in politics is reserved for wealthy or highly educated women. Other interviewees encouraged civil society groups to carry out awareness raising and training activities to encourage greater participation of women in politics.

Economics and Resources

The economy of Bafatá is primarily reliant on the fish trade and the production of staple foods and cash crops such as rice, vegetables and cashews. Fieldwork participants noted that the economy is hindered by a lack of mechanization and investment. They noted that the town of Bafatá lacks central market infrastructure to enable economic activity and exchanges. The region also lacks adequate facilities to process and preserve agricultural products. In the Bissau-Guinean cashew industry, the vast majority of production is geared toward the export of the raw cashew nut, and most processing of cashews occurs in other countries. Traders and exporters mainly benefit from the cashew trade, while farmers are often disadvantaged in this industry.

Due to its reliance on agricultural production, the economy is also vulnerable to environmental constraints, especially low precipitation levels. With limited infrastructure available for irrigation, drought or uneven rainfall could have a serious impact on the region's economy.

Interviewees in the fieldwork noted that certain economic sectors are dominated by one of the ethnic groups; for example, cattle-breeding is the common economic activity for the Fula and agricultural production is primarily conducted by the Mandingo. In addition, interviewees identified an immigrant-indigenous divide, and expressed that many of the businesses in the region are dominated by immigrants from neighboring countries. This has contributed to grievances among indigenous communities around youth

unemployment and resource distribution, which could contribute to tensions in the future. For example, one interviewee cited the example of an administrator in Xitole sector who reportedly allocated land to a foreign farmer rather than an indigenous one because of the incentive he expected the foreign farmer to pay.

Interviewees also discussed grievances about the poor provision of public services and infrastructure (namely electricity, drinking and irrigation water, and roads). Interviewees reported that hospitals and schools do not have adequate resources to accommodate the community and that teachers are poorly trained. An issue mentioned several times was the recent privatization of electricity in the region. Interviewees reported that electricity has become more expensive (50,000 to 75,000 FCFA per month, putting electricity out of reach for many people), is unreliable, and is inaccessible to sectors outside of Bafatá.

Women in Bafatá region are actively involved in trade as well as, to a lesser extent, agricultural production. Some women are engaged in cross-border trade with Senegal and Gambia, and one interviewee noted that local women have formed a trade association for women who trade in traditional cloth. While a smaller number of women are involved in agriculture, few women in Bafatá own their own land, as the customs of many local communities do not allow women to inherit land.

Population and Demographics

Bafatá is an ethnically mixed region, with members of the Mandingo and the Fula groups comprising the majority of the population. While fieldwork participants did not identify ethnicity as a source of division, there is a history of intercommunal tensions between the Mandingo (who are predominantly farmers) and the Fula (who are pastoralists) related to issues of land access, primarily in rural areas. Intercommunal tensions between the Mandingo and the Fula in the region date back to the 19th century and have been used more recently as a rallying point by politicians.

The population of Bafatá is majority Muslim (77 percent) with smaller Christian (7 percent) and animist (4 percent) communities.[56] While relationships between religious groups were not reported to be a source of conflict, there are divides within the Muslim community between Sunnis and Shiites which some fieldwork participants warned could contribute to future conflicts. Interviewees also cited the Ahmadiyya, an Islamic movement originally native to Pakistan[57], as a potential source of future intra-religious conflict. Many in mainstream Islam view the Ahmadi as heretics, and their activities were banned by the Bissau-Guinean government in 2005 following clashes in Gabu region between Ahmadi and non-Ahmadi Muslims.[58] Ahmadis remain a religious minority in Guinea-Bissau; in 2012, they made up only two percent of Muslims in the country.[59]

Fieldwork participants also identified an influx of immigrants from neighboring countries, including Senegal, Guinea, Nigeria and Niger, as contributing to demographic growth in Bafatá. Interviewees expressed that business and commercial activities in Bafatá are now dominated by members of immigrant communities, contributing to grievances around youth unemployment and land allocation among indigenous communities.

Fieldwork participants particularly expressed concerns around poor infrastructure (namely access to clean water, electricity and roads) and the lack of a university or other higher education institution in Bafatá. Interviewees noted that the lack of a university results in youth leaving the region to seek further education or training in Bissau. However, due to the cost of attending university, many students are forced to suspend

[56] Ibid.
[57] "Guinea-Bissau | Freedom in the World 2006", Freedom House, 2006.
[58] Ibid.
[59] "The World's Muslims: Unity and Diversity", Pew Research Center, August 2012.

their studies or return to Bafatá without training or employment.

The phenomenon of *talibé* children was also identified as a "delicate issue" by participants in the women's focus group. *Talibés* (also known as *almudus* in Fula) are students of the Koran who are often sent to Senegal or Gambia for religious education. Particularly in Senegal, human rights organizations have documented instances of forced begging and abuse of *talibés*[60], and international organizations and NGOs classify the practice as child trafficking.[61] The city of Bafatá has historically been a key source of *talibés* and other victims of child trafficking.[62] One interviewee in the fieldwork identified a local NGO, SOS Talibé, as a source of resiliency due to their work to support repatriated *talibés.*

Security

Key security concerns in Bafatá include petty crime, armed robbery, livestock theft, drug trafficking, and sexual and domestic violence. Particularly in rural areas, fieldwork participants also reported incidents of land-based conflicts and herder-farmer conflicts between the Mandingo and Fula ethnic groups.

According to fieldwork participants, police in the region lack the material resources to adequately respond to the security concerns of the community. For example, there is only one police station and one police vehicle to cover the region's six sectors. Other issues identified by fieldwork participants included perceptions of corruption within the police force, a lack of training, and a lack of trust between the police and local populations. As a result, one interviewee noted that communities in the city of Bafatá have formed a local vigilante group. Members of this group reportedly do not carry weapons and work closely with the police.

Participants in the women's FGD noted that women are particularly vulnerable within the region and reported an increase in domestic violence. Several interviewees noted that women rarely report instances of domestic violence to the police out of fear of dissolved marriages; instead they turn to family members or traditional leaders to resolve the issue.

> *"…the man can beat the woman and even if he is the one who is guilty, the woman cannot take him to the police or local authority. They perceive taking the husband to court as the ending of the marriage or relationship."*
>
> *- KII, Bafatá Region*

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Religious and traditional leaders were identified as sources of resilience in Bafatá and these individuals play a primary role in conflict mitigation and dispute resolution. Religious leaders were viewed as contributing to social cohesion between groups through their sermons. It was noted, however, that the social capital of these leaders declines when they are perceived to be politicized.

Civil society organizations (CSOs) and NGOs were also identified as a source of resilience. In particular, fieldwork participants identified the CSOs Network, the Human Rights League in Guinea-Bissau (LGDH), the Children's Parliament of Bafatá (PIB), the Movement of Youth Action (MAJ), and SOS Talibé as local organizations who are providing services and platforms for engagement and advocacy in the region. Women have been particularly active within CSOs, and their

[60] "Senegal: New Steps to Protect Talibés, Street Children", Human Rights Watch, July 2016.
[61] "Child Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau: An explorative study", Einarsdottir, J., Boiro, H., Geirsson, G., and Gunnlaugsson, G., UNICEF, 2010.
[62] "Trafficking in Persons Report 2009", U.S. Department of State, 2009.

engagement has served to promote women's equal participation in public life.

One interviewee also noted that, while many government officials are viewed as being disengaged from the region, administrators who collaborate with local leaders and carry out projects that are beneficial to communities (he cited the example of an administrator who built a market in Bafatá) are well perceived by the population and can be a source of resilience.

Bissau Region

Located on the Geba river estuary, the population of the Bissau region stood at about 404,400 in 2012.[63] Bissau is the administrative and economic capital of the country and is involved in the export of primary agricultural products, mainly cashews. The region is religiously and ethnically mixed, with the Balanta, Fula, and Papel as the largest ethnic groups.

Structural Vulnerabilities	• Perceptions of corruption and bias within the judicial system • Barriers to accessing the judicial system • Perceptions of corruption and nepotism within government and the public sector • Underrepresentation of women and youth in politics and decision-making processes • Political manipulation of youth • Poverty • Economic dependence on cashew exports • Lack of mechanization and capacity for processing of agricultural products • Lack of investment and financing for entrepreneurship • Deforestation and poor management of natural resources • Youth unemployment • Perceptions of foreign domination of the private sector • Lack of resources for public services (hospitals, prisons, police stations) • Gender disparities • Lack of resources and training for security forces • Perceptions of corruption with the security sector
Event-Driven Risks	• Elections in 2018 and beyond • Military coup • Withdrawal of ECOMIB and UNIOGBIS

[63] "Guinea Bissau Socio-Economic Data, 2015", National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Non-governmental organizations and civil society organizations • Social cohesion among religious and ethnic groups • Presence of ECOMIB and UNIOGBIS • Signature of Conakry Agreement

Bissau, the political and economic capital of the country, is overwhelmingly impacted by the current environment of political uncertainty in the country. In terms of vulnerability and risk, many interviewed noted the widespread perception of political and social inequality in the region, with many citing corruption and nepotism as a particular vulnerability and impediment to political inclusion. As in other areas of the country, the region is heavily reliant on agricultural production for their livelihoods, but is mainly an exporter of raw, rather than processed or finished, commodities, which impacts profit margins. The trade and sale of cashew nuts dominates the region, which has benefited from high global market prices of late. However, many noted that soil erosion and the lack of mechanized farming equipment hinders the region's potential in terms of output of both cashews as well as other crops. The predominance of foreigners in the business sector was noted although most interviewed did not feel that this was a major risk. Others, however, feared that it could be a longer-term vulnerability if there were not a more concentrated effort by business owners and the government to help locals gain access to the education and skills needed to reach the higher echelons of the business community. Women also remain significantly underrepresented in the formal business sector, and often work informally as traders and merchants on the street. In terms of resilience, the region enjoys generally positive intercommunal relations between ethnic and religious communities, and also relies on traditional rulers to help mediate and arbitrate disputes. In areas where police presence has increased, those interviewed during the Focus Group Discussion (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) reported a reduction in criminality and drug use. In some areas, however, interviewees reported that due to the weak police presence, some had turned to relying on neighborhood watch groups for local security.

Rule of Law

Participants in the fieldwork in Bissau reported widespread perceptions of corruption, impunity and bias within the judicial system and government institutions. In addition, many respondents viewed the judicial system as inaccessible to many Bissau-Guineans, given the high cost of hiring a lawyer. Some interviewees expressed that justice is available only to the wealthy or those with political or military connections. In addition, it was noted that the courts lack adequate resources and funding to pay judges and other officials, or even in some cases to carry out basic functions and pay rent. As a result, many Bissau-Guineans prefer to pursue justice through traditional or community-based mechanisms.

> *"For me, there is no justice. Justice is there for the rich and not for the poor. Justice only protects the rich to the detriment of the poor. Even if there is no reason, the poor man will be condemned because he does not have enough to pay a lawyer or bribe the judge."*
>
> *- KII, Bissau*

Another issue raised by some interviewees was the centralization of justice and rule of law institutions in Bissau, which is a barrier for populations in other parts of the country to access justice. One interviewee explained: "The islands for instance lack the presence of courts. The people living on

these islands have to travel for an average of 6 hours to Bissau and an additional 3 hours to Bouba to get access to court. It is discouraging, and the people often give up on undertaking such a long journey."

Politics and Governance

As Bissau is the capital of the country, politics – namely the current political gridlock – was a key concern of interviewees during the fieldwork. Respondents expressed that the gridlock had paralyzed the country and is having negative impacts on all aspects of society. In addition, the fieldwork reflected the fear and uncertainty in Bissau caused by the current political standstill, and interviewees reported rumors of an imminent military coup, detention of military personnel, and bans on political demonstrations. Respondents in the men's FGD also noted that the current political rhetoric could spark violence.

Beyond the current political situation, fieldwork participants reported widespread perceptions of corruption, nepotism and mismanagement within the government and public sector. As participants in one FGD explained, "in the public sectors, political affiliation is considered over technical capacity, such that people with political affiliation are given positions senior to people who do not have political affiliations, even if such technically capable people have been on the job before the recruitment of the person with political affiliation."

Interviewees also expressed a sense that political leaders act only in their own self-interest rather than in the interest of the population. Participants in the youth FGD expressed concern that youth would be manipulated by politicians (either along ethnic or political lines) in the leadup to the 2018 elections.

Fieldwork participants also noted that youth and women are underrepresented in politics and decision-making processes. Interviewees in the women's FGD pointed to cultural and religious views toward women and low levels of education as hindering women's political participation, and expressed that many women view politics as being reserved for those who are well-connected, have traveled abroad and speak several languages. Participants in the youth FGD expressed that many youths in Bissau are politically engaged but have little influence in decision-making processes. They also warned that many youths are vulnerable to being manipulated by politicians for political gains in the lead up to elections.

Participants expressed mixed views about the potential role of civil society groups or religious leaders in mitigating political tensions or mediating the current political impasse. Some viewed civil society organizations (CSOs) and religious leaders as potentially playing a positive role, while others saw these actors as compromised by political influence or personal interests.

Economics and Resources

The economy in Bissau is dependent on trade, fishing and the production and export of agricultural goods. Like many regions in Guinea-Bissau, cashew cultivation and export is the primary economic driver in the region. Currently the price for cashew exports is at an all-time high (reaching 1000 FCFA/kg), which has boosted the economy, but future drops in commodity prices could have a serious negative impact on government revenues and livelihoods. Deforestation and climatic changes were also raised as factors which could potentially disrupt the cashew market in the future.

While several fieldwork participants highlighted the country's fertile soil and resources, agricultural yields are hindered by poor resource mismanagement, lack of mechanization and the lack of capacity to process and preserve products in the country. Participants in the men's FGD noted that fishing activities are not benefiting the country, as local fishermen lack the processing capacity needed to export fish and foreign trawlers

operating in Guinea-Bissau's waters make it hard to compete.[64] Interviewees in this FGD warned that grievances between local fishermen and citizens of neighboring countries over perceptions of illegal fishing could be a source of conflict in the future.

Throughout the fieldwork, participants expressed that foreign nationals from neighboring countries such as Senegal, Guinea and the Gambia are heavily involved in the business sector, including importation, wholesale and retail activities. While interviewees noted that relationships between Bissau-Guineans and foreigners remain peaceful, the perceived domination of foreigners in the private sector has contributed to grievances around resource allocation and employment and could, some warned, be a cause of tensions in the future.

Youth unemployment was a key concern raised by fieldwork participants. While interviewees in the youth FGD expressed that youth in Guinea-Bissau have a strong entrepreneurial spirit, they decried the lack of investment, microcredit lending or job creation programs for youth. They noted that employment, particularly in the public sector, is often dependent on political affiliation, which increases the politicization of youth in search of employment.

> *"You can have your own idea, but without money you will not be able to move on with it."*
>
> *- Youth FGD, Bissau*

Population and Demographics

Bissau is an ethnically and religiously mixed region. The largest ethnic groups are the Balanta, the Fula, the Manjaco, the Mandingo, and the Papel. Participants in the fieldwork also identified population growth driven by immigration of foreign nationals from neighboring countries. Respondents noted that relations are currently peaceful between foreigners and locals, but expressed concern that future grievances around resource allocation, particularly land sales, could generate tensions in the future.

> *"The foreigners seem to be more numerous in the city of Bissau than the nationals, to the point that there are districts [where] we think we are abroad."*
>
> *- KII, Bissau*

Fieldwork participants also identified good inter-religious relationships between Muslims and Christians in Bissau and did not see a strong likelihood of religious-based conflict. However, members of the youth FGD expressed concern that some sects of Islam, particularly the Ahmadiyya, have the potential to foster radicalization and extremism. Nevertheless, participants in the youth FGD said that they viewed religious conflict in the future as being highly unlikely.

Poverty and a lack of adequate healthcare were other key concerns expressed by fieldwork participants. Interviewees noted that healthcare providers lack training and equipment, and that the cost of accessing treatment is prohibitive. Some respondents noted that this has contributed to a high rate of infant and maternal mortality.

Pervasive gender disparities were also highlighted by respondents during the fieldwork. Respondents noted that domestic abuse, early and forced marriage, and early pregnancy are common. Participants in the women's FGD also reported that boys are encouraged to attend school, whereas girls are encouraged to stay at home, leading to educational and employment disparities.

[64] "Guinea-Bissau's rich fish stocks in peril", Al Jazeera, April 2014.

Security

Political tension and the potential for political violence were key security concerns identified by fieldwork participants in Bissau, particularly given the current political impasse. Interviewees noted that rumors are circulating in Bissau about the creation of a pro-government militia group and there are suspicions of an imminent military coup. In addition, political demonstrations in Bissau have turned violent in the past and recent demonstrations by opposing political movements have contributed to fears of political violence ahead of the 2018 elections.

In addition, crime and armed robbery were identified as security concerns in Bissau. Fieldwork respondents noted that security forces remain under-resourced and underpaid, which has contributed to perceptions of corruption and ineffectiveness within the police. Some interviewees noted that rates of crime and drug use have decreased in Bissau thanks to increased police presence, but others felt that the government is unable to adequately protect communities. One interviewee noted that several communities have created their own groups to fight armed banditry in their respective neighborhoods.

Fieldwork participants spoke positively of the security contributions of the ECOWAS Mission in Guinea-Bissau (ECOMIB), with interviewees in the women's FGD expressing that the presence of ECOMIB has reduced political violence in the capital. Another interviewee said that ECOMIB has improved the city's overall security and expressed concern about what would happen after the ECOMIB withdrawal.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Positive relationships between ethnic and religious groups were seen as a key source of resilience in Bissau. Many interviewees viewed the likelihood of ethnic or religious-based conflict as being very low thanks to this social cohesion.

The presence of ECOMIB and the sanctions[65] put in place by the United Nations were also seen as having positively contributed to peace and security in Bissau. In addition, the signing of the Conakry Agreement was positively viewed as an important step in bridging the political divide at the country's leadership level.

In the area of rule of law, the youth FGD highlighted the creation of a government center to carry out sensitization and awareness-raising activities around legal issues as well as providing legal assistance to citizens.

NGOs and other civil society organizations were also seen as positively contributing to society and filling gaps in government service provision. One interviewee specifically pointed to an NGO that works to improve access to the justice system, regardless of ability to pay for a lawyer.

[65] After the 2012 military coup in Guinea-Bissau, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on the leaders of the coup and key military officers.

Cacheu Region

The region of Cacheu, located in northwestern Guinea-Bissau, had a population of 192,010 in 2012.[66] Fishing, commercial trade and agriculture are the predominant economic activities. The main religious groups are Muslims, Catholics and Protestants. The major ethnic groups in the region are the Manjaco, the Jola/Felupe, and the Balanta.

Structural Vulnerabilities	• Political gridlock and weak government presence characterized by the lack of a governor • Perceptions of corruption and inefficiency in the justice system • Neglect of government development policies • Lack of infrastructure • Rural exodus, particularly of youths
Event-Driven Risks	• Market fluctuations • Climate change • Irregular rains and salt water intrusion • Land-based conflicts • Tensions over illegal fishing • Increased immigration and IDPs
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Social cohesion between ethnic groups • Ethnic and religious peace • Participation of women in local politics and agricultural industry • High rate of youth in school • Affordable housing • NGO educational support • Initiatives to engage women in politics • Microcredit initiatives, particularly for women

With a population of about 200,000, Cacheu is Guinea-Bissau's fifth largest region. As with all nine regions there is no local administration apart from a governor who is nominated by presidential decree. However, in the current political crisis, that governorship has been suspended, exacerbating the sense of isolation and neglect by residents. Most residents subsist through fishing

[66] "Guinea Bissau Socio-Economic Data, 2015", National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau

or agriculture. Although insecurity was not a major concern in Cacheu as expressed in the quantitative or qualitative data, poverty and a lack of infrastructure were acute. Limited opportunities in the region contribute to rural-urban migration of youth to the capital, Bissau. Along with a weak government presence in Cacheu, access to justice was a challenge. Given the general lack of public security presence in the region, youths are sometimes mobilized for neighborhood watch purposes. Resilience factors, however, include strong social cohesion including positive inter-ethnic relations between the three major groups (Jola/Felupe, Manjaco, and Balanta) who worship, socialize, and marry across ethnic lines.

Rule of Law

Lack of confidence in the judicial system was prevalent among FGD discussions in Cacheu. Fieldwork participants reported that the local court currently lacks a judge, and no prison exists in Cacheu. Some participants identified constraints facing the regional court, based in Canchungo, including alleged corruption and low capacity. Furthermore, respondents reported that justice is perceived as only accessible for the rich, citing the high cost of hiring a lawyer. Many participants in the focus groups discussed perceptions that crimes, such as petty theft and illegal fishing, allegedly go unreported.

Conflicts surrounding land ownership were also raised as a concern in Cacheu with interviewees reporting that state mechanisms designed to resolve these conflicts are unreliable. Some focus groups mentioned the rise of private courts and community justice mechanisms to deal with crime. The women's FGD discussed an example of this. A group of 300 women in Cacheu established a code of conduct, which stipulates that a person who is deemed to be guilty in a conflict situation should pay a sum of 1500 FCFA.

Politics and Governance

Participants in the fieldwork identified a lack of leadership within the regional government and neglect from the national government as key political issues in the region. These concerns are exemplified by the region's lack of a governor, which is reflective of the political gridlock at the national level. In addition, the region lacks key public services, including courts, prisons, and health services, which has in turn impacted rule of law, capacities for conflict mitigation, and quality of life.

Interviewees noted that while women participate in politics, they face discrimination and are underrepresented. A campaign run by a local NGO to encourage greater political participation among women was reported to have improved female engagement in local politics. However, they noted that, for most women, the struggles of daily life take precedence over engagement with broader national politics.

Economics and Resources

The Cacheu economy is highly dependent on agriculture, particularly cashew production. The lack of diversification in the economy causes the region to be vulnerable to external factors such as market volatility, rainfall fluctuations, and climate change. Irregular rains and salt water intrusion were singled out as having recently disrupted agricultural production in Cacheu. Interviewees discussed increased deforestation, particularly for cashew plantations; the difficulty of the harvest is exacerbated by negative rainfall patterns. As a coastal region, Cacheu is at a high risk to suffer from the impacts of climate change, such as through the disappearance of the mangroves on the coastal region. Cacheu currently has a low capacity and ability to adapt to economic shocks.

The fishing industry, another significant component of the region's economy, suffers from poor infrastructure and overfishing, which limits

the fishery output from this region. Illegal fishing was reported to be a source of tension for locals, and contributes to land and property disputes. Participants in the fieldwork also expressed concern about the over-exploitation of fishing resources in the area. The fishing industry is burdened with double taxation, as fishermen are taxed both in Senegal and in Guinea-Bissau because they must buy their materials outside of the country. According to participants, this, as well as dealing with authorities from both countries, makes it difficult to start and sustain a fishing business.

The fishing industry is also hindered by the poor infrastructure. The lack of refrigeration capability was highlighted in multiple focus groups. Women who sell fish do not have the ability to store their wares, and thus must travel outside of Cacheu to preserve the fish. Women are also impacted by the lack of interest in the production of palm nuts. Women pay the men to harvest the nuts from the trees, but now most men prefer to work in cashew harvesting, which is more profitable. Participants noted that women had to travel to other villages to find men to harvest the nuts, but then had difficulties transporting the harvest back to their village.

In Cacheu, women are actively involved in horticulture and the trade of fish, salt, oysters and palm oil. They also have access to credit grants from NGOs. Because of these economic activities, they have money to send their children to school. In one instance, women raised funds to pay for a solar panel to be installed at the local school, allowing for children to study after dark.

Population and Demographics

The exodus of youth out of Cacheu, mainly to the capital, has altered the demographic structure of the region. The youth focus groups mentioned that the high unemployment rate, even amongst the educated, is impacting negatively the economy in the region. While youth migration out of the region is prevalent, there is an overall increase in the population of Cacheu. This was, in part, caused by immigration from Guinea and Senegal, as well as refugees from the sub-region.

Interviewees reported that local hospitals are overwhelmed by malaria cases during the rainy season and that the majority of doctors are located in Bissau, requiring patients to travel long distances to access care.

Participants noted social cohesion between the ethnic groups as a resilience factor. Even though the ethnic make-up of Cacheu is dominated by three groups (Jola/Felupe, Manjaco, and Balanta), there was no mention of ethnic conflicts. This social cohesion is exemplified by a trend of interethnic marriages. There are also good relationships between religious groups in the region, which include mainly Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims, who celebrate religious holidays together.

Security

Theft of cattle and personal property is rare, but does occur, as does assault and armed robbery. Cacheu lacks adequate police forces and resources, as the local police station is reportedly understaffed and under-resourced, with reduced capacity to respond to the challenges of the region. The low capacity of security forces has contributed to a perception of impunity for crimes committed. Participants in the fieldwork noted that some young boys are mobilizing to protect their community, and that the men currently serving as police officers are often too old to handle the job.

Interviewees noted incidents of violence against immigrants, fueled, in part, by the illegal exploitation of river and forest resources. While retaliations are not prevalent, the absence of authorities to address the problem has led to concerns that there may be vigilante-type retaliation in the future.

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

The rise of community justice mechanisms was cited by interviewees as a resiliency. Participants also discussed the rise of self-defense groups in response to a lacking local security force. Additionally, social cohesion between ethnic and religious groups has been a source of resiliency in many communities.

Oio Region

Located in the northwestern region of the country, the population of Oio was 226,846 in 2012.[67] The predominant economic activities within the region are agriculture, especially cashew nuts, and trade. Oio is a multiethnic region, and is home to the Balanta, Mandingo, and Fula. Other groups include: Pepel, Mansonca, Manjaco, and Mancagne.

Structural Vulnerabilities	• Poverty • Lack of social services, including healthcare • Undiversified economy and dependence on a monoculture - Cashew • Youth unemployment • Land-based conflicts • Limited police force and lack of police resources
Event-Driven Risks	• Flooding affecting agriculture production • Inter-religious tensions • Herder-farmer conflicts
Social and Institutional Resilience Factors	• Traditional and religious leaders • Infrastructure development programs • Community radio initiatives for awareness raising on social issues • Access to Justice Centers (CAJ)

Oio is the second most populous region in the country after Bissau. A few minor security incidents reported in the quantitative and qualitative data included election violence in 2014, drug trafficking and other general issues of criminality. As with several of the other regions, poverty, a lack of essential public services and poor infrastructure add pressures to social well-being. Ethnic tensions are exacerbated by religious sectarianism, politics, incidents of cattle theft, and land disputes over cashew plantations. Resilience factors include the role of NGOs and civil society organizations (CSOs) who work to address the social, economic, and political risks and vulnerabilities in the region.

Rule of Law

Interviewees reported a lack of confidence in the justice system, stating that justice is only for those who have money, and that the system disadvantages the poor. They also described

[67] "Guinea Bissau Socio-Economic Data, 2015", National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau

perceptions of rampant impunity in the justice system. Moreover, residents of the region reported perceptions that the justice system is not independent, citing interference by the military or powerful traditional leaders, and bribery to influence the ruling of the judges or judiciary agents. There is also minimal representation of women in decision-making and in political parties.

While the participants did not have confidence in the formal justice system, the Access to Justice Centers, which are financed by the United Nations, were reported as a resiliency. Even though the Center cannot always effectively respond to the demands of population due to workload, it is still viewed positively. Moreover, when there is community or intercommunity tension, traditional chiefs were described by interviewees as a resource for conflict resolution. If the problem is not resolved from there, the conflict goes to local police, then the sector police, and then to tribunal, for civil cases, or to court, for criminal cases.

Politics and Governance

During the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) and Key Informant Interviews (KIIs), interviewees reported that many of the issues in their region derived from political polarization. Disputes between political parties, the PRS and PAIGC,[68] sometimes result in violence. During a KII, an interviewee discussed how this polarization has also affected the education system. Teachers' unions are also politically divided, focusing on politics rather than the interests of teachers and students. Interviewees also discussed the ties between ethnic divisions and political polarization, stating that people vote along ethnic lines. Politicians have exacerbated these divides to gain political traction and earn votes. [69] In general, participants in the FGDs and KIIs reported perceptions of low government presence in the region, citing the lack of impact that the administration has had in Oio. Elected politicians have not acted on the promises they made during their campaigns.

However, several resilience factors were noted, including a community structure to resolve local conflicts. The impact of traditional and religious leaders is noted to be part of this resilience. Also, the communities have built canals to protect the rice fields from flooding. Some participants noted that the Association for Children Abuse (ACJT), which protects children and denounces abuse, is also a resilience factor.

Economics and Resources

Oio is one of the poorest regions in the country. The economy is reliant on fishing in the coastal areas and subsistence agriculture in the inland areas. As a result, the Oio region is prone to economic instability due to fluctuations in market prices and changes in agricultural yields. Participants in the fieldwork reported that the price of cashews – a key economic activity involving a significant portion of the population in the region – is unstable and has been falling. Inflation and shortages of fish and other essential goods also contribute to economic vulnerability in the region. Other issues noted included tension between local authorities and traditional land occupants over land sales because the land, according to the constitution, belongs to the state. Interviewees also discussed historical conflicts over the ownership of cashew plantations, and the region's high unemployment rate. Many of the interviewees discussed the necessity of working multiple jobs to sustain themselves and their families.

Participants also noted that poor infrastructure, especially related to water, as an ongoing vulnerability. There is poor drinking water infrastructure, and people in the region drink untreated and unreliable well water.

[68] Party for Social Renewal and African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cabo Verde

[69] The Balante ethnic group represents 43.6% of the region and the Mandingo ethnic group represents 32.9% of the region. National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau

Participants did note some resilience factors in the area of Economics and Resources. Many women in Oio are engaged in the agriculture industry, and thus have been able to provide income for their families. Some participants also noted that people had begun to organize themselves into small associations to get access to funding from NGOs. Community leaders were identified as playing a positive role in mitigating conflict over resource access.

Population and Demographics

During the FGDs and KIIs, interviewees cited chronic poverty as a key vulnerability that is exacerbated by lack of opportunities of youth. Youth unemployment was perceived to lead to drug consumption, prostitution, and other harmful practices. There is also a lack of schools and training programs, especially given the high demand. Participants in the fieldwork also stated that one of the causes of the high rate of youth unemployment is the lack of a state job program for them. There is also a high dropout rate of girls from schools and a strong indication that female genital mutilation is being practiced in some parts of the region. Concerns surrounding health also emerged during FGD and KII discussions, which included the prevalence of HIV in Oio. Interviewees also discussed the health system, saying that it lacks the infrastructure and resources to effectively service the population.

Religious tension between the Fula ethnic group and the Mandingo ethnic group was also discussed. Both groups are predominately Muslim[70] and dissension has emerged in deciding which group will lead prayers. Despite these concerns, several interviewees stated that there is generally social cohesion between ethnic groups and conflicts are generally on a personal level, not between entire communities.

There were some resilience factors in the Population and Demographics sector. Many families are supported by women who work in the informal sector such as trades, which provides them with income. There is also a community radio sensitization initiative to prevent conflict between pastoralists and farmers.

Security

Interviewees viewed the security of region as particularly problematic, citing a lack of police and police resources. They expressed concern that the police could not respond to emergencies in some areas. Many police stations are in old buildings, if they even have a building. Police and military salaries are low, leaving them vulnerable to corruption or bribery.

> *"If one of the [cashew] transport vehicles broke down, the population would form a gang to rob the vehicle and the police do not have the means to get to the site on time."*
>
> *- Men's FGD, Oio Region*

Another security concern that was discussed during the fieldwork is the theft of cattle and other livestock. These thefts are reportedly perpetrated by the Balanta ethnic group, the largest ethnic group of the region[71]. These thefts occur for both economic reasons and during traditional initiation rites. There is also the perception that police may be complicit in these thefts. Participants reported that there are farmer-herder conflicts over land access, mostly during the rainy season, but noted that these incidents are generally isolated. Another issue raised during the fieldwork was the presence of a prison in Mansoa, which led to participants feeling unsafe or feeling as though the city had a bad image.

[70] 88% of Fula and 86.9% of Mandingo in Guinea-Bissau are Muslim. National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau

[71] The Balanta ethnic group is 43.6% of the population of Oio. National Institute of Statistics, Guinea-Bissau

Social and Institutional Resilience Factors

Participants frequently noted a few resilience factors that work in many sectors, such as the United Nations funded Access to Justice Center. Participants also noted that community authorities, such as traditional leaders, were helpful in conflict resolution. NGOs have also played a positive role in encouraging the population to organize themselves.

Conclusion and Recommendations

Guinea-Bissau has faced significant political and economic challenges in recent years, which has led to a lack of confidence in the national government and government institutions. Perceptions of corruption and impunity within the justice and security systems have also developed. The political instability at the elite level has often detracted focus and resources from addressing the systemic, endemic issues affecting the Bissau-Guinean population: poverty, poor infrastructure, and a lack of economic diversification. The main economic activities in Guinea-Bissau - fishing and cashew farming - are vulnerable to market fluctuations, resource mismanagement, and climate change. Additionally, dissension over access to natural resources has driven discontent throughout the country. Unemployment, especially among youth and women, due to poor education and training as well as lack of opportunities, remains a key vulnerability. The country and its international partners need to engage in serious reforms within the political, economic and security spheres. Women continue to face systematic discrimination in the political, social and economic spheres, manifested in risk factors such as gender-based violence and high maternal mortality rates. Women, along with the youth population, should be viewed as sources of resiliency within the country, leveraging their participation in politics and economics to build a more prosperous and stable future.

National Recommendations

Rule of Law

- Promote efficiency and transparency within the formal justice system
- Support programs to improve access to justice
- Build mediation and arbitration capacity for traditional and religious leaders
- Strengthen existing mechanisms to protect women's rights in both traditional justice mechanisms and courts
- Support initiatives to expand access to justice and provide free legal assistance to vulnerable populations
- Carry out awareness-raising campaigns around the legal system and citizen's rights, especially in rural and underserved communities
- Promote sensitization and awareness programs on human rights

Politics and Governance

- The government and regional and international partners should work to create a conducive political atmosphere for the implementation of the Conakry agreement
- Monitor elections to help prevent instances of electoral violence and promote transparency
- Facilitate dialogue processes among electoral stakeholders
- Provide training and resources to encourage greater political participation among women
- Support the creation of fora for youth engagement and inclusion in political decision-making
- Carry out awareness-raising campaigns with emphasis on civic education for youth
- Expand social service provision in rural regions and build trust with local communities
- Support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the national and local levels

Economics and Resources

- Expand and strengthen accessibility to microfinancing programs and training, particularly for youth- and women-led initiatives, as well as for small-scale farmers
- Strengthen small and medium enterprise initiatives (SMEs)
- Invest in modern and sustainable agriculture, to help small-scale farmers and herders adapt to climate change
- Encourage investment in modern technology and agroindustry to increase capacity for food processing and preservation
- Allocate resources to improve and expand infrastructure and social amenities
- Enact economic reforms
- Develop and implement policies to diversify the economy
- Enforce policies on economic integration to encourage the free movement of goods and people
- Adhere to international instruments to curb illegal fishing and help protect marine ecosystems
- Support the creation of a community resource management office to help resolve disputes over land and resource allocation

Population and Demographics

- Support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage youth, particularly in rural areas
- Increase spending on education and healthcare, particularly in areas outside Bissau
- Prioritize teacher training programs to increase number of qualified teachers in rural areas
- Promote girls' education
- Support awareness-raising activities around issues such as domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and teenage pregnancy
- Enforce existing legal protections around gender-based violence (GBV) and female genital mutilation (FGM)
- Support inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue to improve social cohesion

Security

- Encourage the implementation of security sector reform (SSR)
- Enhance the institutional and operational capacity of the security and defense forces for improved security
- Encourage initiatives to enhance collaboration between local communities and security forces to improve security
- Build the capacity of the security forces to conduct maritime patrols on the Bijagos islands to curb illicit activities

Appendix A: Data Sample

Phase	Dimension	Source	Metric	Sample
Phase 1: Desktop	Resilience	SNA	Survey	16 Peace/Security Actors (organizations)
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	ECOWARN	SitReps	697 reports
Phase 1: Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections is/are protected from political interference	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	EIU Democracy Index	Electoral process and pluralism	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	EIU Democracy Index	Political Participation	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	EIU Democracy Index	Functioning of Government	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	IDEA	Average Voter Turnout Parliamentary	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Transparency International	Corruption Perception	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	BTI	Political and Social Integration	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Freedom House	Political Rights	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Proportion of seats held by women in national parliament	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Mo Ibrahim Index	Personal Safety	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UN, ECOWAS, AU	Peace Operations	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)

Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	ACLED	Conflict Fatalities per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UPPSALA	Presence/Conflict with Non-State Armed Groups	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	PTS	Political Terror Scale – Amnesty	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	PTS	Political Terror Scale – State	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	PTS	Political Terror Scale – HRW	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	Refugees by country of origin per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	Refugees by country of origin (difference 2015-2014) per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	IDPs by Country of Asylum per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UNHCR	IDPs by country of asylum (difference 2015-2014) per capita	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, national-level judges give reasons for their decisions/judgments.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	Global Integrity	In practice, the mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective.	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)

Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	WB Human Rights and Law Report	% of Women on Constitutional Court	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Does the law mandate equal remuneration for work of equal value?	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Does the law mandate nondiscrimination based on gender in hiring?	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited?	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Gini coefficient	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Gini WYD	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Income Share Held by Highest 10%	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Population with Improved Sanitation (Urban-Rural Difference)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Population with Improved Water Source (Urban-Rural Difference)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Children under 5 moderately or severely underweight, percentage	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Depth of the food deficit (kilocalories per person per day)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Prevalence of Underweight, weight for age (% of children under 5)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	GDP per capita, PPP (current international $)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Literacy, 15-24, Women	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	School enrollment, primary and secondary (gross), gender parity index (GPI)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Employment to population ratio, ages 15-24, female	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)

			(%) (modeled ILO estimate)	
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Median Age	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Population Growth	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	UN Stats	Prevalence of underweight, weight for age, female (% of children under 5)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Maternal mortality ratio (modeled estimate, per 100,000 live births)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Contraceptive prevalence, any methods (% of women ages 15-49)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	World Bank Data	Life expectancy at birth, female (years)	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Vulnerability	WB – Women, Business, and Law	Percentage of women aged 20-24 years old who were married or in a union before age 18	15 (all ECOWAS member states normalized and scaled)
Phase 1 Desktop	Risk	ECOWARN	IncReps	202 (after reducing for duplicates and relevance)
Phase 1 Desktop	Risk	ACLED	Incidents	55
Phase 2 Field Research	Risk and Vulnerability	Focus Group Discussions	Broken out by Men, Women, and Youth	11
Phase 2 Field Research	Risk and Vulnerability	Key Informant Interviews	Prominent individuals and local experts	11

Appendix B: Vulnerability Index

Index Data Sources

Based on the five human security pillars, a series of indicators were identified based on relevance and measurability. Data sources were then identified from recognized institutions such as the World Bank, United Nations, as well as universities, research institutions, and think tanks. A full list of data sources is attached in ***Appendix A***. During selection and testing of the index, the availability of data was assessed to ensure an even distribution of scores.

Process: Calculating the Scores

The index is scored on a scale of 1-10, with 1 representing the highest level of vulnerability, and 10 the lowest level of vulnerability. Each raw data set is normalized and scaled, before being integrated into the indicator and pillar scores.

1. Normalization

An index, by definition, integrates and compares data sets with very different curves and distribution. As a first step, therefore, it is necessary to normalize the data so that it can be properly compared. Without framing the data within the context of the wider group of numbers, its meaning can become skewed. Therefore, the process of finding the mean and calculating the Standard Deviation (SD) of the data set, then using those elements to approximate a normal distribution, can be used to provide this meaning. The Gaussian normalization formula is outlined below.

Where μ is the mean

σ^2 is the variance

$$f(x, \mu, \sigma) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}\,\sigma}\, e^{-\frac{(x-\mu)^2}{2\sigma^2}}$$

SD is the quantity calculated to indicate the extent of deviation for a group of numbers as a whole. Normal distribution is then used to find how the variables are approximately normally distributed. In the context of this tool, it will help to understand where countries sit in relation to each other within the group distribution of a particular data set.

For raw data sets that have gaps (e.g. data is unavailable for some countries but not others), country data points are left blank. This ensures countries are not provided with an artificial score, where data does not exist.

2. Scaling

To create an index where countries are scored within a defined range, the data sets must be scaled so the scores can be integrated. This process of scaling transforms the normalized data into a number between 1 and 10, with 10 representing the lowest level of vulnerability. The below formula was applied to standardize

the distribution values from [min, max] to [MIN, MAX], matching the new scale of values both for the highest and lowest edges of the distribution.

$$X = MIN + \frac{(MAX - MIN)}{(max - min)} \times (x - min)$$

3. Aggregation

Each indicator may be made up of either one or multiple data sources. In cases where multiple data sets were used to make up the one indicator, the data sets were each scaled to preliminary index scores (1-10), as outlined in the above steps. The average was then taken of these scores to reach a final index score for that indicator. This process was repeated at the pillar level, first averaging, then scaling the indicator scores.

Appendix C: Additional References

Barma, N.H., Huybens, E. & Viñuela, L. 'Institutions Taking Root: Building State Capacity in Challenging Contexts', World Bank Group, September 2014 http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/book/10.1596/978-1-4648-0269-0

Embaló, Birgit, 'Civil-Military Relations and Political Order in Guinea-Bissau', Journal of Modern African Studies, 2012 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies/article/civilmilitary-relations-and-political-order-in-guineabissau/120520BC168EBC89753551D6271F9BFF

International Crisis Group, 'Security Sector Reform in Guinea-Bissau: An Opportunity Not to Be Missed', 2015 https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/guinea-bissau/security-sector-reform-guinea-bissau-opportunity-not-be-missed

Interpeace/Voz di Paz, 'The Roots of Conflict in Guinea-Bissau: The Voices of the People', 2010. http://www.interpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/2010_GB_Interpeace_Voz_Di_Paz_The_Voice_Of_The_People_EN.pdf

Kodila-Tedika, O., Simplice, A. 'State fragility, rent seeking and lobbying: evidence from African data', International Journal of Social Economics, 2016, Vol. 43: Issue 10 http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/abs/10.1108/IJSE-11-2014-0234

NZAID 'Conflict-Risk Assessment Guideline' 2008 http://www.gaportal.org/resources/detail/nzaid-conflict-risk-assessment-guideline

OECD ' States of Fragility 2016: Understanding Violence', 2016 http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/development/states-of-fragility-2016_9789264267213-en#page1

UNICEF 'Child Trafficking in Guinea-Bissau: An Explorative Study', 2010 https://unicef.is/sites/unicef.is/files/atoms/files/child_trafficking_in_guinea-bissau.pdf

USAID 'Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)', 2008 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/187786.pdf

Woolcock, M. 'Engaging with Fragile and Conflict-Affected States ', Harvard Kennedy School, August 2014 https://www.wider.unu.edu/publication/engaging-fragile-and-conflict-affected-states

World Bank, 'Working Paper No. 88: Conflict, Livelihoods and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau', 2007. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDEVDIALOGUE/Resources/Conflicts_Livelihoods_GB.pdf

Appendix D: Matrix of Vulnerabilities, Risks, Resilience Factors, and Recommendations by Human Security Pillar

GUINEA-BISSAU	Vulnerabilities	Risks	Resiliencies	Recommendations
Rule of Law	➢ Allegation of corruption and impunity in the justice system ➢ Lack of trust in formal justice mechanisms ➢ Lack of resources for formal justice system ➢ Poor prison infrastructure and conditions ➢ Inadequate inclusion of women in the formal justice system ➢ Lack of independence of the judiciary ➢ Alleged politicization of the justice system	➢ Incidents of corruption or impunity within the court system ➢ Weak enforcement of criminal penalties ➢ Violation of code of criminal procedure especially cases of Police playing the role of the judiciary ➢ Prison break ➢ Overcrowding of the prison ➢ Impunity ➢ Increased criminal activities (including drug trafficking, illegal logging ➢ Abuse of power ➢ Diminished confidence in the judicial system Diminished public trust in the administration	➢ Role of traditional and religious leaders ➢ Access to Justice Centers (CAJs) and civil society initiatives to improve access to the legal justice system ➢ Initiative for justice sector reform, supported by the UN system and partners ➢ Gender Law ➢ Anti-human trafficking law ➢ Strong CSOs net working	➢ Promote efficiency and transparency within the formal justice system ➢ Support programs to improve access to justice ➢ Build mediation and arbitration capacity for traditional and religious leaders ➢ Strengthen existing mechanisms to protect women's rights in both traditional justice mechanisms and courts ➢ Support initiatives to expand access to justice and provide free legal assistance to vulnerable populations ➢ Carry out awareness-raising campaigns around the legal system and citizen's rights, especially in rural and underserved communities ➢ Promote sensitization and awareness programs on human rights
Politics & Governance	➢ Political and institutional fragility ➢ Lack of transparency and accountability ➢ Perceptions of corruption and nepotism within the public sector ➢ Weak state presence and	➢ Electoral process in 2018 and beyond ➢ Coup attempts ➢ Political instability ➢ Delayed/Non-implementation of Conakry Agreement ➢ Street demonstrations/ protests ➢ Arbitrary and selective	➢ Signature of the Conakry Agreement	➢ The government and regional and international partners should work to create a conducive political atmosphere for the implementation of the Conakry agreement ➢ Monitor elections to help prevent instances of electoral violence and promote transparency ➢ Facilitate dialogue processes among electoral stakeholders

	poor provision of public services ➢ Underrepresentation of women and youth in political decision-making process ➢ History of military interference in politics ➢ Cyclical political stalemate ➢ Politicization of the state institutions	imprisoning of political rivals ➢ Violation of civil rights ➢ Caducity of the Conakry agreement ➢ Weak coordination among international partners on resolving the ongoing political stalemate		➢ Provide training and resources to encourage greater political participation among women ➢ Support the creation of fora for youth engagement and inclusion in political decision-making ➢ Carry out awareness-raising campaigns with emphasis on civic education for youth ➢ Expand social service provision in rural regions and build trust with local communities ➢ Support initiatives for good governance and transparency at the national and local levels
Economics & Resources	➢ Poverty, unemployment ➢ Lack of infrastructure (roads, water, electricity) ➢ Undiversified economy ➢ Low agricultural outputs ➢ Resource mismanagement and exploitation ➢ Weak private sector ➢ High dependency on the single cash crop (cashew production)	➢ Farmer/herder conflicts over land access ➢ Fluctuating commodity prices ➢ Illegal fishing and logging activities ➢ High rate of poverty ➢ Unequal sharing of resources ➢ Illicit economy on Bijagos Islands	➢ Microcredit and other lending initiatives, particularly for women ➢ High price of the cashew nut	➢ Expand and strengthen accessibility to microfinancing programs and training, particularly for youth- and women-led initiatives, as well as for small-scale farmers ➢ Strengthen small and medium enterprise initiatives (SMEs) ➢ Invest in modern and sustainable agriculture, to help small-scale farmers and herders adapt to climate change ➢ Encourage investment in modern technology and agroindustry to increase capacity for food processing and preservation ➢ Allocate resources to improve and expand infrastructure and social amenities ➢ Enact economic reforms ➢ Develop and implement policies to diversify the economy ➢ Enforce policies on economic integration to encourage the free movement of goods and people ➢ Adhere to international instruments to curb illegal fishing and help protect marine ecosystems

				➢ Support the creation of a community resource management office to help resolve disputes over land and resource allocation
Population and Demographics	➢ Rural-urban migration ➢ Low capacity of health and education services ➢ Cross-border migration ➢ Weak education system and infrastructure ➢ Environmental degradation ➢ Food insecurity	➢ Unfavorable climatic conditions ➢ Conflict between groups over access to land and other natural resources Early marriage and pregnancy ➢ Salinization of ground water and rice field ➢ Gender-based violence	➢ Interfaith dialogue ➢ Adoption of the measures to curb FGM	➢ Support vocational training and job creation initiatives to engage youth, particularly in rural areas ➢ Increase spending on education and healthcare, particularly in areas outside Bissau ➢ Prioritize teacher training programs to increase number of qualified teachers in rural areas ➢ Promote girls' education ➢ Support awareness-raising activities around issues such as domestic violence, early and forced marriage, and teenage pregnancy ➢ Enforce existing legal protections around gender-based violence (GBV) and female genital mutilation (FGM) ➢ Support inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue to improve social cohesion
Security	➢ Under-equipped security forces ➢ Poorly trained security and defense forces ➢ Porous borders ➢ Perception of corruption within the security forces	➢ Withdrawal of ECOMIB ➢ Farmer/herder disputes over land access ➢ Political violence related to elections and institutional impasse ➢ Inconclusive DDR ➢ Coup attempt ➢ Increased criminal activities (including drug trafficking, illegal logging ➢ Diminished public trust in the police institutions ➢ Political protests ➢ Human rights violations ➢ Abuse by security forces	➢ Presence of ECOMIB, UNIOGBIS, AU, EU and CPLP ➢ Implementation of the Defense and Security Sector Reform Program (DSSR)	➢ Encourage the implementation of security sector reform (SSR) ➢ Enhance the institutional and operational capacity of the security and defense forces for improved security ➢ Encourage initiatives to enhance collaboration between local communities and security forces to improve security ➢ Build the capacity of the security forces to conduct maritime patrols on the Bijagos islands to curb illicit activities